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ABSTRACT 
Brunel University, Uxbridge, England, Department of Electrical and Electronic 
Engineering, Division of Cybernetics. 
Ernin Der-Kureghian 
"CONSIDERATIONS IN DESIGNING A CYBERNETIC SIMPLE LEARNING MODEL; 
AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM OF MODELLING LEARNING." 
1988 
Learning is viewed as a central feature of living systems and must be 
manifested in any artifact that claims to exhibit general intelligence. 
The central aims of the thesis are twofold: (1) - To review and critically 
assess the empirical and theoretical aspects of learning as have been 
addressed in a multitude of disciplines, with the aim of extracting 
fundamental features and elements. ( 2 ) - To develop a more systematic 
approach to the cybernetic modelling of learning than has been achieved 
hitherto. 
In pursuit of aim (1) above the following discussions are included: 
- Historical and Philosophical backgrounds; 
- Natural learning, both physiological and psychological aspects; 
- Hierarchies of learning identified in the evolutionary, functional and 
developmental senses; 
- 'An extensive section on the general problem of modelling of learning and 
the formal tools, is included as a link between aims (1) and (2). 
Following this a systematic and historically oriented study of cybernetic and 
other related approaches to the problem of modelling of learning is presented. 
This then leads to the development of a state-of-the-art general purPose 
experimental cybernetic learning model. The programming and use of this model 
is also fully described, including an elaborate scheme for the manifestation 
of simple learning. 
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PREFACE 
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Having embarked on the task of the study of the phenomenon of learning, 
and in particular its manifestation in machines, with a background in 
mathematics, electronics and control systems it was inevitable that an 
analytical mechanistic bias would be the overriding feature of the initial 
approach. As a medium for the investigation of artificial 'learning' in 
systems the construction of a state-of-the-art computer remote controlled 
experimental mobile-robot was undertaken, which was hoped to embody the 
implementation of a simple learning program that would enable the machine to 
gradually 'learn' from very fundamental criteria, after a process of interaction 
with its environment. The method of learning would be diametrically opposite 
the other major approach to 'machine learning', that of incorporating a lot of 
a-priori knowledge and information-base into the machine. 
It was envisaged that a basic scheme could be devised which transformed 
the initial random behaviour of the model into a more ordered and purposeful, 
yet simple, patterns of behaviour. The elaborations of this scheme would, in 
turn, slowly lead to more interesting behavioural instances; and, indeed, even 
complex higher order learning capabilities could be displayed by later 
developments of the basic program. The actual embodiment of the 'learning 
system' in the physical construct was only an incidental characteristic of the 
design, chosen for purposes of clarity and ease of experimentation. Hence, 
the mobile robot itself was designed in a very versatile manner, its 
input-output features chosen in a non-machine-specific way that would allow 
its use as a general purpose tool for a variety of experimental modelling 
tasks. 
The ensuing approach was, in fact, consistent with the intuitive 'natural' 
manifestations of the process of learning. Parallels could be drawn with the 
evolutionary and hierarchical ordering of learning seen in nature, and the 
continuity which is observed amongst various levels of learning behaviour (or 
their underlying mechanisms). 
The completion of the hardware model was followed by various software 
developments which would emulate various simple behavioural patterns. A 
more elaborate 'learning' program was also planned that in a manner similar 
to some other research in this area would attempt to realize. the ·learnin.' 
capability in the machine. 
ii 
In a survey of the subject of "Machine Learning" it was seen that a great 
many fundamental aspects are either taken for granted, or various 
misconceptions and inconsistencies are evident between alternate viewpoints. 
Many hardware 'learning' models rely too much on the causalities of their 
physical fabrics, or use 'clever tricks' and engineering solutions to portray 
aspects of learning or human intelligence, Others incorporate a great deal of 
designer's own knowledge at the outset, and the inherent learning potential 
in-built within the model is sometimes misconstrued as "capability to learn 
from basic principles". Methods used for representation or implementation of 
'learning' in artificial systems were also varied. Ranging from physical 
configurations, verbal descriptions, graphical illustrations, mathematical 
equations, logical propositions, to elaborate cognitive conceptualizations. The 
role of an external 'teacher' or 'supervisor' was also a rather prominent one 
in most 'learning systems', detracting from the autonomy of their 'learning' 
capabilities. 
Hence, it was becoming increasingly evident that a much more fundamental 
analysis of the problem and a deeper understanding of issues involved was 
necessary, if we were not to get trapped in a self-propelling dogma of a 
blinkered and narrow view of tl;le subject. The endeavour of investigating 
root notions such as teleological or entropic aspects of this class of models, 
and identification of their 'necessary and sufficient' features was seen as a 
worthwhile task on its own. 
Immersion in a Cybernetics Department was the principal influencing factor 
that lead to this broad and generalist outlook. Since its introduction, in the 
1940's, the science of Cybernetics has made an important contribution to the 
breadth of scientific thinking. Although, at times, suffering from the 
generality of its concepts, nevertheless, cybernetics has been able to put 
forward some specific methodologies for solving problem, in more narrowly 
defined areas. 
Cybernetics attempts to unify studies of living and inanimate purposive 
systems, and in its true spirit it would have been appropriate to have a 
methodology which could be equally applicable to both domains. A general 
cybernetic formalism on par with those in other well established sciences 
would allow the analysis of natural phenomena in the context of artificial 
systems. Indeed, if such a hypothetical formalism was forthcoming, then 
learning could have easily been manifested in systems. Yet, the complexity of 
the task of devising an abstract cohesive language is such that attempts so 
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far have been grossly inadequate, and have only managed to highlight the 
underlying difficulties involved in such endeavours. 
However, so far, the principal strength of cybernetics has not been in its 
techniques, but in its promotion of a fresh and expansive outlook or approach 
to problems. The broadness of perspective means that prejudices which 
sometimes hinder developments in other fields have been, generally, absent in 
cybernetic enquiries. 
Hence, in this cybernetic tradition. it was deemed necessary that before 
we attempt to tackle our specific objective three main areas had to be 
scrutinized in more detaiL Firstly, the natural learning phenomenon in its 
many forms should be looked at, and a variety of related issues addressed. 
Secondly, the characteristic problems involved in modelling a· natural 
observation should be understood, and tools and techniques used for such 
modelling tasks outlined. Thirdly, a general investigation of previous attempts 
at modelling of learning should be made, to highlight relative merits, findings, 
or typical difficulties confronted in each paradigm. 
As the above undertakings were being pursued the multiplicity of facets of 
the phenomenon of learning and its studies were being much more 
appreciated; and, at the same time, the vulnerabilities of a narrow approach 
to its simulation or synthesis becoming more prominent. Each field of study 
would lead to other subtopics or sublevels, and the interlinkings of issues and 
subjects was gradually compiling a very complex multidimensional picture. All 
aspects of description, investigation, analysis, simulation and synthesis of 
learning were characterized by a hierarchy which spanned from the system or 
behavioural levels to the molecular level. 
The task of studying all elements of "learning" is an enormous one, and 
for this reason each segment of the composite picture is scrutinised within a 
predominant specialised discipline. This singularity of approach (without 
generally paying too much attention to alternate subjects) is seen in almost 
all literature on learning, even those which take on a multi-disciplinarian 
stance, normally, view the subject through lenses tinted by a particular bias. 
A variety of subjects such as Behavioural Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, 
Neuro-physiology, Education, Sociology, Cybernetics, Pattern-Recognition, 
Control Systems, Artificial Intelligence, etc. deal with learning; each having 
its own conception of learning and the relative importance of issues involved. 
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Bence, it was decided that as a joint objective of the thesis an overview 
of the various aspects of study of the learning process and its mechanisms be 
undertaken. Principally, the results of this non-standard approach will be of 
benefit to a prospective designer of a 'learning' model. Whereby, a very 
broad awareness of many topics, issues, and similar research can be attained, 
without cluttering the totality of picture with too detailed specifics of each 
paradigm. The aim is, however, not so much to try to unify the whole 
subject but to point to the particularities and discrepancies of diverse view, 
and the way they deal with various issue~ in learning. 
The level at which each topic will be covered is, generally, governed by 
the its relevance to the second more specific objective of this thesis, namely, 
the considerations in designing a cybernetic simple learning model. At times, 
8 summarized tabulation, classification, or definition of specific features of an 
I1pproach will be made without much qualification; yet, at other times, a more 
detailed analysis or discussion of subtopics of a discipline will be attempted. 
The intention of this particular form of examination is to furnish an 
informative coverage of principal keynotes, trends, and points of contention 
involved in the variety of learning related disciplines which might have direct 
or indirect bearing to our specific problem. Additionally, by looking at the 
underlying historical and developmental aspects of subjects, attention could be 
drawn to their kinships and their commonalities of purpose. 
All in all, it is hoped that the insight gained, and the deeper (and 
broader) understanding of the whole subject, from the conglomeration of the 
general and· the specific pursuits of this thesis will provide a firm platform 
for later research into the much more difficult (and worthwhile) task of 
devising a true 'learning' model, which in itself is a life-time long scientific 
quest. 
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CHAPTER 1 
---------
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLE.M' 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
In this introductory chapter we will attempt to prepare the background for 
our later more detailed analysis of various aspects of the learning process and 
its modelling. The schematic illustration of FIG.l.l outlines the principal 
approaches and topics of interest to the phenomenon of learning, and shows 
the variety of facets to this multi-dimensional concept. 
However, the representation of FIG.l.l is not meant to be very precise or 
exhaustive, and research in many other disciplines, directly or indirectly, bear 
relevance to the process of learning - similarly, the inter-linkings of 
disciplines are not illustrated in FIG. 1. 1. 
The approach of the initial part of this thesis will be a very broad 'global' 
one. Yet, at the latter parts, this generality will culminate into a more 
focussed leaning towards the simpler modalities of learning, in particular, its 
simple manifestations in models. Indeed, it was the design and construction 
of such a model which prompted this sweeping approach to the thesis. 
We will begin by defining and analysing the nature of the problem. Mter 
a general discussion of the notion of learning the developmental and other 
aspects of learning (i.e., historical, philosophical, operational and technical) 
will be outlined. Then, more specific issues and problems of manifestations of 
learning in various models, and approaches to such endeavours, will be looked 
at in more detail. In particular, the case for building hardware 'learning' 
models will be argued. Finally, the general and specific objectives of the 
thesis, and the impetus behind the direction of its particular developmental 
path, will be discussed, and an overview of the chapter8 described. 
1.1 WHAT IS I..MRND«l ? 
Learning and adaptation are central criteria of Ute, influencing almost all 
aspects of human behaviour and aumy of ani.,.Js' behaviour. The concept of 
"learning" in its intuitive hu.an-learning sense is an age old !lOtion, referring 
to the way that humans and ArdRs increase their knowledge and improve 
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their skills. But, the modern comprehension of this multi-faceted concept is 
a complex and a different one, referring to many other connected aspects, 
and implications of usage of the verb 'to learn' are far greater than its 
established common understanding would suggest. 
~E~~-NETS 
~i~ J["":-PHYLOOE-N-si-s-" L._" ...... _..1 =-] (EVOLUTION~Y) ._11. 
CHANGES IN VARIATIONS IN 
MECHANISMS SPECIES 
~LUTIONARY ~----~ 
------
Creativity 
. MIND/BODY 
----_ ........... _-...... 
Consciousness~----·-----­
Self-Awareness~----------
Rationalist VB. 
Empiricist 
NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE 
MAN/MACHINE PROBLEM (BRAIN/MACHINE) 
Intelligence 
Cognition 
--------~Language 
Perception~------­
-----... Memory 
FIGURE 1.1. A schematic outline of "LEARNING" related disciplines, their 
domains of interest, and some major phenomenologiCal issues or 
topics. 
Some researchers have suggested that "learning" is too general a label to 
be used for such diverse range of activities and processes. In this thesis, 
also, it was found that a distinction was necessary, hence,· we will follow a 
notation of enclosing the term LBARNING in single quote marks (' ') when it 
refers to its 'artificial' aspects, or its manifestation in a specific 
non-biological system (e.g., machine 'learning', a 'learning' robot). 
Conversely, without the quote marks when it is expressed in the global sense, 
or within its natural context (e.g., the learning process/phenomenon, animal 
learning). 
In spite of the difficulty of devising an adequate definition of learning, 
which can cover all its manifestations, it is surprising that there is not much 
controversy or disagreement over the definition of "learning" itself. The main 
problems arise in the interpretations of such definitions. Later, various 
definitions of the learning process will be expanded within each discipline. 
But, an all encompassing simple expression of learning could be: 
"TO PROFIT BY PAST BXPBRIBNCB". 
An explicit premise of our extensive approach to learning is that the 
process of learning should not be regarded as an exclusive attribute of man 
and animals, and a machine or an abstract mathematical system satisfying 
various criteria, given the right interactive circumstances, should also be 
considered as a 'learning' entity. 
The study of the learning process, as in many other brain related 
phenomena, seems to have three general facets: 'epistemological' (knowledge 
related) aspects, 'operational' (acquisitional or executive) aspects, and issues 
and problems involving both epistemological and operational aspects. 
Epistemology is defined as the theory of knowledge, and knowledge itself 
can be regarded as a product of the process of learning (in its broad sense). 
Therefore, generally knowledge and learning are regarded as intrinsically 
related. Bence, epistemological considerations should always accompany the 
investigations of learning. Of course. in the lower forms 01 learn1q, such .. 
reflex learning, epistemological aspects are of a trivial nature. 
The term 'adaptation' is sometimes defined &II: .ac:litication of behaviour 
due to negative feedback from the environment. But, in this thesis 
adaptation will be looked at as a simple ..mt8lltation of the proce_ of 
learning. 
The illusive Batun of human 'thought' and ita attributes Ce.g.,learDing) 
has intrigued man for thousands of years. and problelDB of tr7iDg to expJain 
the mental and the behavioural characteristics of humans (and animals) have 
been in the forefront of science of philosophy, as well as occupying workers 
from many other disciplines such as mathematics. 
But, generally it is regarded that a systematic approach to these problems 
only began in earnest from the 17-th century, when the physical studies of 
the surrounding world were starting to explain some of the dynamics of the 
inanimate phenomena. Galfieo was one of the principal thinkers who 
attempted to explain the physical world in terms of mathematical 
relationships, he believed that mathematics was the 'language' of physical 
universe. 
Some philosophers and mathematicians such as Hobbes had started looking 
at human thinking processes in terms of physical and mathematical 
abstractions, and with the introduction of Newtonian physics the 
mechanization of thoughts truly began its course of development. 
It was Descartes, the famous "French philosopher/mathematician, who in his 
attempts at unifying sciences explicitly addressed the mind/body problem, and 
developed a theory of mind. He regarded thoughts as symbolic 
representations which could be fundamentally equated with mathematics, but, 
he was also a 'dualist' who saw the mental and physical universes as separate 
and non connected. Descarte's conclusion was that mind and body were 
distinct phenomena, and hence divided human activities into two groups of 
'mechanical' and 'natural'. Animals were declared as wonderful machines, yet 
human beings were considered as machines with minds in the form of a 'soul' 
imbedded deep within the brain. 
Although, the notion of humans as machines was later argued by many 
scientists and was common place, such as in f8lDOUs 18-th centur7 philosopber 
Bume's concepts of "mental mechanics", a widespread belief in a discontinuity 
between animal and human intelligence peraiated well into the l~tb century t 
until the introduction of Darwinian evolutionary doctrine<. 
During the 17-tb and the 18-th century many attempt. were also .ada to 
copy various aspects of human and animal actiona, by constructin« siJaple 
mechanical automata or devising aodels of mental proceseea. Some abstract 
models were based on the contemporary theories of mental phenomena, but 
the majority of these models were artifacts built by aJdlled cl'aftmaen and 
watchmakers to demonstrate intricate human like (or animal like) movements. 
During the 19-th century many other elaborate walking or even talking 
machines and automata based on gears. pulleys. levers and bellows were also 
constructed; some in the latter part of the century were using 
electromagnetic components in their models. Similarly. game-playing machines 
were devised. the most advanced of which could play end-games of chess 
quite cleverly. 
In parallel to the introduction of such wondrous constructs developments 
were also being made in the field of design of calculating machines. A 
principal figure of the era was Babbage. who is sometimes considered as the 
father of computer-sciences. Be conceived the idea of "analytical engine". 
and although did not fully realize his ambition of constructing such a 
machine, his conceptualization. together with the development of an algebraic 
foundation for binary symbols and postulates by Boole. prepared the 
groundwork for future computing machines. 
The 'mind/body' problem, stated simply as: "Bow the mind and body affect 
each other", also gave rise to another duality of approach. the so called 
'empiricism' versus 'rationalism'. The followers of the doctrine of empiricism. 
including philosophers such as Bobbes and Dume. believe that experiences and 
their associations are the only source of knowledge. They also subscribe to 
the 'mechanistic' view point whose thesis is as follows: "Mind is like a 
machine built from simple non-vitalistic elements". The rationalists, on the 
other hand. believe that reason and relation of concepts are the basis of 
knowledge. belief and action. 
At the latter stages of the 19-th century and the earl;,. 20-th century. the 
search for mathematical counterparts of reasoning and thinking was still a· 
principal pursuit of ph:i1oaophers and mathematicians. Whitehead and Russell's 
studies of knowledge and logic, and speculations into the mathematical basis 
of abstraction, culminating in "Principa Mathematics" was a landmark 
achievement in the attempts at unification of fundamental iaaues of reasoning. 
logic and mathematics. During the .... period, the tbeoret1cal and 
methodological foundations of modern trends of the acience of paTChoioo was 
also being eBtabHsbed. The theories of learning were developed as a 
subsection of ps;,.choloJU in two distinct major C81DpS:-
(1) - The tassociationist' /tstiJaulua-reaponae' / 'behavtourist.': whose followers 
subscribe to the e.piriciat poin-" of view, and iDcluded .any of the 
e~rimental ~B;,.choIogiats, name1;,. pioneerin. adherents such as 
Tllorndtke ana Pavlov. 
(2) - The 'COJtDitiviat': who are fro. the rationalist school interested in 
or~'liona1 aa~ts of human activit;,. and reject the mechanistic 
doctrine, the ~=Cipal protagonists were Gestalt psychologists such as 
Kohler and To • 
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The mass of experimental results obtained about learning processes, and 
the theories proposed in various related fields, were incorporated in models 
which could either 'simulate' the results of an experiment or 'synthesis' a 
proposed postulate about learning, most such models were mathematical 
abstractions. It was the introduction of the science of Cybernetics by 
Wiener, and its explicit declaration of man-machine equation, which signified 
the start of the modern venture into the design of 'learning machines'. 
Cybernetics was the catalyst which promoted the use of well established 
mathematical abstractions to the problems of modelling of aspects of living 
organisms in machines. 
A yearning for mechanization, in the tradition passed on from Descarte's 
time, compelled cyberneticians such as Ashby and many other system theorists 
to formalise behaviour and thought on basis of mathematical concepts; and 
later try to manifest such concepts in hardware models. A notable 
contribution was also made by the introduction of the 'information theory' by 
Shanon, which allowed the quantification of some previously vague concepts. 
As well as the modelling of 'learning' behaviour the work of some 
cybernetically oriented neuro-physiologists and mathematicians, namely 
McCullock and Pitts, was the prelude to a whole generation of neural-network 
type cellular 'learning' models. 
The next. significant development in this field was the advent of the 
digital computer, which without any doubt has proved to be the most 
important single innovation for the modelers of the learning process. The 
infrastructure for today's computers was laid over a century ago by the 
formalisms of Boolean aIaebra and the desi,cns of calculating aaachinery, such 
as Babbage's "analytical engine". 
However, the modern theory of computation owes a great deal to TurinJr's 
abstract analysis of computational machinery, In particular bia conception of 
ideas of "Turing Machines" and "Universal Turing Machines". The. simple 
abstractions were .ade of two basic components of • 'read/write head' and 
an 'infinite-tape', which were constructed for aDaWeriDa theoretical queationa 
rather than for u. in practical prob1e ... Yet. the7 were iDIluential in Jatar 
deve]opJBents of digital computera b7 other p:loneeriq workera, such as 
who great17 contributed to the deaqrn of practical aeneral 
purpose computers. 
Turing's abstract machines were not suitable for representing human 
behaviours or mental processes, yet, they were able to mathematically prove 
an important assertion, which stated that if behaviour, language, or thought 
could be specified in a formal sense then all human activities could be 
represented by a Turing machine. 
The most recent approach to 'machine learning' was established in the 
early 1960's with the widespread availability of digital computers. This so 
called 'information processing' approach is the dominant paradigm of today. 
The subject of ·Artificial-Intelligence" or A.I. (a name coined by one of its 
pioneers, McCarthy) is the principal domain for research on the modelling of 
learning today; and it predominantly relies on the use of digital computers. 
Of course, during the past three decades, other computer structures were also 
introduced, to deal with a variety of, mainly cognitive, modelling tasks (e.g., 
parallel, analogue, LISP, production-systems). 
(i) - Philosophy 
As we have seen the psychological theories of learning developed from 
centuries of philosophical enquiry into the problem of mind/body distinction. 
Other philosophical introspections into issues such as 'mind', 'self-reference', 
'consciousness', or 'awareness' have resulted in hypotheses about knowledge 
acquisition, or motivational aspects of behaviour; and have influenced the 
contemporary psychological thinking. 
It is, therefore, hardly surprisina that when conceptual descriptive 
terminologies of human mental states and functions are applied to alternate 
domains of machines, computers or abstract systems then 80 much controversy 
arises. Concepts such as 'consciousness', 'perception', 'cognition', 'learning', 
'creativity', 'memory', 'thinking', 'feeling', 'awareness', 'emotion', 'attention', 
'intelligence', 'free-will' are to name but a few. These concepts have been 
intuitively used for centuries without much attention to their underlying 
functional or biological basis. Bence, the ezpJorationa of 'DaaChine' or 
'mathematical' counterparts of the.. concepts are at beat speculative; and 
loosely analogous to trying to DaIDe component. of an· autolDObile engine or 
define their functions, in terms of 'muscular' mecbania1ll8. 
Neverthele88, it is fair to -7 that philoaopbical scrutinies mto the 
mechanization of these ideas, besides providing interesting debatina topics, 
have shed light on the nature of many previously opaque concepts; and have 
allowed hypothesising about their integration. In some cases, however, due to 
the incompatibility of levels of descriptions involved, results of the 
translations of human concepts to machine domain have been of a very 
non-conclusive nature. 
(n) - Growth 
The growth and development of an adult animal from a single egg-cell is 
governed by the blue-print provided in the genetic information within the 
cell. The development and changes of the brain and the nervous-system can 
be seen throughout the life of an organism, the crucial stages being the 
prenatal and early childhood. periods. The learning capabilities and 
behavioural changes which accompany such neuronal changes are, hence, of 
interest to our wide perspective of this phenomenon. 
(iii) - Evolution 
Similarly, from an evolutionary perspective it can be seen that the 
learning process has gradually developed from the simple response mechanisms 
of uni-cellular primitive organisms to the most complex conceptual capabilities 
of man, which even allows him to introspect about the very nature of such 
processes and their mechanisms. 
Bence, perhaps, the attempts of those modelers who only concentrate on 
the higher strata of learning hierarchy should be seen as a disregard for the 
clear example provided by the 'natural' modeler of this procesa (i.e., the 
natural selection). Demonstrating (in BOJDe 3.6 billion years) that the 
development of a conceptuai.iaing organism requires a progreaaion of step., 
from very simple to highly complex and rich in knowledge, both in ita 
ontogenetic and phylogenetic ordering. 
The studies of learning ill ita natural domain have a ~t deal of 
relevance to the tartificial' modelers of this phenoJDenon. The weD 
docwaentecl empirical observations of learni.nc in p87cho)oa bave provided 
IIUlD.J' inaiahta into the Dature of learned behaviour, and, alIIo UIe 
orpnizational aspecta of ita structure. Many detbdtiona, attribute. and 
functions of different classes of Jearnin.r bebavioura have ahJo been 
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characterised. In addition, the studies of the brain and neuronal mechanisms 
have revealed illuminating underlying features of learning processes. 
Today, it is unanimously accepted in learning related scientific fields that 
mental phenomena are the consequence of underlying physiological structures 
of the brain. This mechanization of cerebral functions is, also, being more 
and more validated by evidence from developments in sciences of 
neuro-physiology and psychology. 
The interaction of 'analytic' and 'syntactic' aspects of studies of brain 
phenomena have provided some of the most challenging scientific questions of 
our time. Depending on the era (and fashionabillty of various paradigms) the 
brain has been described as: "a network of canals", "a water clock", "a 
mechanical clock", "a telephone exchange", and most recently "a digital 
computer". 
The complete understanding of inner workings of the brain is a very 
difficult (if not impossible) task by the very nature of the problem. Bence, 
this problem has been tackled either by the studying, the theorizing and the 
manipulation of inputs and outputs to the brain (and its elements); or by the 
construction of organizational 'models' of neuronal mechanisms, and the 
studying of model's input-output relationships. 
A great volume of experimental results has been amassed in psychology on 
the various manifestations of the process of learning in humans and animals. 
Augmenting these evidence is the rich source of findings of 'coanitive 
scientists' on the structural knowledge based aspects of the learning process, 
and also the investications of 'neuro-physiologists' and 'physiological 
psycholopts' on the learning related mechanisms of the central 
nervous-systems. 
Some very precise scientific techniquee have been developed for the 
rigorous recording and analyaia of the. ezperimenW results, both in 
qualitative and quantitative tena.. Yet, there is no general consensus about 
the explanations of these findinJrs. Theories postulated within one field, 
ltenerall7 have no direct relevance to other levels of investiJtation; and even 
within a specific line of approach many qualifications have to be made about 
the experimental observations before theorildna. Therefore, for a given set 
of evidence, it is not only sufficient to propoae a theory, but the NaaoD8 for 
putting forward such a theory should be justified. and the acope of ita 
applications specified. 
The above is a fundamental problem in science, typical of complex 
phenomena, such as learning, with many levels of descriptions. However, 
there are three principal ways of describing the learning phenomenon:-
(1) - 'Behavioural' or lGenera1j.si.ruc' descriptions which involve classifications 
of equivalent events and discovery of behavioural causalities. 
(2) - 'Neuro-physiological' descriptions of mechanisms involved in learning. 
(3) - lCo~tive', IOr~tional' or ISystem' descriptions which entail 
deVIsing systems whose properties match with the observations of 
behaviour or mechanism. 
It must be pointed out that mathematical abstractions could be applied to 
any of the above three levels of description; and such formalisms should only 
be regarded as a language for expression, and not a separate descriptive level. 
Today, an obvious gap exists between neuro-physiologists or psychologists 
and designers of 'artificial learning systems', which is hardly surprising if we 
consider their differing backgrounds, techniques, skills, or terminologies used. 
It is interesting to look at the significance and the contribution of various 
artificial 'learning' models to the natural domains of the study of learning 
phenomenon, for example, psychology, neuro-physiology, teaching, or 
ontogenetic and phylogenetic sciences. The views of the workers from such 
disciplines are indeed diverse, they range from skeptical repudiation, 
dismissals as only interesting diversions; to serious enthusiasm, and utilization 
of these 'artificial learning' models for purposes of simulation or better 
understanding of their own criteria. 
Although, many tnon-biological' assumptions are made in the design of 
most 'learning' models, nevertheless, positive contributions bave clear17 been 
made to the studies of learning in its natural domajn& Por UBlDple, 
lartificial' neuronal models and networks are eom.monly used in 
neuro-phyaiology for better understanding of neuronal plaaticity. alao, in the 
field of A.I. various discoveries bave been made about the pereeptual and 
Hnguistic aspects of symbolic knowledge. 
1.5 NA'ft&\L VB. ABTD'ICJAL Ml'JCI8 C'6 IUIABNllG' .... , 
The fundamental queation of whether art::Iflcial qate.. (software and 
hardware) can in fact 'learn' baa preoccupied ID8D7 workers involved in the 
modeDing of learning p1'OC8ll88ll, and is a prilae COIUIideratiora in ..t A.I. and 
cogmUve The basic issue hinpa on the ,definition of 
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human (and animal) 'intelligence'. In observing any natural learning behaviour 
three major questions are posed:-
(1) - What are the mechanisms involved? 
(2) - What are the components of learning? 
(3) - How does learning change with time? 
Each of above questions have been partially answered at some level of 
observation in neuro-physiological and psychological sciences. Yet, the 
principal problem is that the manifestation of the learning process in man 
(and in animals) is not clearly understood. When a particular learning 
behaviour is scrutinised then a linguistic description or a mathematical 
quantitative evaluation of performance can be made; similarly, some aspects of 
neuronal changes can be observed. But, the hypotheses compiled are still 
very incomplete and many ambiguities have yet to be resolved. 
Putting aside the vitalistic objections, arguments against artificial systems 
being able to 'learn' are, generally, either based on their superficiality due to 
mimicry/duplication, or use entropic considerations (i.e., order is only possible 
from order - a machine will only do what it is told or designed to do). Yet, 
it is a truism to say that many of the 'learning' models devised so far have 
been able to display novel behaviours which in some cases have even 
surprised their designers. Others, also, in an 'open' interactive manner have 
'learned' to perform specific tasks with a proficiency which at times surpasses 
that of a human. In any case, the daunting question always remains present 
whether the manifestation of 'learning' in such an artificial model is 
functionally equiValent to the human learning process. 
Turing (1947) foresaw that artificial systems could be made to manifest 
learning in human sense. and proposed that with technological development of 
larger computing machines experiments along these lines. The following 
Turing's criteria for 'learning' in machines can be considered on an equal 
I 
footing to his now renowned "Turing test for 'intelligence'" (which will also 
be discussed later):-
"Let us suppose that we have set up a machine with initial instruction 
tables, so constructed that these tables might on occasion, if g09d 
reason arose I modify these tables. One can imagine that atter the 
machine had been operating. for some time~. the instructions would have 
been altered out of rec::ognition, but nevenIleleaa st:iJl be such that ODe 
would have to admit that the machine was still doing very worthwhile 
calculations. Possibly it might atm be getting reiulta of the _ t7P8 
desired when the machine was set up, but in a much more efficient 
manner. In such a case ODe could bave to admit that the p~raa of 
the machine had not been foreseen when its or1ginal instruction. were 
put in. It would be like a .pupil who had learnt much from hia JD88ter:, 
but bad added much more til' BiB own work. When this haBr;ns I teel 
that. one is obliged to regaru the machine as showing inle enca. " 
Turing (1950), also, in a very knowledgeable, and historically significant, 
analysis of the problem of machine 'intelligence' again discusses the 
possibility of designing machines that can 'learn':-
"Instead of trying to produce a program to simulate the adult mind, 
why not rather try to produce one which simulate the child'? If this 
were then subjected to an appropriate course of education one would 
obtain the adult brain." 
Turing looks at the adult's brain as starting from an initial 'state of mind' 
at birth and going through a process of 'education' and 'experience'. The 
importance of the issues of 'reward' and 'punishment' (not in the emotional 
sense) are also emphasised in such a 'learning child-machine'. 
An important analogy is also made by Turing in comparing the process of 
learning with the process of evolution. 'Natural selection' is seen as a very 
slow learning process which is governed by changes brought about by random 
'mutations' - as opposed to changes brought about by 'motivational' or 
'reinforcing' aspects of the process of learning. This 'random' element is 
regarded as a useful feature which could be utilized in some machine related 
'learning' strategies; in particular, in non-trivial problems that have large 
combinatorial characteristics, where other systematic solutions are inadequate. 
There is a well investigated and documented empirical observation in 
psychology, the so called 'superstitious behaviour', which shows a tendency in 
humans and animals to attribute order and organization to events which are 
totally random. Another aspect of this feature of human psyche, evident 
from the dawn of civilization, has been the desire to assign purpose and 
intelligence to inanimate phenomena surrounding us. Therefore, it is hardly 
surprising that machines or systems that seemingly act 'intelliaent' are so 
readily ascribed with human intellectual capabilities. 
In this respect, we can make the interesting observation that almost 
invariably one of the first considerations in the desian of a laboratory robot, 
or an A.I. computer program, ia the personsUaing of the model with a human 
sounding name (e ••• , FREDDY, SIIAKBY, HACKBR, etc.); and these machines 
or programs are often referred to aa "he" and not "it". 
The proficient A.I. programs of today, such as chess playing programa, 
would have unquestionably been considered as 'intelligent' a generation aco. 
But, the tendency is to dismiss a behaviour as 'intelligent' once it is broken 
down to its logical components, elrBlDined, and a mathe_tical formalism 
abstracted for its s7ntheBia. 
One of the important ways which the more recent models of the learning 
process vary from their biological counterparts is in their widespread reliance 
on a tteacher' or 'operator' element. Most learning in nature is attained by 
direct interaction and experience with environment, with an tinternal' 
evaluation of experiences prompted by 'goals', 'motives' or 'drives'. The 
earlier cybernetic 'learning' models did try to copy this aspect of natural 
learning, yet, were only capable of performing very simple tasks. 
The various 'teleological' explanations as to why humans and animals 
should posses the learning capability have ranged from "entropic balance", 
"evolutionary adaptiveness", "survival", "biological control", "preservation of 
vital parameters", "purposiveness", "divinity" to many others. Similarly, such 
considerations are thought to be pivotal in the design of complex 'learning' 
systems. 
It is conceivable that a genuinely autonomous machine with 'learning' 
capacity may, after its interactions with the environment, develope a notion 
of 'purpose' (in the abstract sense). Yet, still at the more fundamental level 
of design other internal teleological centers may be incorporated, which 
enables the machine itself to direct its behaviour, rather than to exclusively 
rely on the external judgments of its designer/teacher/operator/supervisor -
examples of this type of primary design principle are 'seeking equilibriums' or 
'seeking change'. 
There are also many instances where the psychological and biological 
aspects of 'life' are too frivolously applied to machines, robots, computers or 
even abstract models. One extreme example is when some writers contend 
that machine-tools or robots are 'reproducing' themselves when they are 
engaged in the construction of other machine-tools or robots. These 
conceptualizations should be regarded with some degree of skepticism, and 
also care should be taken in the choice of 'natUJ'Bl' concepts when applied to 
various aspects of an inanimate design, alternately their defiDition ahould be 
qualified for such artificial domains. 
So we have seen that many problems arise when various terminologies 
based on human attributes are acrutiniaed within diaciplinee iDvolved with the 
modelling of the learmn. proceaa. ContradictioDs, overJappiqa, and 
ambipities between different tenas become hlnderiDlr atuabliDa bJocka, 
resultina in much effort being expencled towards ararum. pointe of diaUnctioD. 
Concepts of '1ntelliaence', 'perception', 'cotPdtion', '_morT', 'und8l"lltandm.', 
'thinlri~', or 'knowW.e' are 801M of the hiatoricaU7 ..... controversial such 
notions. So it is understandable that many workers have a striving for the 
relative safety of mathematical descriptive methods where, generally, 
terminologies refer to precise concepts within the axiomatic framework of the 
particular formaHv.ation. 
Formalising in general means changing the universe of discourse (or the 
language) by use of some translating rules. It is hoped that greater precision 
could be achieved in the new body of discourse. Yet, in the case of the 
learning proceSB a lack of sufficient knowledge about underlying 'syntactic' 
and tsemantic' rules has meant that the translations to the new formalised 
domains have, generally, been in a very limited and narrow sense. 
A recent trend in the modelling of Imental' processes has been to 
'externalise' the particular capabilities of the brain from its natural (neuronal) 
mechanisms. 'Language' and tvision' are some other attributes of the brain 
which have been studied and theorized in this vain (Chomsky and Marr 
respectively), by inherents of their logical processes, rather than structural 
details of entities embodying these processes. 
In system theory various attributes of general systems are studied and 
their properties compared. A principal recurring argument of this nature 
which has been applied against the use of computers for the modelling of the 
learning proceSB is their tsequential' rather than 'parallel' character. It is 
contended that since nature, through the course of evolution, has equipped 
animals with a brain which essentially works in a parallel IIUlJ1Der, then it is 
only logical that the same principle should be incorporated in the design of 
tools intended for the modelling of the brain's proceaaes. 
Partly for this reason, and partly for other technological or commercial 
considerations, the development of paraDel processors and parallel computers 
have again become focus of much attention, and subject to much activity in 
recent years. 
Considerations have alao been given to the issue of 'digital' VB. 'BIIBlogue'. 
All human and animal primary _~ and the changes in environment are by 
nature continuous (or 1lI:I8loguft), the dillcrete (or dlCital) interpretation. of 
such changes are only attributed at the higher 871DboUc repl'888ntaUoaal 
levels of the brain. RYen, the 80 callecl on-off action of the DeUI'ODII is oaly 
a 'description' of their real activity which is continuous. 
However, it can be mathematically shown that any analogue process may 
be approximated by an equivalent digital process, to whatever degree of 
accuracy required - by a process of 'sampling'. Examples of such an 
approximation abound in our verbal descriptions of surrounding world (e.g., 
hot, cold, dark, etc.). 
Most of the early 'learning' models were based on analogue criteria, of 
course, they were attempts at the simulation of lower non-symbolic levels of 
the learning hierarchy. Some workers have also contended that the 
continuities of the environment can only be adequately represented by 
analogue systems. They see that changes of the real world, and continuities 
of perceptions of such changes, carry significances which are lost when the 
same changes are recorded and stored in discrete unconnected units. Hence, 
the digital computer is considered as a poor choice for modelling fast 
analogue changes of the world which implicitly carry a vast amount of 
'bonding' information (whose preservation is deemed crucial). 
So far the fundamental necessity of analogue processes in the task of 
simulation or synthesis of 'learning' has not been conclusively demonstrated, 
and with the development of much faster parallel digital computing structures, 
the arguments of relative merits of digital vs. analogue should be switching 
from the 'computing device' domains into issues of principle. 
1.7 lQ1RIJJlI} OF LBARNDIl 
Synthesis of a model provides grounds for further testing of a theory or 
its modifications. Normally, if theories are simple then deductions can be 
made either by verbal descriptions, simple hardware, symbolic logic, or 
mathematics. But, for the more complex theories linguistic descriptions 
become very tedious; and hardware, logical or mathematical deacriptiona will 
be too difficult to devise, or will be highly erroneous. It is precisely for this 
class of theories which a recourse has been made to computers - particularly, 
in explanations of higher mental activities of humans. 
H a model is capable of uhibiting behaviour which functionally is a very 
faithful duplication of the phenomenon it is trying to sbaulate, then It can be 
said that the model has a close equivalence to the original. Additionally, if 
there were alao close physical resemblances between the .adel and the 
original (i.e., texture, size, colour, etc.), then it is conceivable that the model 
can replace the original without noticeable distinctions. 
Various mathematical equations and other forms of parametric abstractions 
have been devised to support different learning theories or specific learning 
observations. The techniques used in such abstractions utilize a variety of 
mathematical criteria, such as 'probabilistic' or 'set-theoretic'. 
Yet, the fact that the process of learning can be interpreted in so many 
levels has led various researchers to express the theories of learning in terms 
of simple models which are more easily understood than complex mathematical 
abstractions of the observations, or their mere linguistic explanation. 
'Learning systems' are realized as models in three basic ways: mathematical 
abstractions, computer programs, and specially built hardware devices. 
The hardware models have the added advantage of incorporating the 
causalities of the physical environment within their design. But, most of all, 
hardware models are advantageous because of their practical considerations, 
and the clear insight they provide into the relation of structure and 
behaviour. 
A well conceived hardware model can aid explanation as much as a well 
formulated abstract theory. Getting a physical model such as a robot or a 
machine to function properly is equivalent to demonstrating that the theory is 
internally consistent; and running the robot/machine through several tasks is 
logically equivalent to hypothesising about a particular explanation. 
Therefore, irrespective of the means used for realization (hardware or 
abstract) theories can be functionally equivalent. In other words, there is an 
'isomorphism' (point-by-point parallel correspondence) between the behavioural 
patterns of such realizations. 
Later, it will be seen that most 'learning' models, except perhaps the 
designs used for simulation of lower modalities of learning (e.g., refiexive 
behaviour, neural plasticity), have generally two basic design features -
refiecting the distinction of human 'action' from 'thought'. 
Firstly, the 'behavioural' features of the model, and secondly the 
tinformation-processing' aspects incorporated within the model. While, the 
tperformance' of a model is judged from its behavioural features, the 
acquisition of knowledge and all tlearning' is centred around its 
information-processing faculties. 
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A third higher descriptive feature, as in the case of humans, can also be 
incorporated within a 'learning' model, and that is the capability to 'abstract' 
or 'model' an internal isomorphic representation of the external world (and 
the model itself). Whereby, inductive inferences can be made about the 
eventualities of the models behaviour without physically engaging in such 
behaviour. Generally, it is regarded that for this facilitation a 'language' 
capacity is necessary, to enable the abstraction and extrapolation of syntaxes 
within input data. Here, the philosophical issues of 'self' and 'self-awareness' 
could find scope for exercise. 
'Learning' models could be categorized according to a variety of criteria 
(e.g., historical ordering, type of approach, type of data acquired, or domain 
of application). In an intuitive hierarchic sense, probably the simplest type 
of 'learning' models are those which demonstrate basic reflex conditioning 
behaviours or other innate features of animals. Next in the line of hierarchy 
are the models which use the reinforcements of favourable responses as their 
basis, and generally involve statistical criteria. Such models can be regarded 
as some kind of 'generalizing' or 'averaging' devices. Their elaboration, in 
turn, could entail adding secondary reinforcement centres which can determine 
the 'good' features that were before determined by an external 'trainer' or 
'teacher'. 
The 'concept learning' models which utilize logical representations of 
external world rather than their numeric or statistical features are, yet, 
higher in rank. Finally, the most complex types of models are those 
incorporating a broad spectrum of intricate learning methods, mostly based on 
knowledge intensive systems directed towards the acquisition of a specific 
skill, and involving the higher strata of human learning capabilities. 
When various models of 'learning' are evaluated or discussed we must also 
consider whether they are "special purpose" or "general purpose" models, 
referring to their relative range of applicability. Many other considerations 
will also be outlined in later chapters. 
The developments in the field of modelling of learning have been 
characterised by over optimistic claims of its researchers. Yet, failed 
overeager predictions of cyberneticians and A.I. workers are not the kind that 
disprove the whole theory, but only shows weaknesses in the choice of its 
direction or pace of development. 
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In the 1950's and the 1960's, such modelers having analyzed the problem 
and proposed a blue-print thought that it would only be a matter of time, and 
improvement of appropriate technological tools, before their simple systems 
could be elaborated into fully fledged sophisticated 'learning machines'. This 
scientific over-expectation is typical of many disciplines, and does not imply 
that the workers involved have anything but the best intentions. 
The advent of digital computers with their ever increasing computing 
powers (faster and with more memory), although predicted by the early 
modelers of the learning process, did not provide the revolutionary 
breakthrough expected. The aspiration of pioneers of cybernetics for a 
general purpose computational machine, with nearly unlimited potential, which 
can be used for the simulation and synthesis of the learning process is almost 
realised today in the shape of digital computers. But, in spite of these 
powerful tools, solid and successful global 'learning' theories which can be 
applied to different tasks and systems have not been forthcoming. The 
recurring theme has, therefore, been an under estimation of computer 
capabilities, and an over estimation of its potentialities. In a sense, we can 
say that theoretical advances have not been keeping pace with technological 
innovations. 
1.8 DIFF.BRBNT APPROAaIBS TO THE PIUn.BH OF KlDElJJNG OF I...EARND«; 
Some early designers of 'learning' systems had anticipated the two 
developmental paths that would be taken by researchers in the field of 
'machine learning'. Which were the two diametric strategies of building-in 
(or programming-in) a 'lot' or 'little' complexity into the initial state of the 
system. They contended that, on the one hand, complex logical inferences 
could be incorporated at the initial state of the machine, hence, the pattern 
of the 'intelligent' behaviour would be present from the start. Or, on the 
other hand, by incorporating just a minimal amount of information and a 
capability to 'learn' the machine would be able to develope the 'intelligent' 
behaviour gradually itself. The actual development of 'learning' models within 
the past four decades has traversed quite an interesting (and logical) path, 
which closely emulates the general pattern of these early predictions. 
As it will become evident from our later discussions of various approaches 
to the modelling of the learning process, and from many examples cited, the 
notion of learning pJayed a much more prominent role in the earlier 
endeavours of designers of 'intelligent' machinery or systems. 
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Following the proliferation of the theories of learning, the development of 
'learning' models generally progressed on a parallel lines to such theories, and 
mainly incorporated various 'natural' criteria in their designs. These 
psychological models were principally used for the simulation and better 
understanding of the theories of learning. 
Later, such challenges were taken up by cyberneticians, control-engineers, 
automata theorists, or general systems mathematicians, who used many more 
abstractions in their models. Similarly, other 'intelligent' models were 
developed in subjects such as Neural-Nets, Logical-Nets, Self-Organising 
Systems, and Pattern-Recognition which also featured many aspects of the 
process of learning. 
The advent of digital computers was a significant landmark. One group of 
modelers continued on the path of simulating natural learning processes, using 
these newly acquired tools and techniques. However, a substantial proportion 
of the followers of the new 'information processing' paradigm decided that 
the constraint of adhering only to the 'natural' aspects of learning was too 
limiting, specially since progress was slow, and was dictated by the pace of 
progress in neuro-physiological and psychological sciences. Hence, they 
embarked on designing 'cognitive' computer-oriented 'learning systems' using 
various 'ad-hoc' techniques, and abandoning the emphasis and constant 
references to 'natural' aspects of learning. They contended that their 
methods could achieve the end result pattern of a 'learned' behaviour in a 
much faster and more efficient manner - particularly, in specific task 
domains. 
The workers in this paradigm try to incorporate a great deal of prior 
'information' and 'knowledge' into the initial structure of the system. Yet, 
generally, not much attention is paid to the 'acquisitional' aspects of the 
design; also any 'learning' mentioned normally refers to a specific problematic 
domain, and not to its 'global' sense. 
Today, all the above approaches are still being pursued in parallel with 
varying scales of followings and popularity. Adherents of BOme rejecting the 
methodologies or even the viability of BOme alternate approaches, yet, others 
seemingly adopt a more accommodating and tolerant views of disparate 
approaches. 
In any case, intellectual feuds between followers of opposing paradigms 
seemingly resulting from argumentation of relative merits of each approach is 
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not a helpful pursuit. Specially, in view of many precedences in the history 
of science, where alternate approaches have coexisted in parallel until 
conclusive settlement (e.g., quantum theory vs. wave theory) - although, each 
being argued with fervour and believed to be true by its followers. 
Nevertheless, to find the real weaknesses of a discipline or approach it is 
best to listen to informed counter arguments of its critics. The frailties of 
opposite views are invariably exposed more, and the relative merits of their 
own discipline are highlighted out of proportion. Therefore, to get a 
balanced view, the two (or maybe more) accounts of the same story should at 
least be heard. 
It is a prevailing belief of workers in fields such as A.I., 
pattern-recognition, robotics, cybernetics, computer sciences, etc., that within 
the next 40-50 years there will be technical possibilities of constructing 
machines with intellectual capabilities of an adult human. Although, the 
scenarios leading to such a development vary tremendously, ranging from an 
optimistic utilizations of such machines to their doomsday type dominations. 
Here, an implicit assumption is also made that parallel discoveries in brain 
sciences and psychology will make new and significant contributions to this 
pursuit of 'intelligent' machinery. An important postscript to above 
conviction is that if human intelligence can be attained then it surely can be 
surpassed, and the next level of speculation will yet bring to surface the 
enormous possibilities which 'super-intelligent' developments will entail. 
In the following we will attempt to elaborate on the two resulting 
principal approaches which have come to dominate the field of modelling of 
'learning' • 
1.8.1 '11IB CYBBRNBTIC "BJl"l'QI-UP' APIBWlI 
The usage of term "cybernetic" is not a universally exercised practice. 
Various other researchers refer to this distinct approach as "brain studies", 
"natural", "neural-nets", "Self-Organising Systems", or "pattern-recognition" 
approach. But, the appropriateness of using the 'cybernetic' label in this 
context will be justified in our later discussions of the subject of 
Cybernetics. 
A point of relevance, here, is that the wide perspective which this thesis 
is advocating has been a characteristic of the cybernetic view of most 
disciplines. Georae (1986), in his discussion of the development of 
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cybernetics, A.I. and related subjects, highlights the issues involved in the 
diversification of a field of knowledge. He contends that distinctions in 
approach (i.e., cybernetic vs. A.I.) to problems of modelling of human 
activities are non-fundamental, and each approach of these overlapping 
disciplines only signifies "the different ways of slicing a cake", rather than 
the divisions themselves. 
The early cybernetic learning models relied heavily on ideas of 
control-theory, such as 'feed-back', and the intricacies of their designs were 
generally attributable to clever interconnections of few electronic, electrical 
or mechanical components and devices. 
The pioneers of this paradigm did, in fact, approach the problem from a 
very logical point of view. Their intention was to manifest the elementary 
modalities of learning in abstractions or artifacts, utilizing observations from 
simple behavioural traits (mainly in animals) or simple neuronal mechanisms. 
Their approaches are today, generally, described as mundane, simplistic, 
weakly-specified, non-productive, or unfashionable. But, an important point is 
lost in such assessments of these early trends, it was indeed not the intention 
of their designers to show or to make models which could immediately 
demonstrate the higher intellectual capabilities of humans. They were more 
interested in the underlying fundamentals, and a slow progressive, yet 
versatile, path to the higher strata of intelligence hierarchy - hence, the lack 
of spectacular achievements. 
However, it is true to say that cyberneticians, neural-net scientists, or 
other adherents of the "bottom-up" approach to 'learning' have not exhausted 
all possibilities of their paradigm. Maybe, today, some 30 years after the 
high point of their elementary 'learning' models, with the introduction of new 
technological tools and techniques, and increased theoretical and empirical 
knowledge, once again attention should be focused on this intuitive approach; 
and BOme of the fundamental aspects of the modelling of the process of 
learning scrutinised in much more detail. 
The centuries old argument of brains vs. machines surfaced with a new 
vigore with the flourishing of the new disciplines of computer sciences, A.I. 
and Robotics. Of course, the principal goal of the research in these fields is 
not to cleverly mimic 'natural learning' (in a science-fiction sense), but to 
scientifically create machines which are genuinely able to 'learn', and use this 
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capability, fundamental to all 'intelligent' behaviour, in improving their 
performance or knowledge. 
The 'computer' or 'information' revolution is generally considered as the 
second industrial revolution. But, in fact, the course of the mechanization of 
thought processes can be regarded more as an evolutionary process, which is 
developing in parallel to the mechanization of muscular powers, currently 
manifested in industrial robotics and automation. 
Today, developments of computer technology, currently in its 5-th 
generation with 6-th and 7-th in planning, are taken for granted. Their 
power, speed and capacity are increased an order of magnitude every tew 
years. 
The general tendency in information processing is towards computer based 
models. At the root ot this trend lies the central belief that mathematical 
formulae, machines and robots are incapable of conveying 'mental' symbols 
and carrying out complex computations on such symbols; after all, the 
ultimate objective. is to have systems which can display tacets of 'thinking'. 
However, the computer is seen as a suitable vehicle for such abstractions. 
This trend, in turn, accounts for the way that the learning process (and other 
endowments of the brain) has come to be 'externalised' to the brain, and its 
explanations based on higher organizational features of the structure rather 
than the specifics of mechanisms or symbols themselves. In other words, the 
'fibre' of the model is no longer considered relevant, whether it is biological, 
chemical, electronic, mechanical, or abstract; and the computer is simply 
regarded as a convenient tool at disposal. 
On refiection upon this latter point, if some of the current disciplines 
involved with the modelling of 'learning' (e.g., A.I.) are looked at in isolation 
from its 'computer' component, then distinctions between such subjects and 
psychology, linguistics, sections of philosophy, or some other fields become 
less clear cut. It is the appreciation of this underlying kinship which has 
compelled some workers to describe all these disciplines under the umbrella of 
"cognitive sciences". The science of "Cybernetics", in the same vain, can be 
regarded as the broader interdisciplinary approach which encompasses 
biological, cognitive and mechanical aspects of 'learning'. 
A characteristic of the very title of many information-processing 
disciplines of today such as "Pattern-Recognition", "Speech-Recognition", 
"Artificial-Intelligence", "Problem-Solving", or "Theorem-Proving" is that their 
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names actually refer to the ultimate 'goals' of their workers, rather than 
signifying the 'course' of their scientific endeavours, as is the case with most 
other scientific topics. If, indeed, the objective of true artificial-intelligence 
was attained then there would not be a point for such a pursuit. 
Some early Information Processing models were clearly engaged in either 
or both aspects of 'simulation' and 'synthesis'. But, this distinction has 
become much more vague in the increasingly more complex models of A.I., 
where the appreciation of underlying difficulties of the task has made the 
distinction, to some extent, immaterial. 
Within the doctrine of Information Processing no real attempt is made to 
incorporate in a model the biological structures or the natural ways of 
achieving the same end. It is also believed (although not with very firm 
conviction) that a conglomeration of sub-models, each capable of simulating 
one aspect of human intelligence, will at the end lead to the attainment of 
true artificial 'intelligence'. 'Learning' models in this approach are generally 
devised for four major categories of 'learning' tasks:-
(1) - Rote Learning: memorizing a sequence of tables for later use. 
(2) - Parameter Learning: learning by adjusting or discovery of values of 
certain parameters - e.g., in pattern-recognition. 
(3) - Method Learning: algorithmic learning of procedures applicable to 
different situations. 
(4) - Concept Learning: building a knowledge structure out of elementary 
concepts. 
In recent years, the trend in this field has been away from the 'pure' 
aspects of learning, and towards the 'problem-oriented' aspects. Various 
economic considerations have compelled many workers to seek more practical 
and industrially-applicable results. Therefore, the early 'learning' models 
based on 'natural' phenomena are now, in the main, considered out of fashion 
(and to some extent futile) by the adherents of information-processing 
approach to modelling of learning - the emphasis has shifted to tackling 
specific clearly defined problems, or class of problems, at the 
'representational' level. 
1.9 WHY IIJIU) BARDWARB KDDS AND RB7lS ? 
As we discussed previously, hardware devices, as models, have some 
intrinsic qualities which can facilitate a better understanding or synthesis and 
simulation of a phenomenon. In particular, the reason why hardware 
simulations of 'learning' are attempted is because most behavioural, cognitive 
or neuro-physiological experimental results are difficult to interpret; and 
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theories based on them are, normally, imprecise and their consequences hard 
to follow. Hence, the way that mathematics provides a rigorous foundation 
for theorizing in the physical sciences, the machine simulation can be 
regarded as fulfilling a similar function in behavioural sciences. 
The conception of modern notion of "robotics" is generally attributed to 
Czech play writer Karl Capek (term "robot" is a derivation of Czech word for 
'workers'). Science-fictional robots aside, there is not much doubt that real 
robots have been very useful in assisting man in situations where the 
environment is dangerous, inhospitable, or inaccessible; or the task is 
mundane, repetitive, routine, or dangerous; or when simply some improvement 
of a performance criteria is required. 
Today's sophisticated robots (hardware models) are mostly used in 
conjunction with a digital computer, and, therefore, when referring to their 
'intelligent' behaviour it is basically the 'intelligence' of their accompanying 
computer program which is insinuated and not the hardware construct itself. 
In addition to the advances made in computer technology, which are so 
relevant to 'learning robots', numerous other areas of engineering have also 
been providing their specific contributions to such designs. 
Generally, the computer is regarded as the 'brain' of the robot, the 
manipulators or mobile vehicles as the 'body' or 'effectors', and the various 
devices which can provide almost any imaginable quantified measure of the 
physical environment (e.g., light, colour, vision, heat, touch, smell, sound, 
pressure, speed, movement, sonar, etc.) as the 'sensors'. The inputs of these 
sensors are converted to electrical signals which, in turn, are translated to 
digitized codes of computer language. 
The technology of robotics is forging ahead at a brisk speed, and 
constantly more precise, faster, more powerful or more versatile manipulators 
and robot vehicles are constantly being developed. The wondrous tasks that 
some of these robots are able to perform are quite astounding, a recent 
Japanese experimental robot can playa whole musical score on the piano 
without any training, by recognising the musical notes with a 
pattern-recognition system and using delicate finger type ma~ipulators; other 
advanced walking or hopping robots can now show very high degrees of 
dynamic balancing capabilities. Yet, in spite of all these achievements very 
little actual 'learning' is included within their designs - most of the 'learning' 
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achieved in the current generation of robots only refers to the memorizing of 
spatial trajectories or paths. 
Another category of robots, such as the project undertaken for the 
purposes of this thesis, are the 'experimental robots'. The forerunners of 
this class of robots were the mechanical and electrical devices ('turtles') 
which were constructed by cyberneticians interested in simulating specific 
behavioural traits. Since the early 1960's, various laboratories in academic 
institutions have been engaged in building either 'roving' mobile robots or 
'hand-eye' manipulative robots with many interesting and varying features. 
Some mobile robots had manipulators or TV-cameras mounted on the carts, 
others used legs rather than wheels for movement - here, the studies based 
on human or animal limb movements have provided a helpful source of data. 
Many of the early experimental mobile robots had their logic decision making 
mechanisms embodied within the hardware of the design, however, the later 
versions had the processing centre incorporated in a digital computer, which 
was either on-board or housed separately and in communication via cables or 
infra-red/ultrasound/radio signals - this dissection of the "brain" from the 
"body" of robots was considered as an important breakthrough. 
The computer controlled laboratory robots, as well as being interesting 
scientific curiosities, are built for a variety of reasons. In some instances it 
is an obvious practical problem solving or industrial application which dictates 
the necessity of this type of research. Other workers are simply using these 
vehicles as tools for experimentation or demonstration of particular 
psychological or educational criteria; here, robots are regarded as a kind of 
simple roving animal which interacts with a rich sensory environment. 
Similarly, various cognitive postulates on perceptual problems may be 
investigated using robots that have visual sensory devices attached to them; 
and, indeed, they have been influential in a better understanding of the 
processes of formation and acquisition of knowledge structures. Some 
experimental robots have aided the development of various programming 
languages and tools (e.g., LOGO, PROLOG). Finally, an experimental complex 
robot can be a good medium for combining various isolated ideas within a 
single autonomous body, such as combining a visual system with a navigational 
system or a manipulative system. 
The developments of laboratory robots have been progressing almost in 
parallel to the technological advances of computer sciences, having nodes and 
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troughs which are attributable to particular trends of an era. For example, 
in the early 1980's such developments received an impetus from the 
widespread use of LOGO programming language in educational establishments. 
LOGO needed a simple 'turtle' for demonstration and many such devices were 
constructed both in laboratories and also marketed commercially. 
On the whole, the principal reason why these models did not quite realise 
the early aspirations of their cybernetic designers is the lack of supporting 
tgeneral' software developments, which would have allowed much more 
interesting behavioural emissions from such models. Hence, all such 
laboratory exercises have concentrated on very specific behaviour patterns or 
tasks. To BOme degree, their designers have been frustrated that despite 
having a versatile physical artifact, with many potentialities, they cannot find 
appropriate methodologies to embody interesting behaviour within it. 
1.10 THK mJJCrIVHS OF 'IHESIS: DBSI~ OF A SIMPLR 'I..BARNDC' RBJl' 
Before we attempt to outline the objectives of this thesis in detail, it 
would be a good idea to briefly explain the background, the progression of 
ideas and endeavours, and the circumstances which were influential in 
determining the direction and the development of the thesis in this partiCUlar 
extensive way. 
The original topic of interest was, of course, the modelling of learning, 
principally, in the simpler manifestations of its hierarchy. The objective was 
to start from the lowest level and elaborate to the higher strata of learning. 
After a preliminary study of the subject, the design and the construction of a 
computer controlled mobile robot was decided upon as a project. The aim 
was to construct a very versatile experimental tool for implementing various 
learning hypothesis, or using it for synthesis and simulations of specific 
learning related criteria. The task of designing and building 'learning' 
machines or systems which in some sense can act 'intelligently' has an 
intrinsic fascination. The robot was to represent a very simple organism, 
being able to interact with its environment in a primitive way. 
The processes of design and construction of the robot was an interesting 
and challenging endeavour, and will be discussed briefly later. Various 
considerations had to be made as to what features to include so that an 
experimenter may interact freely with the machine, without various 'house 
keeping', 'operational' or design constraints which characterised many other 
such experimental devices. Frequently, these constraints hindered the latter 
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software developments of the machines, forcing their designers to change the 
focus from 'fundamental' issues to 'machine specific' issues. 
The degree of the complexity of the robot was also a crucial 
consideration. Since if it had too many input or output devices, then the 
fundamental issues of interest could not be represented faithfully. Similarly, 
if the potentialities of the model were too trivial, then no 'learning' 
behaviour of any significance could be manifested. It was decided that a 
radio controlled device would be built, which would be in constant radio 
communication with a computer that can continuously monitor the states of 
its touch, shock, and sonar sensors; and, also, could transmit direction and 
speed instructions out to the robot. This device, which in certain functional 
capabilities could be possibly compared to an amoeba or a virus, would be 
able to autonomously rove in the environment of a laboratory, and should 
have enough sensory complexity to demonstrate simple obstacle avoidance type 
tlearning' tasks. 
The actual building of the robot was an arduous task itself, and involved 
many considerations and hurdles which had to be overcome, such as design 
and construction of motor-drive, power supply, charger, sonar, 
data-communication, radio-transceiver and computer-interface circuitry, as 
well as the chassis, mechanical parts, contact-switches and various other 
components. 
After the completion of the tbody' of the robot and its successful testing, 
the next stage was to start the development of an appropriate software which 
would enable the robot to demonstrate, within its universe of discourse, a 
tlearning' behaviour, more or less the way it would be manifested in a 
hypothetical organism of same complexity. Although, it was envisaged that 
even with such primitive senses the same machine, with the aid of the 
computer, could be made to conceptualize about its environment in a trivial 
sense. Yet, this higher level of description would be a choice of the 
designer, and not intuitively detectable from the design. It would clearly 
stretch the capabilities of the robot which was not equipped to deal with the 
conceptual level of description in the first place. This point emphasises the 
parity of behavioural complexity and underlying neural structural complexity 
observed in nature; and should be an important consideration when attributing 
tintelligent' aspects of behaviour to machines, or when dismissing a machine 
as incapable of achieving such 'intelligent' behavioural traits. 
Various simulation programs were written for operating the robot within 
the laboratory environment. These programs (written in FORTRAN) ranged 
from simple traversing of graphs or mathematical functions, to the simulation 
of a reflexive behaviour which entailed the machine roving around and moving 
away from obstacles upon collision. The behaviourally most advanced program 
involved the sonar scanning of the room by the robot and drawing a kind of 
map of the environment on the computer display. This allowed the robot to 
plan a path and explore the room without bumping into various obstructions. 
At a lower level of behavioural complexity, also, a simple algorithmic 
procedure would enable the robot, using its sonar signal, detect a course of 
collision and take avoiding actions. The program itself was quite long, and 
included many Imachine supervision' secondary aspects, yet, the essence of 
the, so called, tintelligent' aspects of the behaviour was contained in a few 
lines of programming (a simple mathematical deductive process). Now, the 
real challenge could be redefined as: how we could manifest the same logical 
deductive process by a gradual Ilearning' in the machine starting from almost 
random behaviour, and using basic criteria. 
The search for the implementation of such a tlearning' process involved 
looking at similar areas of research and designs of tlearning' robots; and even 
the blue-print of a simple scheme was devised which without doubt would, 
unfailingly, lead to the attainment of such a desired I learned ' pattern of 
behaviour. Yet, more and more, it was becoming evident that the objectives 
of such simulation exercises must be clarified in the first place, and more 
fundamental questions answered before embarking on such an endeavour. 
It was observed that too often the designers of such programs, with the 
aim of achieving interesting and quick results, delve in the specifics of a 
particular formalism, methodology or behavioural pattern (normally from their 
previous backgrounds), without considering the full implications of such 
endeavours. The results of this kind of hasty approach, in general, only 
reinforced some preconceived ideas, and had very few surprises in store; 
normally, leading to an even narrower perspective of the subject, and leaving 
the elements of initial beliefs of the designer largely untouched. 
Bence, a principal shift of emphasis took place, and it was decided that 
before the specific preferences (prejudices?) of our design was set a journey 
through the genesis of the phenomenon of learning be undertaken. 
The approach taken was to get a kind of 'snap-shot' of the state of 
research in various disciplines at this moment of time; and also to find out 
the applications, future possibilities, and aspirations of workers in each field. 
The underlying philosophical, historical, biological, evolutionary, and social 
aspects would, in addition, be covered so as to understand some of the 
interrelations of various disciplines, their common features, or backgrounds to 
their development. 
The challenge of a comparative study of all aspects and approaches of 
learning was considered as both rewarding and daunting. Yet, such a 
multi-approach compilation was regarded as a valuable contribution to our 
later more 'objective' analysis of the 'learning' models, and also to any 
designer of such models at the preliminary stage of their task. Specially, 
since most studies of the learning process and its modelling are carried out in 
the rigid boundaries of a single discipline, which reflect the common interests 
or the typical backgrounds of researchers in its domain. 
An attempt will be made to highlight the shortcomings of each paradigm, 
as well as citing its achievements and strong points. At the final analysis, 
however, it can be said that the definitive statements of the weaknesses of 
each approach to design of 'learning' models are much more conclusive than 
the hopeful possibilities professed by their adherents. 
Yet, deliberately, no particular angle of the arguments will be promoted on 
exclusive basis, or pursued as a theme. Since, not only it is the striving for 
objectivity which culminated in this wideness of perspective, but, it is the 
express advocation of this thesis that such a 'broad' view should be adopted 
in "the modelling of learning". Hence, in simple terms the objective of this 
thesis can be summed as: "MAKING QUALIFIED JUDGMENTS" 
It is, however, not contended that for a real breakthrough a revolutionary 
abrupt step need to be made in the development of 'learning machines' (i.e., 
starting from basic alternate criteria, possibly non-related to the natural 
occurring processes). But, the aim is to stop and view the whole topic with 
the widest possible perspective and try to clarify few goals, and deviations 
from such goals; and also to look at the 'total' context in a much more detail 
without being prejudiced by a blinkered uni-disciplinary bias. In other words, 
we would like to see what conclusions, interpretations, commonality of 
concepts, or inter-relations exist between the branches which have sprouted 
from the mainstream of the PS7chological and philosophical studies of 
learning. 
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1. 11 'llJE Cl1'1LINB OF 'llJE 'l'1IBSIS 
In starting an undertaking such as this project there are certain 
characteristic pitfalls which may pose problems for the researcher. "Solving 
the World" and" Ambitious Paralysis" are, according to Bundy (1984), two of 
the traps which may hinder progress or even force the worker to abandon the 
endeavour in frustration. However, due to the very broad nature of this 
thesis it was inevitable that at times deviations from the main objectives 
would happen, and keeping the underlying aims in focus was one of the major 
obstacles of this endeavour. 
There is a saying that: "a little learning is a dangerous thing", and as we 
are trying to 'learn about learning' in this wide ranging manner then the 
difficult decision has to be made as to what depth should we probe the 
various fields involving this ubiquitous phenomenon. Is it enough to skim 
over an approach, or should we familiarise ourselves with the particular 
methodologies and formalisms of the approach. 
Due to the extensiveness of task in hand, a compromise had to be made to 
limit the investigations of subjects to a broad yet uniform sense. With only 
occasional indulgences made into detailed analyses which are considered 
essential to the core problem - hence the fundamental aspects (both 
knowledge and behaviour related) concerning 'learning' models are more 
emphasised. Typical or historically important works of each discipline will 
also be cited, their notable proponents mentioned, and the basic criteria and 
viewpoints of the paradigm discussed. 
We will not try to engage in very deep philosophical discussions of the 
periphery concepts of learning. These debates are typified by the scrutinies 
of the concept of 'intelligence' and its various aspects in many A.I. related 
literature. Such a pursuit, although worthwhile and interesting in a 
philosophical domain, in a sense will probably narrow down the definition of 
learning in the sweeping manner we wish to study, and will deter us from 
covering the widest possible range of approaches to 'learning' (and 
'adaptation'). The notion of 'learning', hence, will be discussed in its 
consensus understanding of the concept, which, incidently, varies from 
discipline to discipline. In this work we will attempt to characterize the 
process of learning from different points of view, and also to specify 
, distinctions or unifying features. 
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A decision had also to be made as to what levels the mathematical 
abstractions should be scrutinised - in spite of personal preferences for such 
abstractions, due to a mathematical background. Based on the broad nature 
of the thesis, the general criterion used was to include only formalisms which 
were pertinent to the underlying fundamental issues, or where a direct 
relevance could be seen to the specific goal (i.e., the design of simple 
'learning' machines); and the understanding of which would not require 
rigorous mathematical background. 
Therefore, the outline of this thesis can be summed up in the following:-
(1) - Natural learning observations studied in a broad sense, including both 
physiological and psychological aspects. 
(2) - Hierarchies of learning identified in evolutionary, functional, and 
developmental sense. 
(3) - Various features and components of different types of learning 
processes identified. 
(4) - Models and modelling discussed in general; and specific principles, tools, 
formalisms and techniques involved in the modelling of 'learning 
examined. 
(5) - Approaches to the problems of 'simulation' and 'synthesis' of 'learning' 
considered, their development outlined, some notable examples discussed, 
and relevant issues addressed or argued. 
(6) - The design and construction of a hardware mobile robot discussed as a 
~ssible tool for experimentation, simulation or synthesis of various 
simple 'learning' schemes. 
(7) - Features deemed to be essential in design of 'learning' systems 
discussed, both in general terms and also in the context of above 
experimental hardware model. 
1.12 AN OVBRVIBW OF 'l1IE CHAPrBRS 
Finally, here, we will briefly outline the composition of each chapter, and 
the course of development of the thesis. The intermediary chapters or 
sections, however, could be studied also in isolation, since they are separated 
by 'natural' methodological, paradigmatic, or phenomenological breaks in 
approach or level of enquiry. 
In Chapter-1 we began by a general definition of the problem which is of 
interest to this thesis, namely the process of learning and its modelling. The 
various developmental aspects of related sciences were looked into, and 
specific key issues of contention were analyzed in more detail. Next, the 
modelling aspects of the phenomenon of learning and various approaches 
involved were discussed. Finally J the case for our particular global approach 
r 
to the issue was arg\led and the objectives identified. 
In Chapter-2 we will be examining the three principal approaches to the 
empirical studies of learning in man and animals. The learning theories 
developed in psychology, brain-sciences and cognitive studies will be 
discussed, and the backgrounds to their development pointed out. Various 
definitions of learning, its attributes, and related issues will be addressed; and 
their underlying neuronal mechanisms described. Also, different taxonomies 
and hierarchies of the learning process and its mechanisms will be outlined. 
Chapter-3 will be concerned with the general problem of the modelling of 
learning, hence, discussions of some fundamental issues of modelling will be 
undertaken; principally, involving its facets of 'simulation' and 'synthesis'; as 
opposed to the empirical studies which mainly involve 'analysis'. 'Learning' 
models will be broadly categorized into 'natural' vs. 'artificial'. Finally, 
abstract tools, mathematical theories, and techniques used in the modelling of 
'learning' will be reviewed, and some teleological considerations outlined. 
In Chapter-4 and Chapter-5 an attempt will be made to describe the 
various synthetic (artificial) approaches tQ the modelling of the learning 
process. The order of discussion approXimately refiecting the historical 
sequence of appearance or prominence of each approach. After outlining the 
essential features and problems within the various disciplines involved, 
typical 'learning' models of each paradigm will be described. In addition, 
evaluatiQJl and analysis of each approach, its achievements and its goals will 
also be undertaken in relation to the 'complete picture' we are trying to put 
together on the topic of learning. The principal approaches covered will be: 
'adaptive control', 'neural-net', 'automata theory', 'self-organising system', 
'cybernetic', 'pattern-recognition', 'artificial-intelligence', and 'robotics'. 
In Chapter-6 the specific objective. of the thesis, or the a~ysi.s of 
various aspects of design of cybernetic 'learning' models, will be pursued. 
The robot experimental vehicle, referred to earlier. will be briefiy discussed; 
yet, the actual technical details of construction or the developed software 
will not be included. Additionally, some fundamental issues in 'learning' 
models will be discussed, the possibility of their realiv.ation in simple 
hardware models (e.g., our particular robot) considered, and the blue-print of 
a hypothetical system capable of 'learning' will be outlined. Next, in 
Chapter-7 we will summarize our discussions and make final conclusions. 
Finally, in the Reference section the various literature used in the course 
of writing this thesis, in particular, the large number of papers accumulated 
over the years on the subject of learning and its modelling, will be listed. 
However, again, we will not include the many technical and computing books 
or references used in the course of our hardware development. 
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CHAPTER 2 
---------
EM'.PIRICS AND THEORIES' OF LEARN.:z-NG 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Observations based on the dynamics of the living and the inanimate world 
surrounding us show an intriguing variety of learned and adaptive processes. 
A child learns to coordinate its sensory-motor activities, or t.o recognize 
the features and significances of its environment; a man trying to acquire a 
physical skill learns to develop and control his muscular movements; a student 
learns the meanings of new collections of symbols and grammatical rules, and 
learns to solve a variety of conceptual problems; an animal in an experimental 
psychology laboratory learns to tackle a complex maze-running problem; a 
circus animal learns to perform astonishing feats. All in all, animals in 
nature from mollusks to mammals show a diverse range of learned behaviour, 
and even simple organisms such as amoeba or bacteria can exhibit 
adaptiveness to new stimuli in their environment. 
Similarly, a robot in an industrial plant, or a roving mechanical turt.le in a 
laboratory, can be made to improve its performance by using data from past 
experiences; a chess or checkers playing computer program can 'learn' to play 
at proficient level, and compete against human opponents, apparently by 
'learning' from its mistakes; a complex pattern recognition system 'learns' 
shapes of objects or human faces, and gradually makes fewer matching errors. 
Problems involving learning or adaptation have puzzled the minds of 
researchers from many diverse fields of science, as well as occupying the 
'pure' researchers of the learning phenomenon. Some of the principal points 
of discussion and controversy are the definitions of criteria shared by 
different types of learned and adaptive behaviour, and also the identifications 
of underlying features of such activities - for example, in the above diverse 
range of 'learned' behaviour. 
2.2 VARIaE LEVm..S OF INVESTIGATIOO AND STUDY OF LEARN'1m 
"Learning" in its general sense can be defined as: 'the process of adaptive 
interactions between a physical entity or an abstraction and its environment'. 
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Yet, the phenomenon of learning, as seen from the hierarchical representation 
of TABLE 2.1, is a multi-faceted and multi-dimensional concept, whose 
investigations entail many specific descriptive or mathematical aspects and 
levels. 
TABLE 2.1. The main disciplines associated with various domains of Learning 
Research are outlined in a hierarchy; the first four columns show 
the principal levels and aspects of study. 
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In fact, most scientific enquiries are characterised by a hierarchy of 
explanations, and a variety of investigatory levels. In learning sciences the 
levels of descriptions range from speculative issues about the nature of 'mind' 
and social aspects of learning, down to cellular and atomic features of its 
manifestation. 
Eaplrica aDd Tbeorlel 01 LearDiD, 35 
Scientific research, in general, involves the scrutiny of a subject in a 
specific descriptive framework of reference. Hence, normally the results 
which are obtained are consistent and valid, if merely looked at from within 
that particular body of knowledge. The principal distinction between 
different hierarchical levels are in their operational considerations. In other 
words, the views that are held, the techniques that are used, the questions 
that are asked, or the type of answers which will satisfy such questions. 
A look at the historical development of most scientific enquiries shows 
that the initial explanations and observations of a phenomena mainly begins 
from the higher strata (e.g., the verbal characterizing) of the hierarchy of its 
descriptive levels. These observations, in turn, generate the more precise 
lower levels. The general consensus is that the statements at the lower 
hierarchical levels are much more solid and fundamental, and can be applied 
over a wider range of problems; yet, their explanatory powers lack the depth 
and the reasoning features of the higher levels. 
Of course, the boundaries of many such levels are only loosely defined, 
and hence ambiguities arise when attempts are made to cross over these 
descriptive boundaries. Similarly, when results occurring at one level are 
predicted as a consequence of events at another level then various 
inconsistencies become evident. The principal reasons for such difficulties are 
the lack of direct correlations between different descriptive levels; or, the 
need for additional dimensions of enquiry, such as 'ontogenetic' and 
'phylogenetic', to be taken into account in the higher levels of description or 
investigation. 
It can be seen from TABLE 2.1 that there are many specialized areas of 
current scientific investigation interested in the process of learning. 
However, most learning-theories have been developed from within the 
following three principle branches of science:-
(i) 
(ii) 
- COGNITIVE SCIENCES: the cognitive scientists are interested in the 
study of the accumulative and organizational aspects of learning 
related temporal e~eriences. Bence, normallY-l knowledge structures 
and other perceptual issues are investigated wi hin cognitive sciences. 
Most of the research in 'Artificial Intelligence' (A.I.) could be 
included in this category. 
BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCES: the workers in this field investigate the 
external and empirical manifestations of the learning-process in 
human beings ana animals. The formation and the development of 
learned and adaptive behaviours are the primary subjects of interest 
in this area. 
(iii) - BRAIN and NERVE-SYSTEM SCIENCES: the researchers in this area 
study the internal mechanisms of the learning process, observed by 
the changes which take place within the nerve-system during 
learning. The brain scientisl.s are in pursuit of the neural correlates 
of adaptive behaviours. 
E.plrlc8 a.d Tbeorlea 01 LearDI., 36 
2.3 DEVEI.DPMENT OF I..EARNIKl THlnuES - PHIL<B>mICALIHIS'laUCAL PBRSPBCl'IVES 
There is little doubt in the minds of researchers in learning that this 
science has developed from the philosophical enquiries into the nature of 
man's mind. Over many centuries the problems of 'mind' and 'body', and 
their relation to each other, had occupied the attention of philosophers and 
later psychologists. Elaborate concepts (e.g., consciousness, purpose, desire, 
etc.) had been defined to explain the 'intelligent' activities of man. A typical 
theoretical framework as an explanation for such modes of human behaviour 
was the doctrine of 'Hedonism' in the 17th and 18th centuries, which asserted 
that individuals are motivated by a desire for 'pleasure' and by an aversion to 
'pain' • 
Historically, human subjects were the principle domain of investigation for 
the researchers in behaviour. Much attention was given to the reasoning and 
intellectual faculties of man, especially, the effect of experiences on the mind 
and the organizational aspects of such mental impressions. During the past 
hundred years, the presence of two opposing philosophical views of 
'Rationalism' and 'Empiricism' has led to a major divergence of ideas in the 
field of learning sciences. 
2.3.1 AN OVERVIHW OF LEARNING-'11I1DU.BS WI'11IIN CXXNITIVB SCIENCES 
In rationalism, reason rather than the sensations input to an organism is 
the basis of knowledge; the animal's experiences are dealt with in a 
non-reductionist and holistic fashion, and the raw data are interpreted only 
according to certain forms of innate perceptual assumptions and relations. 
The internal processes and concepts embodied in the brain are considered to 
be as important as the experiences themselves. The case for the Rationalist 
view is much stronger in describing the higher forms of learning such as 
problem-solving or language-acquisition, and also in explaining the structural 
organization of perceptual data. Cognitive scientists and philosophers share 
the rationalist view point. 
A major school of thought, the 'Gestalt', was developed within the 
rationalist view-point, in opposition to the 'reductionist' analyses of 
experiences. The Gestaltists were originally concerned with perceptual 
organization and the unitary nature of sense information. But, later, using 
similar concepts, endeavoured to explain the problem-solving and learning 
abilities of animals. This was not done by considering only the animal's 
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input-output interactions, but by taking into account notions such as: 
knowledge, thinking, planning, inference, intention, insight, goal-directed ness, 
expectation etc. In cognitive explanation of leaning, the worker is interested 
in large-scale (molar) rather than smaIl-scale (molecular) action descriptions. 
Many elaborate learning theories have flourished from this 
rationalist/cognitive view point. Even, some mathematical models or 
pseudo-behavioural learning models (e.g., Tolman's ) have been developed with 
cognitive inclinations. Similarly, many of today's Problem-Solving, 
Artificial-Intelligence and Pattern-Recognition models also subscribe to the 
cognitive and organizational view. 
The discovery of various knowledge related structural or information 
retrieval (i.e., 'memory', 'remembering' and 'forgetting') aspects of the 
learning process is also attributed to Cognitive-Psychologists. In future 
chapters we will investigate the details of some cognitive learning models, and 
discuss them more fully. 
2.3.2 AN OVHRVIBW OF LRARNING-'J.'HlDUBS WI'lHIN BEHAVIOORAL SCIENCHS 
The doctrine of Empiricism has the view that experience is the only source 
of knowledge, and our 'ideas' are derived either by a direct copying of 
sensory impressions in the brain, or by combining several simple (or complex) 
ideas into one simple (or complex) idea. The majority of behaviourists and 
physiological psychologists are proponents of this view of 
knowledge-formation, and most of the associative theories of learning have 
been developed within this school of thought. 
Empiricism has four major components:-
(i) - SENSATIONALISM: all knowledge is derived directly or indirectly 
through experience. 
(ii) REDUCTIONISM: all complex ideas are comp<?sed of a basic pool of 
simple ideas and are, in turn, reducible to these simple ideas. 
(iii) - ASSOCIATIONISM: ideas or mental events are connected through the 
proximity of their occurrence in time or space. 
(iv) - MECHANISM: the mind is a machine like entity, built from simple 
components, with no mystical dimensions. 
The study of human and animal learning behaviour has been one of the 
most intriguing subjects for the inquisitive scientists throughout the ages. 
Initially, hampered by the complexity of the task and the vagueness of 
methodologies, or other socio-religious obstacles, no significant advances were 
made into finding a scientific understanding of the 'learning process'. It was 
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Darwin's study of animals' common ancestry and the subsequent development 
of evolutionary theories which laid a solid foundation for the systematic 
research by behavioural-physiologists and behavioural-psychologists; namely, 
principal adherents like Thorndike, Pavlov, Watson, Lorenz, Hull and Skinner. 
The work of these behaviouriats have contributed to the rich body of 
contemporary knowledge on animal-learning; and their rigorous empirical 
enquiries triggered an explosion of scientific interest which has led to the 
enormous variety of research into this subject. 
It is relevant here to mention a dichotomy which exists regarding the 
methods used for the investigations of learning in animal-behaviour sciences:-
(i) - EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: the experiments in this field are 
performed in controlled laboratory environments using isolated 
stimUlus-response investigations of a behavioural pattern, which may 
not normally occur in the animal's encounters with nature. There is a 
clear and deliberate omission of all mentallistic references (e.~., 
consciousness, mind, free will, imagination, emotion etc.). The mBlD 
task is the prediction and the control of behaviour by the sole use of 
observed data.; introspection plays no part in this method. 
(ti) - ETHOLOGY: or the study of animals in natureb-is historicalll the 
established branch of behavioural-sciences, but .. 4 50 years ago It was 
overshadowed by the rise of e~ri.mental psy-cnology. However, more 
recently, the rigid settings and the unnatural surroundings of mazes, 
boxes and pulleys of experimental psychology laboratories have 
compelled some behavioural scientists to return the domain of study 
baclt to the animals' more accustomed surroundings in nature. 
2.3.3 AN OVERVIEW OF LHARNIKl '11DDUBS WI'l1IIN BRAIN AND NERVB-BYSl'BH SCIENCES 
During the 18th and the early 19th century, the accumulation of 
physiological knowledge was gradually localizing the brain as centre for 'mind' 
and 'soul'. This, later, followed by the general acknowledgment of the 
nervous-system as the sole organ responsible for control and coordination of 
all animal activities. By the beginning of the 20th century, the discovery of 
electricity and investigations of its effects on nerve and muscle tissues, 
together with an increasing knowledge of electrical, anatomical and 
physiological details of the brain (and its components the 'neurons') had led 
to a much clearer view of the make-up of the brain and the nervous system. 
Work pioneered by the famous Russian Scientist Pavlov into isolating 
specific aspects of an animal's learning behaviour, and other early analytical 
studies of response mechanisms, resulted in the introduction of associative 
learning theories. These endeavours were the inspirations for the 
brain-researchers to embark on a methodical study of the brain's functions 
and structures. 
The theories of 'Neural-Pathways' introduced by Bebb (1949), as a 
progression of Pavlovian ideas was an attempt to find a coherent explanation 
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of learning in terms of sensory impressions on nerve structures. The 
convergence of behavioural and physiological sciences helped to establish 
many inter-disciplinary subjects. However, several strictly behaviourist or 
specialized neuro-physiological branches of learning sciences were also 
developed. Although, there have been many significant advances in all fields 
of nerve and brain sciences, physiological theories that can offer global 
principles or laws for different types of learning have not been forthcoming. 
The most solid achievements have been based on the empirical observations of 
specific isolated aspects of learning such as 'conditioning' or 'habituation'; 
and have, mainly, involved experiments on simple nerve-cell preparations or 
lower animals. 
The spectacular progress made in the science of Genetics, from the 
speculative observations of Mendelian Genetics to the descriptive explanations 
of Genes, followed by the molecular discoveries of DNA, RNA, and finally the 
mechanisms of genetic coding, can be a good example as to how, ideally, the 
theories of learning should develope. Therefore, the study of the learning 
process at the cellular level should really be complementary to the studies at 
the behavioural and cognitive levels, and not isolated within its domain. 
Since, only a combined broad approach will enable the attainment of 
significant breakthroughs, on par with the science of Genetics. 
2.4 BEHAVIOORAL APRDACH TO <X:NCEPrS AND ISSUES IN LEARNING 
To understand some of the methods used by behaviourists in exploring the 
mysteries of this enigmatic subject, we should look at some typical definitions 
for "learning" in related literature. 
LEARNING 1S:-
"A change in the strength of an act through traini!!g procedure." 
(Hilgard and Marquis, 1940) 
"The reassortment of animal's responses in a complex situation." 
(Skinner, 1961) 
"A process which manifests itself by adaptive changes in an individual's 
behaviour as a result of experience." (Thorpe, 1963) 
"The process through which life experiences leave a mark on an individual 
and permits an animal to develop new adaptations." (Dethier and Stellar, 1970) 
"A relatively permanent change in behaviour which is not directly observable (different from performance) and comes about as a result of experience or 
practice." (Mednick, Pollio and LOftus, 1973) 
"An adaptive modification of behaviour towards a stimulus that can be traced 
to a specific experience in an animal's life with that stimulus or a similar 
one." (Alcock, 1975) 
"The change in behaviour or behaviour P.Otential to a given situation brought 
about by repeated experiences in that Situation, provided that the behaviour 
change cannot be explained on the basis of the subject's native resP-Qnse 
tendencies, maturation, or temporary states. It (Bower and Hilgard, 1981) 
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We can see that in the above selection of definitions, regardless of their 
generality or specificity: (a) - there is an underlying mechanistic approach to 
the explanations of the learning-process; and, (b) - there is emphasis on thc 
externally apparent aspects of learning, namely, the 'behaviour', and little 
reference to any of its internal features. 
A typical behaviourist's experiment deals with the categorization, the 
isolation, and the scrutiny of a particular external behavioural aspect of an 
animal's learning-process. Under a desire for objectivity (pcrhaps misplaced), 
and a quest for theorizing the learning-process, the behavioural scientists 
have demanded that all knowledge should be operationalized in terms of 
behavioural responses. The enormous volume of research amassed over many 
years in the behavioural-sciences has resulted in the formation of a solid 
framework of concepts and criteria about the behavioural aspects of the 
learning-process. Now, without trying to go into much historical, 
experimental or developmental details, firstly, we will outline the basic 
assumptions which have been the guidelines for researchers in this field, and 
secondly, we will enumerate the major concepts that have emerged from this 
body of science. 
2.4.1 CHARAa:rHRISTIm I ATlRIBl1rES I cnlCKPl'S AND lAWS OF LEARNING 
All classes of learning and adaptive processes in animals are intuitively 
considered to possess a unique origin, this is in view of their common 
phylogenetic background. Hence, the differences seen between various 
learning processes are not merely an indication of their accompanying 
structural complexities, but, also, reveal the levels of an evolutionary ascent. 
This hierarchy being the result of the endeavours of various species in trying 
to cope with increasingly complex environments and learning tasks. Ideally, 
some unifying concepts and theories should exist to encompass and explain all 
classes of adaptive-processes. But, in reality, the empirical analyses of these 
processes have compelled the behavioural scientists into defining rigid 
boundaries and characteristics for different types of 'learned' behaviour. 
2.4.2 IBARNDIl VB. INNAm BBHAVIaIl 
One of the most notable points of discussion in behavioural sciences, as 
well as being historically significant, has been the dilemma over 'innate' 
against 'learned' behaviour. This strict classification of behaviour led to 
years of debating amongst researchers in animal-behaviour. 
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The question of instinct vs. learning was also at the root of the so called 
tNature-Nurture' controversy. On the one hand, the hereditarians claimed 
that behaviour is mainly the result of an internal genetic process. On the 
other hand, the environmentalists maintained that most behaviour is the 
product of experience. 
The validity of this distinction in a fundamental way is not conclusive, and 
empirical results have shown a mutual dependance in the development of 
innate and learned behaviours. The Innate (unlearned) responses have been 
classified into three major types:-
(1) - REFLEXES: simple neura-muscular reactions to stimuli. 
(2) - INSTINCTS: complex patterns of inborn activities. 
(3) - TAXES: orientation of the organism with respect to a stimulus. 
Instincts are generally referred to the tstereotyped' patterns of behaviour 
which: are usually complex in nature; are found universally amongst the 
members of a species; are evoked without the need for prior learning or 
experience; are seen in their complete form at their first occurrence; are 
relatively invariant; and are elicited by a specific releasing stimulus. 
The birds' song-learning or nest-building abilities and numerous other 
ritualistic, predatory, maternal and reproductive activities of insects and 
animals are classified as tinstinctive'. However, it has been observed that the 
proper development of an instinctive behaviour is dependent on the external 
presence of the appropriate environmental cues, as well as the internal 
genetic make-up and hormonal secretions. 
In the case of a young bird learning to sing, ethologists have made the 
observation that the young bird must be exposed to the singing of a mature 
bird at a critical phase of its development in order to acquire the complete 
singing proficiency of a fully grown bird. Similarly, the nest-bUilding 
capabilities of birds, although quite complete in their first occurrence, are 
refined in successive seasons as a result of gradual adaptations to various 
environmental factors. 
In addition, some experiments have shown that sensory or other 
deprivations, or the administration of artificial physio-chemical stimuli during 
the development of an animal's nervous-system interfere with its acquisition 
of normal learning-ability. Although, the precise nature of the correlations 
between biological and environmental events are unknown, a clear 
interdependence has been demonstrated. 
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A different version of the nature-nurture controversy is the attempt to 
apportion the relative contribution of genetic and environmental factors in 
the formation of a particular type of behaviour. 
Today, instinctive-behaviour is no longer considered in a rigid either/or 
fashion. The phylogenetic composition of an animal determines the pattern of 
such stereotyped activities which are, in turn, shaped to the individual 
animal's ecological niche, or its other environmental conditions. 
In a sense, the genetic native response patterns, inborn in the animals' 
nervous-systems, may be considered as the link between 
phylogenetic-adaptations and ontogenetic-learning. 
One of the most important characteristics of innate behaviours are found 
in their 'Releasing-Mechanisms' (i.e., the sensory cues which initiate a set of 
genetically programmed actions). Innate behaviours such as: the reflexive 
constrictions of pupils, the seasonal mating habits of birds, or the orientation 
skills of insects, are all controlled by releasing-mechanisms. Releaser stimuli 
could be either perceptual/physio-chemical/environmental inputs, or internal 
releasers such as the hormones which regulate and dictate many aspects of an 
organism's life. 
2.4.3 LEARNING VB. arHER SENSCEY OIANGHS 
Further distinctions are normally made between the behavioural changes 
resulted from the process of learning and other behavioural changes. Some of 
these changes show a striking resemblance to some features of a 'learned' 
change brought about by conditioning or extinction, but they are generally 
thought to belong to a different class of behaviour. However, it is not clear 
yet if there are completely distinct mechanisms at work at the 
neuro-physiological levels of some of these apparently similar changes. These 
non-learned sensory changes are as follows:-
(1) -
(2) -
(3) -
MATURATION: the developmental changes associated with growth 
process, such as learning to walk in humans or learning to fly in birds. 
FATIGUE: a recoverable change to performance due to motor 
exhaustion, such as reduced response time due to tiredness. 
SENSITIZATION: a reversible adaptive alteration to sense organs or 
sensory habituation, such as can tie seen in the heat sensing mechanism 
of the skin, where sensitization to excessive but non-damaging 
temperatures may occur. 
(4) - DAMAGE: a ~rmanent change to behaviour due to a physical 
impairment or decay of sensory motor system. 
Since learning itself is not directly observable (except possibly in a very 
elementary sense, in the associative conditioning of a simple animal's 
nerve-cell preparation), a crucial distinction is made between 'learning' and 
'performance' (i.e., the only external measure of the process of learning). 
Simply observing performance, without taking some underlying parameters such 
as motivation, attention, arousal and drive into account, will not give a clear 
view of a learning-process. It can be said that performance is an integral 
'factor' or a 'variable' of the learning-process. 
2.4.5 ATIRIB1I'.ES OF LEARNING 
To narrow down the definition of an organism's activities which could be 
called as 'learned', and exclude all other non-learned behavioural changes, 
generally, the following three principles have been attributed to learning 
within the literatures of behavioural sciences:-
(1) - PERMANENCE: learnin,c may result in an enduring change in an 
animal's future behaVIour. 
(2) - ADAPTIVENESS: learning comes about as a result of practice or 
experience which culminates in adaptive or advantageous change. 
(3) - CONTROLLABLE: learning can be altered by experimental, instructional 
or environmental intervention, and is a reversible process. 
2.4.6 mmmOOING 
A survey of psychological and animal-behaviour literature shows that the 
origin of modern learning theories is, generally, attributed to Thorndike's 
work on 'trial and error' learning at the end of the 19th century - in 
experiments involving caged animals that learned to escape from puzzle-boxes. 
These experiments led to the development of a conceptual framework, and 
signified the basis for the methodology used by later behavioural researchers 
in learning. 
Another major landmark in the development of learning theories was the 
Russian Physiologist Pavlov's experiments on the conditioning of animals' 
reflex responses (e.g., the salivation response in a dog). This work, in turn, 
signified the start of a variety of 'Stimulus-Response' (S-R) associative 
theories. The 'Pavlovian/Type-I/Classical Conditioning' can be, generally, 
thought of as a simple type of learning. While. lacking the richness and the 
descriptive/interpretative qualities of a complex learning process. this form of 
conditioning has the advantage of being easily controllable and demonstrable 
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experimentally; and the theories that have been developed from this type of 
work have enabled the explanation of many aspects of simple learning in 
organisms. 
The physiological processes involved in the response conditioning of simple 
animals have also been investigated, mainly, by noting the neuro-chemical and 
neuro-physiologica1 changes that take place during conditioning. 
Later, 'Skinnerian/Type-II/Operant/Instrumental Conditioning' was 
introduced which, yet, further developed the idea of stimulus-response 
conditioning, and founded many new hypotheses and terminologies. Unlike 
classical conditioning which was mainly involved with the reflexive and 
automated modes of behaviour; here, other more complex criteria were also 
postulated by workers on this second type of conditioning to explain various 
facets of higher order behaviour. 
The main distinguishing feature of Type-I/Classical Conditioning from 
Type-II/Instrumental Conditioning is that in type-I the stimulus which is to 
be conditioned occurs independent of animal's response, while, in type-II such 
stimulus ('reinforcer' or 'punisher') is dependant on the emission of some 
designated response. Generally, the essence of a conditioning experiment is 
to isolate a specific behavioural pattern, and observe the establishment of a 
bond between a previously neutral input (Unconditioned Stimulus) and an 
elicited output (Responses/Reflexes) of the animal. Such associations are 
governed by the proximity of input-output occurrence, and also by the desire 
of the animal to achieve or attain a favourable response. 
An extension of simple Pavlovian conditioning notions has been the ideas 
of 'secondary' or 'higher-order' conditioning. This is the observation that a 
second neutral stimulus could be paired with a Conditioned Stimulus (CS) t.hat 
had already been conditioned to produce a response, and later this secondary 
stimulus will itself evoke the response without the presence of es. 
There have also been interesting investigations of the so called 
'Introceptive-Conditioning' or the conditioning of internal involuntary reflexes 
(e.g heart-beat) to some external stimulus. This type of conditioning has 
been demonstrated dramatically by experimental results - animals that had 
been trained to reduce their pUlse-rate in return for the electrical stimulation 
of certain pleasurable areas of their brain, would, in fact, reduce their 
heart-beat to a fatal point. 
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In addition to the learning theories which were introduced by the rigorous 
investigations of the phenomenon of conditioning, many other S-R learning 
theories have been put forward, namely by: Thorndike, Bull, Guthrie and 
Estes; and generally, from the reductionist-behaviourist point of view. The 
following are some general principles which have emerged from the various 
postulates on conditioning and other S-R theories:-
(i) - THE LAW OF CONTIGUITY 
The principle of 'association' or 'connectivism' is one which prevails in all 
S-R theories, it is the assertion that a connection is created between 
experiences which occur closely together in time or space. The extension of 
this law to the classical conditioning ideas was to attribute the bonding of 
Conditioned-Stimulus (CS) and Conditioned-Reflex (CR) to the temporal 
proximity of their occurrence. 
Experiments on the relationships of the elapsed time intervals between the 
Conditioned-Stimulus (CS) and the Un-Conditioned-Stimulus (UCS) have shown 
that a time lag of under one second between CS and UCS is optimal in 
establishing the corresponding bond. In other words, the rewarding stimulus 
to the animal should, optimally, follow the occurrence of the stimulus to be 
conditioned in little less than a second. The associative feature of 
experiences, as outlined by the law of contiguity, has been further highlighted 
by the 'inferential' nature of stimulus and response linkage in the 
higher-order conditioning. 
(ii) - THE PRINCIPLE OF REPETITION 
The conditioning experiments have shown that the repetition of a CS and 
UCS pairing strengthens the CR. This observation is universal in all types of 
learning. 
(iii) - THE CONCEPT OF GENERALIZATION 
In the process of conditioning, the response once established to a 
particular stimulus, will be evoked by a stimulus similar to es. This is called 
'Primary-Generalization' to distinguish it from the learned similarity of two 
stimuli, which is called 'Secondary-Generalization'. 
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(iv) - THE CONCEPT OF DISCRIMINATION 
This is the complementary concept to generalization. 'Discrimination' is 
the process by which stimuli are differentiated, and the desired ones filtered 
out from a range of stimuli. 
(v) - THE PRINCIPLE OF REINFORCEMENT 
This concept, in certain forms also known as the 'Law of Effect', is the 
process essential for the strengthening of associative bonds between 
experiences. Reinforcement is, basically, about the role of 'reward' and 
'punishment' in the consolidation or the weakening of associations. It is the 
general consensus that animals would learn to do things better if they were 
rewarded with food, water or other rewards. 
The major ideas of reinforcement were developed from the work on the 
Skinnerian type Conditioning, it was discovered that both 
'positive-reinforcement' (reward) and 'negative-reinforcement' (punishment) 
were influential factors in motivating an animal to learn. 
Partial-Reinforcement has also been investigated, and attributed with the 
interesting property of establishing a stronger S-R bond than a total 
reinforcement. 'Goal', 'motivation' and 'drive' are relevant notions here, 
since many psychologists believe that these are the forces which activate an 
animal's learning. Although, these concepts could be correlated to some 
physiological mechanisms, yet, they can only be inferred empirically from the 
performance of an animal. In the language of behaviourism; it can be said 
that an animal is 'directed' towards 'learning' by striving for a 'goal', and the 
energizing source for 'motivating' such behaviour is the 'drive'. Here, some 
workers, in attempting to explain the nature of the initiating forces of 
learning, have speculated that 'drive-reduction' is the primary reinforcer in 
the learning process, and that a stimulus is bonded to a response if and only 
if the animal's drive and motivation level are reduced after such a response. 
(vi) - THE LAW OF INTERFERENCE 
This law covers the case of 'Forgetting' and the 'Extinction' of 
conditioned/learned responses; it states that a learned or conditioned pattern 
of events or behaviours may be weakened or inhibited by similar learning 
endeavours. The permanent nature of learning mentioned earlier is also 
emphasized by this law. The typical gradual extinction of a 
conditioned/learned responses is believed to be due to 'inhibition' and not the 
result of an irretrievable loss. This can be demonstrated by a so called 
'spontaneous-recovery' of a conditioned-behaviour which had been forced into 
a complete apparent extinction by the retraining of the animal - the 
conditioned-behaviour is, normally, restored to half its original comlislency 
after a rest period. 
2.5 THE COGNITIVE APPROACH TO CONCEPTS AND ISSUES IN LEARNING 
During the development of behaviourist explanations of the 
learning-process, all knowledge had been considered to be reducible to 
stimulus-response bonds. This belief and its apparent inability to explain 
many complex issues arising from the investigations of learning had impelled 
many researchers to voice their criticism to the mechanistic view of the 
subject. Cognitive-Scientists refuted this observational and empirical emphasis 
in the analysis of the learning-process, and introduced a new outlook towards 
this subject, the key notions being Information, Perception and Organization 
of Knowledge. 
In trying to tackle the problem of learning from a different angle, there 
have been many re-definitions of the behavioural concepts using the 
organizational approach, as well as the introduction of a number of new 
criteria. However, in certain cases it is difficult to appreciate the validity or 
the necessity for separate terminologies. Numerous concepts within cognitive 
and behavioural outlooks refer to identical properties of learning and many 
underlying principles are common to both views. 
seemingly due to differences in:-
(1) - Levels of observations, 
(2) - Interpretations put on empirical results, 
(3) - Approaches to various problems, 
The distinctions are 
(4) - Preferences given to specific experimental methods. 
A typical behaviourist's experiment is that of an experimental animal 
involved in a maze-running or lever-pressing task, while a cognitive 
psychologist typically engages in experiments on human su bjects in recall or 
recognition of a string of symbols. In the following without pinpointing the 
underlying critical or diametric views, or the detailed experimental evidence 
we will briefly enumerate the various definitions and concepts that have 
emerged from the study of learning by cognitive-scientists. 
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2.5.1 DEFINITIONS OF LEARNING 
The question of 'learning' in cognitive-sciences is approached in a 
fundamentally similar way to the behaviourist's view, it is considered that 
learning should possess the same principle attributes of:-
(1)-~ (2) - AlW'rABILITY (3) - axJKllABILITY 
The holistic nature of outlook to problems has led the workers in this 
field to define the process of learning in more abstract terms. Sommerhoff 
(1974) emphasizes this point: "The main correlation established during learning 
appears to be between objects and goals rather than between specific neural 
inputs and outputs." 
2.5.2 PERCEPTUAL CONCEPTS IN COGNITIVE-SCIENCES 
The cognitive-sciences have historically evolved from the Gestalt school of 
thought and have inherited many established principles of the theories of 
Perception. The main underlying principles of perception are:-
(i) 
(ii) 
- THE LAW OF FIGURE-GROUND: A distinction is made between a 
figure and its background, using the perceptual features of it's 
boundaries, this 18w can be equated to the 'concept of 
discriminatIon'. 
THE LAW OF SIMILARITY: Items that have some common features 
are grouped together, this law can be equated to the 'concept of 
generalization' • 
(iii) - THE LAW OF PROXIMITY: The elements of a field of objects are 
grouped together according to their nearness to one another, this law 
can 6e equated to the 'law of contiguity'. 
(iv) 
(v) 
- THE LAW OF COMMON-DmECTION: A set of percepts will tend to 
group .to~ether if they appear to be in a sequentia order or points 
on a sunple curve. 
- THE LAW OF SIMPLICITY: The perceptual information is divided and 
organizes into simple and regular figures. 
The 'Trace-Theory' of perception emerged from these principles, it was an 
explanation for the neural processes which are active during perception. This 
theory states that: "The perceptual experiences are reflected in neurons as an 
enduring trace, in the same form as the original neural-impressions of such 
perceptions". Ideas or events are associated not by the formation of a bond 
between two or more separate entities but by the creation of a new 'whole' 
unitary percept. 'Recall' or 'Remembering' is the reactivation of a given 
memory trace. A trace continues to exist in the nervous-system and can be 
retrieved by the selection of the appropriate cues, and the SUbsequent 
amplification of the trace. 'Forgetting' occurs in either the retrieval-failure 
of the trace, or the disintegration or modification of it. Trace-theory and 
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other theories of perception and cognition have been instrumental in the 
formation of a cognitive explanation of the learning process. Various notions 
to the behaviourist's concepts of contiguity, reinforcement, repetition, 
interference, discrimination and generalization have, hence, been developed; 
and, while some of these redefinitions are only a different way of construing 
a concept the cognitive approach has. indeed, shed light on some specific 
aspects of learning, namely that of memory-formation, knowledge-acquisition 
and the concept of 'expectancy'. 
2.5.3 STIMULUS-STIMULUS (S-S) THEORIES OF LEARNING 
An alternate class of explanations of the learning-mechanisms. namely J the 
Stimulus-Stimulus (S-S) theories have emerged from the cognitive school of 
thought. The pioneers of learning research within Gestalt idealogy such as 
Koffka and Kohler founded the lines of scientific work on the subjects of 
insightful-learning and problem-solving. This was later followed notably by 
Tolman's (1959) work on cognitive aspects of learning, especially 
Latent-Learning (solving detour-problems and cognitive-mapping by animals). 
The resulting S-S explanations of the adaptive-processes which were 
involved in these areas of learning research were contrary to the Bullian S-R 
theories. the Pavlovian-Conditioning notion of stimulus-substitution is possibly 
more akin to these S-S ideas. The S-S theories state that: "The perception 
of relationships between stimuli and the anticipation of consequences are the 
primary functions in the modifications of behaviour during learning, also, 
association is made between different stimuli rather than a stimulus and 
response" • 
The two varying S-R and S-S explanations of a learning-process is 
illustrated in FIGURE 2.1. where a Type-I/Classical Conditioning task (e.g., 
conditioning of a reflex response) is analyzed using these two interpretations. 
TYPE OF 
EXPLANATION 
S-R 
........... 
S-s 
PHASE 1 
Pre-Test State 
UCS -+ UCR 
PHASE 2 
Training-State 
UCS ----,0\10 CR 
(UnCon. ) (UnCon. ) (Con. ) + Neutral 
Stimulus 
PHASE 3 
Testing-State 
CS """"""*""uaojIo CR 
. .............. . 
CS=UCS ---+ CR (Stimulus) (Response) (Resp.) _ ______ .... ___________ ..... _________ ,...;_.....& __ '"'1 ... ___ '_____ ... 
FIGURE 2.1. The S-R and S-S explanations of a typical conditioned refiex 
e;xperiment, the principal difference of these two theories are in 
the final phase of learning. In S-S the Conditioned-Stimulus 
and the Unconditioned-Stimulus are thought to have functionally 
fused together, while in S-R a new associative bond is thought 
to have been created between CS and CR. 
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2.5.4 MEMORY 
The proponents of conditioning experiments had contemplated the question 
of memory-formation. In their view a memory of experiences or events was 
created and organised, and was an intrinsic and integral part of the 
learning-process. The explanations of learning-mechanisms involved in the 
neural level was based on the Stimulus-Response (S-R) notions, the essence of 
these theories was the consolidation of associative bonds between stimuli and 
responses. 
The S-S approach to memory-formation has culminated in a host of 
theories and findings in the cognitive sciences. To elaborate some of the 
issues that are involved, we will attempt to analyze a hypothetical learning 
process. 
Any organism or animal as an entity could be thought of as having three 
general modes of activity:-
(i) - 'Inputs' (sensory or physical) from the environment to the body. 
(il) 
(iii) -
'Out'puts' from the organism which brings about changes in the 
enVlronment (or its movements). 
'Internal Processes' occurring within the body of the organism. 
-----_._._ ... _ .... _--
Within this universe of actions learning is an isolated phenomenon, with 
some of its attributes enumerated earlier. The existence of a persistent 
sensory-impression of experiences at the neural level, and the relevance of 
such a storage of information to the learning-process, was intuitively taken 
for granted by early researchers. The principles of tdirectiveness' and 
'repeatability' of a learning-process are the main witnesses in support for 
such a 'Memory-Trace' or 'Engram'. The presence of a storage for 
information in the brain can also be inferred, by the subsequent testing of 
the performance or the knowledge of an animal that has undergone learning. 
If we take for granted certain a-priori concepts regarding the 
environmental constraints and the internal modes of an organism (e.g., the 
feasibility of response, motivation, drive, attention), then a tri-Ievel 
explanation of a typical learning process could be depicted by the sequences 
of TABLE 2.2. Whereby, the various explanatory stages of verbal-descriptive, 
state-of-knowledge, and memory-trace are outlined. 
TABLE 2.2. The different phases involved in a general task-learning activity, 
the corresponding states in the knowledge level and the 
memory-trace modes are shown. 
PHASE 1 
PHASE 2 
PRE-LEARNING 
INITIAL 
LEARNING OR 
TRAINING 
PRIOR KNOWLEDGE 
ACQUISITION 
OF INFORMATION 
END OF PROCESSING AND 
PRE-LEARNING TRACE 
TRACE-FORMATION 
PHASE 3 PRIMARY STORAGE TRACE-RETENTION 
LEARNING OF INFORMATION 
...... "" ..... 11 .. 111 .• __ ........ ... .. ttt ..... "II_" ....... U_III_lIIlutIUIIIIMUm_ItIlOltllltN./.I ft' .. "_III_'_..__ ........ u .. _ ... '_._II .... 'U __ ... ' ..... IIIII'.UIU'III_Jn1II1.tI '_""" __ ''''''''''III''''II_IIIUIIIJlUIIIJIIIIIIII.IIII,,"II,_''''_''''IIIUIIIII,nlll1l1 
RECOGNITION AND 
PHASE 4 TESTING RETRIEVAL OF TRACE-RECALL 
LEARNED INFORMATION 
II/StMUnMI ... " ....... IH __ au .... ,Irt~ ... ··_* ... ! .... I ........ I ............. WM~  ... """' ............... AltNll 
REHEARSAL AND 
PHASE 5 RE-LEARNING REFINING OF TRACE-CONSOLIDATION 
LEARNED INFORMATION 
-..nu .... ,IUIIINID""UtMtIl ..... 1111IUIIIIfC.I.....mn~.....,...."" ............... 1 1~ __ "*" .......... I ... lnu .. : ,.,....."."' ___ ..-.-__ II.....,...-sau ............ ' __ I'.ttILII' 
TOTAL OR PARTIAL 
PHASE 6 FORGETTING LOSS OF STORED TRACE-DECLINE 
PHASE 7 
--"'--' 
USE OF 
LEARNED SKILL 
OR KNOWLEDGE 
INFORMATION 
EXECUTIVE 
MODE OF 
INFORMATION 
TRACE-UTILIZATION 
.. _-----_. 
The explanations of TABLE 2.2 is by no means a blue-print for all learning 
processes, various phases could be omitted, repeated or may occur in different 
order, depending on the experimental or specific environmental circumstances. 
2.5.5 DIFFERENT TYPES OF MEMORY 
In the micro-level of observation of a learning-process, all the elements of 
the brain (i.e., the 'neurons') may seem to be functioning, in a continuous and 
seemingly random mode of electrical activity. However, in the macro-learning 
sciences various explanations and definitions have been devised in an attempt 
to separate the brain into areas whose functions could be associated with 
specific cognitive processes (such as 'retention', 'retrieval' or 'forgetting'); 
also, different types of memory-storage with distinctive mechanisms have been 
elaborated. 
Referring to TABLE 2.2, the phases 1 and 2 which refer to the static and 
transitional learning stages of memory-trace will not be discussed in more 
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detail here, since the acquisitional aspects of learning were covered earlier in 
this chapter. 
The investigation of memory-trace retention, the phase 3, has resulted in 
the categorization of memory into different groups according to the type of 
information stored. These various types are 'Semantic-Memory', 
'Spatial-Memory', 'Sensory-Perceptual-Memory' (audio, visual, touch, etc.) or 
Procedural-Motoric-Memory (skills). 
A further classification of memory is, also, made into 'Iconic-Memory', 
'Short-Term-Memory' (S.T.M.) or 'Long-Term-Memory' (L.T.M.), according to 
the duration of information retention within each type. 
(1) -
(2) -
(3) -
Iconic-Memory: This is described as a very short lasting visual memory, 
iconic-memory refers to the temROrary retention and recall capabilities 
of visual and nervous systems when exposed to a brief visual percept. 
Short-Term-Memory: This type of memory is generally referred to the 
temporary storage of perceived data for future evaluation, utilization or 
disposal. The dominant feature of S. T .M. is the fast decay time of the 
information. In the case of animal experiments involving place-learning 
or latent-learning it was noticed tliat an animal that was allowed to 
see the placinj( or a food object in a room established a S.T.M. of that 
event, and if·· after a fairly short ~riod of time the animal was 
released in that room, it displayed a delayed-action' by remembering 
the location of the food and subsequently searching for it. Other 
experiments on human subjects have established the capacity of an 
average human's S.T.M. to 6e 7±2 symbols, letters, numbers or words. 
Long-Term-Memory: This ty~ of memory: contains a very large volume 
of iriformation, experiences of an animal's life are accumulated in this 
type of memory as well as the semantic-memorl in the case of humans. 
Tile information stored in the primary level 0 S. T .M. is thought to be 
transferred to this hig;her and more permanent level. The factors 
contributin, to or inhibIting such transfers are motivation, arousal and 
attention 0 the animal and the novelty, sil{nificance or repetition of 
the eX]'!eriences. The rehearsal of the learnmg material in phase 5 of 
TABLE~.2, facilitates the transfer of information from S.T.M. to L.T.M. 
2.5.6 DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN S. T .M. AND L. T .M. 
The categorization of memory into L. T .M. and S. T .M. has been under 
constant scrutiny by scientists. Yet, many critics have pointed out that there 
is no conclusive evidence to justify such a distinction. This is mainly in view 
of many similar and common principles which are observed in retrieval, 
interference or decay aspects of both memories. 
The physiological evidence of partially damaged brains or lesions of parts 
of an animal's brain has indicated that such damage could impair one kind or 
other of memory, but whether this conclusively proves the dual nature of the 
memory mechanisms and locations is not clear yet. 
For simple associative learning tasks in lower animals the 'plasticity' of 
the brain as a homoeomorphic entity has been demonstrated. The technique 
Eapirica a.d Tbeories of LearDi., 53 
normally used is to observe the effect of lesions to various areas of the brain 
on learning or recall abilities of an animal. It has been shown that there are 
no specific regions in the 'cortex' (grey matter) of the brain, which are 
uniquely responsible for the acquisition or the retention of this type of 
learning. 
The 'holographic' nature of memory-storage has, also, been demonstrated 
by noting that the removal of a percentage of an experimental animal's cortex 
does not extinguish a specific learned task, but only results in the reduction 
of resolution of certain aspects of the animal's performance, speed or 
learning-capacity. In other words, such dissections lead to the reduction of 
the resolution of memory, rather than the complete loss of chunks of 
information. 
It has also been noticed that the total loss of the thypocampus' of an 
experimental animal's brain, only inhibits the transition from S.T.M. to L.T.M., 
and the prior contents of L.T.M. or the current information in S.T.M. is not 
directly affected. 
The results of these and other experiments have shown that, although, 
distinctive memory processes seem to be involved, physiologically the 
existence of separate brain locations for the two memory mechanisms has not 
been positively verified. The main objection to the methods involved in this 
type of work being the interference of such experiments in the actual 
mechanisms under investigation. 
2.5.7 REMEMBERING 
The current cognitive-psychology research has been mainly involved with 
the organizational aspects of memory formation and retrieval. Remembering 
or recall of an experience involves procedures of 'recognition' and 'retrieval' 
of memory-traces. 
In the act of recognition the animal given a multiple choice of stimuli 
chooses one which has a particular set of cognitive attributes or cues. In 
higher learning processes, such as concept-learning or problem-solving, this 
task extends to a 'search' for cognitive rules or procedures. 
The retrieval of information from memory has also highlighted a 
distinction between S.T.M. and L.T.M. Experimental results have shown that, 
the retrieval of data from S.T.M. is done by duplicating or replaying the 
original perceptual experience, for example, in the recall of a set of words 
which are stored in S.T.M., only the sound is remembered and not the 
meaning, while in recalling from L.T.M. the meaning or the context of an 
experience is remembered. 
The process of information retrieval calls for a 'search' of the 
memory-store for the appropriate attribute, the procedures involved in this 
search could be one of a number of conceivable alternatives, such as 
serial/parallel or holist/partist. The experimental results in this direction 
point to the search in S. T .M. being done by a Successive-Scanning of memory 
in search of target information. In L.T.M., also, a hierarchal and contextual 
ordering of information, and search, has been demonstrated which indicates 
that data is structured according to its meaning or context, and experiences 
or inputs to a learning organism is classified in groups of similar percepts. 
2.5.8 FORGETTING 
Finally, in phase 6 of TABLE 2.2, the memory-trace formed during learning 
and relearning is subsequently diminished by the passage of time. There are 
five major explanations of this change as follows:-
(i) 
(ti) 
- Decay Theory: This is possibly the simplest e~lanation. It considers 
the decay of the memory simply _as the erosion of blocks of storage 
by time, and although it explains the reduction of recall at the 
S. T .M. level guite adequately, It does not account for the persistence 
of some trivi.ill information or skills over extremely long periods. 
Trace Change Theory: This theory attempts to e!H~in forgettinJ{ as 
the result of a gradual rounding-off or gener . tion of varIOUS 
details of memory of an event, and not the loss of strength of a 
memory-trace. The shapes of percepts are thought to, either change 
into familiar objects, or evolve into simpler shapes. Hence, although 
some novel or unique events are preserved almost in theIr original 
form, the mundane or routine events are rounded-off into their 
nearest ty~ical occurrence. Trace-change theory is not unanimously 
accepted by all learning. researchers, it started from the 
perception-theories of Gesl.alt Psychology L and it 'presupposes a 
continuous rehearsal of memory-traces. The experIments used in 
proving this type of theory are normally based on the successive 
evaluation of Ule learned-material, this is done by com~ing the 
reproductions of the original learning at different time intervals. 
The main criticism to this type of experiments is that the forgetting 
could be simply due to the distortion of data during the continuous 
rehearsals or reappraisals of information. 
(iii) - Retrieval Failure: This phenomenon indicates that forgetting is not 
due to the loss of the learned-material, but is the result of a failure 
in the retrieving of information from memory. The ex:periments 
conducted in support of this theory show that a memory WhICh seems 
to have been lost: can in fact be recalled by the introduction of new 
retrieval cues. 
(iv) - Intentional Forgettin,: Motivational influences on forgetting have been 
shown to have a significance in extinlfllishing memories associated with 
painful or un'pleasant e:g>eriences, . this tYJ)!t of forgetting is most 
commonly evident in indIviduals suffering from repression, also in 
controlled experiments ~ple could intentionally forget a learned 
memory by consciously deciding to dispose of the contents of a S.T.M •• 
(v) -
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!~:t'3:::se wiICi-:~h~ :!t~:l~rai st~~l t~ro{lou~t\~~~~rnt:~~re~~: 
aspects of learning has been exhaustively investigatea and a great deal 
of sU}lporting experiments exist. The observation that two similar 
experIences over a period of time tend to interfere with the retention 
of each others memorr-trace has led to the development of 
'Interference-Theory', whIch in fact is comprised of two sub-theories of 
'Retroactive-Interference' and 'Proactive-rnterference'. 
(a) - letroacti,e-llterferelce: The lain clail of interference theorl is that1 lelor, once established does not deca, or be cOle 10Bt, but is onl, displaced as a resu t of BOle lew 
sililar laterial. Bence, lere paBsale of tile does lOt contribute to for,ettil,. 
Retroacti,e-Interference iB a rhenolenon which stateB that newl, learned laterial cal 
replace the lelor, of pre,iousl, earned sililar laterial. 
This obser,ation haB been delonBtrated b, elperilents il which half of a ,roup of 
subject a in an task-learnia, elperilent participate oal, in the first part the erperilent, 
aad are rested in the second part. Whilel the felailial subjects continue with the learninl elperilent. The relati,e hi'h recal abilit, of the rested ,roup in relelberill the 
laterial which laa jointl, acquired, BhoiB that the continued traininl has in f.ct 
interfered with the pre,iousl, learned Bililar •• terial. 
(b) - Proacti,e-Ilterferelct: This is the cOlpleleltar, lotion to the ODe abo,e, it describes the 
effect that pre,ious elperielces or lelories cal ha,e 01 the acquisition of lew laterial. 
This tJPe of interfereDce is also deloDstr.ble \, elpirical reBults. B, uainl sililar 
techniques to retroacti,e-ilterference erperileats, it has been cODcluBi,el, BhoVD thatl the capacit, of learninl a particular tlpe of laterial II, diliniBh, IS the reBU t of 
interference fro. pre,iousl, learned Billlar laterial. 
2.5.9 OTHER ISSUES IN COGNITIVE SCIENCES 
As pointed out earlier, cognitive sciences have been investigating primarily 
the complex modes of learning-behaviours in higher animals and humans 
beings. Some existing concepts have been further developed and other new 
ones introduced. For example, the introduction of cognitive-search methods, 
cue-selection procedures involved in concept-learning, and also in insight and 
latent learning the idea of 'expectancy' of an event are some of the notions 
put forward in this paradigm. These 'issues seem to be relevant to our 
discussion of learning and will be discussed here. 
2.5.10 PROCEDURES AND STRATEGIES IN CONCEPT-LEARNING 
The learning of concepts is basically an attribute of man, although it has 
been shown that some higher animals possess conceptual capabilities in 
learning symbols or audio-visual commands. Yet, to conclusively demonstrate 
the notion of concept-formation, it would be necessary to know what an 
animal thinks, hence, language capability could be considered an implicit 
component of this type of learning process. 
One of the key issues in concept-learning is, the methods involved in the 
search of attributes/factors/cues of a concept in a specific context. The 
procedures for the 'search' and 'recognition' of these cognitive-cues bears a 
close similarity to the activities involved in the brain in 'recognition' and 
'retrieval' of memory-traces. Experimental results of the investigations in 
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this area have shown that the search and sorting of such attributes could be 
done in the following two principle ways:-
(i) - Reception/Serial Procedures: where a subject forms a hypothesis 
according to the successive encounters of the occurrence of an 
e~erience. To test such hfP.<?theses there are basically two distinct 
strategies. First, the 'holistic-strategy', which is to remember as 
many occurrences of a 'significant' experience and to try to verify the 
hYp<?thesis on the basis of such data. Second, the 'partist-strategy' 
in which the hy~thesis is tested in each incidence of the 'significant' 
experience. Here, the 'significant' or 'positive' instances of a 
concept-rule are those events which reinforce the subject's actions -
it may also be an instruction from a teacher, or a reward. 
(ii) - Selection/Parallel Procedures: are the complementary notions to serial 
procedures. In this case, the eX'periences are confronted all at once. 
The task is to extrapolate the slgnificant attributes from a selection 
of inputs. Here, also, ~rincip'ally two main strategies are used. First, 
the 'scanning-strategy in whiCh the subject forms a conceptual-rule (a set of attributes) and tests for the significant/positive instances of 
such a concept. This is done by successively scanning the context in 
a random manner, and by evaluating the hyppthesis at each stage. 
The second strategr is the 'focusing-strategy', which is to initialJ)" 
choose a general exemplar' with the highest positive conceptual 
attributes available. Su15sequently, conceptual events are selected in 
such a way that each attribute can be tested. This individual 
verification and rejection of attributes, finally refines the general 
exemplar, and yields the desired conceptual-rule. 
2.5.11 EXPECTANCY 
The notion of 'expectation' or 'anticipation' is also another important 
concept which has emerged from cognitive-sciences. This issue will be 
elaborated here, the background to the development of such ideas outlined, 
also the prominent role of Tolman (1959) in this area emphasised, and his 
theories of learning using this criteria briefly described. The particular 
interest in this fundamental issue is in view of the possible applications of its 
concepts to the problem of designing simple 'learning' models, as outlined by 
the objectives of this thesis. 
The survival of an organism requires the maintenance of certain physical 
inputs of the animal within tolerable levels, such as food, water, oxygen, etc. 
A notable feature of behaviourist's description of the learning-process is the 
underlying assumption that learning is initiated as a result of an animal's 
need to stay at its optimal physiological state. An explanation of a learning 
task achieved by a hungry animal, using the terminology of behaviourists 
could be as follows:-
The animal 'motivated' by a 'drive' for the 'goal' of attaining food. is 
'emitting' an 'exploratory' behaviour, this 'appetitive' task could bring ahout, 
by chance or by experimental design, certain events which will 'reinforce' the 
animal's behaviour. The 'contiguity' or the 'drive-reducing' properties of such 
events helps the animal to learn and remember the behavioural sequences 
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leading to these events for future use. The higher the motivational level or 
the drive of the animal the better the quality of learning. 
The 'goal' in such learning-tasks may be an object which is acted upon or 
ingested, or it could be the execution of a certain behavioural pattern, or, 
more generally, it can be considered as a change in the stimulation of the 
animal. New goals and sub-goals may be learned if they are instrumental in 
attaining the initial goal. The organization of such goals are considered to 
be in a hierarchal form in the order of survival-value priority. 
Similarly, the motivation could be a physiological need (e.g., food, water, 
pam-aversion), an acquired or learned motive (e.g., in experiments on 
primates, chimpanzees can learn to work for symbolic tokens which could be 
later used to acquire food), or could be a motive with not a very obvious 
purposive nature (e.g., the manipulation of toys by infants as noticed by 
Piaget (1977), or a general need for perceptual change in stimuli). 
The emphasis on the 'purposive' and 'goal-directed' nature of learning 
behaviour is, also, a major feature of the cognitive theories of learning such 
as Tolman's. He pointed out that: (1) - behaviour should be analyzed at the 
level of purposive actions rather than movements; and (2) - behaviour is 
"docile", in the sense that it should be considered adaptable to various 
changing circumstances, and the means available to the animal determine the 
choice of actions it takes. In his view, the actions of a motivated (e.g., 
hungry) animal are determined by the so called cognitive-mapping, which is 
the use of the knowledge of the spatial paths and other perceptual aspects of 
its environment. The organism is capable of putting together such 
information, or inventing a solution for reaching the goal event. The current 
behaviour is guided by the belief of the outcome of the actions rather than a 
reflexive response to a given goal. 
The analysis of behaviour of a hungry animal could be done at two levels, 
on the one hand it may be considered as a collection of muscular responses 
and on the other hand it can be looked at as a sequence of purposive mental 
events. However, as mentioned earlier, like most complex phenomena an 
organism's behaviour may be described at several different levels, and the 
distinction here seems to be the degree of emphasis given to the physical or 
mental aspects involved. 
Tolman was a proponent of the temporal and mentallistic approach to the 
explanations of behaviour. Be had the view that the organism engaged in a 
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deliberate reflection about problems. Such notions, nlthough familiar in 
human common sense, had a metaphysical flavour which resulted in a critical 
reception of his ideas by other scientific researchers of behaviour. Bence, in 
pursuit of a more objective explanation of his ideas he engaged in the 
investigations of the problem-solving abilities of animals, and other cognitive 
processes involved in learning. Although, human subjects would have been 
intuitively a more suitable domain for this type of enquiries, he mainly used 
animals for his experiments. 
In doing such research Tolman laid down the basis of an elaborate 
learning-theory. He postulated that the internal representation of events 
'signified' 'what-Ieads-to-what'. This representation was a strictly 
un-observable mental process, and it involved the 'anticipation' of stimuli and 
the 'expectation' of an event occurring. He emphasised the distinction 
between the 'acquisition' of learning and 'performance'. At the physiological 
level he favoured the S-S interpretation of the learning-process. 
Some of Tolman's experiments were based on observations of place-learning 
and latent-learning abilities in animals, these experiments involved the 
remembering of mazes or spatial paths by the organisms with no apparent 
immediate rewarding or reinforcing agents. 
The 'Law of Effect' which was introduced by Thorndike at the end of the 
19th century, and also the later 'contiguity' principles, slated that, behaviour 
is only learnt if it leads to the satisfaction of certain motivating conditions. 
Hence, their explanations of learning-processes could not wholly account for 
the observations made by Tolman. Therefore, he introduced the "principle of 
expectancy" which although not contradictory to the law of effect, yet, 
attempts to explain the learning-process at a deeper level. The 'reward' not 
only reinforced a specific response, but also went one step further by 
reinforcing the expectancy of a stimulus leading to such a response. 
According to Tolman's view, "learning takes place by confirmation of 
expectancies. " 
These theories explained the results of a class of experiments on primates 
in which monkeys having previously seen the placement of a fruit (banana) 
under a box upon the subsequent release into the environment expected to 
find the goal-object by lifting the box. But, if the banana was replaced with 
a different fruit (lettuce), then the animal's reward expectation of the first 
kind of fruit was not confirmed, and it rejected the second reward and 
carried on looking for the original goal-object, although it would have 
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normally accepted the lettuce as a primary reward. Habits and their 
formation is an important aspect of human behaviour in which the ideas of 
expectancy and the confirmation of such expectancies play a prominent part. 
For Tolman, the reward is not a necessary element of acquisition of 
learning, and the law of effect is not a universally valid principle for 
explaining adaptive learning changes. His principle learning theories based on 
the notion of 'what-Ieads-to-what' stated that:-
(a) - Two or more stimuli events are combined in 8-8 relations to form the 
basis of knowledge and. 
(b) - A stimulus 81 its response R1 and another stimuli 82 that follows R1 
form a three-term e~ectanc'y, written as 81-R1-S2. These expectancies 
are strengthened if the subsequent occurrence of S1-R1 sequence is 
followed by the expected stimulus S2. Similarly, it is weakened if 
S1-Rl occurred but were not followed by 82. 
An interesting feature of expectancies was that, they could be integrated 
into larger strings of expectancies (S1-Rl-82-R2-••• ), such as in learning a 
maze, the animal connects the expectancies at the choice points, it is 
subsequently able to amalgamate these sequences into a single chain of 
actions, which can be activated at the start of the maze. 
Another issue raised from this line of research was the inferential nature 
of thought processes, it was believed that an animal with a 81-R1-82 
expectancy, and engaged in its appetitive exploratory behaviour, learns 
associative relationships between pairs of events such as 82 and St. It 
subsequently makes an inference for a new expectancy of 81-Rl-S*. This is a 
process by which the discovery of perceptual associations by an organism 
(such as 82-S* pairings) at the cognitive level can help to solve a particular 
problem, and effect the behaviour at the response level. Using this method 
the animal acquires a large number of 8x-Sy and 8m-Rm-8n connections. 
This knowledge base could be organised into a sort of neural or cognitive 
map, by which the animal is able to find the shortest or the most economical 
chain of actions for attaining a desired goal. 
Tolman used the metaphor of brain being a map-control room rather than 
a telephone-exchange, where the incoming stimuli are not connected by single 
one-to-one switches to the outgoing responses but are turned into a tentative 
cognitive like map of the environment, which determines what responses if 
any the animal will finally release. 
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The main criticisms of this type of research have been: firstly, their 
su bjective and mentallistic nature; and secondly, the lack of structural 
theories which can specify ways that these expectancies could lead to the 
appropriate actions. However, many important issues have emerged from this 
line of work, especially regarding the internal representation of the dynamics 
as well as the statics of the environment in the brain. The main question in 
this respect is: how can the external flow of events be symbolised by internal 
processes? 
A proposal was made by Sommerhoff (1974) regarding the nature of 
changes involved in the transition of external dynamics to internal 
representations, on a more objective grounds. Using the concepts of 
'directive-correlation' and the notion of 'anticipatory-reaction', the following 
speculations was made, as to what kind of processes could exist in the 
internal mechanisms of expectancy-formation. 
(a) - It is possible that the internal representations of expectancies bears no 
direct correlations with behaviour, and the internal. processes involved 
in the realization of such expectancies work at a different level. 
(b) - The internal expectancies could be represented by a stochastic p-rocess, 
based on the probabilities of events and outcomes and the consolidation 
or weakening of such notions. 
(c) - A deterministic model of expectancies is also conceivable, involving the 
creation of isomorphic associations between internal representations of 
events and their outcomes. 
One of the main contributions of Tolman's theories to the contemporary 
science of learning has been to emphasise the two distinct levels at which the 
learning-process should be investigated. A learning animal is constantly 
making a mental model of its behaviour by constructing expectancies and 
neural-maps; and, also, by using its behavioural responses and stimuli from its 
environment it is able to confirm or reject these expectancies. Hence, this 
dual "processing + executive" nature of explanations has become the prevalent 
feature of many of today's information-processing models of the 
learning-process. 
2.6 SOCIAL ASPECTS OF LEARNING AND TEACHING 
Some relevant issues of social-behaviour, social-learning (in animals and 
humans), 'intelligence', and the general area of education and the impact of 
the learning theories on teaching will be discussed here. 
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2.6.1 SOCIAL-LEARNING 
Learning-processes which have been discussed so far have been mainly the 
outcome of an individual organism's interactions with the environment. These 
adaptive behaviours were emitted to enable an animal to survive. However, 
such behaviours almost invariably occur in a social context. The social 
organization has its own evolutionary survival advantages in facilitating 
reproduction, rearing of the young and providing defence against predatory 
and other challenges of the environment. At the same time, it contributes to 
emotional stress, disease and conflict. Social behaviour is the 
interaction/influence of individuals on each other. 
social-behaviour are:-
Various elements of 
(i) 
(ii) 
- ReJ>roductive-Behaviours: To some degree a social element exists in 
thls type of behaviours, for most species. 
Developmental-Factors: The critical inputs to the organism, that play 
a major part in the setting of the pattern for social roles. 
PhysiologiCal examples are the hormones that determine morphology, 
and psychological and perceptual examples are the events that 
determine response tendencies, such as the factors involved in 
'imprinting' or the setting of social-dominance hierarchies. 
(iii) - Communication: Most animals have means of communicating between 
individuals of s'pecies, varying from simple physio-chemical signals to 
complex symbolic processes such as language. 
(iv) 
(v) 
- Territorial-Arrangements: The aspects of social behaviour influenced 
by animals' breeding, habitat or food-source locations. 
- Characteristic Species-S~ific Behaviour: These are the actions which 
are determinea on tile basis of particular ecological factors 
surrounding a species; such as materniil care or family organization. 
A study of ethological and behavioural literatures reveals the variety of 
behavioural adaptations that exist in the social level of animal's behaviour. 
Examples for each of the above categories are: the nest-building and 
courtship-behaviour of birds; the imprinting of young birds to the early 
experiences of their lives; the ritual dancing-display of stickleback fish at the 
time of mating as a means of communication; the territory establishing 
behaviour of sea-gulls at the nesting time; and the food-begging behaviour of 
young chicks. The intriguing feature of all these examples is the intricate 
balance which is kept between the learned/environmental and the 
innate/ genetic/hormonal contributions. 
In the case of humans the theories of the social-learning have been 
developed mainly within the science of social-psychology. This type of work 
generally has a combined cognitive and behaviourist outlook, and it analyses 
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the learning, motivation and reinforcement of social behaviours in terms of 
cognitive events intermixed with external behavioural events. 
The emphasis in the theories of social-learning is on learning by 
observation, rather than learning by doing or personally experiencing. In 
social-psychology and education the development of intelligence, and the 
'Intelligence Quotient' (IQ) have been major topics of investigation; also, a 
matter of special interest has been the heredity properties of intelligence. 
The relation of intelligence or IQ with learning ability is a controversial 
issue and has also been rigorously investigated. It has been shown in some 
experiments that in certain instances the IQ can be correlated to a specific 
learning ability of a subject. However, this is not a universal observation, 
and is dependent on various environmental backgrounds or the training of 
individuals. 
Another fact which has emerged, is that the learning-proficiency can not 
be transferred between tasks with different basic elements. For example, 
learning can not be transferred between manual and formal tasks. 
The scientific study of higher forms of learning such as problem-solving, 
concept-learning, and language-learning has established yet another area in 
learning sciences, that of the instructional aspects of social-learning, namely, 
'teaching' • 
2.6.2 TEACHING 
One of the most important contributions of the findings in psychological 
learning-sciences has been to the development of instructional theories and 
teaching-programmes. Although, the work of many researchers on learning 
deals with its purely scientific aspects, some investigators have ventured into 
studying the ways this knowledge may be utilised in education. 'Teaching' or 
'training' can be viewed as the control of a learning-process, or alternatively 
as the transfer of knowledge or skill. 
The investigations of learning as highlighted by the variety of theories, 
approaches and views, and by the even less precise understanding of its 
mechanisms, has not yet yielded a unifying descriptive science. Hence, as 
anticipated, many consensus also exist in the field of teaching-theories. 
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Additionally, the validity or effectiveness of many contemporary teaching 
techniques are questionable, this is in view of their inability to improve the 
'quality' of the learning, rather than simply providing environmental 
facilitation for learning or recall. The earlier theories of instruction were 
embodied within the 'curriculum theories' of the science of education, these 
theories basically promoted the presentation of the learning-materials in some 
orderly fashion. In the past 30-40 years programmed-learning has been 
introduced, in the development of which experimental-psychologists played a 
major role. 
Recently the accessibility of inexpensive computers and other audio-visual 
aids, has facilitated the introduction of teaching-tools such as simulators, 
films, TV, video, tape-recorders and computer assisted instructions, to many 
schools and educational establishments. 
The impact of this mechanization of teaching has been to increase the 
importance of this field of study, and also to emphasise the need for an exact 
theory of instruction, which will help the devising of automatic 
programmed -teaching strategies. 
Cognitive and S-R theories as well as some notions from motivation and 
personality studies, have contributed to the following ideas which are 
currently used in various teaching theories. 
(i) - MOTIVATIONAL ASPECTS 
Learning is best fostered if a goal or a hierarchy of goals are set for the 
learner, this could be a behavioural objective, such as obtaining a specific 
proficiency-level after a number of lessons. This type of goal is usually more 
effective than aiming for a general understanding or appreciation of a 
subject. Also, the interest of the learner should be aroused, by setting 
interesting tasks and goals with optimal degree of difficulty. 
(ii) - PRESENTATIONAL ASPECTS 
A task or a skill which is to be taught should be broken down into its 
appropriate components and organised into a hierarchy. Thus, the learning 
material should be ordered into sub-units and presented from simple to the 
more complex units. Also, the learned material is better retained and more 
easily transferred if it is fully understood, than if the same material is 
learned by rote-memorising. 
Eapl .. lcB •• 4 Theorie. of Le .... I.' 64 
The perceptual structure of the teaching material is also important, 
conceptual information could be learned better, by the proper organization or 
presentation of learned material and the placing of vital visual cues. The 
environment of the study or the classroom has to reinforce the relevant 
task-learning behaviour, poor concentration, poor attention, poor habits or 
other distractions are all interfering with the optimal teaching-processes. 
(iii) - STUDY TECHNIQUES 
Recital; practice; manipulation of learned material by responding or 
relating one part to another; asking of relevant questions; searching the text 
for answers; will all enhance the learning of material. These techniques also 
help to form automated habits which improve the performance in future (e.g., 
the learning of some mathematical rules). In studying a text various 
prescribed study guides are devised, these generally involve following a 
specific sequence of steps, using which a student can improve the learning or 
remembering of studied subjects. 
Also various mnemonic or memory devices are elaborated, these are special 
techniques of making the material more meaningful and hence, improve the 
recall and learning abilities. 
2.7 A TAXONOMY OF ADAPTIVE AND LEARNED BEHAVIOURS 
In the following, a classification of different adaptive and learned 
behaviours will be outlined. No special phylogenetic considerations are made 
in this stage. The list is simply a taxonomy of adaptive activities of animals 
in order of their behavioural complexity, as defined in behavioural and 
cognitive sciences. Also certain adaptive observations may be accounted for 
in more than one of the specified catagories. 
(1) -
(2) -
INSTINCTIVE BEHAVIOURS: The simplest kind of ada'ptive behaviours in 
animals, instincts are inborn-response tendenCIes which p'rovide 
automatic mechanisms for adapting to the recurring situations in life. 
Instincts are normally compfete in their first occurrence and are 
triggered by a specific stimulus. There is normally.. an element of 
learning or modification present in most instinctive benaviours. 
IMPRINTING: A highly specific and limited form of learning, it could 
also be considerea as an externally triggered instinctive oehaviour. 
Imprinting can be clearly observed in birds, during the early P-eriods of 
their lives. The young birds in a 'sensitive' ~rioCi after hatching, will 
take any large moving object to be their mol;her, this impression will 
stay with the birds for the rest of their lives. 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
- HABITUATION: Possibly the simplest ty~ of true learning universally 
seen within different species. Habituation is the waning of normally: 
occurring behaviour. An animal gradually decreases its normEil 
res-POnse to a stimulus" which is re'peatedly being ex~sed to. 
Altliough, habituation is similar in characteristics to fatigue or 
sensory-adaptation, it is different in the sense that, it p'ersists over 
long .periods of time. Habituation has the important survival function 
of, filtering-out the insignificant and mundane aspects of life. 
- CLASSICAL CONDITIONING: A very simple type of lear¢ng, involving 
associations between stimuli. This phenomena was origirmJly observed 
by Pavlov, in experiments on the salivation response of dogs to fex>d 
stimuli, it was noticed that, a previouslr neutral stimulus, such as the 
sound of a bell, could be bonded assoc18tively with the fex>d stimulus! 
and after an appropriate number of training procedures, the sound 01 
the bell alone wouIa evoke the salivation response. 
- INSTRUMENTAL CONDITIONING: Instrumental/Operant Conditioning, 
brou~ht to prominence by Skinner, is essent18lIy similar to ClassiCBJ 
CondItioning, the main feature of this type of conditioning is the 
choice that an animal has over the stimuli it receives and the 
responses it makes. An animal that learns to depress a lever to get a 
fex>a pellet makes an association between the foOd.-obtainment and the 
lever-pressing, based on the reinforcement or the reward of its needs. 
- TRIAL AND ERROR LEARNING: The term "trial &. error learninl{" was 
brought into wide usage by Thorndike, this type of learning IS also 
referred to as 'habit-formation', it has the basic elements of 
instrumental conditioning, and normally, contains a subsidiary element 
of classical conditioning. Trial and error learnin~ involves chex>sing 
successively a response from a collection of PQsslble responses, and 
evaluating the consequences of such response for future utilization. 
- ONE TRIAL LEARNING: This type of learning is associated with 
Gutherian learning-theories, which state that, a stimulus-pattern gains 
its full associative strength on the occurrence of its first pairing with 
a response. Guthrie attemfted to explain the subsequent lmp.rovement 
in learnin(, as a matter 0 refining the learning for each element of 
movement mvolved in a particular behaviour. 
- REPETITION LEARNING: The acquisition of skills or knowledge as a 
result of successive repetitions of a behavioural or j>erceptual pattern, 
is normally referred to as 'repetition-learning' or 'Iearning-by-doing', 
which could be thought of as a special case of trial &. error learning, 
where there is no ·choice' of response for the animal. 
- ROTE LEARNING: This type of learning involves the memorizing of 
behavioural/cognitive patterns or response sequences and the 
subsequent display of such behaviours in appropriate situations (e.g., 
learning of nonsensical string of letters); in this type of learninjt the 
sound or the shape of stimulus is remembered and ~not its meanmg. 
(10) - SERIAL LEARNING: The extension of individual stimulus-response 
bonding to the sequential chains of such J)8irings, and the learnmg of 
associations in tasks involving such serial elements, are referred to as 
'serial-learning', and was originally introduced by Ebbinghaus. 
(11) -
(12) -
LATENT LEARNING: This type of learning, the study of which has 
been associated with Tolman, is the learning of s~tial or other 
environmental information by animals, and although it takes place most 
of the time, does not exhibit itself under normal conditions of 
performance. Latent-Learning, is basically the association of 
mdifferent stimuli or situations without a patent reward (e.g., the 
formation of memory-maps in normal foraging activities of animals). 
INSIGHT LEARNING: Insight reJates to the organizational aspects of 
lear¢ng, also, the percep~ion of relationships. Insight Learning 
originally investifatea bf Itohler, is the solving of a problem by the 
reorsanization 0 experIences or the sudden discovery of novel 
relationships. 
(13) -
(14) -
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PROBLEM SOLVING: Another category of insightful-learning, is 
normally associated with cognitive-sciences, and ,enerally refers to 
solving problems by humans using semantic descrIptive explanations, 
incorporating mathematical or logiCal arguments in the process. 
VERBAL LEARNING: The learning of verbal information, in terms of 
associations based on ideas rather than the semantic lists of percepts. 
(15) - CONCEPT LEARNING: The learning of conceptual relationships, by the 
discovery of list of common attributes in a context. Some of the 
methods involved in the research of this type of learning are:-
III - OdditJ-Priacirle-Learaing: Inyolyes preBeating severll stiluli to I subject, the tlBt 
being, to pic tbe one which iB diCferent frol all the others in a particular attribute. 
Ibl - Paired-ABBociati,e-Leafni.g: Subjects leara a list of discrete aBBociatioDB Ie.,., pairl of 
SflbolB, one of the pair iB used aB a cue (Btiaulus) fOf the recall DC the second 
I responBe II. 
(cl - Learaill-Seta Of Leaflill-To-Leara: A Bpecific concept Of criteria is preBented to the 
Bubject Ie.,., tbe subject lust eltract the ilplicit conceptual-rule froa a selection of 
objectsl. It hlB beeD aoticed that hi,her anilalB subBequeDtl, tactle a lililar tJPe of 
problea luch better, and pOBBesB aD abilitJ of 'hov-to-learn'. 
Idl - Free-Recall-Leafning: SubjectB after learDin, a list of iteas (serial or parallell, are 
tested for leafning retention b, being asked to recall the iteaB In Bile order or randoalJ. 
2.8 THE BRAIN AND NBRVR-SYS'l»f SCIBNCHS AP'Pln\aI 'ID ISSUBS IN LEARNING 
So far in this chapter we have looked at the manifestation of learning 
outside the body of an organism. The brief references to possible internal 
mechanisms have only been temporary digressions from the mainstream 
external approach, prevalent in both behavioural and cognitive sciences. 
The behaviour of an animal in nature, and in particular those labelled as 
'learned', can be explained in many levels of: social interactions; states of 
mind; changes in hormonal secretions or the levels of certain chemicals in the 
blood stream; levels of sensory inputs; the altered patterns of brain cells; new 
synaptic properties of a brain region; changes in protein synthesis or even 
the changes in the atoms composing the animal's body. 
The immense complexity and diversity of the task of explaining any 
behaviour in absolute terms is obvious. However, since not all such 
information can be utilised all the time, the purpose for which a description 
is intended, dictates the level of explanation. The investigation at an 
inappropriate level of enquiry, not only will be redundant, but would not have 
the essential elements for the proper analysis of the problem. 
The studies of the natural learning processes have, generally, been 
conducted in three major empirical levels: behavioural/executive, 
cognitive/mental and neural/mechanism. The neural level, admittedly, is the 
basis for both the behavioural and the cognitive levels. But, while in 
cognitive or behavioural psychology, normally, observations involve a single 
domain (i.e., perception or behaviour), in neuronal explanations a hierarchy of 
descriptive levels exist (i.e., system, single neuron, biochemical, biophysical, 
etc.). 
2.8.1 SOME PIDLOSOPIDCAL ISSUES - HOLISM VB. REDUCTIONISM 
An organism may exhibit complex and intricate patterns of activity, but, 
learning is said to take place only when previous experiences are utilised in 
the subsequent behaviours. The impressions of such behaviours at the 
neuronal level, perceived by the subjective reality of the animal's senses and 
transformed into electrical nerve signals, has raised many issues and 
controversies on subjects such as 'mind' or 'consciousness'. The legitimacy of 
such physical/mental relationships, and also the question whether this problem 
can be meaningfully tackled by man in a 'self-understanding' sense, has been 
the concern of philosophers and psychologists throughout the ages. 
An important philosophical distinction, Holism vs. Reductionism has been 
made regarding the possible approaches to the study of the brain and the 
nervous-system. The Holist subscribes to the rationalist view that biological 
investigations of the brain should be carried out on the totality of the cells, 
and not on its elements or molecular components. The brain is considered to 
be 'more' than the sum of its interacting elements. The main emphasis in 
holism is the organizational aspects. The Reductionist, on the other hand, 
being from the school of empiricism, believes that the full understanding of 
the complete workings of the brain is only possible by the comprehension of 
its neuronal, molecular and sub-molecular components. The notion of 'mind' 
or any other mystical properties of the brain are rejected by the reductionist. 
2.8.2 lllS'ImlCAL BAClmROOND ro 'llIE DHVEL<>RomNT OF BRAIN-SCIENCES 
The localization of 'mind' or other psychological phenomena in the brain 
and nervous-system was only established from the late seventeenth century. 
The more ancient theories regarded the heart as the centre for 'soul', and 
the brain was considered as an organ simply for the cooling of blood. Later, 
the 'ventricular fluids' brain theories were introduced by Descartes who 
believed the soul was located at the brain-stem. For Descartes, the brain 
consisted of a ventricular system of canals and pistons which circulated the 
vital body fluids. The mechanically minded scientists of the eighteenth 
century replaced this model of the mechanisms of the brain with a clockwork 
model of cogs and wheels. 
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At the beginning of the 19th century, the science of 'Phrenology' was 
introduced, namely by Gall. The phrenologists were interested in mapping llnd 
labelling various areas of the cortex as responsible for particular mental 
faculties and moral values. Indeed, the issue of whether separate brain 
regions are responsible for specific functions, or whether they fulfill many 
roles; otherwise referred to as 'specifity vs. plasticity', has been a major 
point of controversy ever since. 
The discovery of 'Electricity' and 'Animal-Electricity', led to findings on 
the neuro-physiological properties of animals' nervous-systems. Similarly, the 
use of low-power microscopes in biology facilitated the anatomical 
investigations of brain cells, and the discovery of 'neurons'. Much of the 
research which followed involved the electrical investigations of the brain and 
neurons, and the analysis of various portions of the brain. These 
investigations resulted in the introduction of a new class of models for the 
brain mechanisms, based on the electrical-networks of its elements. A 
popular analogy was the brain being a "telephone exchange". 
The modern era of Brain-Sciences began with the invention of electronic 
recording and amplifying equipments, which have been progressively refined 
ever since their introduction. The discovery of the 'brain-waves' showed 
that, regular electrical activities could be recorded, with their frequency and 
strength depending on the various modes and levels of animal's activity, the 
patterns of such electrical recordings were rigorously investigated. Many 
other technological advances such as: the probing techniques of the brain 
using precision electrodes; the discovery of chemicals for staining or tracing 
of nerve fibers; and the discovery of electron-microscope have shed light on 
many anatomical and physiological features of the brain. More recently, also, 
the science of molecular-biology and neuro-chemistry have revealed many new 
chemical properties of the brain-cells. 
The clinical study of different brain disorders and defects, both 
psychologically and biologically oriented, also the study of the interfering 
affects of various drugs on the workings of the nervous system, have been 
major contributing factors to a better understanding of brain mechanisms. 
2.8.3 THEORIES OF LEARNING - NEUROLOGICAL APPROACH 
Today, in learning sciences the behaviour of an animal is considered to be 
exclusively a product of its nervous system. Keeping this in mind, it is 
surprising that in the majority of definitions and theories of learning little 
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reference is made to the neurological aspects. There may be possible 
historical or developmental reasons for this apparent neglect. For instance, 
until the early 1960's psychologists held the view that neuro-physiology had 
very little to offer which was relevant. However, with the explosion of 
neuro-physiological research within the past three decades, the gaps between 
the psychological and neura-physiological explanations are narrowing. 
Using the metaphor of "brain and computer" for analogy. Behaviour can 
be thought of as the output of the computer, in the form of data. On the 
other hand, the neurons and sub-cellular elements of the brain can be 
considered as the individual memory-cores, or the electrical charges in the 
electronic circuitry. The enormity of the task will be appreciated if we were 
asked to investigate the workings of a computer by only observing the 
movements of electrical charges within its memory storage. Conversely, it 
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to understand the underlying 
mechanisms of a computer from the analysis of its input/output data. 
From the time of Pavlov, psychologists have speculated notions and 
theories regarding the nature of the physiological substrate of learning. In 
general, they hold the view that there are brain correlates of behaviour and 
learning; and have postulated that an organism has certain primitive neural 
mechanisms, with their specific functional rules stipulated by behavioural 
implications. However, not a great deal of interest is shown towards 
understanding the precise nature of the mechanisms of such 'engrams' or 
'memory-traces' • 
Neuro-physiologists, on the other hand, have been interested in the 
mechanisms that provide the animal with the diversity of behaviour. In their 
view the investigations of biological correlates of learning and meticulous 
probing of the hardware of the brain, will finally prove to be more rewarding 
than the behavioural investigations. 
Another point to mention here is that, although, the neurological domain 
of investigation includes the sense organs, the muscles and the 
central-nervous-system (CNS). Yet, the main areas of interest in learning 
related biological sciences have been away from the peripheries, and mainly 
involving the examination of changes that occur in the eNS during a 
'learning-process' • 
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2.8.4 METHODS AND TECHNIQUES OF OBSERVATION IN BRAIN SCIENCES 
A study of the course of development of brain sciences highlights the 
point that technological advances play a major role in the understanding of 
brain-mechanisms. One of the first techniques used for the investigation of 
the brain was 'ablation', in which a portion of brain is destroyed or cut out 
and the resulting behavioural changes noticed. This technique was refined by 
the introduction of electrodes that could cause a small lesion at a more 
precise location of the brain. Another method, which does not entail the 
destruction of the nerve-cell is the stimulation technique, which involves 
using an external electrode or a permanently implanted electrode in the 
animal's brain (sometimes activated remotely by radio waves). Similarly, 
recordings of the brain's electrical activities can be made using sensitive 
electrodes which are capable of detecting the faint firings of a single neuron, 
or the wide-scale electrical activities of the outer skull (EEG). Computers 
are, also, used to filter out the background electrical noise present in the 
brain-wave patterns under observation. 
The chemical stimulation (instead of electrical) and detection of nerve cell 
activity is also possible - whereby, delicate hypodermic needles are used. 
Neurally acting drugs under investigation can be injected in tiny amounts, and 
their effect on behavioural patterns or an adjoining neuron detected. Other 
methods of stimulation or lesion of brain cells are also utilised, such 88 
laser-beam, cooling, etc. 
Although, many important discoveries are made using these techniques the 
conceptual objections to methods such as ablation, lesion or stimulation are 
still valid. Specially, in view of our limited knowledge of the actual 
processes involved in the cellular levels of the brain, and the interference 
which these techniques might cause to the delicate mechanisms under 
scrutiny. Hence, these type of results should be viewed with caution and 
supported by the evidence of other experimental methods. 
Another issue which is relevant to these types of experimental techniques 
is the subjectivity of the observation. The occasional experiments on human 
subjects, with the verbal accounts of the stimulated sensations, does not give 
a systematic and consistent picture. Conversely, animals can be systematically 
studied, but there is no verbal description of the induced sensations, and the 
inferences must be made from the behaviour of the animal. 
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It is, also, worth noting that the distinction in the 'holist' and 
'reductionist' approach is also manifested in a dichotomy of methods used for 
the probing of the brain. The holist may scrutinize the patterns of 
brain-waves during a learning process, while the reductionist will look at the 
individual neuronal firings during such a process. 
2.8.5 MODIFICATIONS OF THE BRAIN DURING LEARNING 
The search for the 'engram', the neural substrate of learning experience 
has proven to be so far futile; the problem may well be due to the 
inappropriate way which the issue has been posed. The origins of speculative 
brain mechanisms of learning was embodied within the associative learning 
theories of physiological-psychology, as typified by Hcbb's (1949) 
"reverberating circuits" explanation of the formation of neural associations. 
Such theories have been searching for neural mechanisms to support the 
notion that new neural connections are made as a result of learning. But in 
view of more recent evidence, it progressively looks like that a subtle change 
in the already existing network of connections, could be the only functional 
change which comes about as the result of learning. 
The investigations in this area of learning research, has amassed a useful 
body of knowledge on the changes that some specific types of learning cause 
to the nervous-systems of mainly simple animals. However, no universally 
valid principles have been demonstrated. With the criteria used in such 
investigations, differing neuro-biological mechanisms have been observed in 
the cellular correlates of the phenomenon of habituation in cats and mollusks. 
This shows that to find a true globally applicable engram, either we have to 
increase our knowledge of the workings of the brain and nervous-systems, or 
approach the issue from a different perspective and use different criteria for 
observation. 
The evidence of neural changes associated with learning are as follows:-
(i) - NEURO-ANATOMICAL CHANGES OF LEARNING 
The prediction had been made in theories such as Bebb's 'reverberating 
circuits', that an enduring oscillatory loop between two neurons will bring 
about persisting structural changes (of unknown nature); one possible 
hypothesis was the anatomical growth of synapsis between the two neurons, 
which results in both neurons acting as a single unit. 
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The only positive finding regarding the induced neuro-anatomical change us 
a result of external behaviour, is the relative large numbers of the neuronal 
synapsis and the larger cortex size of the group of experimental animals 
which are reared in complex environments rich in sensory stimulus, when 
compared with a similar group of animals that have been reared in a dull 
environment. These anatomical variations primarily observed during the 
growth of animals but in certain cases also in the experiments involving the 
adult animals, are possibly attributable to some neuro-chemical secretions. 
Bence, the general consensus in this field is that experience as well as 
organising the existing neural synapsis in the brain, in a 'select and preserve' 
fashion, 'directs' or 'causes' the formation of new synapsis. 
(ii) - NEURo-PBYSIOLOGICAL CHANGES OF LEARNING 
The proposal was made by Pavlov that possibly some electric fields could 
be responsible for the associative bonding of two neurons, this was 
investigated later but no conclusive evidence for such mechanism were 
discovered. 
A method preferred by some researchers has been to use simple neuronal 
preparations as a model for investigating various hypothesis regarding the 
physiological changes in learning; these preparations range from a single 
neuron to groups of identical neurons. By observing the levels of electrical 
neuronal firings, it has been established that many simple types of learning 
such as habituation, sensitization, classical conditioning, and instrumental 
conditioning can be demonstrated at the neuronal level in simple animals like 
sea-slugs or locusts. 
When studying the physiological manifestations of learning in such simple 
animals, two major problems are evident: firstly, many problems arise when 
attempts are made to generalise the findings to the more complex animals or 
man; and secondly, when a neural preparation exhibits the properties of 
habituation or conditioning, it does not necessarily follow that they 
correspond to habituation or conditioning at the behavioural level. 
At higher levels of investigation, the experiments are carried out on the 
intact nervous-systems of animals; the 'mirror-epilepsy' experiments have 
managed to achieve the conditioning of neurons on the one hemisphere of 
mammalian cerebral-cortex to the firing of neurons on the opposite 
hemisphere. Other neural conditioning experimenters have accomplished 
similar results with the conditioning of reflex actions such as the eyelid 
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movement of cats. Also, in a class of experiments, the neuronal correlates of 
particular learning tasks in the active animals have been localised on the 
basis of the increased electrical activity of such neurons. 
At the more holistic level, some researchers have demonstrated a shift in 
certain brain-wave patterns or other electrical (EEG) changes during learning, 
but generally speaking no clear explanation of the nature of the 'brain 
product' of learning has emerged. 
(iii) - NEURO-CHEMICAL CHANGES OF LEARNING 
In the past few decades, the possi bility of the existence of a 
neuro-chemical substrate of learning has been rigorously investigated, often 
with controversial and sensational outbursts of claims regarding the chemical 
means of 'memory transfer' or dramatic enhancement of learning abilities by 
use of certain chemicals. 
The role of 'Ribonucleic-Acid' (RNA) in the transfer or acquisition of 
learning is a subject under close scrutiny of many neuro-chemists. It is 
established that some modifications of the structure of the RNA takes place 
during learning. Also, the maze-running proficiency of experimental rats have 
been correlated with certain characteristics of the RNA molecules in their 
brain. Similarly, the administration of some drugs which inhibit the RNA 
synthesis slows the learning in rats; however, this inhibition of protein 
synthesis does not affect the contents of long-term memory. 
By far the most dramatic claims have been regarding the transfer of 
memory from one animal to another by means of 'encode RNA'. In one set of 
such experiments, planaria (earth-worms) were fed on the remains of other 
'trained' planaria; and the claim has been made that the behaviour of the 
recipient animals were modified as though they had gone through the original 
training procedure. In the absence of a plausible RNA memory hypothesis 
which can explain exactly how RNA and memory are related, these types of 
observations should be viewed cautiously. Many other chemicals and drugs 
are also shown to be able to interfere with or block the memory-trace in a 
definite and well documented manner. 
2.8.6 A BRIEF UXE AT 'I1IB MlDlANIfH3 OF 'llIE BRAIN AND NERVOOS-8YS"l'JM 
The Brain is one of the most complex and challenging mysteries of nature, 
the great volume of knowledge amassed about this object of intense scientific 
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enquiry has only accomplished a minimal understanding of its mechanisms and 
functions. 
In human nervous systems millions of 'receptors' monitor internal and 
external changes and transmit the information to the brain. The 
'molo-neurons' in various organs receive the commands sent from the brain, 
for the execution of muscular movements or internal regulations. In the 
brain itself billions of neurons, with the number of possible interconnections 
greater than the number of atoms in the universe (according to many texts), 
process the incoming information and act appropriately. In FIG.2.2 a general 
view of human brain with its major anatomical components, also a typical 
Qutline of 'neuron' and its action potential are shown. 
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FIGURE 2.2. 
t
a} - The brain with its principal regions 
b - The outline of a typical neuron and its major components 
c - The pattern of a typical neuronal electriCal firing 
(i) - THE NEURo-ANATOMY OF THE BRAIN 
The brain is a mass of folded grey spongy tissue, made up of billions of 
living cells called 'neurons' (approximately 10to cells in human brain). The 
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brain anatomically consists of two different tissues. The outer cortex 
(grey-matter) and the inner (white) sub-cortical nuclei. The neurons in the 
cortex are relatively independent of their near neighbours, but through 
trans-cortical fibers, communicate with other distant neurons, and form a 
neural-network. The largest co~ponent of the brain of mammals and higher 
animals is the 'cerebral cortex', it is made up of two mirror copy hemispheres 
or lobes. The cortex is the region of the brain mainly associated with the 
non-automatic and adaptive behaviours of animals. The concept of the 
localization of functions or 'specificity', signifies that certain cortical areas 
are devoted exclusively or primarily to particular functions, such as: vision; 
audition; tactile sensing; initiation of muscular actions; establishing of 
associations; and speech. More locally, however, there appears to be an 
overlap of functions and the duplication of many activities in different 
regions of the cortex, this is referred to as the 'plasticity' of the brain. 
The sub-cortical areas of the brain are mainly responsible for the mental 
life of animals. Their motivation, arousal, drive and attention, as well as 
some automatic reflexive actions of their behaviour are controlled from this 
region of the brain. 
The units of the nervous-system, the neurons, come in a variety of shapes 
and sizes, in different species and also in different parts of the eNS. The 
neurons are made up of three major components: the'dendrites' (for receiving 
the information); the 'cell-body'; and the taxons' (for conducting and 
transmitting of information from the cell-body). Each neuron is connected to 
many other neurons via its axons and dendrites (e.g., 10' connections in a 
typical human brain cell). 
(ii) - THE NEURo-PHYSIOLOGY OF THE BRAIN 
The nervous-system, as a vast network of receptors, neurons and effectors, 
can be considered to be an electrical maze of elements in continuous modes 
of activity. The means of communication between this network of neurons, is 
the electrical impulses that travel along the axons from one neuron to 
another. The neurons, typically, fire in interacting groups or modules, these 
modules, in turn, are the elements of larger integrated subsystems in the 
brain. There are three important principles of neuronal interactions: 
'convergence' (many neurons influence the firing rate of a single neuron); 
'divergence' (each neuron causes the firing of many other neurons); and 
'feedback' (a neuron influences the firing rate of the neurons that affect 
them). 
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The nerve impulse is usually described in terms of travelling electrical 
charges or 'action-potential', this has an 'all-or-none' (on/off) characteristic. 
However, the sensitivity of the nerve-cell is not constant, and after an 
impulse the nerve is less sensitive to firing. The threshold of firing could 
also rise, as a result of 'adaptations' to a continuous stimulus, or 
'accommodations' for a stronger stimulus. 
The amplitudes of individual impulses do not vary and are of no value as 
far as the information transfer is concerned. The frequency of the firing of 
neurons, although significant at sense organ and effector level, is not of 
prime importance at the processing level, where the identity and the 
distribution of excited fibers, convey the real information. 
Here, it is relevant to mention that the holistic approach to the electrical 
investigations of the brain has produced a mass of important results, involving 
the 'electroencephalogram' (EEG) recordings of the brain. Various types of 
EEG wave patterns are correlated with human mental states, and although, 
initially, strong claims were made regarding the significance of such 
recordings by their pioneering protagonists, their true composition is more 
uncertain today. 
(iii) - THE NEURO-CHEMISTRY OF THE BRAIN 
The neuronal discharge and the progression of the impulse in dendrites are 
generally considered in terms of the electrical properties of such phenomena, 
in much the same way as an electrical charge travels along a cable. 
However, the transmission of neural impulses can be considered in terms of 
the complex electro-chemical interactions that lake place in the dendrites. 
The uneven distribution of charged 'ions' in the membrane ofaxons and 
dendrites create a potential gradient which facilitates the passing of the 
electrical signals through the cell. Also, other chemicals called 
'neuro-transmitters' are responsible for the electrical impulse travelling 
between the synaptic junctions of two neurons. 
As mentioned earlier, the investigations of 'ribonucleic acid' (RNA), which 
is a molecule in the nerve-cell body, and is responsible for protein synthesis 
within the neuron, has been another important area of neuro-chemistry. The 
production of RNA is shown, although not conclusively, to be related to 
certain aspects of neural organization. 
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Many hormones and chemicals have been shown to have blocking or 
stimulating effect on neuronal activity, some interfere with the transmission 
of impulses by loosening the synaptic connections between neurons. It has 
been recently established, that the brain also produces its own sensitizing 
morphine like chemicals (tendorphines') to suppress pain. 
2.8.7 nm NEUROLOGICAL APmOt\CH 'ID SCJiE PSYCHOLOGICAL OONCEPI'S OF LEARNING 
The neuronal study of the brain has resulted in the discovery of 
mechanisms for the neural correlates of some psychological concepts. Some 
relevant issues to learning and performance namely, attention, arousal, 
motivation, drive, reward and punishment, will be discussed. 
(i) - AROUSAL AND ATTENTION 
The activities of a collection of diffusively arranged neurons, based at the 
core of the brain-stem, namely, the treticular formation', have been directly 
linked, with the phenomena of arousal, attention, alertness, awareness, sleep 
and coma. The process of attention or arousal, is the brain's way of limiting 
the intake of information. The learning animal must extract from its 
experiences the stimuli which are important for its survival and need to be 
remembered for future utilization. The role of the reticular formation in the 
attention mechanism has been clearly demonstrated ever since the work of 
Bremer in the 1930's. 
The different levels of arousal, from alertness to deep sleep have been 
correlated with the patterns of EEG brain waves of animals. Also, the 
electrical stimulation of the reticular formation is seen to increase the 
attention level of an animal. 
Animals with ablations or lesions to their reticular formation would fall 
into a deep sleep or coma. However, in more controlled and careful 
experiments, these animals if kept alive for a duration, would get some of 
their normal behaviour restored and come out of the coma. Again, the 
plasticity of the brain seems to have been demonstrated. 
Studies have also shown, that a group of experimental primates that had 
learned to discriminate between two lights, and had their attention aroused by 
the electrical stimulation of the reticular formation, prior to the training, 
performed better than a similar controlled group. Hence, the increased 
attention had improved the learning. The nature of actual mechanisms 
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involved in attention is not clear yet, but it is thought that the sensory input 
fibers to the cortex branch off at the brain-stem, and send their information 
to the reticular formation within which the level of alertness is evaluated and 
relayed to the cortex. 
The reticular formation also plays a significant part in the 
sleep/wakefulness cycle. During sleep, only the important signals will be 
received by the brain. In the awake mode, the reticular formation is thought 
to exert some measure of control and modulation over the incoming sensory 
inputs. This modulation is usually inhibitory, attenuating a certain input 
while attending to some other stimulus. 
In 'habituation' phenomenon, the sensory inputs are blocked or attenuated, 
so that the stimulus is no longer considered novel or significant. The 
concept of attention is of prime importance to learning, specially, in 
attaching 'meaning' to stimuli, and determining which inputs should be 
registered and which discarded. 
Chemicals such as anesthetic drugs that produce unconsciousness, appear Lo 
act by depressing the reticular formation. Other drugs which increase 
alertness (e.g., amphetamines) and probably improve learning ability 
temporarily, also seem to exert their effect in this region of the brain. 
(ii) - MOTIVATION, DRIVE, REWARD AND PUNISHMENT 
Learning and motivation are highly dependant phenomena, as pointed out 
in the behavioural discussions of the subject. The role of drive in acquiring 
learning and performance is conclusively demonstrated. 
The physiological investigations of the concept of drive and motivation, 
have revolved round the common biological needs, such as, food, water, etc. 
The mechanism of these drives have been rigorously examined. Various inputs 
of the sense organs, levels of certain chemical or hormonal secretions in the 
animal's body, collectively, determine the specific drive level of the animal 
and are also instrumental in regulating the appetitive actions. 
The neuronal centre for the motivational aspects of the behaviour, has 
been found to be the 'hypothalamus' of the brain. Different areas of which 
are observed to be responsible for each type of drive or reward. The regions 
for the stop/start commands of an appetitive activity, are seen to be 
allocated for the reward/punishment of the same activity. 
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The ablation or lesion experiments have demonstrated that the removal or 
destruction of certain parts of the hypothalamus could make an animal 
overeat by large amounts (by interfering with the 'slop' mechanism), at the 
same time the drive of the animal seem to have been diminished. Similarly, 
lesions to other regions inhibits the 'start' mechanism, and if not force fed, 
the animal will die of starvation. The lesions if not extensive, will allow the 
animal to recover normal eating habits, after a period of time. This also, is 
in view of the plasticity of the brain cells involved. 
The significance of the hypothalamus as a centre for a range of 
psychological variables, has been further emphasized by a line of research 
started in the past twenty years, initially by Olds and Milner, this work 
involved the mapping of reward and punishment centres in the brain. By 
using electrical stimulations of the hypothalamus, the 'pain' and 'pleasure' 
centres of the brain have been localized. An experimental animal would 
self-stimulate a pleasure-centre, to the point of exhaustion. Although, this 
type of self-stimulation at some brain sites, seem to depend on the animal's 
drive state. Some controversial experiments have reported similar studies on 
human subjects. The chemical investigations of drive mechanisms, has shown 
that, there are certain chemicals involved in facilitating or blocking of 
synaptic connections in drive areas of the hypothalamus. The evidence of the 
effect of many drugs commonly known as 'mood-altering', and also the 
discovery of endorphines (the internally made morphine), show a conclusive 
underlying chemical substrate to the machinery of reward and punishment. 
2.8.8 THE NEUROLOGICAL BASIS OF MEMORY 
In earlier sections of this chapter, the notion of memory, its different 
categorizations and various other relevant issues were discussed in detail. 
Here, we will only briefly elaborate the neurological correlates of. memory. 
The contemporary theories and speculations of brain mechanisms for 
memory-storage systems are somewhat confusing, and do not provide an 
adequate basis for solid explanations of this phenomena. 
Memories are the stored records of an individual's experiences. In the 
physiological investigations of memory, it was established quite early that the 
mechanisms involved are not as originally thought a collection of neurons 
oscillating in a dynamic 'reverberating circuits'. Baving rejected the purely 
functional neura-physiological explanation, the 'consolidation' theories of 
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memory-trace, based on some enduring physical, structural or biochemical 
changes in neurons, were introduced. 
The experimental work on 'amnesia', induced in patients after accidents or 
brought about on animals by 'electroconvulsive-shock' (ECS), has demonstrated 
that, there appears to be two different memory modes of long-terru-mcmory 
(LTM) and short-term-memory (STM). 
2.9 nm EVOUIDOOARY AND DEVElDRiENTAL ASP.ICl'S OF BRAIN AND LEARNING 
In this section we will review the issues raised by the phylogenetic (the 
evolutionary relationships in species) and the ontogenetic (the developmental 
stages of individual's growth) Rtudies of nervous-systems and learning. 
These two outlooks are intricately dependant on each other, and, as is 
often said, the various stages of animal evolutionary developments are 
analogous to the developmental stages of an embryo into an adult mammal, 
which involves the transformation of a single-cell into a fish like organism 
then into an amphibian form and ending with a fury mammal. 
The fact that animals and plants adapt to their environment was 
recognized long before the theories of evolution. The 'natural' classification 
scheme and the similarities of different species were the main supporting 
criteria. However, ever since the introduction of the systematic explanations 
of the process of evolution by Darwin, Lamarck and others, the scientific 
search of the mechanisms of this complex process has been the objective of 
researchers from many disciplines. A constant stream of evolutionary 
hypothesis, corroborated by empirical results or fossil records, have been 
contributing to the true understanding of the origins of life and species. A 
prime example was the finding of the mechanisms of heredity, and variations 
in animals, in the science of Genetics. 
The first issue to be emphasized is that the biological evolution should be 
only looked at in the context of a general cosmic evolution, which 
encompasses: nuclear, geological, chemical, organic, behavioural, social and 
cultural evolutions, with a hierarchy of ordering. Life has evolved filling a 
particular 'niche' in the composite picture of cosmic evolution. 
Biological evolution is defined as the process of adaptations seen within 
the living organisms. It has been the force which bas helped to enhance the 
complexity of biological life. The process of 'natural selection', as introduced 
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by Darwin, is generally thought to be the primary law of evolution. However, 
looking from alternate view points, the propagation/reproduction/nourishment 
of the genes have all been considered as the governing agents of the process 
of evolution. 
The origin of life dates back perhaps 3.5 billion years, some 1.2 billion 
years after the solidification of earth. The simplest forms of 'living' 
organism, created by physio-chemical processes, were the organic molecular 
structures capable of simple chemical reactions. The feasibility of the 
synthesis of inorganic chemicals into complex organic molecules, such as that 
found in the living cells, has been experimentally demonstrated by numerous 
workers. 
The earliest living organisms are envisaged to have been energy-producing 
rather than energy-utilizing entities, possible conceptual models for such 
mechanisms have also been put forward. The forces of natural selection 
acting on these simple life forms, which possessed the three vital properties 
of 'multiplication', 'variation' and 'heredity', created the complex and varied 
range of life seen today. 
The process of biological evolution operating on all organisms, yet at 
varying degrees and speeds, has produced, on the one hand, the plants which 
are more or less homogeneous in their complexity; and, on the olher hand, 
the animal species from simple bacteria to man. Although, il must be noled 
that the forces of evolution are active on all levels of life, and today's 
single-cell organisms are of much greater complexity than that of say two 
billion years ago. 
2.9.1 THE EVOLUTION OF REACTION MECHANISMS (NERVOUS-SYSTEMS) 
The 'nervous-system' is one of the most complex and intriguing products 
of the process of biological evolution. Life has evolved from the simple 
living molecules into the thinking and symbolizing animals, that are capable of 
questioning, observing and explaining in scientific terms lheir own nature and 
origins. In the science of biology, it is unanimously accepted that animals 
share a common ancestry, this is not only in view of their unique genetic 
coding mechanisms, but also because of the similarities in their neural 
transmission methods and other biophysical resemblances. 
One of the most essential and fundamental properties of living matter is 
'irritability', which is the capacity to respond to stimuli. The most primitive 
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organisms are thought to have exhibited this irritability by performing simple 
chemical reactions, such as the process of photosynthesis. To call these 
organisms 'alive' or not is a matter of definition. Viruses which in size and 
complexity of activity approach the very largest of non Jiving molecules 
(proteins), are normally considered an intermediary between living and non 
living matter. 
(i) - UNICELLULAR SYSTEMS 
Evolutionary adaptations transformed some of the primitive simple living 
entities into more complex single celled organisms. The present day 
unicellular animals exhibit a variety of 'behavioural properties' which could 
give an indication of the kind of forces active in the primitive life. Initially 
isolated masses of living material probably showed a general irritability, 
through the course of evolution gradually the property of irritability came to 
be localized and refined to special pathways, both in su b-cellular and acellular 
levels. 
There are three rudimentary properties which are seen even in the 
simplest of the single cell organisms of today: Sensitivity, Reaction and 
Conductivity. In simple unicellular animals such as 'amoeba' and 'protozoa' 
(e.g., Paramecium), simple stimuli (e.g., food, heat, cold, touch, chemicals or 
light intensity) are sensed by specialized parts of the animals' body (e.g., 
photo-chemically sensitive molecules or sensory bristles). Reactions of these 
organisms consists of feeding or movements, which takes place by the 
reshaping of the body (amoeba) or the movements of whip-like 'cilia' 
(paramecium). 
Even with the limited scope of these sense and reaction mechanisms these 
simple animals show a wide variety of behavioural patterns, mainly based on 
the attraction to or the aversion from different stimuli. The amoeba's entire 
behavioural repertoire seems to revolve on searching for food, capture and 
ingestion of food depends on the specific type of the food and the satiety 
levels of the amoeba, it invariably withdraws from all non-food stimuli. The 
'conductivity' is also present in amoeba in the biochemical channels of 
communication within its cell body, stimulation at one point is followed by 
the appearance of finger-like projections at another point. 
The paramecium also is in a spontaneous state of activity, characterized by 
the rhythmic and coordinated movements of its cilia, however, it switches to 
specialized patterns of behaviour (e.g., feeding, object-avoiding, etc.) when 
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encountering a significant stimulus. The conducting system in these protozoa 
being the forerunner to the early nervous-systems, is made up of a network 
of thread like fine fibers connecting all the cilia together. In the absence of 
a neural mechanism for behaviour control, it is assumed that the genetic and 
other information processing is carried out biochemically within the animal's 
cell body. 
The primitive life, on the one hand, evolved into more complex unicellular 
organisms; and on the other hand, evolved into associatively joined cells, then 
into tissues, tissues into organs, and finally organs into organisms, where lhe 
adaptations of each unit is not solely in terms of the individual unil's 
requirements, but in terms of the survival of the whole. 
(ii) - MULTICELLULAR SYSTEMS 
The next evolutionary step in the development of CNS was the 
transformation of the single cell organisms into the multi-cell animals. 
This process first involved the change into colonies of single cell units and 
later into true multicellular entities. The multicellular animals with their 
infinite possibility of combinations of cell units, attained complexities much 
higher than the unicellular organisms. The resulting much larger animals 
were made up of self contained cells, each with their individual metabolic and 
dynamic attributes, yet affecting each other in varying degrees. With the 
multicellular animals came the need for greater coordination and 
communication between individual cells. The cells in the body were grouped 
into specialized units and there was a division of labour in dealing with 
different changes (both inside and outside the body). 
Specific sense organs, muscle systems, digestive systems, etc., were 
developed, which further enhanced the irritability of the animal. 
The unicellular means of signaling, namely, chemical messenger systems 
(hormones), were too slow and inaccurate (were diffused randomly throughout 
the body), hence, were gradually replaced by a more rapid electrical 
conduction system. This system could sense, integrate and react to 
environmental information much more efficiently. The arrangements of 
irritability and conduction cells, that control the functions of the whole 
organism are called the 'nervous system'. 
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(iii) - SIMPLE NERVOUS SYSTEMS 
Whether the nervous systems were developed after the emer~ence of its 
basic element the 'neuron', or were developed from equivalent biochemical 
systems is not clearly known. However, it is commonly accepted that, the 
first neural structures were direct connections between the 'receptors' und 
'effectors', and that the evolution of the nervous systems has resulted in the 
development of less direct and more complicated linkages between the senso 
and response mechanisms. 
A large group of animals whose ancestors possessed the primitive nervous 
systems are hydras, jelly fish, corals and the sea anemones. In these 
organisms, neurons and synapses are already fully developed. 
Although, the physiology of the neuron is almost the same within all 
species, there is a large variation of the type of synapses both within the 
nerve-cells of a particular animal and between different species. In the 
simplest of the above group of animals, the hydra, reflexive behaviours, such 
as feeding or movements away from dangerous stimuli have been developed. 
To achieve the relatively high level of coordination required for these 
reflexive behaviours, basically three types of neural cells have been evolved: 
'receptors', 'effectors' and 'conductors'. These cells are organized mainly 
near the surface of the animal's body close to the external stimuli. Three 
types of reaction mechanisms can be seen: (1) - effectors that can be directly 
and independently stimulated by environmental inputs; (2) - effectors that are 
stimulated directly by receptor cells; and (3) - receptor cells that are 
connected to the effector cells via the conducting cells, hence facilitating a 
more varied and complex range of reflexive behaviours. 
In the colonial species of these groups of animals, a colonial nervous 
system as well as the individual unit's nervous system can be seen. 
More advanced sense organs (e.g., light sensitive) were also developed in 
some species similar to jelly fish. The 'nerve net' conduction system of these 
simple animals, although appear to be a synaptic system, has two distinctive 
features, firstly, unlike synaptic systems they allow for bi-directional 
transmissions, secondly, the whole nerve net system is interconnected, and 
every activity seems to involve all of the nerve cells. The centralization of 
these nervous systems were severely restricted by the radial asymmetry of the 
animals' body. The ultimate in radial nervous systems is achieved in 
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'Echinoderms' (e.g., starfish), with their much higher versatility of movements 
and centra] structuring (though fairly superficially) of their nerve nets. 
Almost from the beginning of the evolution of the nervous systems, two 
major trends have been evident, one towards the specialization of units, the 
other towards the integration of similar units. The overall effect has been 
towards centralization. 
As the nerve nets condensed into nerve tracts and moved away from their 
location near the surface of the body of animals, the distances between 
receptors and effectors became greater, and the direct synapses between input 
and output mechanisms all but disappeared. The number of intervening 
neurons between effectors and receptors increased, and were progressed 
deeper into the animal's body. These developments and specializations allowed 
animals to make more refined and coordinated responses that could be utilised 
more or less independently (e.g., swimming, feeding). 
(iv) - COMPLEX NERVOUS SYSTEMS (Invertebrates) 
The next major evolutionary step was the formation of 'ganglionic system'. 
Worms and mollusks are examples of the types of organisms which developed 
the 'ganglia'. These species have a greater repertoire of behaviour, have 
more complex movements and unlike the simpler animals have a specific set of 
neuro-muscular connections. Another important characteristic of their 
nervous system is that, while in the nerve net cells were dispersed evenly 
throughout the organism's body, in worms and mollusks the int.er-neurons are 
clustered together and cell bodies are formed into localized masses called 
'ganglia'. Nerves arrive at the ganglion from sense organs or other ganglia 
and leave it for muscles or other ganglia. Ganglia possess three different 
types of nerve cells: receptor-neurons, motor-neurons and inter-neurons. 
Thus the ganglia having all the essential features of the central nervous 
systems, is the evolutionary link between nerves and brains. 
The transmission of neural impulses in ganglionic systems are unidirectional 
and a much more precise and rapid control of muscular activity is possible. 
The ultimate in neural conduction speeds have been achieved by the 
development of giant nerve fibers in mollusks. These neural developments 
together with the bilateral configuration of the animals' bodies, evolved 
organisms, that had their centre of neural activity (the ganglia), located in 
their heads. Unlike more primitive animals, worm like creatures had a 
distinct 'head' and 'tail', and their movements were biased in the forward 
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direction. The evolutionary selection forces developed sense organs of higher 
complexity, situated mainly in the anterior areas of the animal body. 
Originally, the 'head ganglia' was a kind of relay centre for the sensory 
and motor neurons that stretched their axons into it. Later the messages 
arriving from the senses were modified before being passed on to the motor 
systems. Many inter-neurons were evolved, possibly independently, within the 
confines of the ganglion itself. The complexity and variety in structure was 
reflected in the functional richness; many areas in the ganglion were localized 
and specialized for specific tasks, and an hierarchical mechanism for the 
control of the activities of animal evolved. 
The ultimate evolutionary products of ganglionic systems can be seen in 
today's arthropods, insects and mollusks. The nervous systems of such 
animals although controlled centrally, to some extent have a degree of 
autonomy within each individual functional group. A severed tentacle of an 
octopus will still function normally for a period of time. This diffused nature 
of ganglionic activity, together with the design and structural limitations 
imposed on the growth of the brains of such animals, has resulted in the 
development of highly successful and varied yet stimulus-bound species. 
Insects and ganglionic animals with their complex vision, olfactory, 
orientation and chemical sensory capabilities, exhibit an intriguing array of 
instinctive behaviours and mimic many aspects of vertebrate life. An octopus 
on the other hand, with the largest invertebrate brain, if allowances are made 
for the peripheral ganglia, has only a rat size brain. Ganglionic brains 
seemingly do not have the adequate features which enable the evolution of 
powerful learning mechanisms. 
(v) - CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEMS (Vertebrates) 
A separate evolutionary development has led to the appearance of 
vertebrate nervous systems and brains. For this to have happened two major 
elaborations of the invertebrate nervous system was necessary, first the 
separation of the radial neural tract from the gut, and second the 
centralization of the nervous system in the brain. 
The development of bony skeletons in fish-like primitive animals was the 
first ascending stage; the spinal cords developed within the solid tubular 
bones of these animals, but relatively speaking spinal cords have not evolved 
to a great extent during the course of time, however, they have lost their 
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The development of these three regions of the brains and the relative 
dominance of different regions and hence their relative sizes in different 
species, is the prominent feature of the brain's evolutionary history. The 
primitive marine animals had the midbrain as the most utilized section of the 
brain. The 'cerebellum' started to feature as an important area in the 
amphibians, needing a greater degree of coordination of movement and body 
equilibrium. With land based animals the forebrain started to develope into 
'cerebrum', which was used for the processing of the more complex olfactory 
environmental inputs. The 'thalamus' developed in the amphibians to deal 
with the coordination of different senses lost its dominance of this function 
in the land based animals, to a more advanced cerebrum. In birds, cerebellum 
is well developed, perhaps to deal with the coordination problems encountered 
in flight. 
A variety of cortical developments can be seen in mammals. The smooth 
cortical surfaces are the feature of the cortex of the lower vertebrates and 
the folding twisted cortical surfaces are seen in the higher mammals, this 
presumably is to accommodate more volume of nerve cells within the brain. 
The latest addition to the mammalian brain is the 'neocortex', which is the 
only area in the mammalian brain that does not have a primitive equivalent in 
the reptile brain. Neocortex of the primitive mammal was used for motor 
functions, but in the higher animals this region of the brain is used as the 
'association area', which is an essential region of the brain in learning 
animals. 
Attempts to equate the intellectUal powers of animals and the size of their 
association areas have failed, since the development of the brains depends 
both on the quantity and the complexity of the sensory inputs. Different 
areas in the brains of various species are dominant, and the same areas of 
the brain are sometimes used for different functions in two groups of animals. 
In evolutionary terms there seems to be a steady increase in the size and 
complexity of cerebral cortex, humans are amongst the highest 
(cortical-neuron-number)/(body-weight) ratio animals (refer to Fig.2.3). A 
striking feature of human brain is that it has biologically evolved very little 
from the brains of Bomo-Sapiens. Also, despite the similarity to the brains 
of BOme primates in shape and anatomy, human brain is of far greater volume 
- an indication of the much greater reasoning and language capabilities of 
humans. 
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2.9.2 THE EVOLUTION OF ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOUR 
Parallel to the evolution of reaction mechanisms and the emergence of 
nervous-systems in animals, their behaviour has also been evolving and 
modifying into activities of much greater complexity, hence prolonging and 
increasing their chances of survival. The adaptations of behaviour started 
from the 'irritability' of crystal like living molecules and culminated into the 
diverse and intricate patterns of individual and collective behaviours of 
mammals. 
According to the hypothesis of natural selection and the empirical 
observations concerning the inheritance of behavioural traits in successive 
generations, it is assumed that as well as purely physical variations between 
members of a species, behavioural traits and mutations also exist. These 
variations are passed on to the off-springs in the form of neural 
organizational patterns, and the preservation of such patterns governed by the 
laws of natural-selection, controls the development of behavioural evolution. 
In the case of man, the language capability has initiated the cultural 
evolution which has accelerated the natural course of behavioural evolution by 
many times, the information and knowledge is not only passed on to the next 
generation in the genetic form but also by other symbolic and semantic 
means. 
An alternate explanation of the evolutionary mechanism, is the intuitive 
notion that, animals pass on to their offsprings not only their genetically 
coded information which is present at birth, but also part of their acquired 
knowledge during their lifetime (possibly by some sort of genetic 
modification). This hypothesis commonly known as 'Lamarckian' explanation 
of the evolutionary process, has occupied the minds of many researchers since 
the 19th century. 
Yet, in spite of numerous experiments all attempts to substantiate such a 
theory has been futile. Specially, since the rise of Darwinian evolutionary 
ideas there has not been a sympathetic scientific environment to promote 
Lamarckian ideas much further. 
The interesting point is that the mechanisms for inheriting learned 
behavioural traits (hence accelerating the evolution of behaviour) evidently 
exists in the form of genetic-coding-machinerYJ which can accommodate very 
large amounts of coded information within each cell body of the organism. 
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Recent developments have shown some possible ways that the RNA and DNA 
synthesis could modify the genes and transform the acquired information of 
an animal to its next generation. 
However, presently in the absence of any plausible solid explanalion, the 
statistical effectiveness of large numbers of individuals and generations as 
promoted by 'natural selection' is the commonly accepted hypothesis, but it 
must be remembered that Darwinian explanation is not the only or the 
complete explanation for the process of evolution. 
In modern psychology, the evolutionary aspects are seldom looked at in the 
topic of 'learning'. In general, the main emphasis in learning research (in 
geographical sense), have been the American Behaviourism, the Western 
Cognitivism and the Eastern-Block Pavlovianism. 
The evolution of learning behaviour, from the simple habituation to 
complex conceptual problem-solving, has been a slow progression 
accompanying the development of nervous-system from the single-cell 
organism to man. 
The process of evolution itself can be thought of as an elementary kind of 
slow learning process. A population of birds, under the influence of the 
forces of natural selection, genetically adapt to certain new environmental 
conditions (e.g., change in dietary supply), after a few generations of 
encounter with such conditions; while the individual birds show some 
adaptations (learn) to the same environmental conditions during the span of 
their lifetime. 
A principal question is: when exactly in the course of evolution did 
associative memory and learning enter life and behaviour. Various 
evolutionary developments indicate that in the same way that the birds 
acquired wings before learning to fly, the mechanisms for learning must have 
been available before any specific type of learning was exhibited. The extent 
of learning ability has therefore been governed by the elaboration of the 
sense organs, the development and the concentration of the nervous-systems. 
The process of mental evolution and the evolution of learning behaviour is 
characterised by many continuities and discontinuities. As species evolved 
into many diverse groups and phyla, variations in the rates of development of 
different branches of evolution started to appear. In some cases, an optimal 
plateau seems to have been reached, and with the type of nervous-system 
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incorporated within such species, the optimal potentiality of a specific level 
of learning is also seemingly attained, such as the intricate innate behaviours 
of insects with relatively poor degree of adaptability. 
The view that the evolution of learning encompasses definite leaps is not a 
universally accepted one, and although some novel types of learning such as 
linguistic-learning in man is acknowledged, a continuous transformation from 
instinctive reaction to conceptual thought is also generally envisaged. Every 
organism that is not solely dominated by innate modes of behaviour, is 
capable of learning; and according to Pavlov and his followers organisms with 
synaptic neural systems have the conditioning of reflexes as the basis for all 
adaptation and learning they exhibit. This argument has since been partially 
justified for the lower animals up to mammals, though again different learning 
processes seem to be involved in fish and birds. 
In a comparative study of learning within species variations between 
individuals or other environmental factors are ignored, and simply the 
existence or the lack of a particular type of learning in a group of animals is 
considered under optimal conditions. 
It must also be noted that certain physical commonalities superpose and 
encompass all types of behaviour in species, also indicating a continuity in 
the formation of various adaptive mechanisms and processes. The causality 
and the uniformity of physical events; the concept of time; spatial, visual, 
auditory, and other physio-chemical properties imbedded in perceptual 
information; are examples of factors which seem to have identical intrinsic 
values for all animals. Such issues although trivial in a sense, and normally 
taken for granted, should be considered and incorporated in any true model of 
the learning process. 
The speculative method which was used to trace the development of 
nervous-systems throughout the evolution is even more apparent in the 
investigations of behavioural evolution, and in particular the evolution of 
learning. No direct fossil records of primitive animals' nerve-systems exist, 
hence predictions of their form and mechanisms are made using the present 
day animals of identical physiology. Similarly, in tracking the evolution of 
learning behaviour the same criterion is used. However, it must be said that 
this hypothesis is even more speculative in the case of behavioural evolution 
and can never be fully verified. 
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2.9.3 EVOLUTIONARY STAGES OF ADAPTIVE AND LEARNING BEHAVIOURS 
The most trivial types of adaptive behaviour in evolutionary tcrms arc the 
'taxes' (orientation responses to stimuli), 'reflexes' and 'instincts' which 
govern the majority of the actions of lower animals. Yet, the most primitive 
true "learning" is probably in 'habituation', which manifests itsclf in the 
protozoa, man, and even in the single neuron; the mechanism of habituation 
has remained virtually unchanged throughout the evolution. 
Habituation occurs when an organism no longer attends to repeated 
arousable stimuli. This action of nervous system (apparently based on the 
actions of neuro-transmitter chemicals in the active neurons) ensures that 
only the relevant information reaches the animal's brain. Habituation also 
implies that a sort of record should be produced in the form of a 
memory-image, since the habituated organism partially retains such response 
in future occurrences of the stimulus. The investigations of habituation in 
lower animals gives a clue as to where and how this memory-image is formed. 
Evolutionary kinship of habituation and associative learning is apparent from 
the many similarities of their properties. 
Sensitization is the next developmental step in evolutionary terms, it is 
the opposite notion to habituation, where an animal is aroused or alarmed and 
the probability of its response to a stimulus increases, whereby it reacts more 
readily to the repeated stimuli. Sensitization seemingly was not present at 
the most primitive types of life and is only evident in the pre-vertebrates 
such as worms and early vertebrates. 
Learning of associations is the next major evolutionary category, an 
association can be 'conditioned' in an animal based on the bounding of 
various stimuli and responses, mediated by certain inhibitory or reinforcing 
influences. There are generally thought to be three types of conditioning, 
which in their ascending evolutionary order are:-
(a) - Inhibitory (punishment) Conditioning 
(b) - Classical (Pavlovian) Conditioning 
(c) - Reinforcement (reward/operant) Conditioning. 
Inhibitory conditioning or punishment learning can be observed throughout 
the primitive metazoic animals. This process has evolved as a more efficient 
replacement for habituation. In evolutionary terms punishment mechanisms 
were evolved prior to reinforcement (reward) mechanisms; hence, these two 
notions are not symmetrically opposite in the developmental sense. 
The classical conditioning or simple associative learning is the core of 
conditioning and the most typical manifestation of simple learning behaviour. 
This type of conditioning can be readily seen in simple animals such as worms 
and mollusks, and at the highest level can be observed in the conditioning of 
the reflexive responses of man. Classical conditioning has two basic varieties 
of 'aversive' and 'appetitive', having different retention durations for the 
conditioned response. 
The reinforcement (reward) conditioning is the next stage of the 
evolutionary ladder of development. The presence of reward systems in 
animals of more advanced nervous-systems is apparent from both physiological 
and psychological observations. The simple mechanistic relationship between 
reward and stimulus-response learning is the basis for governing the 
behaviour of simpler animals. The emergence of reinforcement conditioning in 
animals can be correlated to the appearance of spinal cords, brain stems, and 
hippocampal reward centres 
Some higher forms of conditioning govern the more complex learning 
behaviours of higher (perhaps more intelligent) animals. Unlike the lower 
animal forms, conditioning in the more complex animals is not so much 
stimulus-bound and mainly originates from within the organism itself. Guided 
by the hypothesis derived from experience, the animal attempts to reproduce 
the rewarding and pleasant experiences by acting on the basis of 
'expectations' rather than inputs, and in the process may use complex 
symbolic means such as the use of language in man. These higher 
conditioning forms have three basic evolutionary types:-
(i) 
(ti) 
- Sensory Preconditioning - (e.g., learning of associations between 
sensory data). 
Integrative Conditioning - (e.g., latent learning). 
(iii) - Predictive Conditioning - (e.g., insight learning). 
Even higher types of linguistic learning is prevalent in man, in the 
form of symbolic learning which can also be categorised into following:-
(a) - learning of simple words; 
(b) - learning of simple predications; 
(c) - learning of 'propositional connections. 
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Although as mentioned earlier the evolutionary hypothesis of the 
development of learning is largely speculative and is based on tentative 
criteria. However, several important principles have been postulated using the 
evidence accumulated in this field Razran (1971):-
(1) - Higher levels of learning arise from the lower levels, and bring new 
laws of learning manifestation. 
(2) - Complex modes of behaviour are added to simpler ones and finally 
repI8ce them. 
(3) - Lower levels of learning continue as subsystems within the higher 
systems, contributing to their processes. 
(4) - At each level of learning new behavioural patterns emerge. 
(5) - Higher levels of learning are more efficient but the lower levels are 
more universal and less aisreputable. 
(6) - Normally hi!{her levels of learning have control over lower levels, but 
under certain conditions the lower levels are predominant. 
(7) - The behaviour of simp-ler animals can not be accounted for in terms of 
higher levels of learning. 
(8) - Similarly, the behaviour of more complex animals can not be accounted 
for by reducing it to simpler components of lower level learning such 
as reflexes. 
Some empirical observations justifying the hierarchy of the evolutionary 
levels of learning are: Coelenterates (hydra, sea-anemone) can be habituated 
but not conditioned; some spinal mammals habituate, become sensitized but are 
not conditionable; gill extension in some fish can be modified by punishment 
and classical conditioning, but not by reward conditioning; other fish and 
lower vertebrates can be fully conditioned in all three types; the classical 
conditioning is prominent in most invertebrates, but higher invertebrates can 
also master reward conditioning; the sensory pre-conditioning and integrative 
conditioning is possible in birds and mammals; predictive conditioning can be 
seen in some birds (crows) and higher mammals (dogs, cats); higher forms of 
learning are in general attributed to primates and the symbolic learning is an 
exclusive achievement of man. 
2.9.4 LEARNING ABILITIES IN DIFFERENT SPECIES 
The relative dominance of various types of adaptive behaviours within 
major species groups is outlined in FIG.2.5. 
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FIGURE 2.4. An illustration of relative contributions of various tytles of 
adaptive behaviours in the major groups of animal speCies, in 
the ascending order of their evolutionary development (from 
Dethier and stellar, 1970). 
In the following each major animal phyla will be briefly examined for their 
adaptive and learning potentialities. 
(a) - LEARNING IN PROTOZOA: Protozoa of today represent animals of much 
greater complexity than the primitive single-celled organisms, they 
range from simple 'amoeba' to the organisms such as 'parameciums' with 
their elaborate moving cilia. Protozoa are observed to have innate 
patterns of behaviour (mainly taxes), such as the 'avoiding reaction' of 
a paramecium when it collides with an obstacle. Habituation has also 
been demonstrated, but less conclusively I since the habituated response 
diminishes very quickly; hence, the temporary sensory change, damage 
or sensitization cannot be completely ruled out. Associative learning 
has also been reported in these animals, but again the evidence has not 
been universally accepted or substantiated, basically on the same 
grounds as habituation. 
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(b) - LEARNING IN METAZOA: Animals in this group such as 'hydra', 
'sea-anemone', and 'star-fish' have a range of simple to complex modes 
of stereotyped behaviours (e.g., feeding, locomotion, protection from 
noxious stimuli, etc.). Higher metazoa such as star-fish, characterised 
by more freedom and dexterity of movement, have developed relatively 
more complex range of behaviours, with faster and more coordinated 
actions. Efforts to establish habituation and associative learning in this 
group of animals have also met with many controversies, based on the 
same critical argument as in the case of protozoa. However, there is 
enough experimental evidence to suggest that habituation and simple 
associative learning can be displayed according to certain criteria, 
which have to be chosen carefully in view of the limited perceptual and 
sensory domain of such animals. 
(c) - LEARNING IN WORMS AND MOLLUSKS: These animals are still very 
much stimulus-response systems. However, here habituation and 
associative learning can be clearly demonstrated, even in the simple 
examples of this group (e.g., flatworm). The increased variety of 
activity, allows experiments such as the learning of tT' mazes to be 
conducted on these ~rganisms. The development of 'ganglia' within this 
phyla, is the major factor which has enabled the more advanced 
mollusks such as octopuses to perform relatively complex learning and 
discrimination tasks, and solve 'detour' problems. The dynamics of 
ganglionic cells have also been investigated in isolation for the 
presence of any adaptive characteristics, and properties analogous to 
habituation, classical and operant conditioning have been demonstrated 
within a single cell. 
(d) - LEARNING IN ARTHROPODS AND INSECTS: This phyla includes more 
species than all other species combined, and the diversity and 
elaboration of form and behaviour is immense. The development of 
acute sense organs, enabled the insects to perform highly specialised 
individual and social patterns of innate behaviour. Although, learning 
plays a small role in the life of arthropods which are basically 
stimulus-bound organisms, a variety of different types of associative 
learning have been observed amongst specific groups of arthropods; 
examples are: habituation, classical and operant conditioning, trial and 
error learning, maze learning, latent learning, imprinting, and even 
some primitive forms of tool using. 
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(e) - LEARNING IN FISH, REPTILES AND AMPIDBIA: These animals generally 
possess all adaptive capabilities of the previous groups, fish have been 
trained for various detour, maze solving, discrimination, and other 
problem solving tasks. The maze solving abilities of these early 
vertebrates are found to be more rapid and consistent than the 
invertebrates (with the possible exception of ants). 
(d) - LEARNING IN BIRDS: Birds show yet more facility in learning of more 
complex problems, and as well as other types of lower learning, there 
are instances where the insightful behaviour has been demonstrated, 
concept of numbers, territorial learning, complex imprinting, tool usage, 
and other interesting facilities have been empirically observed. 
(e) - LEARNING IN MAMMALS, PRIMATES AND MAN: Learning ability is 
enhanced to its optimal limit in this phyla of animals. The innate 
behaviours of mammals are not as elaborated as other species, because 
the process of evolution facilitated higher forms of learning, and freed 
these animals from the dominance of simple stimulus-response and trial 
and error type learning. Mammals are able to use their experiences 
more and more in the modifications of their behaviour; in higher 
mammals and primates the conceptual learning aids the solving of 
complex problems; and in man, the ultimate in learning, the symbolic 
type learning is utilised for the rapid and extensive analysis and 
processing of a diverse range of problems. 
2.10 GIUmI AND DBVKLDfMENTAL PBRSPRCl'IVB OF '11m BRAIN AND LEARNING 
Finally, in this chapter we look at the ontological aspects involved in the 
formation of adaptive behaviours. The various stages of the development of a 
complete adult animals' nervous system are normally initiated from a single 
egg-cell. Through an accurate process of duplication and division, and using 
the internal genetic instructions, the cell transforms into a complete animal. 
The blueprint available to the developing foetus, designates the spatial 
organization of various organs. The brain starts to develop by the formation 
of a 'neural-tube' that is capable of producing large amounts of simple nerve 
cells; these cells in tern, by using the chemical tags attached to them, travel 
to their allocated region or make the appropriate connections; hence, 
developing the wiring diagram of the brain. Extending axons search for their 
destined targets, and after they are found the secondary dendrites are formed 
in a similar manner. 
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The degree of the brain development at birth (both physiologically and 
biochemically), varies amongst different species. In humans, the actual 
production of neurons all but ceases at birth; the subsequent increase in size 
of the brain and the developments which occur in the nervous system only 
involve the restructuring and the growth of further neuronal connections. 
Throughout the animal's life, its neurons become less modifiable 
functionally, and a small percentage of them are destroyed, but unlike other 
cells in their body are not replaced. The variations of the modifiability of 
neurons can be observed in the apparent ease with which children learn 
languages. 
Many sociological and psychological evidence have pointed out the factors 
which can affect the development of the nervous systems; examples are: 
nutrition, experiences, and environmental parameters that can enhance or 
disrupt the quality of neural functioning. The behaviour of an animal or 
certain biochemical/physiological aspects of the brain may be modified during 
a critical time of its life, referred to as the 'sensitive period'. 
Using the criterion that performance and learning arc supported by 
appropriate neural mechanisms, then the behaviour of an animal should 
develop from the very simple reflexive and automatic functions. This type of 
behaviour in fact can be evoked prenatally, and has been observed in human 
foetus which display a reflexive avoidance mechanism. 
At birth most of the activities present are non-cortex dependant, and are 
normally controlled by the spinal cord or the lower brain regions. Later 
motor capabilities are developed followed by sensory processing capabilities. 
Increasing interactions of the animal with its environment, causes the brain, 
the perception, and the behaviour to develop in parallel; this is seen by the 
increase in the brain mass and connectivity, and also by the modifications of 
behaviour into the more complex adaptive forms. 
In the case of humans, there have been many scientific investigations into 
the changes which the learning, intellectual and perceptual capabilities go 
through, during the early years of their life; most prominent in this area 
being Piaget's (1977) extensive research into the origins of intelligence. 
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During the span of behavioural and neural development, two criteria urc 
prevalent, tspecifity' and tplasticity'. 
(1) - SPECIFITY: This property can be observed in the way which certain 
neural mechanisms have their implicit coding instructions dedicated to specific 
tasks, and these mechanisms can not be modified to do a different function 
(e.g., severed or damaged nerve tracts that regenerate in a specific manner). 
Similarly, the specifity of behaviour can be seen in the fixed patterns of 
reflexive or instinctive behaviours. 
(2) - PLASTICITY: This property has been experimentally demonstrated by the 
formation of certain neural connections in the brain which only become 
functional as the system matures; it is shown that during the sensitive period 
of animal's life, the development of these connections can be influenced by 
experiences (e.g., in the formation of visual cortex of cats). Behavioural 
plasticity can be seen in all animals which display adaptive activities (i.e., by 
using feedback from environmental sensory inputs, they can modify their 
perceptual abilities). The highest manifestation of the plasticity of the 
nervous systems is the learning behaviour; in the most primitive form, such as 
imprinting or the formation of parental attachments, a sensitive period during 
the early life is crucial; but for other types of learning, the capability 
persists throughout the life, with varying degrees. 
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CHAPTER 3 
---------
In the previous chapter we covered the broad spectrum of theories, 
concepts, and mechanisms of learning from various scientific outlooks. Such 
observations had emerged as the result of extensive and diverse research on 
animal and human learning. The emphasis was on understanding and 
explaining the learning phenomenon by use of empirical methods of 
investigation. Formalization and theoretical analysis of such observations was 
not dealt with to a great extent. 
In understanding the nature of learning, the immense volume of data 
available will not be of any use unless supported by appropriate theoretical 
hypothesis. Similarly, to verify a theoretical model we need the empirical 
data and proofs - the best models are always those based on experimental 
results. 
Many psychologists or brain scientists are also model-builders, and 
construct analytical representations of their subjects of interest. Various 
examples can be cited from diverse areas of research on learning behaviours 
or learning mechanisms of the brain. Similarly, workers from other 
disciplines have attempted to model the process of learning, in terms of 
vaguer non-empirica1 notions of their own paradigms. These analytical models 
of cyberneticians, A.I. scientists and brain-theorists should all, in a sense, be 
regarded as an attempt to close the gap between the behaviourist's and the 
neuro-physiologist's models. 
A model in psychology or brain-sciences is, normally, based on a specific 
criterion observed in animals. It often has rigid boundaries for descriptions 
of a natural phenomena, in the form of a range for variables or sets of 
possible elements. No great attempt is made to associate the concepts under 
scrutiny with other notions outside the requirements of experimental situation. 
The problems are looked at in isolation and the holistic view is not generally 
favoured. 
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In the modelling of a phenomenon as complex as learning, with many 
intrinsic problems (as outlined in the previous chapter regarding the variety 
and the hierarchy of levels of explanations and investigations), an assortment 
of diverse approaches have been utilised. At the cellubr level, the 
brain-theorists concerned with the mechanisms of learning in nature, have 
devised models based on the primary units or elements (i.e., nerve cells) of 
the brain. 
At the higher functional and behavioural levels, some psychologists 
(cognitive and behavioural) and workers in the information-processing sciences 
have concentrated on the organizational and executive aspects involved in 
learning, the models designed by such theorists do not generally stress the 
details of their internal physical construction, in other words, a 'learning' 
system is not believed to be the product of 'unique' internal interconnections. 
Also, in the view of some cognitive or information-processing workers the 
brain should be studied holistically, since they believe that the summation of 
the isolated explanations of parts will not yield a true explanation of the 
whole. 
'Modelling' and 'simulation', are different from simple replication, are 
normally used as tools for: better understanding; condensing of results in 
coherent forms; and communicating ideas to others. In the modelling of a 
psycho-physiological notion such as learning an initial description of the 
system is necessary, the essential features involved should be identified and 
understood as much as possible. A learning animal itself can be thought of 
as a complex model-builder; in a constant process of creating models of its 
percepts, testing various hypothesis about such models, and modifying the 
models into more efficient ones. The brain of a newly born animal can, also, 
be analogi sed to a system of genetically primed units of model-making 
elements. 
A model is the simplified representation of a physical reality, which can be 
used to draw conclusions about that reality without direct reference to it. 
The model retains the essential features of the original, and together with 
the embedded inferential structure of rules can be used for comprehension, 
explanation or experimentation. It can be one of the three types: 'visual', 
'symbolic', or 'physical'. 
The nervous system is an example of how the real world can be modelled 
using neural networks and connections, problems can be solved using a 
combined physical and symbolic neuronal domain rather than manipulating the 
~-==~------~ -----
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real world. However, it must be remembered that irrespective of the 
complexity or the accuracy of a model it is not the reality but only a 
representation of it. 
The type and the complexity of a model or simulation is stipUlated by the 
particular usage requirements. Simulation is the dynamic execution or 
manipUlation of a model, in simulation predictive methods are used to 
constantly validate a model against its reality. Three major factors have to 
be decided in simulation:-
(a) - the 'usage' level, (b)- - the 'domain', and (c) - the 'approach'. 
In constructing the model of a natural learning process, the su bjectivity of 
the perception and the limitations of the senses of an animal in representing 
the reality are prime considerations. The animal, using its past experiences, 
constructs a predictive internal model and conceptualises the reality. Hence, 
to design an accurate representation of such a process, the intrinsic 
continuous (space and time) nature of the environment should be incorporated 
in the model, and the ordering and the scale of various realities maintained. 
Also, in trying to create an autonomous 'learning' system, the philosophical 
objection of tinfinite regression' is raised regarding the true objective value 
of descriptions. 
The goal of model-builders in learning sciences is to construct models or 
machines (physical models) that exhibit the properties of natural learning, 
hence enabling the discovery of new facts about biological learning. 
However, to build true models of natural learning, much more should be 
known about the workings of brain and the way knowledge is represented in 
nervous systems. The question exists, whether the physiological experiments 
on animals or neuro-tissue cultures are the quickest and best methods for the 
understanding of the learning phenomenon, or whether the study of the 
external effects of learning processes is the more fruitful approach. On the 
other hand, the objective of some workers in fields such as artificial 
intelligence is to construct models and machines that outperform humans in 
specific tasks. 
3.2 MODELLING AND SIMULATION 
In this section we will briefly discuss the issues involved in modelling and 
simulation. Also, different types of models and tools used for the 
representation of models will be outlined. 
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As mentioned earlier a model is a simple representation of an original 
entity; it can be used for explanation. experimentation or beller 
understanding. We can only say a model is a 'good' or 'true' model of the 
original. if its specific functional behaviour follows closely that of the 
original within a particular contextual use. The specific purpose of an 
experiment determines the type and the choice of essential parameters and 
variables to be included in the model. 
The concept of 'system' is a useful notion in studying most scientific 
objects which are distinguished from their 'environment' (though boundaries 
are arbitrarily defined). Examples of such systems can be found in: biology, 
physics, mathematics, psychology, cybernetics, economics, etc. Modelling can 
be thought of as a definite kind of similarity between systems. In general 
this similarity can one be of two types:-
(1) - Models of behaviour: similarity between the behaviour of t.wo 
syst.ems. 
(2) - Models of mechanisms: similarity between the structure and 
mechanisms of two system. 
For animals, a model of mechanism could be one which displays the 
essential features of the organization of nerve cells and networks, and a 
behavioural model could be one that represents a specific behavioural pattern. 
The well established theories of systems are able to analyze the 
similarities of behaviour or structure between two formal systems, and based 
on the isomorphic properties of systems, judge if one is a good model of the 
other. However. in the psychological and biological sciences major obstacles 
are encountered in isolating and identifying the essential features relevant to 
a system; whereby. detailed models can be devised which suffer from extreme 
vagueness or imprecision. 
In constructing a model, the objective is to represent the original in a 
simple form; the initial model can either be a 'complex' type, where gradually 
the non-essential features are excluded. or it could be a 'simple' type, having 
the minimal properties of the original. where more features are supplemented. 
Following the identification of the essential features, the task of a 
model-builder is to discover the various relationships that might exist between 
such features and devise an inferential structure of rules. 
The choice of the medium used for modelling is determined by the 
particular use it is intended for. A 'qualitative' view of the original can be 
conveyed in graphical or descriptive models. The 'quantitative' forms of 
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representations involve mathematical, physical, electronic, and computer-based 
(digital and analogue) models. Also, an 'analogue' of a system can be 
constructed, which is essentially different from a model, it simply duplicates 
the behaviour of the original using entirely dissimilar physical properties. 
An important phase in model-building is the procedure of 'validation'. The 
behaviour of the model is matched and tested against that of the original, 
and various adjustments made for a better correlation. A model can become a 
substitute for the original for the purposes of experimentation or testing. 
The exploration of a working model is known as 'simulation', which is used 
for the testing of various hypothesis about the model. In the course of 
simulation additional properties might emerge about the nature of the original, 
these properties can be consequently validated or rejected. A' good' model 
should be able to predict the original's behaviour for different variable values 
in diverse experimental situations. 
Finally, the results obtained from simulation and modelling should be 
translated to the original domain, by making conclusions about the original's 
behaviour. Care should be taken in the generalization of observations or the 
introduction of new properties, if too much commitment is made to a 
particular model many incorrect results can easily emerge. 
3.3 MODELLING AND SIMULATION OF INTELLIGENCE AND LEARNING 
The mind/brain dichotomy, a dominant feature of many scientific fields 
until early this century, imposed the belief that even the most detailed 
understanding of the workings of the brain would not give an insight into the 
mental activities of animals. The erosion of such views and the development 
of more mechanistic concepts of mind and brain, has introduced the idea that 
in principle models and machines that can perform mental processes are 
conceivable. 
The principal supporting evidence for the mechanization of thoughts has 
been the discovery of various neura-physiological mechanisms and structures 
of the brain. These findings have shown that specific physiological units 
could be correlated with certain mental concepts. The mechanistic view 
prevalent today is that if you can understand something, you can build a 
model or a machine to imitate it. 
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In the explanations of the nature of intelligence, and one of it.a most 
fundamental attributes learning, various approaches have been undertaken:-
(a) - The non-biological approach: involves criteria outside the body and the 
brain. 
(b) - The cellular approach: involves the investigations of the properties of 
nerve cells and their interconnections. 
(c) - The structural approach: involves the organizational aspects, and the 
total patterns of electrical activities of the brain. 
(d) - The cognitive approach: sees the brain as a deterministic machine, and 
analyses the functional aspects of parts of such machines. 
3.3.1 MACHINES AND ROBOTS 
Historically, the earliest types of modelling of intelligent behaviour can be 
associated to what is known as 'robotology', or the mimicking of various 
aspects of intelligent behaviour by constructing machines and models that 
would appear to have some 'mental' faculty. There is a long history of 
automated machines made up of gears and pulleys, attempting to copy the 
living organism in crude ways. Examples of the more advanced generation of 
such automata were Ashby's Homeostat (1952) and Walter's Machina 
Spec\llatrix (1953). These machines were able to show to some extent a 
modifiability of response under different environmental conditions. The 
objective in building such physical models was to simulate a behaviour 
isomorphic with natural learning behaviour. 
The technological advances and the techniques available for simulation and 
modelling, have been some of the major influencing factl'"Jrs in the 
development of 'learning' models; many of the theoretical mod.-:ls seem to 
have evolved around the technology present at the time. 
The abstract concepts used in the design of a 'learning' machine should in 
principle be similar to those involved in the design and function of living 
organism; robots or machines constructed with such concepts in mind, would 
only be a physical embodiment of these theories, and the type of hardware 
used should be an irrelevant issue. However, in reality there is an intricate 
relationship between hardware and theoretical development, and U011Y theories 
seem to have derived from hardware considerations. BenCA9, in some 
instances, seemingly, the problem is approached from the wrong direction. 
In spite of this paradox, the machines and robots that have been 
constructed to demonstrate specific aspects of learning behaviour, such as the 
early simple conditioned reflex machines or conditional probabilit7 computers 
and the later more sophisticated electronically oriented machines, ;are not only 
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interesting curiosities of the 'state of art' technology, but. are genuine 
attempts to discover the nature of adaptive behaviour; each generation having 
more and more functional components identical to the nat.ural learning 
process. 
3.3.2 ANALYTICAL 'LEARNING' MODELS 
The earliest types of quantitative models of learning, originating from the 
science of behavioural psychology, involved the mathematical modelling of 
various aspects of learning. The most prominent researcher in this field was 
Estes (1967) who introduced the probabilistic Stimulus-Sampling-Theory based 
on experimental results on animals. Other mathematical models of learning 
and conditioning have, also, been developed in stimulus-response studies, and 
Borne have been used in teaching and educational sciences. 
Another early trend in the modelling of learning was the system and 
automaton approach in conjunction with logical decision making t.echniques, 
examples of which are the neural nets and the self-organising systems; the 
development of these fields contributed to the introduction of disciplines such 
as 'pattern-recognition' and 'control system theory'. The analytical 
researchers of the learning phenomenon, are eager to transfer the problems 
encountered in learning sciences to a mathematical domain, where they seem 
to be more skilled and confident in manipUlating the criteria and extracting 
deductions. 
3.3.3 COMPUTERS 
The introduction of digital computers was a major landmark in the 
development of modelling techniques. The rapid progress of computer 
technology, presently in its fifth generation, has given rise to countless 
discussions and arguments regarding the relation of such potentially powerful 
machines and the brain. Questions such as: - can computers and brains be 
equated in any functional or structural sense? - what are the relative 
similarities? will one eventually exert a control over the other? - can 
intelligence be a property of a machine? are raised, and many philosophical 
and scientific controversies have emerged. 
In the early computer simulations of learning, such as Newell and Simon's 
(1972) 'learning' models, computers were used as tools for making deductions. 
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Basically, the task of computer simulation of learning in principle involves 
two stages. Firstly, the discovery of what is going on during the natural 
learning process; and secondly, how to make computers go through the same 
process. It is not surprising that in view of our fragmented and limited 
knowledge of the former the progress in devising successful 'learning' 
programs has been slow. 
A secondary and more recent objective of computer modelers of learning 
has been to discover methods and techniques which will enable a machine to 
learn a specific task much faster than humans, yet the process need not have 
any resemblance to natural learning. 
3.3.4 BRAINS vs. 'INTELLIGENT' MACHINES 
Brains resemble machines in numerous but generally primitive ways. Yet, 
many functions of the brain seem to be purposive and directive in nature, 
with seemingly unique living qualities. A concept such as 'intelligence' must 
involve all aspects and activities of the brain as a whole. Leaving aside 
'animal qualities', to make computers which are functionally identical to the 
brain, we must make machines with the same input/output behavioural 
characteristics and the same capability for adaptive modifications. 
According to Arbib (1972): "To be intelligent is to perceive the elements of 
a situation beyond raw sensations." Hence, a complex machine that blindly 
follows a deterministic set of rules, with no true element of 
goal-directiveness, would not qualify for this definition of intelligence. It is 
generally accepted that the term 'intelligence' is a matter of definition, and 
saying a machine is intelligent does not mean that it has to learn to be 
intelligent. 
Turing's (1950) test for 'intelligence', is a criterion which can be used to 
establish whether an entity possesses such an attribute; the lest involves 
interrogating the machine in question through a channel of communication, 
hence, not noticing the obvious physical differences; and if at the end of 
exhaustive examinations we still cannot establish whether there is a human or 
machine at the other end, then, we can attribute the machine with 
'intelligence'. However, the subjective nature of this criterion must be 
pointed out, whereby, we can never be sure if the machine or the person 
under interrogation has any sense of 'understanding' or 'purposiveness'. 
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3.3.5 CYBERNETICS AND SYSTEMS THEORY 
Before advancing to the discussion of information processing and A.!. 
models of learning, it is relevant here to mention the role and the influence 
of the science of Cybernetics in the development of 'learning' models. 
Cybernetics was defined as: "the science of control and communications in 
man and machine," by its principal proponent Wiener (1948). The basic 
characteristic of a cybernetic model is its generality of use for various 
systems of organization. The concept of 'system' is a primary prerequisite of 
any cybernetic model, various notions of general systems theory are used in 
the cybernetic modelling and simulation, such as: input, output, variables, 
states, operations, transitions, fields, etc. Also, the idea of tfeed back' is a 
dominant feature of most cybernetic models, especially in designing of 
automatic control systems. 
In modelling a natural learning behaviour or mechanism, the relation of 
parts are seen as the important factor rather than the analysis of each part 
in isolation. Furthermore, the animal is seen as a deterministic machine, 
whose behaviour is the product of the totality of its parts, and with such 
criteria the supposition is made that an artificial device or system can be 
made, that like the brain will be able to develop adaptations in its behaviour. 
Although, cybernetics has been suffering from diversity and generality of 
its concepts it has been applied successfully to more specific problems in 
engineering, social sciences and economics. General system theories and 
Automata theories are other fields which have benefited from the growth of 
cybernetics. 
3.3.6 INFORMATION PROCESSING 
The merger of various notions from fields of cybernetics, system theory, 
information theory, communication theory, and the methodology of computer 
simulation has culminated in the introduction of the information processing 
concepts and models of learning. The computer is used as a machine for 
expressing and developing different cognitive and behavioural theories. In 
simulation, the computer language is used to devise a sequential program for 
actions; the hardware of the computer is of no interest. In information 
processing models, the transmission of information is viewed using various 
engineering notions such as: coding, decoding, signal, noise, and channels of 
communications. 
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The earliest types of information processing 'learning' models, involved 
symbolic concept oriented learning, and included many applied A.I. and 
pattern-recognition models which solved conceptual problems by means of 
creating goals and sub-goals for the task. 
Cognitive modelling is another area of the science of information 
processing, models of various functional properties of the brain such as the 
formation and search of memory are simulated on computers. f-10delling of 
skills, knowledge, goals, motivation are some other examples of the tasks 
undertaken by cognitive scientists. Various 'production-rules', 'strategies' or 
'propositional-beliefs' are used in the design of such models. 
3.3.7 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
Artificial intelligence (A.I.) is a specialised area of information processing 
sciences, the principal difference of A.I. models from other general system 
models is the specificity of application in A.I. The goals of A.I. are to 
design and build intelligent machines that perform tasks normally requiring 
human intelligence, and to simulate and study the natural learning phenomena. 
Learning in A.I. is defined as the adaptive changes in a system that enables 
the system to perform a task or a similar task more efficiently and 
effectively next time. 
The theoretical analysis of learning in A.I. provides a means of exploring 
various possible methods of learning, since, although through the process of 
evolution human learning is possibly close to optimally efficient, by no means 
is the only form of learning. 
In comparing natural learning with machine 'learning' we can see some 
distinct differences: (a) - the natural learning can be a very slow process for 
certain tasks, such as the acquisition of skills or knowledge, while, in ~.I. 
once a 'learning' model is successful the performance will quickly improve and 
'learning' can be easily duplicated; (b) - the perception of a machine is quite 
poor compared to that of an animal; (c) - the two 'learning' systems may 
accomplish the same results but in differing ways; (d) - certain mental 
attributes cannot be modelled successfully on machines, examples are 
'consciousness', 'awareness' and 'insight', although attempts have been made 
to define these notions in machine terms. 
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A.I. can aid cognitive psychology by means of computer simulation and 
investigation of certain aspects of natural learning such as: perception, 
problem-solving, verbal-learning, concept-formation, thinking, memory, 
meaning, knowledge-representation and understanding natural languages. Also 
concepts in A.I. can be used to devise computer assisted teaching methods. 
There are basically two main forms of tlearning' models in A.I. Firstly, 
the skill refinement 'learning' models which involve the devising of tlearning' 
strategies for a particular domain of application, the various tlearning' 
strategies include: 'rote-learning', 'learning by instruction', 'learning by 
analogy', tlearning by example', 'learning from observation' and 'learning from 
discovery'; in these task oriented models, the performance of a functioning 
system is improved in a more or less automatic manner, at a sub-conscious 
level. 
Secondly, the knowledge acquisition tlearning' models, again involving 
various 'learning' strategies but in this case within specific domains of 
knowledge; the main functions of these models are the obtaining of new 
descriptive information, the perceiving of relationships, and the understanding 
of the meaning and usage of input data. Recently, the knowledge intensive 
models involving specific expert-systems have been the dominant area of A.I. 
research. 
A different categorization of A.I. tlearning' models could be made as 
follows:-
(a) - The models designed for specific task oriented analysis. 
(b) - The models used for the simulation of natural cognitive processes. 
(c) - The models devised for the general theoretical investigations of all 
possible learning methods independent of their application. 
3.4 PRINCIPAL CXHJIDERATIC»m AND ELBHENTS OF A GBNBRAL tLEARNING K)J)E[,' 
Taking the mechanistic view that certain aspects of mind and brain are 
deterministic and in principle can be modeled, then, it is clear that the main 
problem of the design of a 'learning' model is one of programming rather 
than the hardware construction of equivalent elements. 
In devising such models of learning, certain criteria and considerations 
should be applied. A choice can be made whether the model is to be 
tinitiallised' with a preformed framework of knowledge about the learning 
task, or more or less start the learning from zero like a child, the level and 
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complexity of the child-model should also be considered. The domain of the 
'learning' machine or model could be either a specific fixed domain or a more 
general changing one, in which case the model should be designed to be more 
critical in separating the significant experiences. 
The relative contribution of 'instructed' or 'experienced' inputs to the 
model should be assessed in the 'learning' strategies involved. Unless the 
'learning' model is based on purely abstract notions which do not directly 
relate to any natural phenomena, then natural concepts such as punishment 
and reward or other mental and physiological parameters are normally 
incorporated. Also, a random element can be included in the model to enable 
the discovery of novel situations. Other important considerations could be: 
the criterion for the self-realization of the model; and the ultimate goal of 
the model, which could be based on notions of seeking novelty, change, 
stability, etc. The basic elements of a general, simple 'learning' model can be 
enumerated as follows:-
(1) - FilterinJ element: to limit or focus the relevant data from environment 
for utilization, this element can be an instructor or a teacher. 
(2) - Memor¥ element: to store in dual form of short and long term the 
essential features and information extracted from various experiences. 
(3) - Evaluation element: to compare with a standard, or ascertain the 
achievement of goals, usually manifested by reward/punishment centers. 
(4) - Learning element: to modify and improve the response by translation of 
the evaluation element's outputs. 
(5) - Executive element: to select the response for each stimuli. 
(6) 
(7) 
Generalization element: to extract specific concepts from the mass of 
stored experiences in memory. 
Discovery element: to distinguish novel or significant experiences. 
(8) - Planning element: to devise strategies and theories for future actions. 
3.5 "NATURAL" LEARNING MODELS 
Historically, the first attempts at the modelling of aspects of learning 
involved the 'natural' approach to the subject, these models exemplified 
various qualities of natural learning using empirical observations. The 
'natural' model builders do not explore the possible alternate learning 
processes or methods, but are mainly interested in the simple representation 
of the psycho-physiological concepts in learning. The models of 'natural' 
learning have two distinct types: (a) - the models of natural learning 
behaviours, and (b) - the models of natural learning mechanisms. 
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3.5.1 MODELS OF NATURAL LEARNING BEHAVIOUR 
The emergence of analytical models of learning behaviour can be traced to 
the work of experimental psychologists who were involved in the empirical 
studies of learning. The earliest learning theories, proposed models which 
were mainly based on a descriptive explanation of processes involved. The 
pioneering adherents of such theories namely Ebbinghaus, Thorndike, Pavlov, 
Gutherie, and Skinner did not give particular quantified versions of their 
criteria. 
However, some quantitative methods were established for the recording or 
describing of learning behaviour; the strength or latency of a stimulus or 
response could be measured in terms of its amplitude or relative frequency, 
attempts were also made to fit the results of the experimental work into 
specific mathematical functions. For example, mathematical 'learning 
functions' such as hyperbola, exponential growth or other functions were 
proposed which could depict certain aspects of learning experiments such as 
forgetting or performance changes over successive experiments. Yet, none of 
these learning functions involved any axiomatic considerations about learning. 
Gradually, the trend inclined more towards the precise analytical models of 
learning behaviour, in an attempt to explain and predict the exact details of 
experimental results. 
The early programmatic theories of conditioning and learning processes 
were supplemented by Hull's (1943) analytical theories which strongly 
emphasised the need for the development of quantitative learning theories. 
He postulated sets of both descriptive criteria and quantitative mathematical 
equations, mainly based on generalized empirical results; despite the rich 
analytical flavour of Hull's writings, his most important contribution to 
learning research was the comprehensive and clarified nature of his 
'qualitative' work. Hull's formal knowledge base for learning processes, also 
the influence of other disciplines such as 'information theory', were 
instrumental in the introduction of mathematical learning theories from the 
late 1940's, these theories included the stochastic as well as the deterministic 
views of behaviour, and generally involved the estimation of some parameters. 
Mathematical learning theories and models have on the main concentrated 
on the associationist approach and the experimental situations which were 
exploited by Hull, Skinner and oiher S-R researchers, but generally for 
simplification purposes do not incorporate the immense range of variables and 
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parameters which influence animal learning, many factors such as the 'drive 
level' or the 'stimulus intensity' are taken to be fixed throughout an 
experiment. 
The range of behavioural phenomena investigated by mathematical learning 
theories include: 'classical' and 'operant' conditioning. 'generalization'. 
'reinforcement', 'extinction', 'serial-learning', 'discrimination-learning' , 
'paired-associate-learning', 'memory'. 'imitation-learning'. 'concept-formation " 
and many other aspects of learning and conditioning. 
Such theories and models have also been applied in the optimization of 
educational teaching programs; for the optimal determination of methods of 
presentation, amounts of teaching material. or various other features of 
classroom organization. The formulation of these theories if done correctly 
can result in a very accurate model of the learning situation and a vast 
amount of useful information can be gathered from the simulation and analysis 
of results. 
More recently some cognitive hypothesis have also been represented in 
mathematical forms. In the following we will briefly discuss Estes' (1967) 
'Stimulus-Sampling-Theory' (SST). one of the most prominent and best 
developed mathematical models of learning behaviour. Many of the ideas in 
SST have also been translated into theoretical notions in other disciplines 
such as cognitive-modelling or information-processing. 
Stimulus-sampling-theory started as a formalization of S-R associationist 
ideas. The basic assumption is that an organism 'learns' by attaching new 
adaptive behaviours to stimulus situations which formally did not have an 
appropriate response. The effectiveness of an adaptive response is evaluated 
by the 'reinforcing' outcome. This use of reinforcement as the essence of 
the learning process, as referred to previously, is the basis for explanations 
incorporating the empirical 'law of effect'. According to SST a subject 
experiencing a reinforcing outcome (0) as a consequence of response (R) to 
stimulus (S) forms a S-R-O sequence in internal representations and learns 
associations of all pairs of elements S-R, R-O, and S-O. 
Stimulus-sampling-theory considers the behaviour to be a probabilistic or 
stochastic process. The choice that a learning animal makes in any situation 
(e.g., learning a maze) is looked at in terms of the probabilities of responses, 
according to criteria based on groups of animals or numbers of successive 
trials. The behaviour is thought to be causally determined, but in view of 
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the large number of possible factors involved such as: genetic make up, 
motivation levels, sensory differences, fluctuations in recalling memory J 
variety of environmental stimuli, and many other un-measurable factors, tho 
best prediction of behaviour is considered to be a probabilistic one. 
Although, it is assumed that if all such causal factors were precisely known 
then the behaviour could be completely deterministic. 
The main variable of a statistical learning theory is the probability of 
response of a subject at any point of time,the probability of a correct 
response should approach 1.00 as learning progresses. Many inferences and 
predictions can be made from the simulations of statistical 'learning' models 
such as those in SST, but care should be taken to avoid the pitfall of 
fictitious deductions. An SST model is normally based on a small sample of 
individuals, from which conclusions are made about the populations of such 
individuals. The performance variations between the members of a population, 
such as differing response tendencies or learning rales can be incorporated 
within the model by the inclusion of a 'variance' factor. 
One of the basic assumptions of SST is that a learning organism that is 
confronted by the environmental stimuli, only has a limited sample of N 
elements (normally fixed) available for processing, the sample may vary due to 
environmental or the subject's fluctuating circumstances. And it is postulated 
that each element in the sample can be assigned a particular probability for 
each trial. Another assumption is made about the connection of responses 
with the sampled stimuli, a deterministic criteria is used whereby a response 
for a particular stimulus is fixed at any specific time and the 'state' of the 
'learning' model is the listing of such stimulus-responsc pairs, thesc 
connections and hence the state of the system changes from trial Lo trial. 
Although, the probability of a response associated with a particular stimulus 
is 1.00, at anyone time there is a probability attached to the occurrence of a 
particular response within a sampled set of stimuli, this is due to the 
probabilistic nature of the stimuli. 
The 'performance' is judged and reinforced by evaluating the 'reinforcing 
outcome' after a subject responds to a particular stimulus sample. This 
reinforcing outcome changes the conditional connections of the elements 
sampled in the trial and updates the model. By utilising this general 
principle, successive trials results in the attachment of 'correct' or 'rewarded' 
responses to increasingly more stimuli elements and the gradual detachment of 
inappropriate responses. The phenomenon of 'extinction' is also embodied 
Tools aDd "ecbDiQues for ModelliDg LeilrDiDg 115 
within such process, whereby the stimulus-response connections which arc nol 
rewarded frequently are slowly phased out. 
Using such basic criteria on stimulus-samples, linear learning-equations are 
formulated for various learning experiments or situations, and by following 
the progress of different S-R connections global inferences or predictions are 
made about many aspects of the populations of such samples. Of special 
interest are the small element samples, for which SST can be applied much 
more consistently and precisely. Hence the models which are based on simple 
conditioning or learning situations can predict the behaviour much more 
accurately. One by-product of such investigations has been to propose 
systems of basic building blocks of learning elements which could be used in 
synthesising much more complex learning processes. More recently, lhe 
stimulus-sampling-theories have shifted from the purely response oriented 
associative views to the more cognitive event and memory formation ideas. 
As well as SST, other mathematical methods such as Bush and Mosteller's 
(1955) have been developed to model specific aspects of natural learning 
behaviour. A different class of models of natural learning behaviour, those 
that strongly emphasise or depend on hardware will be dealt with in later 
sections - the distinguishing feature of the design of these models is the 
particular attention which is given to the intricacies of their physical 
construct. 
Simulations and models of learning behaviour involving the use of 
computing machinery as tools for the implementation of logical deductions will 
be investigated later, these models mainly attempt to duplicate the human's 
higher mental processes such as thinking and problem-solving. Other 
non-computer based models of various aspects of mental activity have been 
devised by cognitive-modelers; generally, in the cognitive type models, lhe 
inclination is away from the simpler aspects of learning and conditioning. 
Simple natural learning situations such as conditioning or trial and error 
learning can be easily simulated by a non-analytical programmatic computer 
model, displaying the appropriate behaviour and characteristics of the process, 
yet it should be recognised that to investigate any novel aspects of such 
learning situation, it will be necessary to dispense with the model and create 
a more complex and elaborate one. The new model could be further explored 
for other crucial assumptions. The problem envisaged with such computer 
simulations is that although a good fit to empirical results can be achieved 
and interesting data obtained, no important theorems in the accepted 
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mathematical sense can be derived or proven, since the emphasis is heavily on 
the simulation aspects of the learning process. 
There is a gap between the computer simulations of learning behnviour, 
such as the A.I. programs, and the simulations of learning in experimental 
psychology, the principal reason being the difference in background nnd 
approach. In psychological simulation the model tries to mimic slep by Rlcp 
the process which a learning organism goes through, while in A.I. the modeler 
is interested in efficient programs that perform a task regardless of how a 
living organism might achieve the same task. 
3.5.2 MODELS OF NATURAL LEARNING MECHANISMS 
The mechanism by which the learning process is manifested within an 
organism's nervous system has been a prime subject for the model-builders of 
many scientific fields, some of the diverse processes and devices that have 
been employed in such models include: the flow of fluids in pipes, optical 
vibrations, electro-chemistry, animal electricity, wires and conductors, 
electrical and electronic circuits, and digital and analogue computers. 
In this section we are basically interested in the models of learning 
mechanisms more or less based on the structural features of the natural 
processes of learning. Hodels involving functional equivalences of natural 
learning with no regard for the underlying biological mechanisms will be dealt 
with later, such models mainly incorporate the information flow and 
processing aspects of a learning animal rather than the specific 
correspondence of elements in physiological learning systems. 
The principle question in the modelling of natural learning mechanism is 
the physiological basis of association. Although, the physiology of learning 
can be modelled in many different hierarchical levels (from biochemical to 
total electrical activities of brain regions), generally the most fruitful 
investigations of the learning mechanisms have been carried out by the 
modelling and simulation of nerve-cell action and nerve-network activities. 
In the modelling of the behaviour of a single nerve-cell various 
characteristics and functional parameters of the nerve-cell activity are 
duplicated in conceptual, mathematical or abstract forms. The degree of 
elaboration is determined by what parameters are incorporated, some examples 
of such cell characteristics are: excitation and inhibition thresholds, synaptic 
integration, coding and decoding of pulses, pulse generation, resting and 
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active potentials, conduction; and many other features of nerve-cell uctivily. 
Such individual nerve models have also been constructed in hardware using 
physical or electrical components. The objective of devising such models is 
to develope networks made up of these elements, also to test and discover 
specilic functional characteristics of individual elements and networks of 
cell-models, hence predict and understand the behaviour of real neurons. 
Simple idealized neuronal models were devised as a simplified tool for such 
investigations. The earliest and the most notable examples were the "forronl 
neurons" introduced by McCulloch and Pitts (1943), initially these models were 
abstract configurations with several inputs and one output, which could have 
been excited or inhibited at particular threshold values, laler models were 
developed to resemble the natural nerve-cell more closely. 
The introduction of such abstract models of the neurons allowed lhe 
simulation and manipulation of networks of such elements using formal logic 
notions and mathematical operations. The model could also be used as a 
'computing element' in the engineering sense and many experimental 
physiological observations could be simulated on computers, any new 
properties discovered during such simulations could be further verilied or 
refuted by experimentation, hence contributing to the better understanding 
and explanation of neuronal activities. Even the simple abstract single neuron 
model can be made to display a kind of simple learning. By changing the 
weighting or the threshold parameters of the model according to a specific 
algorithm, the model can learn to distinguish between stimuli received more 
frequently from the less frequent ones. 
The collective behaviour of nerve-cells have been also extensively 
modelled. Firstly, by the modelling of biological nerve-networks; these types 
of models have been mainly based on the peripheral sensory or motor 
neurons, since these neurons are easier to isolate and observe as a system 
(e.g., cat's visual system). These models provide a theoretical framework for 
the investigation of activities of groups of neurons, using which deductions or 
inferences can be made about the natural nerve-networks. Initially, the 
models were represented in a simple conceptual or pictorial form but later 
more abstract mathematical and computer-based models were developed which 
contributed to the establishment of new disciplines such as 
'pattern-recognition', 'robotics'. 'self-organising systems' etc. An important 
discovery which has emerged from these nerve-net models is the significant 
role of the process of 'reciprocal inhibition' in nerve activity, whereby the 
excitation of a cell is accompanied by the inhibition of other cells. 
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Secondly, the modelling of the nerve networks is carried out using groups 
of abstract single nerve-cell models developed previously. The behaviour of 
such networks being composed of more precise analytical units, can be defined 
and analyzed much more readily. The problems encountered are analogues to 
many problems in logic nets and the mathematical notions and operations of 
Boolean Algebra could be applied to such models. In comparing this type of 
models with the natural neural-networks, we can see that to have the same 
degree of efficient and reliable operation we need to incorporate into the 
model a high degree of redundancy which is prevalent in all natural systems, 
hence duplicate and cross over networks and extensive inter-connectivity is 
the feature of most networks of model neurons. 
Various reflex conditioning experiments can be demonslraled using 
networks of abstract models of neurons, even more complex discrimination and 
performance capabilities can be shown by the appropriate manifestation of 
such networks. Using a criteria for 'success' or 'failure' (punishment/reward) 
and devising feedback channels from the environment, autonomous 'lenrnin~' 
systems have been developed that are able to adaptively modify their 
behaviour under various situations. Rosenblatt (1958,1962) showed lhat in a 
randomly interconnected network of model neurons an orderly discriminatative 
performance can be produced, and more recently olher elaborate and complex 
neural models have been developed that are able to simulate interesting 
features of conditioning and learning. 
Although, the workers in this field do not claim that such automata 
created using abstract models of neurons have any direct similarity to the 
natural processes involved, nevertheless they contend that by the use of a 
simplified model of neuron they are able to show some of the capabilities of 
a learning organism. 
A criticism of the majority of the neural-models is that they favour 
stimulus-substitution notion in the formation of associations, and the idea of 
goal-directiveness is not generally featured, it is assumed lhat stimuli and 
responses have corresponding neural-pools and the learning of 
stimulus-response patterns is accompanied by the formation of the neural 
equivalent of such associations. 
In the physiological sense we know that the temporary proximate activity 
of two nerve-cells causes them to become associated in a primitive or basic 
manner, so that one can now excite the other while previously was unable to. 
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A possible explanation of the mechanisms involved in the formation of 
associations during learning was put forward by Hebb (1949), in his so called 
"reverberating circuit" theories, he postulated that synapses modify or activate 
during the formation of the associative memory which plays an important roJe 
in the process of learning; according to Hebb the cell assemblies arc formed 
as a result of increased efficiency of 'excitation' of one neuron by another 
neuron. Later, Milner (1957) postulated that in addition the increase in the 
'inhibitory' synaptic efficiency is also an important factor. The investigation 
of these and other similar theories using the neural modelling techniques and 
various computer-based simulations has shown that indeed cell assemblies can 
be formed around each block of input cells, the excitatory synapses become 
strong and the inhibitory synapses become weak, however the inhibitory 
synapses are shown to be more dominant. The neural activity can propugatc 
in the form of oscillations, either in rhythmic unison or bursts of activity. 
These observations loosely correspond to the characteristics of the EEG 
recordings that are made from the brain activity of an animal engaged in the 
learning of a task. 
Although, no direct physiological proofs have been found for Hebb's 
fundamental postUlates, and clearly memory and learning are much more 
persistent than initially implied by the purely functional changes of Hebb's 
theories, still many adaptive 'learning' and self-organising models have been 
devised using such criteria. A follow up to this line of ,",'ork has been a 
considerable amount of research into the process of memory formation, and of 
particular interest to learning sciences, the findings on the organizational and 
functional aspects of the associative memory formation within the LTl\1 
system. 
3.6 "ARTIFICIAL" 'LEARNING' MODELS 
The animal learning mechanisms and processes have been studied and 
modelled intensively in disciplines rooted in biological or psychological 
sciences. In spite of having the same final objectives as the 'natural' 
modelers 'artificial' models of learning have, also, been developed by workers 
from many diverse fields of science unrelated to biology or physiology. In 
such areas the problems are usually tackled by attempting to develop 'simple' 
models of natural learning-processes which incorporate some abstract criteria 
not readily seen in nature. Su bsequently, these models are analyzed and 
improved in an effort to approach the complexities of biological 
learning-processes. The emphasis in most such 'artificial' models are on the 
underlying techniques, theories, media or the physical hardware used in the 
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model construction, and not on the empirical observations of natural learning 
phenomena. 
Scientists in the more theoretically inclined sciences of Cybernetics, 
System-Theory, Automata-Theory and other analytical subjects, have developed 
models based on the notion that learning is in fact a universal phenomenon 
applicable to all types of living and non-living systems capable of directive 
behaviour, the animal learning being a special realization of this phenomenon 
in nature. Using various stochastic or deterministic metaphors, adaptive 
'learning' systems are devised. On the one hand, general and abstracl 
cybernetic systems are developed encompassing all types of adaptive processes, 
and on the other hand, specific and precise systems with well defined 
boundaries are designed in fields such as adaptive-control-systems, dealing 
with particular real-life problems. 
A different approach in the development of artificial 'learning' models has 
been to construct hardware realizations of different learning theories in the 
form of physical models. The technological advances and tools available to 
such model-builders have been the major factors in determining the direction, 
the complexity and the accuracy of these models. The building of 'robots' 
that can exhibit true learning has been the ultimate objective of researchers 
in the science of Robotics; other workers have devised mechanical, electrical 
or electronic models which demonstrate some features of conditioning or a 
learning-process. Although, these hardware models have been mainly used to 
simulate or test theories previously developed in the more abstract learning 
sciences, in certain instances, the actual physical characteristics of a specific 
hard"rare device is used as the fundamental criterion and the starting point 
for su bsequent developments. The hardware oriented models will be discussed 
later and their contribution to the learning science analyzed. 
Finally, in the past 30 years with the advent of computers and the 
explosive development of related sciences, 'learning' models based on the 
information-processing notions have been devised, whereby, the flow of 
information during the learning process is depicted on computers in the form 
of programs. Workers in the field of Artificial-Intelligence (A.I.) or 
Cognitive-Psychology design 'learning' models which can be simulated on 
computers, displaying various behavioural or cognitive aspects of 
learning-processes without necessarily following the 'natural' way. Elaborate 
systems have been constructed that can 'learnt specific tasks in particular 
domains, but they are far from the definition of versatile animal or human 
learning systems. The computer in such sciences is seen as simply a tool for 
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the simulation of the model, but the implicit dominant role of computers in 
the design and development of these artificial 'learning' models must be 
emphasised. 
3.6.1 'LEARNING' MODELS IN CYBERNETICS 
In this section we will briefly sketch the historical background and the 
development of the science of Cybernetics, and describe briefly some of the 
underlying objectives of constructing cybernetic-models. 
The origins of the name 'Cybernetics' can be traced to the ancient Greek 
word of 'KYBERNETES', meaning the 'steersman' in the navigational sense. 
However, philosophers like Plato used this term to denole "the arl of 
steering" in the governing of various activities, the word 'KYBERNETIKOS' 
hence implied a knowledge of a subject and the ability to remain in command 
in order to reach a goal. The next landmark in the use of word 'Cybernetics' 
was the introduction of this term by the 19th century mathematician and 
physicist Ampere, he used "CYBERNETIQUE" in the context of 'statesmanship' 
with reference to politics. 
The introduction of the modern terminology of 'cybernetics' is attributed 
to Wiener (1948), generally considered to be the founder of this new branch 
of science. In an attempt to unify subjects from a variety of fields such HS 
biology, mathematics, physiology, psychology, electrical engineering, control 
and communication engineering, Wiener defined the distinctly new discipline of 
'Cybernetics' as:-
"The science of control and communication in the animal and the machine." 
The development 
collaborations with 
of cybernetics· has been highlighted 
different disciplines of science, followed 
by many 
by the 
specializations in the form of newly created independent field of study. The 
main reason for divergence of such specialized subjects away from the 
mainstream cybernetic research, has been the lack of a formal 'cybernetic' 
structure for unifying various concepts. 
During the late 1940's with the appearance of digital computers, devices 
that were capable of fast and complex symbolic-manipulations, cybernetic 
ideas were tied with many mathematical notions in formal-logic, the whole 
area of computational machinery became a major area of interest for 
cyberneticians but gradually the trend of such work drifted away from 
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cybernetics towards the more specialized subject of 'computing'. As well as 
logic, other mathematical theories and concepts have had brief or more 
permanent and deep coalitions with cybernetics. 
Cybernetics can be seen as a science which cuts across many other 
established sciences, it is primarily interested in the interactions and the 
functional aspects of an entity, the energy and physical aspects arc of only 
secondary importance. Although, the machines and mathematical worlds, were 
from the beginning the principal domains of enquiry for the researchers in 
cybernetics, the biological and physiological mechanisms that could be modeled 
or scrutinized analytically were of strong concern too. For some workers 
(specially in the eastern-block countries) cybernetics is used even in a more 
broad sense, encompassing many mathematical or statistical socio-economic 
theories. 
As evident from Wiener's definition of cybernetics, a principal metaphor in 
cybernetics is that an 'animal' is considered to be a kind of 'machine', in 
particular, the brains and the nervous-systems are equated with computer-like 
processing machines. The effort of some workers in cybernetics has been 
directed towards the design of machines, that in principle can emulate some 
intelligent behaviours or brain-functions. The biological results are analyzed 
and reconsidered in mathematical terms, these quantitative frameworks allow 
much higher degrees of precisians and manipUlations of results than the 
ordinary linguistic descriptive models. Although, the gap between organism 
and machine is immense, effective cybernetic theories and models have been 
constructed to show some similarities with living phenomena, but the 
resemblances have been primarily at performance level. 
Wiener's formal definition of the science of Cybernetics does not expressly 
state the topics and the range of criteria that can be investigated by this 
discipline, it specifies: (a) - the types of objects for which the cyberneticians 
could formulate their hypothesis about (man and machine); and (b) - the 
points of view with which the problems are approached, defined and analyzed 
(control and communication). 
The evolution of cybernetics and its applications have shown that, 
possibly, Wiener's definition is too general to account for the distinctive yet 
diverse views that have been developed, and the type of the problems that 
have been tackled in cybernetics; other definitions of cybernetics emphasising 
the 'system', the 'control', the 'information' or the 'structural' and 
'organizational' aspects have also been devised. 
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The principal aims of the science of Cybernetics according to George 
(1973), who also considers "the pursuit of artificial intelligence" as the central 
feature of cybernetics, are:-
(1) - To construct effective theories, with or without actual hardware, which 
realize the principal functions of humans. 
(2) - To simulate the functions of human behaviour by the same logical 
means used in human beings. 
(3) - To produce models which are constructed from the same colloidal 
chemicals as are used in human beings. 
The approaches to the above objectives have ranged from 'theoretical', 
'experimental' to 'engineering'; many overlaps with other disciplines have 
created 'applied-cybernetic' subjects in areas such as economics, 
neuro-physiology, mathematics, etc. 
3.6.2 ANALYI'ICAL ~ AND TJDJNI~ umo FeE KJ)ID.TJNG OF LEARNING 
In the following we will briefly look at some important methodologies, 
concepts and analytical tools that have been incorporated in various 'learning' 
and 'adaptive' models - in particular, many cybernetic models. 
(i) - SYSTEMS AND CONTROL SYSTEMS 
The concept of 'system' has been widely used for the description and 
analysis of the learning process. The framework of terminologies and theories 
developed in 'system-theory', have helped the formalization of many processes 
in the living world as well as the inanimate. We will enumerate some of the 
principal elements of system-theory and other notions relevant to our 
discussion of 'learning-models'. 
A 'system' in general terms can be defined as: 'a set of interrelated 
elements'; in the case of 'learning' systems, the concepts of tchange' and 
'variety' are of special concern, hence for our purposes the system can be 
considered as la set of variables' - a variable here is any measurable quantity. 
In 'physical-systems' everything not included within the system can be 
considered as the 'environment' of the system, but usually a more restricted 
form of environment is chosen which only includes the elements of the 
tuniverse' relevant to the design of the system. 
The system and the environment must not be looked at in isolation, 
whereby the environment is only seen as the ex~ernal forces which act on the 
organism from the outside. The environment and the system must be 
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considered as mutually interactive, or in the case of the more nbstract 
systems as mutually interrelated. 
Every real physical organism can be attributed with an infinite nUJllber of 
variables, a major task for the scientist devising a system is the 
'identification' of the appropriate selection of variables from the indefinite 
list of possibilities. A 'good' system representation is one that only includes 
variables which have a bearing to the 'context' and the 'resolution-level' of 
the problem. 
The 'state' of a system is defined as the set of values which the variables 
take at any instance of time, 'inputs' or 'stimuli' to the system denote all the 
parameters of the environment that effect the system, similarly, 'outputs' or 
'responses' of the system are all effects of the syslem on the environment. 
A schematic diagram of the main system components are outlined in FIG.3.1. 
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FIGURE 3.1. A general system configuration with its main elements. 
The properties of a system can be divided into two different basic groups 
of: (1) - behavioural, and (2) - structural. 
The behaviour of any general system can be completely and uniquely 
defined by: the 'state-transition-functions', which determine how the state 
will change under the influence of various inputs; and the 'output-functions', 
which determine what the system outputs will be for different inputs, given a 
specified state. The 'behaviour' of the system can be represented by a 'line 
of behaviour' or a 'phase-space', whereby the transitions from an 
'initial-state' are shown respectively as successive states drawn against time 
intervals or as 'vector' representations, a 'field' is a phase-space containing 
all the possible lines of behaviour. 
The structure of a system describes, on the one hand, the organizational 
aspects or the 'couplings' between the elements of the system, and on the 
other hand, the interactions between these elements. The coupling between 
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the elements of a system can be achieved by 'series', 'parallel' and 'feedback' 
methods, as shown in FIG.3.2. 
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FIGURE 3.2. The three types of coupling between the elements of a system: (a)-series, (b)-parallel, (c)-feedback. 
The notion of 'feedback' is an important feature of most systems, an 
organism or a system is said to have 'feedback' if its outputs have some 
bearing on its inputs. A special class of systems the 'servomechanisms' or 
'negative-feed back-systems' have a special significance for learning modelers. 
These systems use the feed back loop to incorporate an error reducing element 
which enables the system to achieve a 'desired' state or performance. It was 
the analysis of this type of systems that influenced the thoughts of the 
founders of modern cybernetic theory; for example, Wiener's work on the 
aircraft tracking servo-systems. 
Systems have also been classified into distinct types and groupings such 
as: 'Physical' against 'Abstract'; 'Continuous' against 'Discrete'; 'Artificial' 
against 'Natural'; 'Open' against'Closed', where in open systems all possible 
interactions between an organism and environment are considered, while in 
closed systems (or partially closed systems) no interaction (or limited paths of 
interactions) are considered; 'Deterministic' against 'Stochastic', where the 
response and the new state of a deterministic system can be uniquely 
determined by its previous state and the present stimulus, while, the 
behaviour of the stochastic-system for any given input-state pair is only 
predicted in terms of the probabilities of outputs and new states. 
As mentioned earlier the two major properties of a system are its 
'structure' and 'behaviour'. The types of problems that system-theory can be 
applied to, invariably depend on the investigation or the discovery of one or 
both of these fundamental properties. A specified system behaviour can be 
either the result of a unique system structure or a class of structures. In 
principle, the problems are classified as follows:-
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(a) - The 'synthesis' of a system: a specified behaviour is known .. a structure 
is to be designed so that it can exhibit the prescribed behaviour. 
(b) - The 'analysis' of a system: the structure of a system is known, the task 
is to determine the behaviour of such a system. 
(c) - The 'black-box' problem: a partial or no knowledge of the structure 
exists, the problem consists of determinin,g the behaviour by empirical 
experImentation and inferring a hypothesIs about its structure. 
It must be noted that learning sciences utilise all three approaches (in 
varying degrees) in the design of 'adaptive learning models'. 
A special class of systems are those called the 'control-systems'; the word 
'control' is normally understood to mean 'regulate', 'direct', or 'command. 
The criterion of control in systems is applied to 'dependant' variables or 
elements that interact and influence each other's behaviour. Control, is a 
subjective and relative notion, depending on various contextual limits imposed 
on the performance of a system, the actual physical connections of variables 
are of no great consequence in the definitions of this concept. 
In the most general and abstract sense every physical or non-physical 
object can be considered as a control system, and for every system an 
arbitrary number of control elements defined. However, in science, normally, 
the notion of control system is defined on more objective basis as: systems 
that can 'actively' regulate, command, or direct; hence excluding the 
thermodynamic-equilibrium-seeking systems. These control systems are 
sometimes referred to as 'purposive' J 'teleological' or 'goal-directed' systems. 
Control systems are normally classified into two categories: 'open-loop' and 
'closed-loop' or 'feedback' control systems; in open-loop control systems, the 
control-action is independent of the output; while, in closed-loop control 
systems, the control-action is influenced by the output. However, the 
arbitrary and subjective nature of the definitions of control-action and other 
elements of systems must be remembered. The general scheme of a feedback 
control system is outlined in FIG.3.3. 
FIGURE 3.3. A feedback control system: control is established using the error 
signal which is a summation or the difference between the 
reference input and a factor of the actual output (the feedback 
signal). 
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The use of mathematical techniques in the modelling of learning has helped 
to devise formal systems that by utilising accurate criteria are able to 
describe, ask questions and provide answers about specific problems. 
Mathematics is a precise language with a structured axiomatic framework 
where 'consistency' and 'completeness' are prime concerns. 
Of course, the researcher in learning is not interested only in 'pure' 
abstractions in mathematical domains, but also is involved in the design of 
some 'applied' mathematical techniques for realization of his models, 
predominantly by a digital computer. In the following a selection of 
mathematical topics of interest will be briefly discussed. 
(a) - SET THEORY 
A 'set' can be defined as simply a collection of elements, the set-theory 
has a well formed axiomatic framework of representations and functions; these 
notions have been employed in models where the representation of 'class' of 
objects or elements have been of concern. Ashby's (1952) formal 
representation of the property of Homeostasis (regulation) in organisms, and 
many other models of human thinking and memory, are examples where the 
set-theory notions are utilised. 
(b) - THEORY OF LOGIC 
Logic is generally considered to be the foundation of mathematics, logic 
has been called the 'grammar of reason' because of its intuitive similarity 
with the process of mental reasoning and thinking. But unlike the ordinary 
language which has an implicit vagueness in its construct, logic has been 
abstracted on orderly and objective criteria. Logic has been extensively 
applied in the understanding of cybernetic systems, it has been used to 
perform 'deductions' (generalizations), 'inductions' (proving statements) and 
finally 'abstractions' within such systems. 
In logic variables stand for 'classes' of objects; an algebra for classes (the 
'Boolean Algebra') has been devised, one interpretation of Boolean algebra is 
when it is performed on classes of propositions or statements. The Boolean 
operations of 'and', 'or', 'negation', 'class-inclusion', 'class-exclusion' and 
'equivalence' preserve their intuitive linguistic meanings when acting upon 
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propositions. For this type of symbolic-logic, the theories of 
'propositional-calculus' have been developed, which by using simple arithmetics 
of propositions allow the combinations or manipulations of statements. Bence, 
the validity of relationships between statements in a particular mathematical 
system can be examined and various theorems proved. 
An extension of propositional-calculus is the methodologies and theories of 
'predicate-calculus', predicate-calculus is utilised in the majority of 
'theorem-proving' research of today. The predicate calculus is concerned with 
a more detailed analysis of propositions, allowing for some inner structural 
aspects of propositions as well. A 'predicate' is a function that maps terms 
onto truth values 'T' or 'F' (conventional notions of 'true' or 'false'). 
(c) - PROBABILITY THEORY 
'Probability' is the single notion of mathematics most widely used in the 
learning related sciences. Probability theory is the formal foundation of 
statistical inferences, sampling and survey of problems, and the design of 
many experiments. The probability of an event occurring is calculated on the 
basis of the three criteria:-
(1) - The logical and semantic analysis of possible outcomes. 
(2) - The frequency of occurrence of events. 
(3) The speculative judgements of possible future outcomes of unique or 
novel events. 
Generally, a language or a sequence of symbols which characterises events 
and has probabilities associated with each symbol is called a 
'stochastic-process'. The notion of stochastic process and the accompanying 
mathematical techniques have been applied to many non-deterministic 
'learning' systems, in particular, to natural systems where there are no 
certainties associated with outcomes and events. A special class of 
stochastic-processes are the 'Markovian-Processes', they have the added 
property that the probabilities of symbols in a so called 'Markov-Chain' 
depend on a finite number of previous symbols, these ideas have also found 
important applications in the theory of communication. 
(d) - GAMES THEORY 
The theory of games as founded by von-Neumann (1947) has been used as 
a mathematical tool in BOme 'learning' models. The game theory methods can 
be applied to many 'goal-directed' systems where twining' optimal strategies 
can be achieved by probability estimations. The notions of game theory 
,. 
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which involve chance situations between two or more opponents, can be 
further extended to games where one opponent is the environment, hence 
'games-against-nature' could be devised. Similarly, the subject of 
'dynamic-programming' of special interest to cybernetics and A.I., has been a 
development arising from the field of game-theory. 
(e) - STABILITY THEORY 
The formal concepts of 'stability', 'steady-state' and 'equilibrium' have 
been incorporated in the design of some cybernetic type models of 
adaptive-processes, in particular, those based on biological systems. An 
organism or system is said to be seeking-stability, if its behaviour is seen to 
be directed towards a state of equilibrium. Many artificial or natural systems 
can be observed that have this 'regulating' property, they react to modest 
disturbances from an equilibrium-state and normally by the use of feedback 
loop try to regain the steady-state. The process of 'homeostasis' is the 
biological counterpart of the stability concept; some examples of this process 
are: the physic-chemical cellular regulations, the automatic regulations of 
individual anatomical organs, or the central-nervous-system/hormonal 
regulations of totality of animal. 
(f) - INFORMATION THEORY, COMMUNICATION THEORY 
The concept of 'information' may be considered as one of the central 
issues in science, the implicit relation of information to learning is analogous 
to the kind of kinship that the concept of numbers have to the subject of 
mathematics. The word 'information' is used to signify a quantifiable variable 
which can be conveyed by a variety of physical, symbolic or other means. In 
the most general sense, information can be defined as 'the measure of the 
amount of organization'. 
Shannon and Weaver (1949) laid the foundation of what is now known as 
'statistical-communication-theory' or 'information-theory' during the late 
1940's. The theory of communication according to Weaver (1949) can be 
regarded in the following three distinct levels:-
(1) The 'technical' or • syntactical' level, interested in the accurate 
transmission of symbols. 
(2) - The 'meaning' or 'semantic' level, concerned with the conveying of 
precise inferences about the transmitted symbols. 
(3) - The 'effectiveness' or 'pragmatic' level, concerned with the degree a 
message is able to influence the receiver's behaviour. 
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The classical theories of communication only deal at the technical level of 
problems. However, in learning related sciences all three levels are 
investigated. The communication aspects of a system are looked at in a 
broad sense, the total interactions of a system and its environment are taken 
into account, and also attention is paid to the 'meaning' and 'effect' as well 
as the quantitative measures of the message. 
The fundamental components of a general communicatio~s system are 
shown in FIG.3.4. The messages that originate from the 'source' are 'coded' 
and the resulting 'signals' are 'transmitted' through a 'channel' of 
communication which may be distorted by 'noise', at the other end of the 
channel, the signals are 'received' and after being 'decoded' to their original 
form reach the 'destination'. 
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FIGURE 3.4. A schematic representation of a typical communication-system 
and its principiil elements. 
In the science of information-theory, a statistical view is favoured in 
dealing with the problem of message or symbol transmission, hence 
communication is seen as a kind of 'stochastic process'. 
Various quantitative measures and theories have been developed for 
different aspects of communication, both in the engineering oriented discipline 
of communications and also independently in the mathematical field of 
probability theory. The amount of information ('bits') that could pass through 
a channel can be measured; the 'capacity' of a channel of communication can 
be determined; the 'uncertainty' or the 'redundancy' of a communication 
system can be defined in terms of the 'entropy' of a message, the term 
entropy is derived from a related measure used in thermodynamics, entropy is 
a measure of disorganization, an increase of information corresponds to a 
decrease of entropy J and vice versa; also efficient methods for 'coding' and 
'error-correcting-codes' have been devised. The law of 'requisite variety' as 
introduced by Ashby (1952), has pointed out the various limitations that exist 
on the amount of control exerted by a system over a specific channel of 
communication. 
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Many technical findings in the science of communications have resulted in 
the widespread use of information-theory concepts in the modelling of 
learning. Although the engineering notions of 'communication' are used in a 
much wider and general sense. Parallels of the engineering oriented 
terminologies are drawn for the elements of natural information-processing 
systems, and many questions regarding the influence and the extent of 
interactive forces in such systems answered. 
(g) - TURING MACHINES 
The work of mathematician A.M. Turing during 1930's on the theories of 
'computability' and 'computing-machines', gave rise to the notion of 'Turing 
Machines' and laid the foundations of 'Automata Theory'. Turing as a 
mathematician was interested in finding out a formal basis to deal with the 
solvability of problems; hence, the theory of computable functions were 
applied to an abstract simple construct called the 'Turing Machine'. Turing 
machines, in spite of having very basic components are capable of 
representing all computable functions. 
The principal underlying concepts in Turing machines, are the ideas of 
'effective procedures' or 'algorithms' for carrying out a given class of 
computations. An algorithm is a purely mechanical procedure, which starting 
from a particular initial data, will allow us to uniquely attain a defined goal 
by a step-by-step following of fixed rules. An algorithm need not necessarily 
be a terminating one, but it will in any case guarantee a result. The 'theory 
of algorithms' has introduced the concept of 'potential-realizability' or 
'computability', which is not concerned with the 'limits' but only with the 
'existence' of algorithms. Turing machines are capable of realizing all 
algorithms that can be completely specified by an ordered collection of logical 
states or machine-tables. An implication of Turing machine concept is that if 
a theory can be translated into a blueprint for a particular Turing machine, 
then such theory can also be realized in numerous hardware forms (e.g., 
physical, chemical, computer-simulation, etc.). 
Although, Turing machines are very trivial in hardware sense and simple to 
construct (with some limitations), they possess no practical value, since they 
will be extremely slow and cumbersome in carrying out computations and 
solving problems. The principal applications of Turing machines have been in 
the theoretical domains of the 'theory of recursive functions' and the 'theory 
of computability'. 
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An important viewpoint that has emerged from the study of concepts of 
computability and the theory of machine is that: human and animal behaviour 
or mental activity can be achieved by machines, provided good enough 
descriptions of internal processes are available. The question of hardware ia 
separated from the understanding of the behaviour of an entity; consequently, 
any natural phenomenon such as the learning-process could be duplicated by a 
variety of mechanisms and non-natural artifacts. Arguments developed from 
this standpoint, have generally involved two distinct approaches as far as the 
interactions of mathematics or logic and physiological processes arc 
concerned; firstly, it is proposed that artificial machines can be constructed 
using natural observations; and secondly, it is contended that the analysis of 
artificial abstract machines can be beneficial to our understanding of natural 
organisms. 
Turing (1950) in his analysis of the "fundamental problem of artificial 
intelligence" suggests a procedure for testing an organism for intelligence. 
Turing's test involves the interrogation, experimentation, and observation of 
the entity under question, and the comparisons of its performance with that 
of humans. However, at the conclusion of such tests, the question still 
remains whether the artifact only 'mimics' intelligence, or does actually 
'possess' it. 
In the most general and indirect sense an analogy exists between the 
logical states of a Turing machine and the mental states of humans, also 
between the structural states of a Turing machine and the physiological states 
of the brain; yet, a great deal of 'analysis' of human and animal activity is 
required before we can confidently embark on the 'synthesis' of such subjects 
in machine terms. Many unmistakably 'human' mental processes such as 
self-awareness or consciousness, point to an intuitive gap that exists between 
'physical' and 'mental', or between 'machine' and 'animal'. 
Our observations of many higher mental faculties suggest that activities 
such as problem-solving or thinking do not have a fixed algorithmic nature, 
and in many instances a 'heuristic' metaphor is more suitable, whereby the 
'strategy' or the 'rule of thumb' gives the appropriate explanation. Whether 
the heuristic approach only differs from the algorithmic approach in degree, 
or if it truly represents the actual mental processes involved, is not clear 
yet, but seemingly, the animal's behaviour is the result of both algorithmic 
(deductive) and heuristic (inductive) type processes. 
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In the following, the main components of Turing machines and the 
different types Turing machines will be briefly outlined. Turing machine is 
an abstract concept, but the 'physical' characterization of its major 
components as shown in FIG.3.5 is comprised of: a control unit device, u 
read/write head, and an infinite length tape. 
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FIGURE 3.5. The basic components of a Turing machine. 
The control unit can assume one of a finite set of symbols, it can move 
the tape a single discrete unit to left or right, it can 'halt' the machine, and 
also has a 'blank' symbol as one of the elements of ils stale-space. The 
read/write head scans the tape and transmits the information to and from lhe 
control unit to the tape. 
The tape can be ideally infinite, but it is realistically lhought of as finile 
but 'polentially infinite' or 'indefinitely extendable'; the tape itself is marked 
out into distinct squares lengthwise, and contains a blank or symbols from a 
finite set of symbols which can be read or written on one square at a time; 
the tape can be thought of as an external storage medium for information. 
The behaviour of a Turing machine during successive discrete time sleps 
can be determined by: the change in the internal-slale of the control unit; 
the change in the scanned symbols of the tape; and the motion of the tape to 
left, right, or a stop. A complete Turing machine can be described by lhe 
three 'input', 'output' and 'internal-state' sets, together with the state and 
output mapping functions. Starting from an initial state, given the exact 
description of a Turing machine, a unique sequence of operations will take 
place. A symbol will be read from the tape; the state of the machine 
changed according to the state transition table; the output associated with 
this transition decoded by the control unit; and finally, a symbol may be 
written in the scanned square of lhe tape, or the tape moved along to lett, 
right or stopped. 
The 'algorithms' based on these simple operations can be represented by 
tabulated sets of symbols; the 'programs' of a Turing machine will hence 
define its actions for various state-symbol combinations; a 'computation' will 
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denote a set of actions starting from a particular data point and ending with 
a halt. Turing was able to show that every algorithm could be represented 
by such a machine, furthermore, he was able to demonstrate that a so called 
tUniversal Turing Machine' (UTM) was able to perform any computation 
performed by any other machine, provided we had a description of its 
operations. 
The behaviour of a UTM is determined by the program it reads from the 
tape rather than the specific computations prescribed by a fixed control unit. 
The fundamentals of modern digital computers can be described by universal 
Turing machines, and although the practical computers are not built as Turing 
machines, they can be simulated by the much simpler mechanisms of Turing 
machines, and many computational theories can be verified or discovered. 
The original Turing machine has been modified into many alternate 
versions using different operating considerations, but in each case it has been 
shown that equivalent Turing machines could be devised which in 
mathematical terms have identical operational capabilities; however, despite 
the functional equivalence, the distinctive features of different Turing 
machines are of interest to cyberneticians. Some examples of these modified 
Turing machines are:-
(1) - One-Ended Tape Machines: the tape can only move in one direction. 
(2) - Post-Davis Machines: cannot change both the symbol and move at the 
same step. 
(3) - Paper-Tape Machines: a blank square can written on but only once. 
(4) - Multi-Head Machines: more than one head per tape. 
(5) - Multi-Tape Machines: more than one tape, each with its own head. 
(6) - Multi-Dimensional Machines: tapes with more than a single dimension. 
(7) - Two-Symbol or Wang Machines: having only two symbols of 0 (blank) 
and I, but a large number of states. 
(8) - Two-State Machines: having only two states (0 and I), but the number 
of symbols may be large. 
Shannon (1956) also made the important discovery that Turing machines 
with just two state or symbols can be constructed which are equivalent to 
any other Turing machine, these ideas being specially appealing to computer 
scientists because of the binary connotations of digital computers. 
(h) - AUTOMATA THEORY 
Many natural or artificial tsystems' can be defined by imposing arbitrary 
boundaries between a collection of entities and their environment. The 
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concepts of 'Automata Theory' could be applied to the dynamics of any such 
system which has the three principal identifiable components of 'input', 
'output' and 'internal-state'. 'Automata', generally refers to the abstract 
devices of finite size at any particular time, their behaviour is completely 
defined in terms of relations between their three basic elements (i.e., inputs, 
outputs, internal-state); whereby, the internal-state and output at any specific 
time is determined by the previous internal-state and input. Automata theory 
has developed within the science of mathematics as an independent abstract 
discipline; yet, many interpretations have been imposed on its concepts when 
applied to other scientific fields such as computer science, nervous-system 
networks, control-systems and biological or behavioural systems. Automata 
theory is used as a formal descriptive language to characterize the 
information processing and the behaviour of many automata. 
Established behavioural and cognitive theories have been expressed by the 
conceptual framework of automata theory, these theories are seen to be 
logically identical to their automata theory representations. Adequate 
mathematical techniques such as 'logical nets' have evolved to represent the 
features of the external real world into the internal states of an automaton; 
many 'learning' neuron-like network models have been developed using the 
automata theory notions, some incorporate neura-biological phenomena, others 
have a more abstract formal nature. 
The problems of 'synthesis' and 'analysis' of systems represented by 
automata also arises. The analysis problem is to determine models and 
formulae that can efficiently represent the behaviour of a given automata, 
this can be achieved by devising:-
(1) - Mathematical descriptions: eJg>ressed by 'transition-functions', 
'transition-tables'A and 'transition-diagrams; examples of each are 
outlined in FIG.3.b. 
M = <I,O,S,O,P> (I) 
I is the inpUt set. 
o is the output set. 
S is the internal-stat set. 
G : SxI --> S 
is the next state function. 
F : SxI -> 0 
is the next output ftmctian. 
(i) 
(8) 
G
•• 
I So I 81 
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(ii) (iii) 
FIGURE 3.6. The representation of the behaviour of an automaton by three 
common methods:-
Ii) State-Transition-Function, h) State-Transition-Table, ill) State-Transition-Diagram. 
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(2) - Physical descriptions: such as circuit diagrams, indicating how the 
automata could be built using basic constructable elements. 
(3) - Formal lan~age descriptions: such as 'regular events' and 'regular 
expressions, which are notions devised primarily for the investigation 
of the nature of classes of realizable events, or the limitations of an 
automaton in recognizing classes of sequences. 
The synthesis of an automaton is generally the more important problem; 
given a specific formulation for the behaviour of an automaton, the task is to 
design such an automaton if possible. In some cases these problems are not 
algorithmically solvable and 'heuristic' methods must be used to abstract the 
desired automaton, and then 'decision-theory' methods employed to evaluate 
how closely the end result satisfies our criteria. 
An important question which has been tackled by automata theorists, such 
as Kleene (1956), is to identify the simplest forms of any given automaton. 
Kleene has shown that most natural or artificial events can be characterized 
by an equivalent automaton using nets of simple logic elements of 'and', 
'or', 'not', and 'delay' or 'memory'. 
Automata have been categorized into many different classes. 'Growth' 
automata as opposed to 'fixed' are those which can get arbitrarily large in 
size, they can be considered to be potentially infinite; Turing machines are 
interpreted as growth automata. tpartial-growth-automata' or 'growing' 
automata, can grow but have a limit to their growth, this type of automata 
are effectively identical to the fixed ones in their computational capabilities. 
'Discrete' automata are those acting over specified time intervals, their 
inputs, outputs and states are only considered at those instantaneous 
descriptive moments; while, 'continuous' automata are considered during an 
entire span of time interval; 'analogue-computers' represent a kind of 
continuous sutomata. However, it is established that most continuous systems 
can be effectively approximated by an equivalent discrete systems. Another 
distinction is made between 'synchronous' and 'non-synchronous' automata, the 
former having elements which act in unison. 
A 'deterministic' automaton is one in which the present state and output 
are the inevitable consequence of previous state-input pair, the behaviour of 
this type of automata is precisely defined by its transition functions. A more 
random device, where each state-input pair could lead to more than one 
state-output pair, is called a 'non-deterministic' automaton. A class of 
non-deterministic automata which has been studied rigorously is the 
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'probabilistic' automata, these automata have specific probabilities attached to 
each alternate transition. 
In principle, the probabilistic machines are capable of no more than the 
deterministic ones, but can often do things much more economically. 
Probabilistic or stochastic automata, have been formulated as models for 
systems that have unreliable components effected by various 'noise' factors, 
they have been used for the modelling of adaptive 'learning' systems, and also 
in aiding the simulation of a psychological phenomenon such as learning. 
'Finite Automata', are a category of automata used widely in the modelling 
of real objects, they are assumed to be fixed, synchronous, discrete, 
deterministic, finite-input, finite-output, and finite-state automata. A 
universal Turing machine embodies a finite automaton, but having a 
potentially infinite memory, is not a practical concept for the modelling of 
physical entities such as digital computers or other artificial and natural 
systems. 
Finite automata can be considered to be Turing type tape machines, with 
the following provisions: (a) - they have two separate input and output finite 
tapes both moving one square in one direction at each interval of time; (b) -
only the symbols on the output tape may be changed. Other intermediate 
forms of tape machines have been designed, having applications in more 
complex computational situations, these tape machines can have many 
different tape or read/write-head specifications. 
Although, finite automata are much simpler than Turing machines in 
construct, computationally they are not as powerful, this is because they do 
not possess the external memory storage facilities of Turing machines. Many 
systems with finite constitution of discrete elements, have been defined using 
the notions of finite automata. Of special interest to the modelers of 
learning behaviour and mechanism, are the 'neural network' representations as 
finite automata. The theories of logical nets, based on the mathematical 
treatments of systems composed of logic elements, have been applied widely 
to the biologically oriented neural network models. 
The most extensive use of logical nets in the modelling of nerve systems 
can be seen in the 'modular' type networks introduced in 1943 by McCulloch 
and Pitts (1947). Their concepts involved the fusion of ideas from Boolean 
algebra with networks of idealised neurons. A feature of this type of neural 
network was the ease of their construction in hardware using sequential 
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electronic switching circuits, implicating the possibility of their use in digital 
computers. 
Neural network models were discussed earlier in this chapter, but their 
significance to modelling of learning is in their use of mathematical concepts 
and formulae in representing aspects of behaviour of a natural entity. 
The original 'idealised' neuron models of McCulloch and Pitts, depicted the 
actions of a nerve-cell at a very simple level. A typical configuration for 
such nerve model is shown in FIG.3.7; the neuro-physiologica1 notions of 
'inhibitory' (I) and 'excitatory' (E) input, 'refractory-period', and 'threshold' 
value, were incorporated in these models. The idealised neuron is activated 
(fired) according to various criteria based on: the summation of excitatory 
and inhibitory inputs, the total number of excitatory inputs, or the majority 
of excitatory and inhibitory inputs. Also, in later developments the delay 
element was embodied in neural models, hence giving a memory or storage 
facility. 
FIGURE 3.7. 
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The concepts of 'threshold-logic' and other mathematical theories were 
used to devise more precise models of neurons and networks of such neurons, 
both as ways of simulating physiological processes and also as tools for fresh 
lines of research. Effective procedures had been designed so that networks 
similar to any given behavioural pattern could be described. 
These ideas have found many domains of application in 'learning' systems, 
in particular, in the field of pattern-recognition. The adaptive modifications 
of nerve-network automata have been investigated, both as the structural 
changes of hardware and also as the programmatic changes of behaviour. The 
hierarchical cognitive processes are also a convenient and widely used subject 
for modelling. Many aspects of perception, memory, motivation, 
generalization, classification of inputs and outputs, and even emotion have 
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been modelled by neural-networks. Examples are the automata designed by 
George (1961), Stewart (1967), or Culbertson (1963) which displny some 
features of cognitive classification of input data. 
A different branch of automata-theory is the study of 'cellular' type 
automata, in finite or infinite form. This is the relatively more recent urca 
of automata-theory, which is concerned with the behaviour of EystemB made 
up of regular arrays of identical interconnecting elements. The theoretical 
subjects covered in this field include the study of the computational powers 
and the limitations of such automata; and the applications include the design 
of computers and cellular type machines. 
The behaviour of a simple cellular automaton can be investigated by the 
examination of the activity of networks made up of small number of elements 
that follow a set of specific transitional rules. Different initial configurations 
of states, normally, result in one of the following patterns of behaviour:-
(a) - the activity dies out after a while, 
(b) - the activity reaches a stable state, 
(c) - a repeating pattern of behaviour emerges (oscillations), 
(d) - the behaviour seemingly changes indefinitely. 
Von-Neumann (1956) was interested in the behaviour of cellular automata 
that had eJements which did not perform ideally, and had a smaH probability 
of malfunction; he was basically concerned with the role of error in lo~ic and 
in automaton. The main problem was to find the probability of the 
malfunction of large networks which were composed of cells, euch ""ith a 
small probability of breakdown. Von Neumann showed that if the individual 
probabilities of the cells were small, then the total probability for malfunction 
need not be very large. These considerations are part of the so called 
'reliability' studies of the systems of inaccurate cells; an obvious choice for 
this type of automaton was the first generation valve computer. A basic 
method for improving the reliability is to incorporate 'redundancy' in the 
system; there are two distinct ways of doing this: (a) - having redundant 
components that act continuously, and (b) - having redundant components that 
are kept as spares. Von Neumann used some of the parallel features of the 
brain and nervous systems, which are able to function in a highly reliable 
fashion, in the design of nerve-networks. More reliable cellular automata 
were devised using elements with multiple inputs; later other methods such as 
'quad ed-logic' and various techniques for the testing of reliability of automata 
were also introduced. 
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The idea of a universal cellular type machine similar to the UTM was also 
proposed by von Neumann, this automaton, as well as being computationally 
and constructionally universal, was also able to 'self-reproduce'. Other 
complex cellular automata such as Arbib's machine (1969) have been devised. 
3.6.3 SOME UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN 'LEARNING' SYSTEMS 
The study of adaptive 'learning' systems within analytical subjects, such as 
cybernetics, has revealed or resulted in the redefinition of some basic 
underlying principles of adaptive and learning processes. In this section we 
will discuss the nature of the criteria that are, normally, deemed to govern or 
trigger the adaptive modifications of systems. The main concern will be the 
forces which seem to activate the learning process, or the holistic 
interpretations that can be imposed on such processes. The specific 
components of mechanisms involved, such as the memory or the 
reward/punishment centres, will not be elaborated here. 
Some of the attributes to be discussed in this section have equivalent 
psycho-physiological counterparts, while others are only by-products of 
non-biological abstract theories. Another point which should be emphasised, 
is that there is no unanimity amongst various researchers regarding the 
precise meaning of some terminologies, and many different interpretations of 
the same phenomenon exists, depending on the approach and the background 
of the individual worker. 
(a) - GOAL-DIRECTEDNESS 
Notions of 'goal', 'intention', 'purpose', 'drive', and 'motivation' have been 
discussed earlier in their biological or psychological contexts. Thorpe (1963) 
described the two concepts of 'directiveness' and 'purposiveness' as the 
central features of all adaptive behaviours. Similarly, Tolman's (1959) 
learning theories emphasised the importance of the ideas of 'purposiveness' 
and 'goal-directedness' in learning. 
Many animal activities are clearly goal-directed, hence it is a prerequisite 
of any adaptive or 'learning' system that purports to be animal like, to also 
be goal-directed - by displaying a selective or purposive behaviour. A 
dilemma is anticipated here, since the intuitive notion of 'animal' 
purposiveness is extended to the domain of 'inanimate' objects. The absence 
of intrinsic intentionality in a machine or abstract system means that when 
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we sayan artifact is goal-seeking, we are speaking in purely subjective 
terms, there is no comprehension of the notion of 'goal' - and in the cuse of 
simple goal-directed automata, such as the physical equilibrium-seeking 
systems, not even a memory of the goal event. 
Goals and sub-goals are defined for adaptive systems either by having 
specifically defined target goals to be reached or maintained, or by a sel of 
imprecise general improvement type goals; great difficulty is encountered in 
conveying the meaning and the rationale of achievements (c.g., 'winning' in a 
chess game) in objective terms. 
Even the highly adaptive artificial 'learning' systems seem to only mimic 
the goal-directive behaviour by following a predetermined set of 
error-reducing actions stipulated by a hierarchy of goals - where the sense of 
achievement is normally determined by 'hedonic' principles of reward and 
punishment. The problem is further complicated since we can also look at a 
natural goal-seeking behaviour in 'drive-reduction' terms, where an animal 
seeking food can be equally construed as trying to reduce its hunger. This 
duality of explanation is equivalent to the dilemma of interpreting 
goal-directed ness as error-reduction in artificial systems. 
Despite such epistemological and other philosophical objections, the 
property of goal-directedness is seen by many workers as a universal 
phenomenon, applicable to all types of adaptations. The structural 
interconnections of a system is what determines the goal-directed behaviour; 
hence, goal-directed ness is seen as a system phenomenon; a temporary 
swaying of behaviour from the obvious features of directive ness is allowed, 
provided the total behaviour is pointed towards a goal. 
'Teleological' systems are those that show a goal-directed behaviour, and 
appear to have a purpose. The problem has been to formalise in mathematical 
terms the behaviour of such systems. The difficulties involved in the precise 
definition of purposive type behaviour has also resulted in many controversies 
in their analytical characterization. 
Rosenblueth, Wiener and Biggelow (1943) distinguished clearly the 
structural studies and the behavioural studies of systems, they believed that 
goal-directedness was a behavioural property of systems that dynamically 
interacted with their environment to maintain certain constancies, the 
behaviour was directed by the goals it was trying to seek or maintain; while 
the simple goal events could easily be observed in both biological and 
- -"":-.-
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inanimate systems, the more complex hierarchical goals were difficult to 
manifest in artificial systems. 
Ashby (1952) proposed an objective criterion for the explanation of 
teleological behaviour; he defined goals in terms of the objectives of an 
equilibrium-seeking system. Some examples for such goal-directed behaviour 
were described as: the behaviour of stable systems around their state of 
equilibrium, and other regulatory type systems such as servo-systems. These 
and other biological systems that steered toward a goal under various external 
disturbances were thought to be equivalent in principle; the natural 
phenomenon of 'homeostasis' was depicted in his stability-seeking automaton 
(Homeostat), which appeared to behave purposively. 
Sommer hoff (1969,1974) has analyzed the functional relationships between 
the variables of teleological systems, and has given a formal definition to 
what is meant by purposiveness in biology and psychology. Additionally, the 
two notions of 'subjective-purposiveness' and 'objective-goal-directedness' are 
distinguished (he calls the latter "directive-correlation"); also, by the 
introduction of the condition of 'orthogonality' (acting independently), has 
excluded the thermodynamic equilibrium-seeking systems from the class of 
living teleological systems. However, artificial adaptive systems, such as the 
servo-systems are considered to be in the same class as the natural 
goal-directed systems, provided they are considered in their broad context of 
application. 
Sommer hoff envisages the difficulty of applying his state-determined 
approach to the more complex hierarchical goals of natural systems, and 
devises an integration scheme for goals and sub-goals. He also emphasises 
the goal-directed ness rather than the goal-achievement aspects in his work, 
and mainly deals with behaviour rather than its means or ends. 
Another argument for distinguishing the thermodynamic equilibrium-seeking 
systems from other teleological systems was put forward from the 
information-theory sciences, the former is seen to be closed to information 
flow, while the latter is considered to be open to transfer of information 
from its environment. 
(Ii) - SOME OTHER PROPBRTIES OF TBLEOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 
WhUe goal-directedness explains the nature of the behaviour of a 
teleological system at executive level. it does not account for the reasons 
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behind the appearance of such activity in organisms, in other words, it does 
not tell us why such a pattern of behaviour should come about. This 
question, of vital importance to the survival of all organisms, has brought 
about varied and sometimes contradictory explanations. 
The widespread opinion is that an organism is 'seeking-stability', hence in 
Ashby's terms, is trying to keep the essential variables within acceptable 
limits. The seeking of uniformity, stability, or equilibrium in biological life is 
an intuitive notion; however, some interesting observations such as the 
behaviour of animals that are apparently satiated, or experiments on human 
subjects that have had all their sensory inputs blocked, show that such 
'stable' situations are not ultimately desireable, and a need for 'change' is 
possibly an equally powerful criterion of life. Therefore, some explanations 
have been devised based on 'instability-seeking' or 'change-seeking' concepts. 
Another argument is that the living organism seeks a 'concise' or 'economical' 
representation of its internal information, from which the successful features 
are extracted. 
The degree of organization within an entity is also sometimes seen as the 
desireable cause for the initiation of goal-directed behaviour; such systems 
are thought to be 'negative-entropy-seeking', since the entropy (of 
communication theory) is a measure of uncertainty in systems, and the lower 
the entropy value the more organised the system is, hence the system must 
have a negative rate of entropy change to show purposiveness towards more 
organised states, rather than move towards randomness and chaos. 
Finally, more recently the concept of 'autopoiesis' has been introduced by 
Maturana and Varela (1974), to characterise some of the most fundamental 
properties of living organisms. This abstract new insight into the 
organization of living animals refers to the capacity of the living organism to 
develop and maintain or more loosely put to 'self-copy' their identical 
organizational properties. The emphasis is on 'circularity' in the living 
organism; the holistic unitary view of the organism is adopted, hence the 
interest is in the interactions or the relatiolls of the components of complex 
networks, rather than the analysis of individual components (such as 
reproduction or adaptive centers). Also, a clear distinction is made between 
t.he 'structure' and the essential 'organization' of a system. Autopoiesis is 
seen as a property of the organization of systems with 'internal variables' 
which can give rise to other similar type systems; all living organisms are 
considered to belong to such class of systems. 
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Cellular automata have been constructed as models to display this primary 
function of life. Autopoetic-systems also have a strong bearing on 
'self-organising' studies. 
A paradox emerges when attempts are made to abstract definitions or 
criteria for living organisms; once processes such as directive-correlation or 
autopoesis are defined to a certain degree of precision, essentially 'artificial' 
models or machines could be constructed to display such properties. 
Therefore, to have a consistent definition for the distinguishing features of 
living from the non-living, we must devise the concepts in terms of some 
biological functions, hence excluding all artificially constructable systems. 
(iii) - SELF-ORGANISING SYSTEMS 
The notion of 'self-organization' is also an intuitive concept, introduced 
principally as the result of observations based on the animal nervous-systems 
which seemed to possess similar properties to self-organization. This process 
is considered as an important aspect of goal-seeking systems. The peak of 
interest in self-organising systems and machines which were closely associated 
with learning and adaptive systems was during 1950's and early 1960's. 
Self-organising systems, according to Glorioso (1975), can be defined as: 
"adaptive or learning systems in which the initial states are unknown, random, 
or unimportant;" they are able to change their internal states and hence the 
reactions to specific stimuli; they should also be able to act autonomously, 
whereby no external adaptive element (e.g., a teacher) should be involved, 
this type of 'self-modification' can be achieved in principle by incorporating 
hedonic centres in the system. 
The question of control is also an important consideration, which is to 
determine how to keep the system within viable regions of environment, for 
this reason most self-organising systems have two loperational' and 'learning' 
components. 
The process of self-organization according to Ashby can come about in 
variety of ways; one possibility is to have independently acting separated 
parts, which become joined and organised, an example of this type is the 
process of nerve cell growth in embryo; another method envisaged is to have 
a system of loosely connected parts which become better organised, this 
method is more akin to the process of learning and adaptation. 
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One of the major problems with self-organising systems is their subjective 
and observer-dependent nature. A self-organising system does not mean much 
unless defined in relation to its environment, it can only display organization 
if there is an external source of order in environment. The law of 'requisite 
variety' postulated by Ashby (1956), describes this aspect of the interaction of 
system and environment, by stating "only variety can destroy variety." 
Various abstract theories and formalization of self-organising concepts 
have been developed by cyberneticians, using information theory notions such 
as redundancy or entropy, or feedback control concepts. Models of different 
classes of self-organising automata ranging from the networks of neuron-like 
information processing elements to more complex economic systems have been 
constructed, most such models show a degree of self-organization, but on the 
whole do not display any efficient learning or adaptation. Mainly because of 
this reason, during the past two decades, the work in mainstream 
artificial-intelligence research has not involved a great deal of self-organising 
concepts; and has generally depended on the heuristic techniques which rely 
on an external teacher or instructor to direct the organization of a system. 
(iv) - SELF-REPRODUCING SYSTEMS 
The process of 'self-reproduction' is indisputably one of the most 
fundamental properties of living organisms, for it can be seen even at the 
lowest levels of life, such as cells, viruses and molecules. Self-reproduction 
involves the processing of matter and information, but our main interest in 
here is from the cybernetic organizational point of view. 
Systems have been devised to satisfy the basic criteria of self-production,; 
at the lowest level, some simple mechanical automata have devised which 
depict the 'self-replicating' properties of some physical processes such as the 
formation of crystals, for example, the self-reproducing mechanical 
configuration of Penrose (1959), although, possibly the low level of 
information in this type of structure does not warrant their definition as true 
self-reproducing, as only the identical copies of the original are made. 
The pioneers of cybernetics considered the process of self-reproduction, in 
both man and machine, as part of the vital processes of 'self-maintenance' 
and 'self-regulation', which in their totality determines the goal-directed ness 
in the organism. The manifestation of this process in machines is not seen 
as the machine-tool type operations that can produce other machines, but the 
reproduction of similar structural and organizational intricacies. 
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The automata of today are only in their primeval evolutionary stage of 
development, and it can be envisaged that they will be able to reproduce like 
artifacts in future. Already some computers are used to design new 
generations of computers. 
Von-Neumann (1951) had also proposed two approaches for the analysis of 
the problem of self-reproduction, a "kinematic" (mechanical) and a "logical" 
approach. His work having a strong biological flavour was based on the 
McCulloch and Pitts type networks of idealised neurons. He showed the 
theoretical possibility of constructing machines that could self-reproduce other 
machines as copies of itself or other similar machines. Be abstracted a two 
dimensional cellular automaton which constituted an originally inert lattice for 
the analytical machine, such an environment would provide the 'matter' for 
the machine to self-reproduce; three types of element were incorporated in 
the automaton to perform 'logical-control', 'transmission', and 'muscular' 
functions in the abstract sense. The notion of a genetic-blueprint was 
utilised within the machine in the form of a 'tail' (borrowed from genetics 
terminology) which carried the information about what it is to build, this tail 
would always be copied in the new machines hence giving the off-springs also 
the ability to be self-reproducing. 
This type of automata being a special class of growing-automata, have 
been studied and investigated by other researchers; 'computational-organs' and 
other evolutionary or ontogenetic aspects of natural self-reproduction have 
been depicted in the abstract form. 
(v) - SELF-REGULATING SYSTEMS 
The notions of 'stability', 'regulation', 'equilibrium', and 'homeostasis' were 
discussed earlier in this chapter. Some mental, emotional and biological 
processes can be seen to be clearly 'self-regulatory', the body as a whole can 
be considered to be also a self-regulating system. On a much larger scale, 
some theorists have applied the concept of self-regulation to the whole 
functioning of the plant earth - the 'Gaia' hypothesis. Some physiological 
organs such as the 'hypothalamus' have been associated with biological 
regulatory processes; similarly, in psychology, self-regulation is observed in 
processes involving various goal-setting, motivational and reinforcing elements. 
In general system terms, the notion of regulation is intricately related to 
control, and various aspects of the amount and the degree of regulation can 
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be defined by the use of Ashby's (1956) 'Law of Requisite Variety'. The 
principal component of a self-regulating system is its 'feed-back' loop, and 
the main feature of the design of this class of systems is their ability to 
internally set their own goals and objectives, rather than have such criteria 
determined by external interventions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
---------
.PART-I 
4. 1 INTRODUCTION 
'Learning Systems' in some literature exclusively refer to the formal 
manifestations of learning in control systems, or to the general 
systems-theory view of the realization of the learning process in systems. 
But, in this chapter, 'learning systems' will refer to all physical artifacts, 
abstract theories, or computer programs which can be defined independently 
from their environment, and can display some kind of 'learning' or 'adaptive' 
qualities. A broad definition of learning in systems according to H. Simon 
(1983) is: "Learning denotes changes in the system that are adaptive in the 
sense that they enable the system to do the same task or tasks drawn from 
the same population more efficiently and effectively the next time." 
All four aspects of 'simulation', 'analysis', 'synthesis', and 'black-box 
problem' can be seen in research involving learning-system modelling. But, 
the main issue is the design of systems which use information obtained during 
one interaction with environment to improve performance during a future 
interaction; the basic criterion used could be some form of generalization, 
averaging, or selection of 'ideal' (typical) elements of the set of past records. 
Andreae (1977) specifies three principal qualities for learning (teachable) 
systems, they are: 'potential', 'aptitude', and 'resilience'; respectively referring 
to: the highest levels of task complexity achieved, the speed and ease of 
learning, and the ability to deal with new knowledge or 'noisy' information. 
The terms 'learning', 'adaptation', 'concept-formation', 'induction', 
'regulation', 'self-modification', 'self-organization', and 'self-repair' have all 
been used in the context of 'learning system' research. The goals of 
learning-system scientists are to construct machines or systems that can 
perform such processes. Many workers in subjects such as Cybernetics, 
Robotics, Artificial-Intelligence, Computer-Sciences, Pattern-Recognition, 
Adaptive-Control-Theory, Automata-Theory, and Cognitive-Psychology have 
been intensively involved in pursuit of these goals. 
There are basically three outlooks in learning-system sciences: 
'task-oriented studies' (or engineering approach), 'cognitive-simulation', and 
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'theoretical analysis', each involving structural (knowledge) based and/or 
behavioural (skill) based problems. Although, workers in this field initially 
aim towards one of the above three distinct objectives, their research often 
permeates into different areas and, in turn, creates new lines of investigation. 
The majority of the significant achievements have involved the 'task-specific' 
type research; work implicating 'general' principles of learning, such as the 
finding of efficient global adaptive methods and theories, has been progressing 
at a much slower pace. 
Many taxonomies are possible in the field of 'learning systems'. A 
classification based on the underlying strategies or inferences can be made, 
ranging from the simple rote-learning of programmed learning to the complex 
learning involved in discovery and observation; the relative role of the 
'teacher' is of prime concern here. Other classifications are also possible, 
based on: the methods of representation of systems (e.g., hardware, computer 
program, abstract, etc.); the types of acquired knowledge or skills (e.g., 
parameters in mathematical expressions, classifications, formal or grammatical 
rules, etc.); the domains of applications (e.g., robotics, education, 
natural-language-processing, etc.); or the forms of alterations involved in 
systems (e.g., parameter estimation, structural changes, changes in assertions, 
etc.). Another important consideration, which can be used as a basis for 
classification, is the developmental feature of a 'learning system', whereby, 
the systems that interact with their environment, and go through a specific 
training phase, are distinguished from those that continuously interact, and 
whose performance and training stages are not sharply differentiated. 
In this chapter we will attempt to outline a number of examples of 
'learning systems', and discuss their characteristics. The particular taxonomy 
used will be based on the branches of science involved in this area, each 
class is characterised by a commonality of approach in dealing with the 
modelling problems of learning-systems. Most researchers in such fields, 
while ultimately seek to compare and relate the results of their work to 
natural learning processes, do not, usually, attempt to replicate the mechanics 
of natural learning phenomena; and generally use alternate artificial means for 
manifesting learning and adaptation in systems. The distinctions made here 
are by no means exhaustive or clear cut, but simply represent the research 
fields that share a common methodology~ Many overlaps and similarities, as 
well as differing points of view, may arise; furthermore, research under 
different headings could in fact be referring to the same concept, and 
conversely, results which satisfy the requirements of one discipline may not 
be suitable for application in a different discipline. 
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4.2 ADAPTIVE AND 'LEARNING' CONTROL SYSTEMS APPROACH 
The scientific use of terms 'adaptation' and 'adaptive' originate from 
within the sciences of biology and psychology - referring to tsuccess' in a 
changing environment. However, these terms have taken special meanings in 
different disciplines. 
Wiener (1948) defined learning in a broad all-encompassing form, to include 
both 'ontogenetic' and 'phylogenetic' adaptations; while, on the other hand, 
Shannon (1953) gave a more selective definition for the term learning, based 
on a time dependent measure of 'success' or 'adaptation' to the environment, 
hence restricting the attention to the ontogenetic aspects of learning. 
Andrew (1967) distinguishes learning as the more elaborate manifestation of 
self-improvement than adaptation. In formal control systems, generally, 
learning is seen as a special form of adaptation which is related to time, and 
hence its effectiveness is of issue. 
An engineer, normally, equates learning and adaptation and often uses 
these terms interchangeably; but, a psychologist makes a clear distinction; and 
a biologist has an in between view point. In engineering a tmachine' is 
considered to be adaptive if it has one or both properties of tstability' and 
treliability', in other words, is able to remain within the constraints of 
prescribed bounds and/or is able to repair its actual failed machine parts. In 
such disciplines 'adaptiveness' is seen as a property of a particular class of 
system, whose desired (almost predetermined) 'adaptive-states' can be reached 
or maintained by a series of estimations or error-reducing algorithmic 
techniques, less emphasis is given to the further improvement of the system 
beyond its initially specified goals - the main issue is the attaining of stable 
and reliable performance. On the contrary, in natural sciences the 
developmental view is adopted; adaptation is seen as the manifestation of a 
constantly improving system which interacts with its environment, with the 
end result being largely unknown. 
The basic elements and relationships of a learning or adaptive system and 
its environment, as seen by the engineering control scientists, are outlined in 
FIG.4.1. The system is deemed to be 'adaptive' if the 'critic's' output remains 
within prescribed bounds as the 'environment' and/or the 'machine' change (a 
simple servomechanism is a trivial example of such systems). Similarly, the 
system is said to be 'learning' (in engineering terms) if the critic's efficiency 
is increased during a specified period of time following a change in its 
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environment. 'Self-repair' type systems are also defined as those which can 
improve their performance after a failure or change in some internal 
components. 
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FIGURE 4.1. Schematic representation of an engineering 'learning system'. 
'Feedback' is seen as an important and convenient way of manifesting 
adaptation, but is not a necessary or sufficient precondition for all adaptive 
behaviour (i.e., a well programmed machine with no feedback loop may appear 
to behave adaptively); although most adaptive control systems are 
'closed-loop' and use feedback, in particular, those systems whose inputs do 
not reflect the important environmental or structural fluctuations. Here, a 
simple hierarchical classification of systems in the ascending order of 
machine-environment interaction complexity could be considered: 'random 
systems', 'directive open-loop systems', 'adaptive closed-loop systems', and 
'learning closed-loop systems'. 
The notion of 'self-organization', and its manifestation by the 
'self-organizing control systems', has also been frequently touched upon in 
this area of research, normally, referring to and emphasising the internal 
structural changeability of an adaptive system. 
Adaptive or 'Learning' Control Theories are an extension of 'Automatic 
Control Theories', and a significant amount of research has been carried out 
in this subject since the middle 1950's. Application areas have included the 
control of aerospace and industrial processes as well as man-machine and 
socio-economic systems. 
The goal of the designers of adaptive or 'learning' control systems is to 
construct effective mathematical models (in the more advance systems, 
normally, formulated in stochastic and non-linear terms), from which they are 
able to find or learn the values of certain parameters which optimise some 
criterion in the system. 
In deterministic or stochastic control systems with known structural and/or 
behavioural (input/output) details, if the exact nature of performance criterion 
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and its relation to different system elements were known, then the various 
standard analytical methods, such as error-control techniques or other 
formalizations provided by system theory, can be used to det.ermine the 
appropriate optimal behaviour of a system, and keep its performance within 
satisfied constraints - the control and modification of the system would be 
done on the bases of its known internal structure and external behaviour. 
However, in the case of unknown, or incompletely known, criteria or 
parameters of a system, the techniques of adaptive or 'learning' control are 
utilised to reach or maintain the optimal performance; since, the observable 
changing parameters do not provide sufficient data to enable us using the 
existing optimising techniques of control theory. If the living organisms are 
looked at in this vain, as Ashby (1956), then we can say that "learning" is 
evolved to tackle the adaptive control problems of life. 
An adaptive control system can, usually, be functionally decomposed into a 
quickly changing component, loosely termed as 'the state' of the system, plus 
a slowly changing component which includes the adaptation elements. This 
distinction is vaguely analogous to the bimodal representation of the 
experiences of an organism, by the 'short-term' and 'long-term' components of 
its memory, as specified in the behavioural sciences. More formally, adaptive 
control systems are characterised by its two major components: a 'plant.' 
which is to be controlled, and a 'controller'. This is shown in FIG.4.2. 
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FIGURE 4.2. A general schematic functional diagram of an adaptive or 
'learning' control system. 
4.2.1 ADAPTIVE CONTROLLERS 
An adaptive controller functions by constantly monitoring the performance 
of a system relative to Bome desired performance criterion, and subsequently 
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making modifications, by closed-loop action, to the system structure and/or 
behaviour, so as to approach such a criterion. 
There are two principal types of adaptive controllers: 'passive' and 'active'. 
The designers of passive controllers only use real-time information, that is to 
say, they use parameters which are already available at the outset of an 
experiment - the unknown information is either ignored or given a tentative 
value. On the other hand, the designers of active controllers incorporate the 
possible future availability of further information into their systems; hence, 
such systems, as well as real-time data, can estimate other new unknown 
parameters during their operation; this type of controllers are based on the 
sO called 'dual control theory'. 
Passive adaptive controllers, in general, are the simpler yet the more 
inefficient and sub-optimal controllers, however, they have been investigated 
much more extensively. Active adaptive controllers are able to make 
estimates of the values or the forms of various parameters, and gradually 
improve the system's performance. Active adaptive controllers should ideally 
approach an optimal controller, the final performance of which should be on a 
par with the performance of a controller designed with all the required 
information known in advance. Due to the similarity of this second type of 
adaptive control action to the process of natural learning (as far as their 
performance improvement characteristics are concerned), this class of adaptive 
systems are more readily referred to as 'learning control systems'. 
4.2.2 ADAPTIVE CONTROL PROCEDURES 
Referring back to FIG.4.2, if the exact 'input' to 'output' transformation 
functions of a system were known, then, as mentioned earlier, the control 
theory methods could determine the course of the optimal behaviour of the 
system. However, in some cases there are very rapid or large variations of 
certain system parameters under environmental or internal influences; or 
alternately, we do not know enough about the details of the system or its 
operation; in either case, the techniques of adaptive control, by means of 
successive approximation or estimation, are able to predict the unknown 
parameters or functions, and achieve the desired behaviour of the system. 
The brain is an example of such a system, whereby, it has to cope with the 
changes in its structure through growth and decay, and also make sense of a 
variety of changing or novel perceptual experiences. 
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The 'input' in FIG.4.2 refers to some 'desired' or 'reference' conditions, 
and is normally not known a priori. The adaptive control syst.em functions by 
choosing a tentative input which generates an output from the plant;. the 
'measuring element' directly or indirectly measures some aspects of the output 
and applies it to the 'teacher element'; the 'teacher' or the 'evaluation 
element' compares such measurements with the input of the system, and 
makes adjustments to the state variables of the controller. The system's 
overall performance gradually improves by the updating of the controller, and 
also the revising of control and performance criteria. 
4.2.3 THE TEACHER ELEMENT 
The 'teacher' or 'evaluation' element in an adaptive or 'learning' control 
system has one of two forms, either it is 'external' (i.e., supervised learning, 
off-line learning, or training) or it is 'internal' (i.e., non-supervised learning, 
on-line learning, or self-evaluation); in both cases, the function of the 
teacher element is to oversee the overall performance, and evaluate and 
direct the process of learning or adaptation. In the externally supervised 
systems the exact desired answers are normally known in advance, but, in the 
non-supervised systems, where the 'teacher element' is an integral part of the 
adaptive controller, the optimal answers are gradually approached by using 
some built-in performance criterion. It must also be noted here that the 
external teacher, on the whole, will be largely ignorant of the workings of 
the system, although it might be able to predict some aspects of the 
behaviour of the system. 
The 'teacher element' is universally observed in all types of learning and 
adaptive systems - both natural and artificial. In nature, there are abundant 
examples of 'learning systems' which distinctively have non-supervised 
characteristics; but, in artificial systems such a categorization is not so 
clear-cut, since, the majority of adaptive or 'learning systems' which 
seemingly operate in autonomous and self-learning mode have their 
performance criteria or goals specified by their designers or external teachers 
prior to their operation. Although, some artificial systems are genuinely 
capable of setting their own independent goals and sub-goals during their 
operation. 
It can be argued that no precise classification of internal vs. external 
'teacher' can be made, since in both natural and artificial systems it is 
virtually impossible to isolate the internal teaching or evaluation element as 
an independent functioning entity - either the external events directly or 
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indirectly influence the evaluation criterion or the initial design concepts 
(inborn genetic information in the case of animals), to some extcnt, guide thc 
future goal setting aspccts of the system. However, for practical purposes 
such a distinction is made, specifying if during the course of the operation of 
an adaptive system an external supervisor is involvcd or not. The external 
supervision, normally, resulting in the relatively quicker rate of learning. 
Some adaptive control systems are designed with both types of teacher 
element. 
The switch'S' incorporated in FIG.4.2 could be used to run the system in 
two phases of 'training' and 'operating'. Once the system has been traincd to 
an acceptable level of performance and modified accordingly, then the system 
can be switched to its operating mode, further training becomes only 
necessary if the performance criterion (the same or a different one) is no 
longer satisfied. 
4.2.4 IDENTIFICATION, DECISION. AND MODIFICATION 
The adaptive control law, as defined by most authors in this field (e.g., 
Mendel and McLaren, 1970), has three major functional elements of: 
'identification', 'decision', and 'modification'. The process of identificaUon 
characterises the various constituents of a plant or environment. The 
decision element determines how and which aspects of the system's actual 
performance should be related to the desired performance conditions. And 
finally, the modification element changes the system parameters in accordance 
with the findings of the identification and decision processes - by updating 
the system towards the optimal performance setting. 
The 'identification problem', as posed by Arbib (1972), is: "To use repeated 
experiments upon the input-output behaviour of a system to build up a 
state-variable description for a system which yields similar behaviour." This 
problem which involves the measuring and the estimating of system's 
significant features is of crucial importance to control scientists. In 
cognitive terms, identification is loosely synonymous with the process of 
'feature extraction', an important aspect of the problem of 
'pattern-recognition'. Identification procedures could be used in two different 
situations: (a) - to identify or recognise some static parameters, and (b) - to 
identify or estimate the time-varying parameters of a dynamic process. 
A further classification of identification procedures can be made for the 
'parameter adaptive control systems', which is: 'explicit identification' against 
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'implicit identification'. Both procedures are used prominently in the 'passive' 
type adaptive control systems; the explicit techniques, although less general, 
are usually simpler and have the advantage of being able to adapt more 
rapidly to changes in environment. 
The explicit, or sometimes called 'indirect', identification schemes are 
based on the observation of the behaviour of the plant, and allow the 
updating of the systems's state equations. This approach was developed to 
utilise the existing control techniques which required exact plant descriptions. 
The alternate method, which avoids the specific design of individual plant's 
controller, is the implicit or 'direct' identification. In this case, a general 
purpose controller is utilised which can accommodate the degree of the 
complexity of the particular system; the control parameters themselves are 
adjusted to improve the performance of the system without actually 
determining the exact parameters of the plant. One way of implementing this 
second type of identification procedure is in the 'model reference control 
systems', in which the inputs to the controller also drive a predetermined 
model in parallel to the main system, the output of this model is continuously 
compared with the plant's output, and the controller's parameters modified in 
accordance. 
4.2.5 STABILITY ANALYSIS AND SEARCH TECHNIQUES 
Broadly speaking, two techniques are utilised in the identification 
processes of adaptive control systems, they are: 'stability analysis' and 'search 
techniques'. By using these methods a control scientist is able to establish 
the values of various adaptation parameters and also their convergence 
characteristics (i.e., whether it converges to an optimal, and if so at what 
rate). 
The stability analysis of partially known or unknown system parameters (or 
performance functions) can produce adaptive control algorithms which yield 
estimated optimal values for such parameters. These algorithms, if found, are 
normally 'asymptotically stable' (i.e., converge towards a unique origin); the 
most common method used in this area is 'Lyapunov's Stability Criterion' 
(Mendel and McLaren, 1970). 
Search techniques are the other important class of analytical tools, widely 
used in a variety of subjects. In the discrete combinatorial system structures 
of problems in A.I., the 'heuristic' type search procedures are used much more 
extensively. On the other hand, if the area of search is a continuous lattice, 
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such as in most real-time control systems, then predominantly algorithmic 
search procedures are employed. Recently, many computer based techniques 
have been developed using both algorithmic and heuristic search, and have 
found applications in diverse areas such as: operational research, economics, 
engineering design, pattern-recognition, etc. 
The problem of seeking the optimal (minimum or maximum) of a function 
can be applied either to systems whose parameters have to be optimised; or 
to the more complicated systems with unknown parameters, in which case, a 
measure of effectiveness (performance index) is optimised. In adaptive and 
'learning' control systems when estimating the parameters of the plant or the 
controller search techniques are basically used to minimise some error 
measurement function. 
In some cases, such as 'statistical decision theory' or 'dynamic 
programming', the probability distribution or the density functions of some 
system or environment parameters are to be estimated (or 'learned'); here, 
stochastic techniques such as 'Bayesian estimation' are employed. Another 
class of search techniques which are designed to operate in 'noisy' situations 
are the 'stochastic approximation methods'. 
J.1any classifications of search methods have been devised (McMurtry, 
1970); some of these distinctions, without much elaboration, are: 'uni-modal' 
(examples of uni-modal search techniques are: 'Fabonacci Search', 'gradient 
search', and 'steepest ascent or descent search') against 'multi-modal' 
('random search' techniques have been devised to cope with multi-modal 
problems); 'single-dimensional' against 'multi-dimensional'; 'deterministic' 
against 'stochastic'; 'discrete' against 'continuous'; 'simultaneous' against 
'sequential' (in sequential search the results obtained at each step are used in 
the future steps). Other considerations are the 'stopping rules' for the 
termination of search, and also the 'step size' adjustments of a particular 
algorithms. 
The algorithmic, and more recently some heuristic, techniques which have 
been developed to identify and estimate the values of various parameters or 
functions of a system provide a powerful tool-kit for many specialised 
applications. However, these techniques are mostly limited to the 
environment and system parameters which change at a relatively slow rate 
when compared to the identification procedure itself; they also, generally. 
have specific domains of application with defined boundaries (in view of 
various stability considerations). The designer of a complex adaptive system 
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has the task of dividing the system into significant yet simple subsystems for 
which adequate parameter estimation techniques are already available. 
4.2.6 SELF-ORGANIZING CONTROL SYSTEMS 
The concepts of 'self-organization' was discussed in the previous chapter. 
This notion refers to processes which cause a system to change from a poorly 
organised or non-organised state into an organised state; or alternately, from 
separated parts to joined parts. An obvious example being the growth of the 
nervous systems. 
There are many controversies regarding the necessity for defining such 
terminologies, and whether such concepts can already be accommodated by the 
notions of adaptation and learning. 
The earlier argument raised regarding the objectivity of defining an 
independent internal evaluation element also applies to the concept of 
self-organization. Von Forester and Ashby have both investigated 
self-organizing systems, and introduced some analytical methods for examining 
such systems. Ashby's 'Law of Requisite Variety', stated loosely as 'only 
variety destroys variety', has formalised the above argument by stating that a 
system can only be self-organizing if it is defined with respect to some 
external source of order, hence, implying the implicit need for an 'external' 
teaching or training element in any non-random system. The use of 
information theory concepts such as 'uncertainty', 'redundancy', and 'entropy' 
have made it possible to establish many important mathematical notions about 
self-organizing systems and their environments. 
Self-organizing control systems, aside from being intrinsically 
non-supervised, are according to Glorioso (1975) defined as: "adaptive or 
'learning systems' in which the initial state is either unknown, a random 
variable, or a 'don't care'." These additional conditions imposed on adaptive 
and 'learning systems' could be considered to be quite arbitrary, however, 
many self-organizing controllers have been designed in control sciences. Such 
controllers initially have no information regarding the nature of correct 
control actions; a tentative control signal is generated by the controller, and 
its results assessed; if there is some correlation with performance 
improvement, the same class of actions is pursued, otherwise, a different 
randomly chosen action is tested. An interesting extension of such 
controllers are the 'multiple-input multiple-output' control systems where the 
inputs are correlated with outputs in a specific or unknown manner; these 
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ideas have had many applications, particularly in the science of 
'pattern-recognition' • 
4.2.7 'LEARNING' CONTROL SYSTEMS 
Adaptive control systems using passive controllers were based on real-time 
(instantaneous) performance measurements, or alternately, on averaged 
performance measurements for a short preceding interval. On the other hand, 
control systems can be designed with active controllers, which continuously 
monitor and renew the 'control-law' at each step by using the previously 
estimated parameters and states. This second more complex category of 
adaptive control systems are, normally, called 'learning control systems'; they 
have been devised to deal with rapidly changing or very poorly defined 
environments where adaptive control methods cannot be utilised. 
Two basic additional concepts are featured in the design of 'learning' 
control systems. Firstly, the controllers for such systems classify inputs, 
outputs, or states into classes of 'control situations', and learn the best 
'control action' for each class through specific algorithms; this is necessary 
because, normally, the individual inputs, outputs, or states are too numerous 
to be stored or are ambiguously defined. Secondly, the system is provide 
with a 'long-term-memory' element, this provision is made to make a more 
extensive use of the results of previous measurements for the computation of 
new parameters. Often, 'learning' control systems are viewed as adaptive 
control systems with memory. 
The time constraint on the system's performance which, as defined in 
section 4.2, was the main distinguishing feature of 'learning systems' is 
incorporated implicitly in the design specifications of any 'learning control 
system' - 'learning' occurs if only the average of performance over a 
specified number of trials shows a trend towards improvement. The 
performance of a 'learning control system' is gradually improved with time (at 
an acceptable rate), due to the identification or estimation of some 
parameters of the system; the size of the memory element determining t.he 
extent to which past experiences are used. 
In designing 'learning' controllers, two approaches - are normally used: 
'parallel' and 'serial'. In parallel approach, all possible input-output 
combinations are considered, and the control choice is made on such basis. 
In serial approach (or 'performance feedback' approach), the 'learned' 
information is considered as the experience of the controller, and if similar 
ApprOillcbeB \0 ModelliDIC 01 LearDiDIC - Par\-l 161 
situations recur such experiences will be used to update and improve the 
associated estimates of control or plant parameters. 
The serial approach has been adapted in many control systems because of 
its similarity to the natural course of the learning process. The studies of 
learning phenomenon in psychology, physiology, and other subjects have 
resulted in the formulation of various 'learning' models and theories; 
mathematical models, in particular, have been widely used in the synthesis of 
control systems. 
The importance of the primary concept of 'the law of reinforcement' has 
been recognised by many control engineers who have used this principle as 
the underlying criterion of the design of many 'learning' control systems. 
This class of systems, normally, referred to as 'reinforcement learning control 
systems', mainly, use the probabilistic models of reinforcement learning which 
was developed by learning theorists. 
Reinforcements in such models are of two types of 'positive 
reinforcements' ('rewards') or 'negative reinforcements' ('punishments'). 
Rewards and punishments are used to change response tendencies; rewards 
represent the favourable reactions which are strengthened, and punishment is 
used to suppress the associated unfavourable reactions. 
These two reinforcement processes normally function simultaneously, thus, 
fortifying the favourable responses and weakening the alternatives. In 
stochastic (noisy) environments, rewards are also used to increase the 
'extinction threshold' of a response - making it more immune to extinction. 
'Secondary reinforcements' or 'acquired/learned rewards' can alE;r) occur, 
whereby, the 'primary goals' or 'primary rewards/punishments' are replaced by 
'sub-goals' or 'secondary rewards/punishments', this is useful if the primary 
goals are difficult to achieve or are not well-defined. 
Another feature of such models is the way stimuli or responses are 
generalised into classes of similar elements. Furthermore, some Bf;condary 
rewards could be used as a generalised version of a class of primary rewards. 
A clear distinction is also made between the concepts of learning and 
performance in such theories, the notion of performance referring to a 
measure of learning. 
'Learning control law' has all three elements of adaptive corlf.rol law, 
namely, identification, decision, and modification. Additionally, 8 'memory' 
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element is also included. In particular, the decision and modification 
functions are accomplished by using reinforcement principles. 
A 'learning' control system operates in situations where neither 
environment nor plant details are known. The system, in a self-organizing 
fashion (i.e., with no external supervision), is able to make changes to its 
control actions during its real-time operation. The best control actions are 
evaluated at each instant of time in the absence of complete information; the 
basis of this evaluations is the results of previous control choices, made 
according to prescribed reinforcement criteria. In general, if after a control 
action there is a marked improvement of the performance then such control 
action is rewarded (strengthened). On the contrary, if there is a decline in 
the performance then the previous control action is punished (weakened). All 
such changes are stored in the memory element and used for future 
evaluations of control actions. 
Mendel and McLaren (1970) have analyzed the above interpretation of 
'learning' control procedures in a more precise form, and described four basic 
notions of 'mapping', 'control situations', 'sub-goals', and 'memory' as the 
essence of such systems. Mappings refer to transformations from points in 
control-choice space to points in plant-environment/state space of a system. 
Control situations refer to regions in plant-environment/state space which are 
associated with a single control-choice. Sub-goals are some intermediate type 
goals which are used to direct the learning process towards the optimal 
solution; sub-goals should be consistent with the primary goal at each 
separate decision stage. Finally, the memory, normally with two components 
of 'short-term' and 'long-term', is a separate compartment for storing 
pertinent information about control situations. Based on such primary 
notions, a heuristic 'reinforcement 'learning' control algorithm' is introduced 
which can be used in the synthesis of various 'learning' control systems (e.g., 
precise control of orbiting satellites). 
Although, 'learning' control systems are, generally, not used for the 
purposes of investigation or simulation of biological learning, many of the 
concepts developed for such systems are clearly depicted from the notions of 
natural learning processes. Furthermore, particular parallels have been 
established between the elements of 'learning' control and the elements of 
mathematical learning theory. 'Control-choice' is equated to 'response 
alternative'; 'control situations' are equated to 'events'; probability 
distribution of various control actions is equated to the probability 
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distribution of response alternatives; and also, the reinforcement methods of 
such probabilities are paralleled. 
Fu (1970) describes how the concepts of statistical learning theory can be 
applied to the design of a linear reinforcement 'learning' control system. The 
learning in such a system is achieved by methodically improving the 
performance by the use of the control action (response) probability 
reinforcement. The 'quality' of control actions (responses) for different 
control situations (events) or, in other words, the performance of the 
controller is evaluated by using the outputs of the plant (outcomes). Various 
algorithmic methods and equations (incorporating Markov processes) are 
described for measuring response-probabilities, performance-indices, and 
evaluating the performance. A classification procedure for control situations 
is also outlined; this type of classification can be thought of as some sort of 
'generalization' of data for parsimony reasons. 
4.2.8 OTHER ISSUES IN ADAPTIVE AND 'LEARNING' CONTROL SYSTEMS 
Another class of control systems, which are specially related to the higher 
more complex forms of learning, are the 'hierarchical multilevel systems'. In 
these systems separate adaptive or 'learning' control systems (or algorithms) 
are interconnected, and the learning at each level is influenced by the 
learning at other (one or more) levels. The overall goal of such systems iR 
to coordinate and control the actions of all levels, either in a subordinate 
manner or in a distributed fashion. 
The parameters which are estimated using 'learning' control algorithms, in 
general, converge asymptotically to their true optimal value as the number of 
trials approach infinity. However, in practice, appropriate cost and efficiency 
considerations are specified to limit the iterations to a finite number. Such 
convergence considerations, in a more complex form, are a]so made for 
multilevel type systems. 
More recently, also, the concept of 'fuzzy logic' has been applied to the 
design of some 'learning' control systems. 
In summation, although, all approaches used in this branch of science have 
similar properties, the specific techniques used are very diverse and require 
varying amounts of prior information. This fairly new discipline has benefited 
from the rapid development of computer technology - which has enabled the 
quick processing of complex algorithms in various applications. The majority 
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of adaptive and learning algorithms developed have involved stationary 
environments or stationary parameters and have focused on parameter 
selection; algorithms for non-stationary environments have also been devised 
based on 'nonlinear reinforcement' theories; or alternately, the non-stationary 
environments have been approximated by a finite number of stationary 
environments. 
There is a remarkable degree of complexity involved within the particular 
adaptive techniques used for single-level domains of application, such as the 
control of various processes or plants, and numerous elaborate mathemalical 
methods have been abstracted to deal with rigid 'learning' control problems. 
On the other hand, global axiomatic postulates and concepts which could be 
adequately applied to all adaptive control systems have not been developed to 
the same extent. 
4.3 NEURAL-NETS APPROACH TO 'LEARNING SYSTEMS' 
The concepts of 'neural-networks' were introduced in the previous chapter, 
both in the section dealing with the models of nervous system mechanisms 
and also as tools for the representation and investigation of cybernetic 
systems. 
Neural-net approach to the modelling of learning processes has been one 
of the principal paradigms of 'machine learning' and 'learning systems' 
research. Historically, it is considered as one of the earliest significant 
formalizations of 'learning systems', mainly, involving systems with little or 
no initial structural or task-oriented knowledge. Because of the primitive 
nature of computer technology at the outset of these disciplines, the majority 
of early work was either theoretical or involved the construction of 
experimental hardware models. Learning in neural-nels view, generally, 
consists of changing the probabilities of certain functions of its elements 
(e.g., changing the probabilities of activation of neuron-like logical elements). 
Neural-net approach is closely related to the automata-theory, cybernetic 
and self-organizing systems approaches (to be discussed later), and often the 
boundaries of their methodologies overlap. Adaptive and 'learning' control 
systems approach (section 4.2) was also developed in parallel to the neural-net 
and automata-theory approach in the more engineering oriented sciences. 
Later, the fields of 'pattern recognition' and 'decision theory' emerged from 
the extensive research on neural-networks and logical-networks, these 
subjects will also be further discussed later. 
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The present diversity of approaches in 'learning systems', is partly the 
reflection of a dichotomy which has been evident mainly from late 1950's. 
On the one hand, the so called 'mainstream' A.I. scienti,sts have been involved 
in the modelling of the 'macroscopic' (organizational) aspects of human 
learning, without attempting to simulate any of the notions of nervous 
systems; their studies strongly depend on the use of computers and 'heuristic 
programming' notions; and the models they devise do not, general1y, learn 
from direct experience, but, use conceptual interpretations of inputs to 
simulate the higher levels of human cognitive learning. These workers believe 
that the complexity of the task is such that they need to incorporate as 
much of the designers knowledge in the model as possible, this is achieved by 
using elaborate information processing mechanisms in their designs. 
On the other hand, contrary to the high-level view of the learning 
process, workers in the field collectively referred to as 'neural cybernetics' 
(Feigenbaum and Feldman, 1963) have approached the subject from a 'cellular' 
(component) view point. They design models which are made up of large 
numbers of information processing units or are composed of rudimentary 
elements, these models normally start the learning from very little or no prior 
knowledge, and use specific simple criteria to improve their performance, 
Neural cybernetics, which includes diverse subjects such as 
'pattern-recognition', 'self-organizing systems', 'neural-nets', and 
'automata-theory', is closely related to the issues of neuronal plasticity in all 
animals; while 'mainstream' A.I. deals with the higher brain functions of 
humans. 
Many of the pioneers of mainstream A.I. research (e.g., M. Minsky) were 
originally adherents of the neural-net approach. Continuous attempts have 
also been made to cross over the boundaries of this dichotomy, by explaining 
the functions at the microstructural level using the concepts and the obtained 
results of the higher cognitive level, and vice versa. 1t is evident that 
neural-net researchers are ever more trying to elaborate their concepts to 
higher and more complex levels, while, the A.I. workers try to simplify and 
find the basic elements of their notions; it is envisaged that ultimately these 
two levels should merge to yield a complete model of the learning process. 
It is fair to say that due to the limited success of neural modelling 
techniques and the unfulfilled original high expectations of this discipline, the 
research using such methods has gradually been overshadowed by the more 
symbolic and knowledge based type A.I. work. 
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In the next sections, issues involving learning in neural-networks and 
logical-nets together with some examples will be discussed, followed by an 
analysis of systems which use the concepts of automata-theory. 
4.3.1 MODELS OF NEURONS 
The first logical step in producing any model is to look at its working 
example. In the case of 'learning systems', the nervous system was the 
obvious primary choice for copying the possible mechanisms involved. This 
endeavour has been persistently constrained by the limit.ed knowledge of the 
workings of the nervous system. But, it is clear that the specific concepts of 
interest are not inherently apparent from the physical structures of nervous 
systems; since, similar physical structures can display entirely different. 
behavioural characteristics, and conversely, different physical constructs can 
have identical behavioural patterns. Hence, it is futile to try to study models 
of the brain based on the exact copying of nerve-cell connections, rather, the 
real interest should lie in functional intricacies. 
During the late 1930's, the popular analogy of 'brains as telephone 
switchboard centres' suggested that the nerve cell could be considered as a 
simple switching relay; based on this type of view points, the original 
postUlates used to devise the early simple models of neurons were also 
dependent on the 'all-or-nothing' information content of a nerve cell. The 
neurons were seen as information coding devices, and the brain was thought 
of as a large matrix of these units of information which was reacting and 
communicating with its environment; an implication of this 'information' vie,., 
being that the brain is considered as an 'information-receiving', 
'information-transmitting', and • storage' system. 
A great deal of nerve-net research started off from the original work of 
McCulloch and Pitts (1943). Their proposals, discussed in the previous 
chapter, signaled the introduction of explicit forms of cybernetic modelling. 
They described mathematical principles for constructing a class of computing 
machines whose elements were modelled on neurons, and could be used to 
simulate behavioural and mental theories (the only provision was that such 
theories should be finite and causal). They also proposed hardware models of 
brain cells which incorporated BOrne of the information theory and cybernetic 
concepts being developed during that period. 
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The neuro-physiological investigations of the brain had established various 
relationships between pulse frequency and levels of excitation in nerve cells, 
but, the basic criterion used in the early nerve models was the simple 
all-or-none aspect of neural pulse propagation (same as the binary logic of 
computers). The early neuronal models (tideal neurons') functioned by 
activating their outputs when the summation of inhibitory and excitatory 
inputs exceeded some threshold value. 
A vast amount of work has been done on artificial nerve cells, and many 
hardware based or mathematical models have been devised, simulating various 
neural properties of texcitatory' and 'inhibitory' propagation and other aspects 
of neuronal information transmission (e.g., Walter, 1961; Harmon, 1961; Young, 
1973; Deutsch, 1967; Kent, 1978). 
Neural models are useful interpretations for low-level analysis and 
simulation of nerve action. But, even the protagonists of such simple models 
(McCulloch, 1959) acknowledged that to closely resemble the complexities of 
nerve cell behaviour, we need to define differential equations of several 
orders. The fact is that the basic biological neuron is an enormously 
powerful device, taking a variety of specialised forms for different 
applications, and making optimal connections to suit the requirements of a 
variety of functions. And although, in neural-net approach, neurons are 
considered as digital information processing tools, their overall behaviour is in 
fact composed of many analogue and digital components; whereby, spatial 
locations or time and frequency variations of inputs determine the output of a 
cell. The neuronal processes include many utility functions as well as the 
functions related with the information transmission or storage of data. 
It has increasingly become apparent that the neuronal models based on a 
single pulse propagation are not an adequate representation of information 
processing aspects of neurons; and the. significant notions which should 
seemingly be incorporated in the design of such models are the frequencies of 
firing and the summation of the frequencies of inputs (Powers,' 1978). Bence, 
we can argue that the real usefulness of neural-net models have been to 
stimulate thought and to lead to other practicable applications such as their 
use in pattern recognition systems or the design of computers. 
4.3.2 MODELS OF NEURAL AND LOGICAL NETWORKS 
Models of single nerve cells have been investigated collectively as 
networks of interconnected elements. The primary objectives in developing 
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'neural-nets' were: to examine the possibility of their use as test beds for 
different postulates on nervous systems, or to directly simulate the 
nervous-system-activity. But, more generally, neural-nets cun be considered 
as a methodology for representing, simulating, or synthesising varjom~ dynamic 
systems. 
Neural-nets can be considered as 'finite automata', either in 'fixed' or 
'growth' forms; the elements of these automata can, in turn, be seen as finite 
automata themselves. Numerous investigations of such networks have been 
undertaken, and many aspects of neuronal plasticity modelled and simulated; 
furthermore, attempts have been made to simulate certain higher cognitive 
functions of the brain. We should note that during the development of 
neural-net models of nervous systems a typical cycle of 
'modelling-abstraction-simulation-verification-updating' has been in progress -
starting from a simple model of a neuron, developing into an abstract form 
and finally applied to the original natural domain. 
The neural-net approach to 'learning systems', firmly rooted in the 
biological studies of neural plasticity, originally resulted in the introduction 
of simple models of the workings of nerve cells and various associative 
networks and mechanisms. These early developments were hampered by the 
limited neuro-physiological information available at the time, and also by the 
lack of JIlathematical or computing tools for treating more complex models. 
Later, based on such studies, other formalizations and abstract analytical 
elements were devised, some ,,>"jth no direct reference to neuronal activity; 
networks of such mathematical (logical) elements could produce similar 
properties to the networks of biological nerve models. 
Some rhythmic brain activities (e.g., alpha waves) have been simulated by 
hardware assemblies of nerve models. Psychological and neuro-physiological 
theories of learning such as Bebb's (1949) recirculating storage assemblies of 
nerve elements, Milner's, Lashly's, and many others have been simulated and 
studied using networks of neuronal models. Even, in the case of randomly or 
non-specifically organised nerve-nets, many workers (e.g., Beurle, 1962) have 
demonstrated some neural manifestations of simple learning. Later, nets were 
designed as models for specific sensory mechanisms or for higher cognitive 
central processes (e.g., concept-learning, problem-solving, thinking). The 
introduction of the discipline of 'pattern-recognition' is a consequence of the 
investigations of neural-nets by early researchers such as Selfridge, 
Rosenblatt and Wid row in late 1950's and early 1960's. 
Approaciles \0 "odelliDe: 01 LearDiDe: - Part.-l ]69 
Logic is the basis of neural-nets, and the notion of logical-net was 
introduced as a more abstract formalize of such networks. The concepts of 
symbolic logic were applied to neural networks and used in the modelling of 
nervous system activities. The brain was seen as a network of logical 
elements assembled in a cellular or matrix form. It was argued that the same 
way which the nervous systems are seemingly composed of elcmenlury 
neurons, some logical-nets could be devised from primary logic elements to 
mimic animal and human activities. 
Theoretically it is conceivable that all logical functions and computations 
could be realised by appropriate logical or neural networks; however, it is the 
specific characteristics of such designs, and the similarity of their operation 
to the natural mechanisms which determines their usefulness. The severe 
restrictions involved in the methodology of logical-nets, such as the 
consideration of these networks only at disjointed instances of time, has 
posed many questions regarding the validity of such models as conceptual 
nervous systems. 
In logical-nets, the basic building block is the 'threshold element', many 
variations of which have been adopted. In some threshold element models the 
inputs could have assigned relative values, as in the case of 'linear weighted 
models'; or, the functioning of the element could be based on specific 
criteria, such as the 'majority logic'. 
The single threshold element is capable of implementing ordinary Boolean 
Logic functions by adopting different threshold values. Many properties of 
threshold elements and their networks, in particular, their abiJity to realise 
logical functions, have been extensively investigated. It is worth noting that 
conventional logic is a special case of general threshold logic. 
The threshold element is a powerful computing tool, and can be used in 
the implementation of computing machinery; however, so far, its apparent 
advantages have not been fully realised in computer system designs. The 
more fruitful contribution of logical nets has been to the development of 
pattern-recognition systems. 
Various noise and tolerance considerations are of prime importance in the 
design of logical-nets; and investigations involving these issues have led to 
the establishment of the 'reliability studies' of cellular type automata with 
stochastic elements (von-Neumann, 1956) - a computer is an obvious example 
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of such automata. The notions of self-repair and self-reproduction have also 
been investigated in some computer-based models of neural and logical nets. 
Some mathematicians like Turing (1950), von-Neumann (1956) and ncurlc 
(1962) had proposed that randomly connected logical-nets starting from an 
unspecified initial state could, with experience, change into a specific and 
well organised goal state. Here, an important question is poscd, whether 
neural and logical nets need to be 'fixed' or 'growth' type to adequately 
simulate various aspects of the brain's functions; the indications are that for 
the low level simulation the fixed type models can be sufficient, but as the 
complexity of description increases, it might become necessary to incorporate 
some growth or 'learning' capabilities into such models. 
Although, the drawing of complicated neural or logical nets (and their 
hardware construction) is a cumbersome task, various forms of matrix 
representation have been developed which together with algebraic operations 
simplify this task greatly, and also facilitates their computer simulation. In 
the abstract matrix form, however, all anatomical similarities neural-nets and 
nervous systems have been sacrificed for functional considerations. 
Memory, in its simplest form, has been represented by a 'unit delay organ'; 
but, other models have been devised which show some of the properties of 
human STM and LTM, this is achieved by changing the threshold values of 
the elements during their operation. 
4.3.3 SOME EXAMPLES OF LEARNING IN NEURAL-NETS AND LOGICAL-NETS 
In this section we will briefly look at few examples of neural and logical 
nets which were devised to display some adaptive or learning features. The 
more advanced cellular networks which model various perceptual aspects of 
cognition, in particular, the classification of percepts, ~rill be discussed in the 
section dealing with the pattern-recognition approach to learning. 
It is mathematically possible to describe any behavioural pattern in terms 
of neural-net configurations, provided the behaviour can be accurately 
described and translated to some analytical terminology. The implication of 
this observation for learning behaviour is that specific nerve-nets could be 
constructed to display apparently 'learned' behaviour. However, in the 
realization of such structures, the problems of complexity and size become 
overwhelming hindering factors. 
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Consequently, the main objective of workers in this field has become the 
construction of 'economical' structures that could exhibit complicated learning 
properties; such researchers, according to George (1973), wish to build 
automata that mimic learning by having a "build in capacity to learn and not 
the details of learning itself." An essential consideration here is the 
compromise which should be made between the generalization and the 
discrimination of data in order to faithfully produce the desired descriptive 
level of a learning process. 
The principles founded by McCulloch and Pitts, and later elaborated and 
abstracted by workers such as Kleene, Rashevsky and von-Neumann, have 
been used to construct simple networks for various behavioural patterns 
described in terms of logical formulae. McCulloch and Pitts (1947) devised 
and constructed simple neural-nets with few elements which were able to 
recognise (learn) different musical intervals or various visual forms. Many 
other workers have used neural-net models to simulate visual and other 
neuro-physiological systems which can display simple forms of learning. 
Stewart (1967) describes simple associative networks, originally suggested 
by von-Neumann (1956), which can be considered as being able to learn 
associations between inputs. Hardware models called "Flebus" have been built 
which could be programmed to simulate various cybernetic properties. An 
example of this type of basic associative net is outlined in the schematic and 
non-detailed form of FIG.4.3. 
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FIGURE 4.3. A simple neural-net capable of displa->'ing response conditioning 
of one stimulus with a second stimulus. ;Initially, after firing, 
the stimulus element 81 elicits response Rl+Ra by itself alonel and SI elicits response Ra, after a unit instant of time. Bu 
after conditioning, SI should be able to elicit the response 
Rz+Ra by itself. 
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The network of FIG.4.3 in its simplest form, with N=O and M=O (i.e., with 
no intermediate counting networks), is according to Stewart (1967): "nearly 
the simplest net that could exhibit 'learning' behaviour." More generally, we 
can say that S2 may be conditioned to elicit the response R3 by itself alone, 
provided it occurred simultaneously with SI for N consecutive occurrences -
every non-occurrence of SI with occurrence of S2 would reset the N-stage 
counter to zero. Similarly, the conditioned response will be extinguished if M 
consecutive occurrences of 82 were unaccompanied by 81. 
It must be remembered that the use of psychological terminologies here is 
only a specific interpretation of a purely deterministic logical behaviour. 
Originally, in logical-net language, it was said that S2 became 'a sign for' 81 
when the network established or remembered their prior incidental firings. 
The above principles can be elaborated to much larger automata with 
memory capabilities. George (1973,1977) constructed units similar to the basic 
model of FIG.4.3, and assembled, from such units, automata which were able 
to realise some characteristics of simple learning. 
George (1972) also illustrates a simple automata/environment configuration 
which uses neural-nets - the automata is a simple maze-running machine, and 
the environment is a maze. This abstract model is capable of displaying a 
simple 'intelligent' behaviour. The elements which are used as the basis of 
this system are also similar to the network of FIG.4.3, however, the 
conditioning and extinction networks are substituted for other appropriate 
networks which satisfy the specific criteria set by the design. The general 
class of this simple maze-running systems are also considered, such automata 
are deemed to have the potential to represent much more complex patterns of 
learning behaviour. 
The above class of networks can be constructed based on a variety of 
other hypotheses for establishing associations between receptors and effectors; 
thus, various behavioural learning patterns can be described in a formal 
language, loosely emulating a neurological mechanism. 
Stewart (1967) goes on to describe a method for the classification of input 
and output patterns of neural-nets. A layered net is described, which in its 
general form, with n input (or m output) elements can represent 21l (or 2--1) 
different states or patterns on its receptors (or effectors). A schematic 
version of such classifying nets is illustrated in FIG.4.4. 
So 
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FIGURE 4.4. Schematic diagram for a possible input/output classifying method. 
An automaton can be constructed by connecting the input and output 
classification networks together. There are K=2-x2-x ••• x2- (2D-multiple) 
ways of realising such networks, including the open connections. Bence, it is 
conceivable to build K different types of automaton each having a distinct set 
of behavioural patterns. 
The use of this general classification principle together with the 
introduction of simple memory networks, such as shown in FIG.4.5, will allow 
the design of automata which by employing serial or parallel information from 
their environments are capable of displaying quite complex behaviour for a 
range of situations - by selection of appropriate responses for various 
patterns of input, these automata may also exhibit some adaptive qualities. 
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An n-stage simple parallel storage, once an element is 
activated it will keep firing; a reset function could also 
be incorporated. 
A k-stage memory network which can be of arbitrary 
length} each stage of the chain will remember the 
preceding input that occurred a unit delay (T) time ago. 
However, the feasibility of the more complex versions of such systems 
becomes highly questionable, since the number of the internal elements 
required for the realization of larger networks is extremely high; and a 
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complete classification of inputs and outputs, and the establishment of all 
'negative' and 'positive' associations becomes implausible. 
A simple calculation will show that using this method of classification a 
typical human brain with 1010 nerve-cells will accommodate the sensory 
pattern permutations of only 33 sensory cells, therefore, clearly this type of 
classification cannot be a basis for natural neurological mechanisms - the 
patterns of activity must be the critical issue and not the individual cen 
firings. Hence, it can be concluded that neural-nets, to be able to learn 
efficiently from their environments, need to have a capacity for generalization 
(i.e., making inductive references). 
The importance of the classification of input patterns, rather than the 
individual inputs, is acknowledged in this line of researc:h. A possible 
hypothesis is suggested by stewart for neural classification (and its possible 
use in modelling), whereby, inputs from the environment are received in the 
higher processing levels of nervous system in a coded form; this type of 
encoding can be done internally for the sensory type inputs, but for the 
symbolic type inputs, the encoding process can be thought to have been 
partly carried out in the external environment; after this encoding process, 
similar or associated patterns are assigned to various classes on the basis of 
some similar identifiable features. 
It is obvious that this approach is diametrically opposite to the previous 
classification procedure of FIG.4.4 which involved an expansion of the number 
of input lines rather than their reduction. We can also deduce that only the 
adopting of this holistic view of the sensory percepts will enable us to devise 
possible efficient neural modelling methods which can explain the immensity 
of temporal information. 
Stewart (1967) also describes a class of tself-modifying' networks which 
can be devised by using the principles of 'reward and punishment'. Specific 
design features are incorporated which can modify stimulus-response 
connections of nets similar to the network of FIG.4.3. Sections of such 
automata could be regarded as 'motivational units', thus determining the 
effectiveness of associations. These motivational, rewarding or punishing, 
networks could be made to change according to the demands of their 
environments. The important observation is that as well as the association of 
stimuli on contiguity basis, by using some innate factors of nets, we can 
determine their actions by means of selective reinforcement. The principles 
involved could be extended indefinitely to encompass the more complex 
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adaptive behaviours; a 'random' element could also be included to ensure lhal 
at some future time the correct responses shall be made. These models are 
also construclable in hardware and simple examples were given. 
George (1973) describes a so called 'B-net' (Belief-nel), similar to the 
neural network of FIG.4.3, which is the basis for his 'C-systems' 
(Cognitive-systems); B-nets are represented by the general form of B(rn,n), n 
being the number of inputs, and m the number or the length of the storage 
elements. Generalised linear chained connections can be established between 
such B-nels and simple storage-nets (such as those in FIG.4.5) which are able 
to remember associations to any extent - as a function of: the order of 
occurrence, the frequency, or the number count of evenls. Various 
behavioural properties of such B-nets can also be described in terms of lhe 
probabilities of the occurrence of inputs. 
George goes on to elaborate a 'cognitive' model of the central nervous 
system based on: 'B-nets', 'Control-nets', 'Cognitive-nels', 'Memory-nels' 
(long-term and short-term), 'Motivational-nets', and 'Emotional-nels'. A 
general form of this type of automaton described by George is illustrated in 
FIG.4.6; such systems will be able to classify, recognise and also reason, but 
not necessarily using any actual naturally occurring phenomena. The 
computer simulation of such complex automata are also thought to be possible, 
maybe, with the help of an automatic coding procedure. 
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FIGURE 4.6. Block diagram of a general intelligent adaptive neural-net. 
George (1973) discusses the question of perception within the theoretical 
context of neural-nets, proposes some molar principles for the neural-net 
realization of various perceiving adaptive automata, and highlights some basic 
issues such as: 'memory', 'motivation', 'attention', 'purposiveness', 'belief', etc. 
He also discusses the general problem of the simulation of behavioural and 
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cognitive theories by neural and logical nets, with special attention given to 
the aspects of 'hierarchy' and 'growth' of such models. 
Culbertson (1963) defines a theory of behaviour and consciousness based on 
the neural-net approach. 'Consciousness' is taken to mean 'mental' events or 
experiences (the 'mental' events are believed to 'consist' of physical events), 
and is deemed to be applicable to humans, animals, automata, and robots 
alike; here, a 'robot' refers to a finite automaton reproduced in hardware. 
Be also abst.racts various conscious automata which can display learning. It 
is argued that even 'memory-less' (unconscious) robots could exhibit some 
kind of 'intelligent' behaviour, and the 'intelligence' may be enhanced by 
adopting some probabilistic rather than deterministic model; and furt.hermore, 
by adding storage facility a fully conscious (intelligent) robot is conceptually 
realizable. 
An important perceptual issue for a neural network is the 'meaning' it 
attaches to a stimulus, in other words, how can a neural-net automaton be 
made to react differently to apparently similar stimuli; the answer, generally, 
envisaged is that for the simple modes of behaviour the single-level logical 
design specifications of the net can in fact manifest such variations, but, for 
the more intelligent types of behaviour and learning, such as the formation of 
concepts, we need to incorporate a second meta-level into the design of the 
non-peripheral sections of the nerve-net. This feature will enable the 
automaton to 'evaluate' each situation and assign the proper meaning to an 
output. Even, a higher semantic level is also thought to become necessary 
for the understanding of the external descriptions of environments which are 
received in symbolic form. 
Some neurological postulates of learning, such as Hebb's and Millner's cell 
assemblies, have also been represented by neural-nets in a branch of 
physiology sometimes referred to by 'neuro-cybernetics' or 'biological 
cybernetics'. George (1973) has shown bow such learning cell assemblies 
could be constructed by neural-net configurations. Deutsch (1967) has 
proposed neural-net models based on neurological observations, and using an 
engineering oriented approach, has simulated auditory and visual neurological 
systems, and described models and hardware constructs for simple 'learning 
systems'. Amari (1977) presents primitive neural models of association and 
concept formation by a mathematical analysis of neural "pools"; the principle 
of neuronal 'self-organization', as proposed by Bebb's theories, is verified, 
and simple mechanisms for learning, storing and using of knowledge 
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postulated. Other important mathematical treatments of neural-nets has been 
carried out by Griffith (1971). 
More recently, the control engineering oriented researchers have applied 
some of their techniques to neural-net models of learning. Bobrowski (1984 & 
1982) describes a set of formal mathematical learning algorithms and rules, 
which can be applied to both 'supervised' and 'unsupervised' learning 
neural-nets. In lhese models, neurons are considered as 'fi1lers' which pass 
signals most frequently received; alternately, they are seen as 'deteclors of 
rareness'. The stochastic methods used will approximale lhe optimal 
(adaptive) configuration of a network which, usually, has been laid down in 
advance - a decision rule at each instant of time varies certain weighting 
parameters until the learning is achieved. Kohonen (1984) describes a set of 
experiments for the formation of 'ordered neural-net maps', based on adaptive 
selection; these specific patterns are formed, in a self-organizing manner, as 
a result of sensory experiences. This process is believed to be occurring at 
the higher central processing levels of the brain; and simple two-dimensional 
neural-net arrays are devised which reproduce such maps using some 'primary 
laws of adaptation'. 
4.3.4 AN OVERVIEW OF NEURAL NETS APPROACH 
The above neural-nets have demonstrated possible ways by which bolh 
'macro' (pattern, concept) and 'micro' (direct sensory impression) levels of 
inputs could be represented in a model, and also have suggested a 
methodology for constructing large scale experimental automata (both software 
and hardware). Although, mathematical techniques to sufficiently manipulate 
associations between such representations have not been developed, yet, to a 
great extent. 
The introduction of neural-nets as a kind of Turing machine was 
considered as an important cybernetic development in the early 1940's. 
However, neural-nets have only resulted in the realization of trivia} types of 
behaviour. Consequently, in the last two decades, the interest in this area 
has gradually waned, with some exceptions in specific subjects. On the other 
hand, some of the mathematical ideas and methodologies of neural-nets which 
spread to other disciplines, such as biology and neurology t seem to have 
retained their potency, and have been firmly established as a concrete tool 
for the analyses of natural systems. 
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Some conjectures as to the possible causes of this decline are: 
insufficiency of neura-physiological findings; lack of early computing tools and 
machinery; contradictions with neurological observations; vagueness or 
imprecision of some terminologies to other disciplines; too many assumptions 
about the significances or interpretations of models; too much attention to 
the hardware realization; eagerness to simulate higher cognitive aspects, and 
define their neural-net correlates. 
The comparing of the concepts of neural-nets and the actual processes of 
the brain has been one of the major issues in this field. McCulloch, in 
proposing his theories of neural-nets, assumed that humans started life with 
inborn fixed 'universals' consisting of various sensations, reflexes and 
appetites; and he thought of the brain as an interconnected mass of randomly 
organised nets, experiences would rearrange such connections and manifest 
learning, memory, prediction, and purpose. An important implication of this 
view was that 'mind', probably for the first time, could be described in 
scientific terms. However, von-Neumann (1956) recognised that although it 
was possible to model the processes of the brain in a digita1 binary form, the 
actual indications were that the brain itself was using a mixture of digital 
and analogue processes. Dreyfus (1972) in his analysis of the feasibility of 
computer realization of intelligence concludes that the analogy of digital 
computers and brains is a weak and outdated concept, and digital automata 
(neural-nets) cannot be used to produce a true 'artificial' model of 
intelligence. The problem of applying discrete criteria to the modelling of an 
essentially continuous system and environment, such as the brain, has also 
been argued by Andrew (1967,1983). 
Furthermore, in view of the deficiencies of 'sequential' models in 
representing the processes of the brain such as learning, it is speculated that 
serial mechanisms are, in principle, not capable of imitating the brain which 
seemingly has non-serial characteristics. For this reason, some researchers 
have become interested in the design of parallel computing machinery and 
their possible applications to the neural-net type models of learning. 
Digital computers have been developing alongside the more analytical 
computing automata of neural and logical nets, and in spite of possessing the 
same logical foundations, computers have come to simulate the human 
cognitive aspects using a very different approach. The new approach, A.I., 
has made the understanding at the cell level unnecessary; although, intuitively 
it is more appropriate to start the investigations from the point of trivial to 
the more complex, as promoted by the methodologies of neural-net. Hence, 
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the 'information processing' rather than the 'information theory' aspects have 
dominated the field of artificial learning-systems, shifting the paradigm of 
'machine intelligence' from energy and matter to information; and the 
computing machines have come to be considered as 'information processors' 
and 'symbol manipulators' rather than the crude copies of nervous systems. 
Neural-nets, on the whole, have made an undeniable contribution to 
learning sciences. In the course of their development they have spanned a 
typical pattern of scientific progress, whereby, postulates are postulated upon 
and enormous bodies of knowledge amassed in a hierarchical form. Once the 
pattern of development is set, and a number of researchers commit themselves 
to a particular approach, generally, fundamental questions regarding the basis 
of a paradigm are not raised from within that particular paradigm, and it 
becomes quite a difficult task to break away from the mainstream views of a 
discipline. In addition, the discipline is diversified into complex and 
specialised branches which are heavily reliant upon the previously accepted 
postulates. Therefore, as in the case of neural-net methodology, if at some 
stage of development general problems are confronted and adequate solutions 
are not foreseen, then the whole paradigm suffers adversely rather than the 
specific path of the development. 
Initially, the back-up necessary by some technological tools (e.g., 
computers) were not forthcoming; while, such supplements could have 
corroborated certain lines of development or proposals which were pushed 
aside and generally not pursued later on. For example, in the 1940's and 
early 1950's, it was inconceivable to compare the capabilities of the nervous 
systems and reasonable size computers, while, today, in Dlany aspects (e.g., 
memory size and speed of calculation) computers have overtaken their 
neuronal counterparts. 
Hence, it can be argued that some of the previously discarded ideas could 
be reinvestigated in the light of the new scientific and technological 
breakthroughs, and the questions which were thought to be impractical or 
vague might be seen to be pertinent now. 
Various new lines of development could be envisaged if the elements of 
neural-networks were modelled much more closely on the actual actions of 
nerve-cells, or were of a more complex nature, specially in view of some 
recent neurological discoveries. Ultimately, the extent of future research in 
this direction will be governed by the interest shown in the simulation and 
the understanding of the structural aspects of behaviour. 
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4.4 AUTOMATA-THEORETICAL APPROACH TO tLEARNING SYSTEMS' 
Various concepts of 'automata-theory' and lautomata' were discussed in the 
previous chapter as a general mathematical tool for modelling. In this section 
we will survey the field of automata-theory as a conceptual framework for 
manifesting the process of learning in systems. A specialised class of 
automata, namely the combinational type cellular 'learning' automata, which 
normally feature the classification aspects of inputs, will be covered in the 
future section dealing with the pattern-recognition approach to 'learning 
systems'. 
It is worth mentioning here that neural-nets are a special class of finite 
automata, and many of the previous section's discussions are a]so appropriate 
to the automata-theoretical concepts. The origins of automata-theory can be 
traced to the introduction of Turing-machines. However, during the early 
1940's, the notions of neural-net and finite automaton were, usually, used 
synonymously; but, gradually, the concepts of automata-theory came to be 
discussed in a broader analytical sense of abstract computational machinery, 
while, neural-nets were seen more and more as application tools. 
4.4.1 BASIC CONCEPTS OF AUTOMATA-THEORY 
Automata, in analytical terms, are defined as tape-machines, or as a formal 
class of information processing machines. An automaton has three basic 
elements: 'inputs', 'outputs', and 'internal-states'; various definitions and 
categorizations of different types of automaton were outlined in chapter 
three. Of particular interest are the finite-state automata which can be 
described as: any system constructed from finite number of parts (e.g., cells, 
elements, etc.). The notion of 'finite-state-machine', in preference to 
Turing-machine, was introduced since it was more appropriate for abstracting 
fundamental models for a variety of natural and artificial information 
processing machines, especially, computers and switching circuits; a great deal 
of interest also stemmed from the rise of neural-nets. 
An important distinction is made between automata, and that is the 
'deterministic' against the tnon-deterministic'. A deterministic automaton in 
any particular state will give a fixed response to a particular input; and 
starting from an initial point, will behave in an identical manner for a given 
sequence of inputs. The 'stochastic' or tprobabilistic' automata, being a 
special sub-class of non-deterministic automata, on the other hand, can have 
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a 'random' element or 'noise' incorporated, which may result in outputs not 
necessarily identical for every application of the same input. 
Automata studies have two major components of: (a) - behavioural aspects, 
and (b) - structural (mechanism, anatomical) aspects. The main feature of the 
behavioural aspect of an automaton (provided it is not a random automaton) is 
that its output and state at any instant of time is dependent 
(deterministically or stochastically) upon its previous state and its previous 
input. Another point to mention here is that most learning related studies of 
automata involve the 'discrete' type, in which the changes of an automaton's 
characteristics are only considered at disjointed instances of time. 
The state changes of an automaton are determined by its 'state-structure' 
which, in a sense, represents the dynamic organizational intricacies of a 
machine, yet, it does not directly refer to any actual physical hardware - the 
state-structure is closely related to the movement of information within an 
automaton. According to Aleksander (1978): "state-structure is a function of 
both the physical structure and the function of the elements of an 
automaton." 
4.4.2 MODELLING OF SYSTEMS USING AUTOMATA-THEORY CONCEPTS 
Automata-theory is concerned with the logical properties of dynamic and 
specially non-linear systems; and although, it has been developing separate 
from the subject of computing theory as a discipline in its own right, the 
concepts of automata-theory have contributed greatly to the development of 
computing machinery and computers. The 'reliability' studies of von-Neumann 
(1956) in the context of probabilistic automata is a prominent example of such 
contribution, whereby, stochastic automata have been used to model computers 
which have unreliable components; similarly, other automata-theory studies 
have been applied to the coding theory and the time-sharing of computers. 
As well as abstracting the information processing aspects of machines, 
without actually referring to the hardware or the technology, the automata 
theorists have also been concerned with the actual input-output behaviour of 
various automata, and have developed methods for describing and analyzing 
the dynamic behaviour of mainly discrete systems. Some of these methods 
have been applied to computers, neural-nets, control systems, biological 
systems, and aspects of animal and human behaviour. In chapter three, we 
also outlined the various ways of representing an automaton - graphs, 
matrices, transition-functions, tables, etc. 
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Kleene (1956) demonstrated that automata could be built that for any given 
input situation choose an appropriate output by looking up in a kind of 
'dictionary'. This means that once any pattern of behaviour has been 
translated to a mathematical language it can be represented by an automaton's 
isomorphic behaviour. The same line of argument was developed for the 
neural-nets of previous section, but automata-theory is concerned with the 
more abstract logical and mathematical consequences. 
Automata-theory concepts can be applied to a broad spectrum of systems, 
starting from a simple clockwork mechanism to much more complex social 
systems. Animals and humans have also been looked at as a form of 
automaton, and their behaviour defined in such manner; a special advantage of 
this conceptualization is that it does not imply the equating of men and 
machines. A great deal of such analytical simulations of natural behaviour 
have been undertaken; similarly, many workers have been trying to translate 
the findings of automata-theory to the natural domain - by explaining the 
natural phenomena in the mathematical language of automata-theory. When 
psychological theories are used, the concepts of 'input' and 'output' are, 
normally, equated with the notions of 'stimulus' and 'response'; furthermore, 
the precise automata-theoretic concept of 'internal-state' is correlated with 
either the state of the excitation of the nervous system, or with the 
cognitive organization of· the brain. 
Automata-theory has also attempted to analyze the higher aspects of 
human's experiences, such as learning, thoughts, and other mental events, 
using a mechanistic view of these notions. Mental activities have been 
paralleled to the state changes of an automaton, hence enabling various 
quantitative analysis and evaluations based on some mathematical features of 
such mental activities. 
Aleksander (1978,1983) argues that the state-structure of the br~n is a 
kind of reflection of its environment, ignoring the unimportant details of the 
environment and making 'sense' of its experiences. He pursues the point that 
the automatic homeostatic/regulatory functions of the brain and also the 
concept of 'mind' are all attributable to -the brain's state-structure. 
Furthermore, he describes various temporal concepts such as: 'learning', 
'thoughts', 'emotions', and 'self-knowledge' in terms of the characteristics of 
this state-structure; conjectures are also made regarding the questions of 
'free-will', 'awareness', 'attention', and 'perception', and it is argued that 
such features could be explained in the proposed automata-theoretic model -
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by thinking of the state-structure as a hierarchical conglomerate of relatively 
autonomous sections which are able to control and coordinate each other. 
Some 'deeper' mental properties such as 'unconsciousness' and 'sleep' are 
considered, and speculations are made regarding the nature of variouB 
pathological problems - models proposed for a 'psychotic automaton' which 
could in a very basic sense display the symptoms of Borne psychological 
disorders. 
Aleksander goes on to elaborate automata capable of modelling the genetic 
mechanisms of cell division, in particular, Kauffman's discovery of the 
existence of short stable cycles in the assemblies of randomly connected 
networks is modelled; these proposals exemplify the use of automata-theory 
methods in the studies of an autonomous biological activity. Finally, social 
interactions, such as the family relationships, are seen as another suitable 
domain for the application of automata-theory concepts. 
An important and relatively recent landmark in the automata-theoretic 
research has been the introduction of Chomsky's linguistic theories, regarding 
'syntactic structures'. His ideas based on the underlying structures of 
language has resulted in the introduction of 'artificial languages' for 
automata. The concept of an abstract language, having symbols and formulae 
rather than words and phrases, was defined for formal machines, the syntax 
of such a language could be expressed in terms of various 'production rules'; 
many developments have been achieved in this direction, some relevant 
examples will be covered in the future section on the A.I. approach to 
learning. 
Before attempting to discuss learning in automata and outline some specific 
examples, it is relevant to make few general comments about the development 
of automata-theory within the past 40 years and its importance to 
machine-intelligence. Automata may be described as abstract machines that 
process information, but, it is true to say that the main influencing factor in 
the development of this science has been its relevance to the digital 
computers rather than the need for constructing abstract intelligent 
machinery. 
As far as the modelling of the biological systems or the low-level aspects 
of human activities are concerned, there has been a gradual decline of 
interest following the initial enthusiasm; the reasons behind such a decline 
are more or less similar to those outlined and discussed for the case of 
neural-nets. However, automata-theory has been able to divert its attention 
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and flourish in subjects relating to the formal representation of logic and 
language in computing machinery. 
Automata theorists, on the whole, have a diametrically opposite view to 
workers in A.I.; and like neural-net researchers, favour the basic analytical 
approach to the investigations of intelligence, rather than the high-level 
cognitive outlook. And the computer, featured heavily in their techniques, is 
seen as a simple tool for simulation and not, as proposed by most A.I. 
workers, the sole means of attaining or simulating 'intelligence' in machines. 
4.4.3 'LEARNING' AUTOMATA 
Ordinary automata differ from 'learning' automata, since the majority of 
the non-learning automata are designed on the basis of specific 
state-structures which can only realise a particular information processing 
machine. The 'learning' automaton, on the other hand, can adapt to a 
specific task from a range of different tasks. 
'Learning' automata interact with their environment, and modify their 
response on the basis of the responses they receive from their environment. 
Normally, the general concept of reinforcement, in the form of rewards and 
punishments from the environment, are used to update some aspects of the 
actions of the automaton for various given input situations. The 
automata-theoretic learning techniques have been used to model a variety of 
systems in biology as well as having applications in the engineering and 
control fields such as: optimization, adaptive control, statistical decision 
making, etc. 
Aleksander (1983) argues that for automata (and robots) to be able to 
'learn', it would be necessary to incorporate a facility for the design of new 
state-structures or self-programming within the machine. He also suggests a 
possible way for realising such automata - by devising the machine in a 
hierarchical form, with the higher sections being able to program (teach) 
some of the lower ones. In the mean time, it is pointed out that this 
approach could lead to an infinite regression problem. 
If a deterministic 'autonomous' or an 'input-less and output-less' automaton 
(FIG.4.7a) with a finite number of states is considered, starting from an 
initial state will under the influences of its internal inputs either fall into a 
stable state or continue changing indefinitely (theoretically); it has also been 
shown that such continuous changes will invariably entail cycles. 
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An automaton/environment configuration. 
Now, if the interactions of an automaton with an environment is 
considered, as in FIG.4.7b, then much more complex systems may be 
envisaged; although, it must be remembered that such definitions of 
environment and automaton are quite arbitrary, since the environment can be 
looked at an automaton and the original automaton as its environment; or the 
whole of the automaton/environment could be seen as a single autonomous 
automaton. 
The environment and/or the automaton may be of a probabilistic nature, 
whereby it reacts to the inputs according to some stochastic criterion - each 
output has a specific probability of occurrence for every value of the input. 
An adaptive interaction of the automaton and the environment can also be 
considered, whereby, the environment is able to change the state-structure of 
the automaton. A general automaton/environment learning situation is one in 
which an automaton has a finite choice of actions including the option of 
'no-action'. After a choice is made the environment may penalise or reward 
the automaton, and this, in turn, modifies the future choice of such actions 
in a manner that gradually a more 'favourable' response is attained; in other 
words, the automaton is said to be 'learning' from its environment. In most 
'learning' automata, the environment is considered to be reacting 
instantaneously to the outputs, while the changes in the automaton occur at a 
unit interval after the application of input. 
'Learning' automata can be categorised into two general distinct groups: 
'deterministic', and 'stochastic'. In each case, a further distinction may be 
made, whether the automaton is 'fixed-structure' or 'variable-structure'. 
Deterministic 'learning' automata with fixed-structure are those whose state 
and output transition functions are deterministic, and although easy to 
implement they are rigid in response and their adaptive qualities do not 
improve with time. On the other hand, deterministic 'learning' automata with 
variable-structure could improve their learning abilities with exhaustive 
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algorithmic strategies, however, their accurate implementation becomes 
extremely impractical and uneconomical. 
The behaviour of a stochastic automaton can provide the type of variety 
needed in 'learning systems'; and the necessary modification may be achieved 
by changing the elements of the transition matrices of the aulomaton. 
Fixed-structure stochastic 'learning' automata are lhose which have 
time-invariant stochastic processes determining their transitions; this class of 
'learning' automata, with no los8 of generality, can be assumed to be 
deterministic in nature. The most widely used and the most suitable type of 
automata for the modelling of learning is the variable-structure stochastic 
type. These automata have probabilistic transition functions (matrices) which 
are updated as the process of learning evolves. 
In the following, we will outline some examples of deterministic and 
stochastic 'learning' automata, and also briefly discuss the relatively recent 
concept of 'fuzzy logic' and the application of fuzzy-automata to the 
modelling of 'learning systems'. 
(i) - SEQUENTIAL DE'I'.lDfiNISTIC 'LEARNING' AUl'QlATA wrm SIMPLE MlHEY EI..»IENTS 
Aleksander (1976,1978) discusses the basis for a deterministic 
variable-structure finite 'learning' automaton. A general schematic diagram of 
such system is illustrated in FIG.4.8. 
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FIGURE 4.8. A trainable 'learning' automaton. 
A distinction is made between 'combinational' and 'sequential' 'learning' 
automata, the combinational 'learning' machines are discussed and various 
types of decision making and classification schemes outlined; and some basic 
elements of such systems, in particular. Rosenblatt's 'perceptrons' are 
described - this whole area will be more fully covered in a future section. 
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The sequential tlearning' automata are devised using some feedback 
features from their outputs, they are able to compute and classify various 
properties of their input patterns, as in the case of the combinational type 
tlearning' automata. However, these machines are considered to be more 
suitable when the notion of 'training' needs to be incorporated in an 
automaton. 
The 'learning' automata designed consist of a simple cellular network of 
memory elements (RAMs). Starting from an initial state, the automaton can 
be trained to retain a pattern of input which was applied to it. This trivial 
kind of 'learning' can be achieved by activating the "teach" terminals of the 
memory elements (RAMs), consequently, the automaton either moves into the 
trained state after a unit interval, or, will change into the trained state after 
a finite transitory steps, even though the actual training pattern has been 
removed. These automata are tentatively interpreted as being able to 
perceive, recognise, remember, learn, and switch their attention. 
(ti) - AUTOMATA-THEORETICAL 'LEARNING' IN NEURAL-NETS 
Veelenturf (1981) adopts an automata-theoretical approach in his 
investigations of learning in neural-nets. The described formal deterministic 
variable-structure models of growing neural-networks are based on the 
consideration of each element as an automaton, rather than a neuron-like 
unit. The 'learning' is achieved by choosing the correct behaviour from a 
finite set of examples, this 'learning' process includes the equivalent notions 
of memory and generalization or, in his words, the "abstracting of invariant 
structures underlying a finite set of examples." 
Neural-nets are described as finite automata whose each element has both 
excitatory and inhibitory inputs, and can be defined by a neuronal equation 
which represents its firing at any time. 
Using some neurological evidence, it is argued that the learning process 
brings about changes in the input-output behaviour of a net, and accordingly 
in the automata-theoretical descriptions - in the form of the state diagram 
and the state transition matrix of such learning and growing networks. The 
comparisons and the evaluations of the actual output of a net and the 
required output is carried out outside the system. The learning procedures 
used results in the gradual improvement of the automaton's response to 
stimuli in some desired way. 
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The neurological phenomenon used as the guiding principle is the 
observation that some cortical neurons can detect correlations between the 
activities of different sets of fibers, and change their synaptic effectiveness 
with correct response. The described learning strategies translale thhi 
observation to the analytical domain of automata-theory, by changing the 
weighing values of the links in the state diagram of the automaton. 
Two other fundamental assumptions are made. Firstly, it is contended that 
to learn from the correct examples of input-output behaviours, we should only 
use the presently applied example to update and modify the automaton, rather 
than store al1 correct input-output examples and then simultaneously assess 
the information at the end of the learning period - it is thought that the 
biological learning process is unlikely to have this second type of data 
handling. 
Secondly, by arguing against the two extreme learning methods of 'passive 
memorization' (i.e., forming a state diagram at each stage which includes all 
correct previous examples) and 'enumerative generalization' (i.e., finding a 
state diagram at each stage which is the least complicated model fully 
representing all correct previous examples), it is concluded that although with 
each method we will eventually attain the goal automaton, a more appropriate 
strategy would be one which adopts some essential features from both above 
extreme procedures; this compromised strategy is called the t generalization 
memorization method'. 
Furthermore, the indications are that neither of the extreme processes are 
involved in the neuronal level; since, with the first method, learning would be 
limited only to what examples had been confronted previously, and for the 
second method, it might become necessary to completely rearrange the 
network at each stage of learning, hence both strategies seem to be 
uneconomical and inefficient. Finally, it is suggested that this generalization 
memorization method, tentatively stemming from neurological observations, 
will be able to improve the speed of convergence of the learning process. 
(iii) - STOCHASTIC AUTOMATA AS MODELS OF 'LEARNING SYSTEMS' 
The ideas of stochastic automata have been applied in the implementation 
of various 'learning systems', in particular, to 'learning' control systems - Fu 
(1970), Glorioso (1975), Thathachar and Oommen (1983). Similarly, stochastic 
automata formulations can be applied to deterministic automata operating in 
stochastic environments. Some techniques have also been devised for the 
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synthesis of stochastic automata involving their differentiation into a 
deterministic component plus a 'random noise generator'. 
Now, without actually going too much into the intricacies of the 
mathematics involved, some of the basic concepts of stochastic 'learning' 
automata will be outlined here, particularly as we shall be using some of 
these formalizations in the later part of this work. This outlook is, mostly, 
from the control-system sciences point of view, but some psychological 
concepts of various learning theories, such as Bush and Mosteller's (1951) 
stochastic learning theories, have also been incorporated. In the following we 
will be, mainly, dealing with the variable-structure type stochastic 'learning' 
automata. 
A stochastic automaton can be represented by a quintuple:-
Q = (I,O,S,G,F). 
I, 0, and S being finite sets of inJK.rt.s, outputs, and. states, respectively, 
or:-
I = {il, ••• , i .. } , o = {01, ••• , 0.) , S = {sl, ... ,Sq). 
F and G are the next state and the next outpIt f\mOtions of the form:-
F: SXI---->S, and G: S---->O or G: SXI---->O, 
and for every inprt i(n) and state s(n), considered at discrete instances 
of time, the next state and output are:-
s(n+1) = F[s(n),i(n)], 0(n+1) = G[s(n+1)] = G[s(n),i(n)]. 
In general, the function F is stochastic and the f\mOtion G mayor may not 
be stochastic. 
For each state-input pair, a probability pkl J of transfer from state 51 
to state S,j with input k is defined, or more formally:-
pkiJ = Prob{ s(n+1)=s,; : s(n)=sl, and i(n)=k}, for all i,j = l, ••• ,q. 
Also, for any present state si the total sum of the probabilities of 
transi tions is equal to one, or: 
(""""IIq 
,:,.," pk I J = 1. 
j=1 
'!be above is the basic implementation of a stochastic automaton. '!be 
problem now is to try to change the entries in the probability matrix of 
transition'in such a way to bring about 'leaming'. '!be general form of 
such a state transition matrix, H, with r inputs is as follows:-
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pill,. • ,pi 141 prll,. .,pr •• 
• . M. = 
· 
• 
· · 
, . . • . • . . • • • . , Mr = . • 
· · · · pIu, • .,pI •• I I pr •• , • • ,pr" I 
Furthermore, the state transi tion matrix for a sequence of inputs 
ia ,ib, •..•. can be fOtmd by simple matrix multiplication of their state 
transi Hon probability matrices Ma ,Ma, , • • • The output transition matrix can 
also be considered in a similar stochastic fashion, however, for simplicity 
reasons the output matrix is proposed to be deterministic for most 
'learning' autanata. For the special simple case of automata with only two 
value binary inputs of zero and one from their environment, "1 " 
representing pmishing reinforcement (or penalty) and "0" representing 
reward, the transition matrix M becanes:-
pOll,. 
· 
.,pOlq pill,. .,pI. , 
I 
Mo = I Mt = 
· 
• 
· 
• . , , 
. . . 
pO'I,. 
· 
.,pOq, pI'I,. • ,pi" 
It can be easily shown that the finite deterministic automata are a 
special case of the general stochastic automata, with each ptl J being 
either one or zero, and each row of M having all but one of the elements 
equal to zero. 
The various stochastic automata/environment configurations are displayed 
in FIG.4.9. For randan environments (FIG.4.9a), or deterministic or 
stochastic environments (FIG. 4. 9c and FIG. 4. ge) which vary much too quickly 
in relation to an automaton's parameter modifications, only tentative and 
non-optimal strategies have been developed - since such environments do not 
have adequate features for making inferences. 
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FIGURE 4.9. Five schematic confiJUrations of stochastic automata and 
different types of enVIronments. 
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For the fixed deterministic environments of FIG.4.9b, the input of the 
automaton is some function C of either its instantaneous output, or the 
preceding output (depending on how the environmental reactions are 
considered), in other words: i(n) = C[o(n)] , or i(n) = C[0(n-1)]. 
The relatively slow time varying deterministic environments (FIG.4.9c) can 
be considered similar to the previous class of automata, and usually, the same 
techniques may be applied. In both cases, the function C is, generally, 
associated with a 'performance evaluation' element, as shown in FIG.4.10. 
H1;IIIIIIIIIIIll:;lII::IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII"'IIIII1111111111111111IIIIIIIUIIIIIIIIIII'III""UIUIlI1I 
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FIGURE 4.10. A generalised learning stochastic automata/environment diagram, 
showing the evaluation element intermediating between the 
automaton and its environment. 
The overall measure of the performance of an automaton is given by the 
mathematical expectation of the negative reinforcements from the evaluation 
element (penalties, punishments), or T. 
A measure of learning efficiency has also been introduced, called the 
'expediency' which is related to the closeness of the automaton's behaviour to 
its optimal performance. Ideally, T = Toptiaah and the automaton is said to 
have optimal performance. 
Now, if the assumption is made that every output of an automaton 
produces either a penalty (1) or a reward (0) from its environment; then, for 
an automaton with a fixed or slowly varying stochastic environment (FIG.4.9d 
and FIG.4.ge), the state Si which deterministically leads to an output 011: (i.e., 
Ok = G[Si)) is said to be able to produce 'punishment' with the probability:-
h = Prab{ pmishment given output Ok }, 
or in oUler words, h = Prob{ input=1 output=Ok }. 
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Hence, the probability of transfer from state Si to SJ can be expressed 
by:-
For this special case, at any instant of time the value of T, or the 
expected penalty, becanes:-
r"'''''Uq 
T = \ d~::," ... 11 Ak Prob { output=Ok } 
k=l 
Also,if initially the automaton attached equal probabilities to its 
outputs then:-
Tinitial = l/q 
\'''''''H q 
l Ak 
HUliulluH 
k=l 
And, if T<Tiaitiai then the automaton is said to be 'expedient'. 
Next, we consider how adaptation and learning may be manifested in such 
systems. If, the transition of a state Si to S,j results in an output Ok which, 
in turn, produces a reward from the environment, then it is reasonable to 
increase the probability of such transition occurring in future, and decrease 
the probabilities of other transitions from Sie Bence, pi.; should be increased 
and all other probabilities Pix (where Sl: is any state other than s.;) should be 
decreased. 
The above can constitute a simple mechanism for 'learning' in a stochastic 
automaton - the new transition matrix reflecting the information received 
from the environment and the consequent self-improvement of the automaton. 
An alternate approach to this problem is to modify the state probabilities 
instead of the state transition probabilities - the probabilities for the 
automaton to be at each state; similarly. the modification of the input-output 
probabilities (i.e., Prob{ Ot:ij }) could substitute the above criterion as the 
learning strategy. 
In general, the set of parameters 1m} of a matrix should be adjusted to 
achieve the 'adapted' or the 'optimal' system structure. If there is no a 
priori information about the nature of vector (mIt then. usually, equal 
probabilities are assigned to each state of the automaton. 
If the performance of an automaton. as mentioned previously, is denoted 
by T(m), then we are trying to find T(lDoptiaal). This search for optimal 
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performance can take several forms, depending on the complexity of the 
system, and also if the system is free from random fluctuations or not. 
There are two major classes of 'linear' and 'non-linear' reinforcement 
algorithms. However, for some complex problems, it becomes too difficult to 
devise appropriate analytic techniques, hence the so-called 'on-line' techniques 
have been formulated. 
Probability updating algorithms and schemes, as well as the above 
classification, can also be distinguished into two general groups. The first 
group are the algorithms whose final probability vectors are dependent on the 
initial probabilities of the automaton; while, in the second group, the 
distribution of the limiting probabilities are independent of the initial 
probabilities - the former being the more desirable feature. 
Possibly, the simplest learning scheme is the linear reward-penalty 
algorithm. The probabilities of actions (state transitions, input-output, state) 
are increased or decreased in a linearly proportional manner, depending on 
reward or penalty from the environment. 
Here, a simple linear reward-penalty algorithm will be described, the more 
generalised non-linear form can also be developed in a similar fashion. 
Suppose a stochastic automaton displays an output o(n) at time instant n 
from a set of {OhOZ' ••••••• ,o.}; and also there is a specific probability of PJ = 
Prob{ o(n)=o,j } associated with each output o(n) at time n; also, 
W;"I'·~nr. m 
~. l"fi pj (n) = 1. 
j=l 
The interaction of this output with a random environment results in an 
input i(n) of either zero (reward) or one (penalty) to the automaton. Hence, 
for each output a penalty probability is defined by:-
pl,;(n) = Prob{ i(n)=1 : o(n)=o,j }, for all j = 1,2, ••• ,m. 
The environment is thus characterised by a set of penalty probabilities 
relating to each output; and hence the 'learning' can be manifested by 
updating the output probabilities of the automaton on the basis of its 
reinforcing inputs (either 0 or 1). In the beginning, the probability 
distribution of pi,; is unknown. And for the 'learning' to be successful, the 
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automaton should ultimately choose the actions which lead to the smaller 
values of pi,;. 
A measure of the performance of the automaton, as mentioned before, is:-
T (n) = 
r"""'ilm 
~ l pj (n) pI J 
rt..,,,,,,,,11 
j=l 
Or the average penalty received at the instant n. 
As before, the automaton is called 'expedient' if T(n) < T(O); and is said 
to learn 'expediently', if as time tends towards infinity, the expected penalty 
is less than T(O). 
Finally, a simple probability updating procedure with two parameters 
A and B < 1, and A denoting any output other than OJ, could be as follows:-OJ 
PJ (n+l) = Ap,; (n), if o(n) = OJ and i(n) = 1 
= BpJ (n), if o(n) = 
A 
and i(n) 0 OJ = 
= (I-B) + Bpj (n) if o(n) = OJ and i(n) = 1 
= (l-A) + Apj (n) if o(n) = OJ and i(n) = 0 
The above scheme will ensure that for each penalty the associated action 
probabilities are reduced and other action probabilities are increased. 
(iv) - FUZZY LOGIC AND FUZZY 'LEARNING' AUTOMATA 
The relatively new concepts of 'fuzzy logic' and 'fuzzy sets' have been 
applied in the implementation of various automata-theoretic models of 
'learning systems'. Some practical engineering applications of such techniques 
have also been envisaged. 
The theory of fuzzy logic states that an assertion can have an infinite 
numbers of degrees of truth, represented by values between zero and one -
telling us how sure we are about a proposition such as "he is tall". This is 
different from assigning ordinary probabilistic logical values to assertions, 
which tells us what chance there is of having an absolutely true value of an 
assertion - in fuzzy logic, there is no absolute certainty about a proposition 
being true (i.e., it is only true to some degree). The concepts of fuzzy logic 
have been particularly useful for relative notions such as temperature, height, 
size, etc. Fuzzy sets, loosely equated with the role of adjectives such as 
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'very', 'much' and 'below' of ordinary language, can be constructed as the 
basic quantifiers of fuzzy logic theory. 
The formalization of fuzzy logic was introduced by Zadeh in the middle 
1960's as an extension of Boolean logic to real-numbers; some equivalent 
concepts of 'AND', 'OR', and 'NOT' operators were also defined for fuzzy 
logic. 
Zadeh (1973) describes the fuzzy approach as a substitute for the 
quantitative techniques of system analysis; and argues that in view of the 
inefficiency of computers in dealing with humanistic systems, possibly, this 
new approach could tackle the high degrees of complexity of such systems 
better than the conventional techniques. Be defines the so called 'linguistic 
variables' in place of, or in addition to, numerical variables; and also 
characterises the simple relations between such variables by 'fuzzy conditional 
statements', and the more complex relations by 'fuzzy algorithms'. 
Furthermore, some 'compositional rules of inference' are devised which govern 
the execution of fuzzy algorithms. The principal use of fuzzy logic concepts 
is seen to be in the simulation of the behaviour of ill-defined or complex 
systems where precise descriptions are not readily available. 
Fuzzy logic ideas have found some useful practical applications in 
engineering and A.I. But, it should be pointed out that various philosophical, 
theoretical, and practical objections have also been voiced. For example, it is 
argued that the 'context' of an assertion should also be taken into account, 
since it may influence and distort the objectivity of a fuzzy logic formulation. 
Wee and Fu (1969) formulate a class of fuzzy automata based on Zadeh's 
fuzzy set concepts. Such fuzzy automata behave in a similar way to 
deterministic automata; yet, many of their properties are identical to 
stochastic automata. The inputs, outputs, and internal states of these fuzzy 
automata are defined as ordinary sets of finite numbers of points, while, the 
state and output transition functions are defined using fuzzy connotations. A 
non-supervised 'learning system' is proposed which is based on this 
formulation of fuzzy automata. The model is also applied to various 
engineering problems in pattern classification and control systems, and the 
computer simulation of a fuzzy 'learning' automaton undertaken. 
Kitajima and Asai (1973), also, describe a fuzzy 'learning' automaton based 
on a similar formulation as above. They apply various learning algorithms and 
search techniques to the finding of the optimum performance of control 
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systems with unknown characteristics. Such variable slructure fuzzy automata 
are further investigated by means of computer simulations. 
4.5 CYBERNETIC APPROACH TO 'LEARNING SYSTEMS' 
Cybernetics originated from an engineering point of view, assimilating 
biological systems with electronic or mechanical devices; and al its outset, 
was, mainly, involved with tackling control problems in systems. Later, it 
was recognised as an all encompassing discipline, and was closely related to 
and overlapped a number of different subjects, including computing-theory, 
communications-theory , decision-theory, logic, biology, psychology, and 
numerous secondary areas such as linguistics, semantics, medicine, education, 
industry, management, economics, physiology, etc. Later, the interaction of 
cybernetics and computers also created many applied disciplines which have 
developed in their own right. Not all cybernetic workers call themselves 
"cyberneticians", yet, many of them acknowledge that they are working in the 
area of interest covered by the science of Cybernetics. 
Cybernetics promised and proposed the idea of having a universal scientific 
language for explaining and exchanging various notions. However, as 
discussed in sections 3.3.5 and 3.6.1 dealing with the development and the 
methodologies of this subject, a common analytical language has not been 
forthcoming so far. The various mathematical developments discussed in 
chapter three (e.g., set-theory, logic-theory, probability-theory, neural-nels) 
\>,Thich are used in the implementation of cybernetic models, in spite of being 
quite useful in specific domains, do not show the exactness and the generality 
needed in dealing with a wide range of problems. 
An important observation about the science of Cybernetics is that for 
many purposes it does not distinguish between living and non-living syslems, 
and it believes lhat various formal mathematical theories can be effectively 
applied to inanimate, biological, and social systems on equal basis. Ideally, 
cybernetics, in explaining the issues of control and communication, would 
need a mathematical language analogous to the Newtonian descriptions of the 
dynamics of interacting objects. Whereby, such a hypothetical language would 
be able to formally predict and explain the behaviour of all directive systems 
by using an axiomatic set of rules. These rules being equally applicable to 
the inanimate interactions in machines or systems, the biological processes, 
and the behavioural and mental processes of animals. So far, probably 'logic' 
has come closest to this notion of a cybernetic universal language. 
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As well as lacking in a unified explanatory language, cybernetics hus also 
suffered from the extensiveness of its applications and the ubiquity of its 
ideas. It has been found that the definition of cybernetics can be extended 
to cover such a wide field that very few scientific disciplines ure wholely 
excluded from it. The argument being that anything involving the concepts 
of 'feedback', 'control', and 'communication' qualifies to be incJuded in 
cybernetics. Because of this diversity, many of the cybernetically oriented 
subjects have drifted away from the mainstream of cybernetics, and formed 
into distinct and independent research fields with no apparent reference to 
their originating paradigm or its underlying goals. 
The definition of cybernetics has gradually become more imprecise (and 
sensationalised at times), and probably as a result, attracted workers from 
many diverse disciplines. It has also become a convenient label for usc by 
many interdisciplinary researchers. But, in general, cyberneticians have 
strived towards the forma1ising of observations rather than giving qualitative 
explanations; and have been more interested in 'principles' (sometimes 
speculative) rather than elaborate working models. Furthermore, cybernetics 
has managed to unify the frame of reference of the descriptions of the living 
and the artificial processes. 
The term 'Bionics' has also been introduced referring to the methodology 
of applying biological knowledge to engineering problems. Bionics, as a 
discipline, was established in the early 1960's (in the United States), but has 
not flourished to a great extent; it has been, mainly, involved in the studies 
of systems whose functions were based on or resembled to that of the living 
systems, in other words, the imitations of life functions. Allhough, the 
definition of cybernetics encompasses bionics, it has been suggest.ed t.hat 
cybernetics is more interested in the studies of living systems by the use of 
concepts of inanimate systems, while, bionics is more interested in the studies 
and the applications of biological concepts to other syst.ems. However, such a 
distinction will not be pursued here and all such models will be discussed in 
the context of cybernetics. 
According to George (1977): " ••• models, both in hardware and software, are 
a vital part of the driving force underlying cybernetics. to There are, in 
general, three basic types of cybernetic models: 'hardware', 'mathematical', 
and 'descriptive'; in addition, cybernetic models are characterised by a certain 
'efficiency' and 'precision' of application within a particular domain (i.e., they 
should be accurate and workable). 
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In the following section, we will outline some historical and developmental 
aspects of relevant cybernetic models, and discuss some examples in more 
detail, in particular, those involving the concepts of 'self-adaptation' and 
'learning'. The cybernetic 'learning systems' included here are those which 
because of their particular terminologies, manifestations, or formal notations, 
have not been included in the other catagories of our classification of 
'learning systems'. Although, many of the other approaches to 'learning 
systems' discussed could be considered as sub-divisions of the cybernetic 
approach. 
4 .5.1 CYBERNETICS AND 'I1IE KlDELLING OF nm BRAIN. BHHAVIOOR AND INTELLIGENCE 
The basic underlying assumption of cybernetic ideas is that humans and 
animals are essentially kinds of complex machines; and hence, in principle, it 
is possible to construct some artificial models which behave in a similar 
manner. This mechanistic behaviouristic view stems from the implicit beliefs 
of the sciences of biology and physiological psychology. The tendencies of 
cyberneticians, as behavioural scientists, seem to have been towards one of 
the following two general directions:-
(a) - Understanding and simulating human and animal behaviour and 
underlying mechanisms involved by devising or utilising precise 
analytical formalisations. 
(b) - Developing and synthesising various systems and machines for specific 
tasks which can, usually, outperform humans in some aspect.s. 
An attempt to model the brain in its entirety, irrespective of the triviality 
of the model components, will be an immensely difficult task. Hence, all 
work in this field has concentrated on specific areas of the brain, or on a 
specific principle involved in the nervous syst.em. Examples are the models of 
the 'reticular formation', the 'cerebellum', 'eye-brain systems', Iperception', 
lassociative-memory', etc. 
The essence of the science of Cybernetics is the concept of information 
and it.s implications in systems (i.e., coding, storage, noise, control, feedback, 
etc.). One of the original commitment of cybernetics was to model human 
behavioural and cognitive properties using some simple information processing 
models of neurons (i.e., neural-nets); this type of modelling did not entail a 
precise understanding of the physiology of nerve-cells, but a simple on-off 
analogue would be used. Later, the above conceptualization was also applied 
to the syntheses of some specific mechanisms of the brain (e.g., memory 
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formation). George (1973) outlines the following as the basic types of 
cybernetic models involving the brain and the behaviour:-
(1 ) - Models of visual systems. 
(2) - Classification models. 
(3) - Conditional probability, counting and associative models. 
(4) - Information processing models of particular biological systems. 
(5) - Memory storage models. 
(6) - Models of motivational systems. 
(7) - Natural language programming. 
(8) - Inference-making and theorem-proving programs. 
(9) - Models using heuristic methods. 
(10) -
(11) -
Various formal psychological and neuro-physiological theories as models 
for learning processes and mechanisms. 
Analytical, abstract, or hardware models based on computational 
machinery. 
At the outset of science of Cybernetics, Wiener, as well as introducing 
ideas such as tfeedback', 'entropy', 'information', and 'stable-state' to the 
study of organisms, had drawn parallels between the brains and computers. 
The resemblances seen between the computer and the cybernetic view of the 
brain are not points of much significance; however. it is assumed that, in 
principle, the brain can be synthesised and simulated on computers. 
The various cybernetic analogues of the brain in the form of 
switching-networks, neural-nets, finite-automata, digital computers, etc., in 
spite of giving a very limited view of the mechanisms of the brain, have made 
useful contributions to the understanding of some aspects of the workings of 
the nervous-systems. In particular, the organizational aspects of the brain, 
such as 'classification', 'memory storage', 'generalization' , and other 
autonomously defined functional subsystems of the brain, have been 
understood much better by the use of above analogies. But, in cybernetics. 
the emphasis has been, mainly, away from the higher 'semantic' and 'symbolic' 
representations of inputs and outputs, and more towards the raw analysis of 
information. 
In the early 1950's, mathematicians such as von-Neumann and Kleene had 
proposed that mathematical models could be abstracted from the available 
neuro-physiological evidence. Von-Neumann saw the utility in the two-way 
interactions of concepts of 'natural' and 'artificial' organizations, and believed 
that the observations in one domain could be beneficial or applicable to the 
other. Cybernetics has been. generally, occupied with problems based on such 
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endeavours; but, relatively, more emphasis is given to the applications of 
artificial criteria to the natural domain. 
The behaviour of these models could be analyzed in their precise 
mathematical domain, however, the task of translating and equuting of these 
analytical results to the actual neuronal processes was envisaged as the renl 
challenge of this approach. Some McCulloch and Pitts type learning 
neural-nets were discussed previously, but many other cybernet.ic 
mathematically based models of learning mechanisms have also been devised. 
Numerous workers have attempted to apply the concepts of 'feedback' and 
'system-t.heory' to the motor control mechanisms of animals and humans. The 
spinal cords are considered as the primary centre for such processes in the 
body, but other regions of the nervous systems have a directing or modulating 
effect on the activities of the spinal cords. The motor control systems 
identified have, generally, a hierarchical nature of organization. Similarly, 
many researchers have been engaged in the identification of perceptual and 
cognitive sub-systems of the higher processes of the nervous systems; and 
have devised computer simulations or other descriptive representations of 
their models. 
The cybernetic approach to the brain studies (as opposed to the A.I. 
approach), or according to Arbib (1972) the brain theory approach to the 
metaphor of "humans are machines", is heavily reliant on data obtained from 
biological and psychological observations. But he sees a definite place for the 
'mathematico-deductive' methods of investigations of the brain, alongside the 
empirical observations of neurology and psychology. For Arbib the essence of 
perception and learning, in the brain or the machine, is the processing of 
information based on action-oriented computations taking place in 
'somatotopically' (preserving information) organised networks. 
However, some of the mathematical abstractions of the brain mechanisms 
seem to be very remote from their 'natural' counterparts. The gap between a 
cybernetic model and the subject it is trying to model is hardly surprising, 
since, normally, cybernetic tools are used to implement a conjecture which 
itself does not accurately represent a phenomenon -
neural-net representations of a neuro-physiological 
mechanisms, such as Rebb's cell assembly theory. 
for example, in the 
theory of learning 
Minsky (1968) acknowledges that the science of Cybernetics is the original 
forerunner of the majority of current trends in machine intelligence. In a 
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brief account of the history of machine intelligence, he outlines the course of 
the development of the science of Cybernetics; and describes how the 
introduction of general-purpose computers resulted in the division of 
cybernetics into three main avenues. 
Firstly, the main cybernetic search for simple basic principles; this 
approach leading into the investigations of the so called 'minimal' or 
'self-organizing' systems. A paradigm of this approach was to devise 
collections of, generally, similar components that if arranged in specified 
structures and placed in an appropriate environment would eventually behave 
in an adaptive fashion, and hopefully display intelligent behaviour. The 
'learning' models classified within this first approach included the vurious 
'learning machines', 'adaptive' or 'self-organizing' networks, and 'automatic' 
or 'learning' control systems. However, in r-Unsky's view, the results of these 
undertakings were disappointing, and the explanations inconclusive, since, the 
systems developed worked quite well on simple specific problems but their 
performance deteriorated rapidly as the tasks assigned got harder, or the 
range of tasks were extended. 
Minsky goes on to describe the second and the third directions of the 
development of the original cybernetic ideas as: 'cognitive simulation' and 
'artificial intelligence', respectively. He is similarly critical of the c:ognitive 
simulation approach on the basis of its limitations in expressing the 
complexity and the diversity of human behaviour. Finally, as one of the 
principal proponents of the A.I. approach, he promotes the 'semantic 
information processing' outlook as the most promising route of enquiry; 
workers in this field attempt to build intelligent machines without actually 
having any prejudice towards biological, simple, or humanoid manifestations. 
Most of the "mainstream" A.I. researchers do not consider themselves aH 
cyberneticians. Their 'learning' models almost eXGludes any direct 'learning' 
from raw experience, and, mainly, use an external teacher (perhaps with some 
exceptions; e.g., Samuel's or Andraea's work). 
Many philosophical issues can be raised when discussing the nature of 
'intelligence'; including the paradox of "how the brain can study itself". But, 
assuming that the notion of 'intelligence' can be defined by certain 
non-biologically dependent criteria, based on the manipulations of the 
information received by an organism, then the original definition of 
'Cybernetics' by Wiener (1948) would imply that the concept of 'intelligence' 
. has an important relevance to the science of Cybernetics. Hence, the 
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question "can intelligent machines and systems be made" can be considered at:; 
one of the central issues in cybernetics. 
The higher temporal capabilities of humans have been the prIncipal subject 
of interest for the cybernetically oriented model-builders in disciplines such 
as 'computer-sciences', 'psychology', 'A.I.', 'cognitive psychology', 
'pattern-recognition', etc. Although, some dedicated hardware machines have 
been built to simulate various cognitive aspects, in general, these class of 
cybernetic models have been based on the electronic digital computers. 
'Problem-solving', 'theorem-proving', 'classification', 'discovery', 
'decision-making', and 'emotional' properties are some of the major themes in 
this area. 
At the higher semantic and symbolic processing levels of information, 
models have been devised which display capabilities such as: 
'question-answering', 'language-translating', 'speech-recognition', 
'text-reading', 'music-composing', 'story-composing', etc. This class of models 
will be discussed in the A.I. section. 
It must be pointed out, that although the 'intelligence' shown by some of 
these machines is, at times, quite astounding; and even, it can be envisaged 
that some such machines will in future pass Turing's criteria for intelligence, 
nevertheless, there might not be any actual 'learning' involved in their 
processes. 
On the other hand, as seen from our analysis of learning so far, the 
concept of learning is a very relative notion, depending on context and 
performance; and even the simple register~ng of a pattern on a photographic 
plate can be interpreted as a form of trivial 'learning' of a visual input which 
can be reproduced later. Hence, in a stricter sense, 'learning' machines 
should be characterised by features that bear more resemblance to our 
common conception of the definition of learning. 
An analogy often made in literature when discussing the possible methods 
of devising 'intelligent' cybernetic models is the way man has managed to 
solve the problem of artificial flight - whereby, the problem was solved by 
means other than mimicking the natural wing-flapping behaviour of birds and 
insects. Hence, it is thought that the precise copying of the actual 
mechanisms of the brain is a futile task, and only some general principles 
which are appropriate to the specific class of models should be included in 
the design. 
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Historically, it has been the case that once a machine is devised to 
achieve a specific human-based task in a proficient and expert manner, and 
the ambiguities of a problem is solved, such as the playing of expert games of 
'checkers' or 'backgammon', then the behaviour of the machine is no longer 
considered 'intelligent'. 
If this argument is pursued for the future expert machines which will be 
able to display many of the intellectual faculties of humans, then we can 
foresee that even the most human-like machines will never be considered as 
'intelligent'. Hence, in that sense, the true 'artificial intelligence' may be 
unattainable. 
4.5.2 CYBERNETIC 'LEARNING' MODELS 
The cybernetic approach to 'learning systems' has been striving towards 
the 'universalization' rather than the 'specialization' of the principles involved 
in the learning process. This alternative approach can be used as a way of 
analyzing the learning process which supplements disciplines such as 
psychology, ethology, and physiology. 
Pask (1963) surveys the field of modelling of learning, and distinguishes 
the various types of cybernetic approaches to this problem. He points out 
that cybernetic model-builders have been involved with both psychological 
(behaviour oriented) and physiological (mechanism oriented) domains of 
interest. 
The challenge of making true 'learning' machines and systems, which could 
ultimately become more intelligent than man, has constantly fascinated and 
occupied the minds of cyberneticians. A variety of cybernetic models have 
already been outlined in this chapter; but, because of their particular 
characterization of problems or the use of a specific formal language, such 
models were discussed in the independent context of their methodology. 
The definition of cybernetics, however, covers a much wider range of 
models; here, we will attempt to list the typical characteristics of cybernetic 
'learning' models in very general terms, without actually referring to specific 
classes of 'learning systems' J and without implying that all cybernetic 
'learning' models should necessarily have such features. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
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- Cybernetic techniques are applied to the simpler forms of the learning 
process based on the lower levels of the nierarchy of learning in 
animals. 
- 'Learning' is, normally, manifested without an external 'teacher' or 
'supervisor't and the source of learning is the past experiences. 
- Most cybernetic 'learning' models involve the property of 'feedback'; 
in other word, they can evaluate their own outputs and recognise their 
own mistakes. 
- The \,rincipal questions raised about the elements of a system are 
'what and 'why' they achieve something, rather than 'how' they 
achieve it or 'what' they represent. 
- Although, natural systems are not exactly duplicated as far as their 
mechanisms are concerned, the biological processes often provide the 
guiding principles. 
- The comRarisons of the behaviour and the performance of cybernetic 
'learning models against biological systems, and the use of 'natural' 
terminologies, are quite prevalent. 
- A cybernetic description, normally, involves a formal non-semantic 
mathematical langua,lte; generally, entailing a quantification of the 
concept of 'informatIOn'. 
- Hardware models are, normallyleconstructable from the abstractions of 
a 'learnin~' model, and are of' n used for purposes of demonstration 
and experImentation. 
- While, cybernetic 'learning' models are not, generally, based on 
computers, there is a widespread use of computers as tools for the 
simulation of cybernetic ideas. 
(10) - It is believed that the use of simple cybernetic principles of trivial 
'learning' models will lead to the abstraction of different and more 
complex classes of sy-stems; hence, these principles are thought to be 
applicable to many different levels of enquiry. 
Another important point which should be emphasised here is that, so far, 
there has been no indication that any of the hardware or software cybernetic 
'learning' models have had direct influences on the furthering of our 
understanding of the natural learning prOcesses or mechanisms; unless, of 
course, the 'pure' simulation of these biological phenomena is the objective of 
modelling. 
The researchers who set out by, initially, incorporating some 'living' 
phenomena in their work, usually, get engulfed in the intricacies of their 
formalisations or their hardware constructs; and, later, only relatively 
insignificant (and sometimes superficial) parallels are made between the 
subsequent behaviours of their models and the processes in the natural 
domain. Although, undeniably, this kind of research has contributed a great 
deal to some practical disciplines; yet, the cumbersome use of 'living' criteria 
for such ends is still difficult to Justify. 
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4.5.3 CYBERNETIC MACIDNES AND HARDWARE MODELS 
The history of simple counting or calculating machines goes back many 
centuries. The earliest machines were, probably, the ancient Chinese 'abacus' 
type devices; later elaborated by early calculating machines, such as those of 
Pascal and Leibniz in the 17th century. In the late 18th century, some simple 
programmable mechanical machines were also introduced which used a series 
of perforated cards as their programs. 
Babbage's (1792-1871) calculating machine (Analytical Engine), which was 
to be the first truly 'learning machine', was never realised, but his ideas 
signified the start of the modern era of computing and logical machinery, and 
the search for 'intelligent' machines. 
Cybernetic machines which could realise the mathematical inferential 
nature of a logical formula in some hardware form date back to at least the 
early 19th century. Various examples of such machines are described by 
Nemes (1969), mostly capable of solving a specific logical problem; the early 
versions were, generally, mechanically operated, but later on, electrical or 
electronic components were also incorporated. These machines can be 
considered as forerunners of today's electronic computers which can easily be 
programmed to solve logical or propositional calculus problems. Another class 
of logical machines evolved were mainly concerned with the simplification or 
the minimising of logical expressions, or the economical design of switching 
circuits. Some of these machines, in a trivial sense, 'learned' to 'recognise' 
classes of inputs, and 'concluded' causal relations from logical truth tables. 
The trend in the development of hardware models has been from the basic 
fully predictable models which simulate simple theories to the more elaborate 
constructions that are not fully deterministic a priori. In the latter stages of 
their evolution, the electronic or computer based models have almost totally 
dominated this area of science. The precise behavioural details of complex 
hardware models are not, normally, known to their constructors in advance. 
Although, even in the case of a simple hardware model, certain interactions 
of the machine with its environments might result in some unforeseen 
patterns of behaviour. 
Various theoretical issues and the possible constructability of different 
classes of abstract machines have been investigated by many automata 
theorists and other mathematicians~ Another issue of importance which must 
be recognised here is that all hardware models could, in principle, be 
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programmed on a digital computer, with a complete description of the machine 
and its environment realised in software by an equivalent computer program. 
But, unless some sort of abbreviations of the physical descriptions are used, 
great difficulties with the speed and the memory size of the simulation will 
be encountered - if the variety and the sheer amount of environmental and 
machine information is to be represented accurately. 
Machines and robots have been developed that either under the direct 
control of a human operator, or in a toy-like imitative fashion, will try to 
duplicate some motor functions of living beings. But, of cybernetic 
importance are those machines which, almost in an autonomous way, show 
some simple levels of adaptation and variability, and also bear some relevance 
to the natural sysLems. Hardware models, although interesting phenomena in 
their own rights, need to have a high degree of complexity to be of real 
interest from the point of view of a psychologist or cognitive scientist. 
Many cybernetic hardware machines have also been built to copy various 
specific subsystems or properties of living organisms (plants, animals, and 
humans). The principle of 'self-reproduction' and the 'phylogenetic' 
developments of living entities have been simulated by some physical, as well 
as abstract, models; examples are the self-reproducing cellular type automata, 
introduced by von-Neumann. Other 'purposive', 'goal-directed', or 
'motivational' behavioural simulations, generally, involving the concepts of 
'pain-aversion' and/or 'pleasure-seeking', have also been carried out. 
Furthermore, the science of 'robotics' has been established as a direct 
consequence of the desire to build machines which mimic functions of life. 
When assessing a cybernetic hardware model, it is, probably, as important 
to enquire the motivations of its designer, and the goals the model is trying 
to achieve, as it is to evaluate the complexity and the intricacy of the 
model's behaviour. A researcher may simply want to incorporate the 
'state-of-art' technology in his model, or solve a specific engineering problem; 
on the other hand, some workers try to simulate a particular principle, or 
display a specific pattern of natural behaviour. 
As the attention of cybernetic researchers has been increasingly focusing 
on the more complex subjects, there has been a gradual move away from the 
construction of hardware models; and software models and computer programs 
have been more favoured because of their relative ease of design and 
economy. Yet, the important instructive and demonstrative qualities of 
physical models cannot be denied. 
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4.5.4 CYBERNETIC 'LEARNING' HARDWARE MACHINES 
Cyberneticians believe the conjecture that every aspect of learning, or 
other features of intelligence, can, in principle, be precisely described, and 
consequently lead to the construction of machines which simulate lhese 
descriptions. 
As to what are the most important principal characteristics which should 
be included in a simple learning-machine. Firstly, it should have a behaviour 
which is nol totally predicted or determined by its designer. Secondly, lhe 
learning-machine should be able to make a 'generalization' or 'inference' on 
the basis of the 'frequency', the 'contiguity', or the 'value' of its experiences 
- this feature implying a storage of information (or memory) capability, and 
also a 'judgement' or 'motivational' facility. Thirdly, the learning-machine 
should, according to its incoming and stored information, take appropriate 
actions which will reflect an 'improvement of performance'. 
However, the above characterization does not necessarily imply thal a 
pre-wired machine with a fixed program will not be able to display the main 
features of the learning process; a 'contingency', 'conditionality', or 
'randomness' could be incorporated in lhe design, which will allow lhe 
machine to behave in the desired 'learned' manner. 
In practice, the 'learning-machines' that have been designed so far do not 
just reiterate the abstract theories imbedded in their blue-prints, but 
genuinely surprise their designers, by the unforeseen capabilities and novelties 
of their behaviour - due to their interactions with environment, or other 
interferences. In some cases, the interest is directed towards discovering the 
full potentialities of the constructed machine, be it to simply prove all 
possible theories based on the logical consequences of a set of assumptions 
and a set of rules of inference (e.g., 'perceptrons') 
Some cybernetic machines, in loosely arranged structures, can in facl 
behave in a learning or adaptive fashion, if placed in an appropriate 
environment. But, although such machines have not resulted in a general 
theory of intelligence, nevertheless they have made considerable contributions 
to some fields of engineering, control, and the design of feedback regulatory 
systems. 
APproac:bes \0 Modeill., of Learlli II' - Parl-l 208 
The hardware 'learning' models that will be discussed here are 
predominantly fixed in their actual physical structure, and the modifiability of 
natural neuronal mechanisms of the learning process is not, in general, 
depicted in such models - although, if the atomic level of changes are 
considered, then it can be argued that there is, in fact, a structural 
modification of the machine or the computer circuit. 
Indeed, in future, it may be discovered that the feature of growth and 
change 
entity. 
thought 
are essential characteristics of the structure of any true 'learning' 
However, presently, the 'fixed structure' pre-wired models are 
to be capable of adequately representing all behaviour displayed by 
the 'modifiable structure' or 'growth' models. 
(i) - HARDWARE l'DDELS OF SIMPLE INNATE BEHAVIOOR AND OONDITIONING ~S 
Nemes (1969) describes some simple models which were used for the 
investigation of the 'process of choice' and 'instinctive behaviour' in animals. 
In one example, Luxe's (1920's) simple model of instinctive feeding behaviour 
of a protozoan, an electro-mechanical model is outlined which is capable of 
showing some properties of learning and remembering according to the 
Pavlovian conditioning criteria. 
other mechanisms, based on the concept of 'negative feedback control', 
have also been devised which by controlling an error function are able to 
keep the course of their behaviour within some defined pathways. An 
example of this type of machine was the "Philip dog" (1920's) which, on the 
principle of negative feedback from its two photocells, could operate two 
motors in such a way as to keep the mechanical dog on track lowards a light 
source. 
A later version of these primitive machines was Walter's (1950) "Machina 
Speculatrix", this machine was capable of demonstrating the interesting 
property of 'photo taxis' of animals, in a simple electronic device with few 
components; however, it lacked the capability to 'learn'. This tortoise-shaped 
electro-mechanical cybernetic machine could randomly move around a room 
and if a light source was detected by its photocell, depending on the 
intensity of the light, would steer towards or away from the light -
simulating the innate reflexive behaviours of an animal which explores its 
surroundings and seeks out tfavourable' conditions. The shell of the 
"tortoise" was connected to a touch sensing switch which upon hitting an 
obstacle would send the machine into a tsearch' mode. 
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The interesting behavioural patterns of these machines were in fact only a 
consequence of their 'clever' design features, and no real information 
processing, in the accepted 'contextual' sense of the word, was carried out. 
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A functional block diagram of Machina-Speculatrix's 
behaviour; two reflex systems determine all Ule activities 
of the machine. 
A block diagram of the functions of Machina-Docilis 
showing how the light or the touch reflex could be 
conditioned to the sound of the whistle - the 'u' gate 
of the 'learning system' fully establishes the connection 
S2--->Rl as the number of the coincidences of the two 
stimuli exceed a certain limit over a specific period. 
A simple block diagram of the reflex reactions of Machina-Speculatrix is 
drawn in FIG.4.11(a). The two stimuli could have priority ordering, whereby, 
if both occurred simultaneously, one could override the second stimulus; or 
alternately, their responses could oscillate. In Machina-Speculatrix, the touch 
input had priority over the light input. 
Although, the behaviour of the tortoises were totally deterministic, many 
novel and unpredictable manifestations of such machines within different 
environments were observed; and various 'natural' interpretations of their 
behaviour in terms of 'feeding', 'searching', 'avoiding' J 'hunger', etc. were 
elaborated. In some experiments, even the 'social' interactions of two or 
more of these devices, each having a mounted light source, were also 
investigated. 
Walter's (1953) 'Cora' (COndition Reflex Analogue) machine was a simple 
response conditioning device. Be used the 'black box' techniques of 
transmission engineers to design this machine. Initially, it would only 
respond to a light stimulus by flashing a neon tube, however, after the 
conditioning was complete, the sound of a whistle (the conditioned stimulus) 
Approaches \0 Modell i DC 01 LtHHDi DIt - ".r1-J 210 
alone could elicit the flash of the neon tu be. Walter devised his Cora 
machine on the basis of the evidence provided from physiological psychology; 
but as pointed out by him, at times, many speculations were made regarding 
the actual mechanisms of the living brains in terms of the "explicit clarities" 
of the model. 
Although, no physiological evidence could support such inferences. lIe also 
considered that one of the most important issues arising from the design of 
the Cora machine was the realization that three types of analogue 'memory' 
were seemingly necessary: (a) - a very short 'prolongation' of the effect of H 
neutral stimulus (iconic memory); (b) - the 'summation' of the combined 
effects of several neutral and specific stimuli (STM); (c) - the 'activation and 
preservation' over a long period of the conditioned reflex (LTM), this type of 
memory is also reinforced by further coincidences of stimuli. 
The basic 'strengthening' and 'forgetting' characteristics of a conditioned 
reflex were also incorporated, by having a kind of statistical relation between 
the number of occurrences of the stimuli S1 and S2, and the establishment of 
the association between them. Hence, the design of the circuits stipulated 
that only significant coincidences of these stimuli would enable the stimulus 
S2 to evoke the response Rl by itself. 
Walter differentiated between the various processes involved and defined 
seven distinct operations for the above process. The electronic circuits built 
on such basis consisted of a summing element which after a certain number 
of coincident inputs would trigger a positive feedback oscillator; this 
oscillator, representing the establishment of the conditioned reflex, had a 
damping component, and its response would eventually die out - hence, 
representing the extinguishing (or forgetting) of the conditioned reflex, unless 
additional reinforcement was applied by further training. 
The seven operations involved in the manifestation of the conditioning 
(associative learning) process in Cora, or according to Walter "the seven steps 
from chance to meaning," are shown in FIG.4.12. 
At the next logical step, Walter developed another device called "Machina 
Docilis" (teachable), similar to Machina Speculatrix but with the added 
circuitry of Cora which enabled it to manifest a simple Pavlovian (classical) 
refiex conditioning (or associative learning). The conditioning of the sound 
of a whistle with the ON state of the light or touch detecting sensors could 
result in the sound of the whistle alone evoking 'direction seeking' or 
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'search' movements in the machine. The behaviour of the machine is outlined 
by the block diagram of FIG.4.11(b). 
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The seven stages involved in the establishment of a 
conditioned reflex in a Cora machine. 
But, as emphasised by their designer, these models were only a low-level 
'first approximation' of a single conditioned refiex behaviour, and many of the 
'natural' features of conditioning process, such as the 'inhibition' of a 
response, were not included in the design. Hence, any comparisons between 
these simple models and living creatures would be purely specuJative. 
Walter (1953) also discusses the feasibility of constructing artificial 
nervous systems, and concludes that the building of identical number of 
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neuronal mechanisms with appropriate interconnections is an implausible 
undertaking. And also suggests that the elaborations of cerebral functions 
are, possibly, derived from the "richness of their interconnections," rather 
than the sheer number of units involved. His experimental hardware models 
of a hypothetical simple animal with a brain having only two cells, yet 
capable of showing seven different modes of existence, were a demonstration 
of this conjecture. But, it was foreseen that constructing the more complex 
models on such simple principles might lead to instability problems. 
Angyan (1959) describes an analogue hardware model, 'Machinu 
Reproductrix', based on Walter's models, to demonstrate some aspects of 
neuronal adaptation. This mobile three-wheeled electro-mechanical device 
could also simulate the conditioned reflex behaviour of animals, using three 
types of inputs. But, the characteristics of such natural processes were 
depicted more accurately in these machines. The psychological notions of 
'habituation', 'generalization', 'spontaneous recovery', and 'neurotic behaviour', 
omitted in Waller's Cora machine, were incorporated (in a trivial sense) in 
Machina Reproductrix. However, Angyan saw the principle contribution of 
such simple analogues in their usefulness in clarifying various biological and 
psychological terminologies. 
Another class of conditioning devices have also been devised, primarily for 
the purposes of demonstration and teaching in psychological sciences. An 
example was Hoffman's (1962) 'analogue lab.' - a simple electronic device 
made up of switches, capacitors, resistors and batteries. It could be used as 
a basic model of simple reflex conditioning mechanisms (e.g., salivation 
response of a dog). The device was found to be able to illustrate or 
duplicate many aspects of results obtained from experiments on living animals. 
In the 1950's and early 1960's, numerous other researchers endeavoured to 
build tortoise-type electro-mechanical, non-computer based, versions of these 
machines to simulate instinctive and simple conditioned behaviour of animals 
machines. The more recent computer based examples of such devices (the 
'mobile robots') will be discussed in the next chapter in the context of 
'learning robots'. 
Young (1973) by taking into account various engineering considerations, 
describes a 'learning' machine which has a sort of associative memory. His 
basic criteria of the design of such 'learning' machines are: (1) - detecting 
and recording of the coincidences between the occurrences of a number of 
stimuli; (2) - making some use (deductions and inferences) of these stored 
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information; (3) - having a probabilistic basis; (4) - having 'reinforcing' and 
'forgetting' characteristics; and (5) - being capable of extension to higher 
number input machines. The frequencies of the occurrences of inputs are 
calculated on the 'joint probability' basis, rather than 'conditional probability' 
basis of 'learning' machines such as Uttly's - the justification given is the 
'economy' in the necessary storage devices. 
Based on the above criteria, hardware 'learning' machines called "Astra" 
were constructed; these devices were able to show the reflex conditioning of 
inputs (photocells) in a similar manner to Walter's Cora machine; however, 
they had some additional 'forgetting' and 'inhibition' features. The Astra 
'learning' machines were also simulated on computers, and various industrial 
and engineering applications were envisaged, especially in the field of 
automation and robotics. 
(ii) - CYBERNETIC MAZE-ooLVING AND 'IRIAL &. HlR:R .~, MAammS 
Attempts to create machines which could imitate other simple aspects of 
animals' learning behaviour have also been made. Ross's (1933) machine and 
Wallace's (1952) (computer operated) machine, were both based on the simple 
trial and error learning of tram-like creatures, running in a system of tracks; 
these machines could find their goals by 'exploring' and 'discovering' the 
correct path through 'choice points'. But, probably Shannon's (1951) 
maze-running machine is the most prominent example of this type of 
machines. 
The procedure for finding a maze can be easily formalised by a 
mathematical algorithm, and after this stage, it is a simple enough tash: to 
construct a machine which can 'learn' to go through a 5x5 maze by 
remembering its previous moves. These machines, in fact, demonstrate the 
apparent simplicity of some of the lower types of learning processes; in the 
mean time, they do not really lead us to generalizations which are applicable 
to the more complex learning behaviours. 
Shannon's electro-mechanical "mouse" could find its way round an arbitrary 
maze, by seemingly learning through trial and error. This simple digital 
device had obstacle detecting sensors and action-programming and memory 
relays which could register the sequence of correct solutions on the basis of 
a systematic search. It searched a grid (maze), and 'learned' or 'remembered' 
the correct 'pathway' through the maze towards a goal. Once the solution 
was found ('learned'), the 'mouse' could transverse the maze in a few seconds 
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without any hesitation. It could also show 'forgetting', if the situation was 
changed and the solution was no longer applicable. 
The algorithm used for search did not contain any random element, every 
time the sensory finger hit a partition of the maze it retracted and chose a 
predet.ermined alternate direction. llowever, this algorithm was not 
fool-proof, and certain mazes could simply not be solved. To overcome this 
problem, if the goal was not found after a certain number of moves (24), then 
the previous solutions were thought to be invalid, and the machine would 
restart the "maze-learning process - this was because the machine had 
probably got into a sort of 'neurotic' cyclic loop. 
Shannon's machine also had the interesting property which if the 
connections to its memory relays were changed, or the sign of the feed back 
from the sensory finger was changed, it still managed to operate correctly -
analogous to the plasticity of some animal neuronal tissues. 
Later, Minsky also constructed similar 'learning machines' (based on 
electronic tubes) which could simulate some maze learning capabilities of rats. 
Similarly, an electronic maze-learning "mouse" is described by Jacker (1964) 
which was operated as a component of a so called 'bionic computer' - a 
conglomerate of artificial neurons. This device was able to find its way 
round a maze and also associate various features of the maze with its correct 
responses. 
(iii) - CYBERNETIC GAME-PLAYING MACHINES 
Game-theory, established as an independent discipline by von-Neumann, has 
been instrumental in the introduction of some hardware models ,\\'hich were 
capable of playing various games. 
Even, as early as 1900 simple electro-mechanical devices were built which 
could play the particular endings of chess games - by following an algorithmic 
strategy. Later, much more complex fixed-wire electrical or electronic 
machines were introduced which showed a greater diversity and aptitude in 
playing complete games of chess, or solving specific class of chess-puzzles. 
As well as chess, many other games such as 'checkers', 'Go', 'Nim', 
'naughts and crosses', and various board or card games have also been 
implemented in hardware models. In some cases (e.g., naughts and crosses), a 
precise rigorous mathematical solution has been found for optimising moves, 
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but other game-playing machines rely on heuristic (and sometimes 'learning') 
criteria. 
Although, the majority of cybernetic game-playing machines do not strictly 
'learn' from their experiences, their proficiency has been continuously 
improving. Thus, today, the descendants of the early crude mechanical 
devices are able to expertly play games, and outwardly show a high degree of 
'intelligence' • 
The development of game-theory concepts and, in particular, various search 
and evaluation techniques, together with the advent of digital computers, has 
resulted in the realization of many specialised game-playing programs (this 
area will be covered more fully in later sections). 
(iv) - HARDWARE 'LEARNING' MJDElB BASED ON ABS'I'R.Arn' m PHYSICAL PRINCmB 
Ashby (1952) outlined the process of 'homeostasis' as a simple foundation 
for the entire working of the brain. He also constructed a hardware model 
to imitate this biological phenomenon. The term homeostasis was introduced 
by physiologist W.B. Cannon in the early 1930's, meaning the self-regulation 
of body functions, or the maintaining of the equilibrium of internal states. 
Ash by, in his book "design for a brain ", introduced the analytical notion of 
'ultra-stability', based on the mathematical concept of stability, which was 
said to mathematically represent various homeostatic physical and 
psychological phenomena. This book was more concerned with adaptation 
than learning, however, he pointed out that his proposed models could display 
a rudimentary learning capability. 
Ashby's main goal was the copying of the functions of the living brain by 
using alternate mathematical criteria. And his underlying contention was that 
most human behaviour could be explained in mechanistic terms. Hence, the 
idea of ultra-stability was extended to design a 'mechanical brain' in 
'objective' terms; and based on such criteria, he also proposed a means of 
simulating the brain's adaptive and learning qualities. Ashby also described a 
hardware machine which was able to respond to inputs, and in a 
self-organizing manner change its behaviour and structure in order to achieve 
stability. This device, the realization of the principle of ultra-stability, was 
called the 'Homeostat'. The adaptive behaviour of the Homeostat was deemed 
to be brain-like, and was of special interest to behavioural psychologists. 
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The Homeostat consisted of four identical units, constructed from magnets, 
coils, switches, potentiometers, and other electro-mechanical components. 
Each unit in isolation could be regarded as a simple analogue regulator (or an 
analogue computer) with manual variable settings. The four units, coupled in 
an interacting manner, could also be considered as a multiple-feedback 
complex regulator which would either come to rest at an equilibrium, after a 
few oscillations, or would continue oscillating indefinitely. However, these 
oscillations could also come to rest if a new appropriate selting was found 
manually. 
The interesting features of the Homeostat were only displayed when the 
control of the settings were performed by the machine itself. A process 
analogous to the learning and adaptive behaviour of animals could be 
simulated, if a 'random search' of the settings of the Domeostat was carried 
out - the pattern of behaviour depending on the initial settings of certain 
parameters. If by virtue of this search an equilibrium was attained, then the 
machine would stop the search, and only embark on a similar search if some 
of its variables were changed. 
Of course, this randomness of search is an inefficient way of attaining 
stability, since, no information from the previous results of the settings are 
utilised. On the other hand, it simulates the 'inquisitive' nature of a learning 
animal's behaviour when it experiments with alternate options - temporary 
deviations from the course of a goal-directed behaviour occur, provided such 
deviations are in search of a more favourable outcome. 
The immensity of number of moves required to find the 'stable-state' 
settings of a Homeostat was also recognised by Ashby (1952), and the concept 
of 'multi-stable' system introduced to overcome this difficulty. In FIG.4.13, a 
simple diagram of the 'Homeostat' is shown, each unit having inputs from the 
other three units. 
Ashby (1956) discusses the possibility of constructing systems that are 
more intelligent than their designers, and argues that, in principle, it is 
possible to devise a so called "intelligence amplifier" which could have many 
applications in various socio-economic systems. The concept of ultra-stability 
and homeostasis is again suggested as a possible mechanism for designing such 
amplifiers; thus, they will be able to attain or maintain their essential 
variables within specified goals. The theoretical boundaries of this hypothesis 
is also investigated. 
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FIGURE 4.13. A four unit Homeostat; A, B, C, and D are the manual settings 
of the coil currents of the units. The actual physical processes 
involved were the changing of currents into the units, the 
chan~ing of the polarity of the interconnections, or open 
cirCUIting them; but in an cases, the Bomeostat would make 
equilibrium-seeKing adjustments. 
Later on, some Homeostat-type devices were designed for specific practical 
applications, such as the controllers for generators or autopilot systems; some 
devices which utilised the random selective features of the Homeostat were 
also described for the synthesis of certain sociological or ecological systems. 
Capehart and Terry (1968) proposed a more generalised version of the 
Homeostat for the application to or the modelling of systems that are 
characterised by a random set of parameters, and where the evaluation of an 
optimal performance is desired. The modification suggested to the original 
design of the Homeostat include the addition of memory and learning 
capabilities, so that the exponential growth of the time required for the 
achievement of stable states would be avoided. The memory could store the 
past successful adaptations, and the learning could utilise such adaptations. 
Furthermore, based on a first-ordered differential equation which describes 
the behaviour of the Bomeostat at any instant, firstly, they simulated the 
behaviour of a Homeostat by a computer program; and secondly, using a 
simple dual-type (i.e., short/long term divisions) memory and a reinforcement 
learning criterion, they devised a more elaborate model and its computer 
simulation. The results of these simulation runs were compared, and the 
conclusion made that a significant improvement is achieved when the 
additional properties of memory and/or learning are incorporated. 
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Ultly (1956) used lhe statistical notions of conditional probability, and lhe 
mathematical relations of class inclusion, to devise his theoretical 'learning' 
machines. He, also, conslructed two non-mobile hardware models to show 
some basic cybernetic principles. The 'classification' model which depicled 
simple aspects of perception will be discussed in lhe pattern recognition 
section of lhis chapter. His 'conditional probability' machine was a device 
capable of showing simple 'learning' behaviour, it embodied basic principles 
which could be used to develop control mechanisms for industrial purposes. 
The conditional probability machine would use lhe latest received 
information and lhe previously slored information to form a prediction for the 
fulure patterns of behaviour. The nature of this behaviour was nol known 
initially, and was organised depending on the frequency and the recency of 
the occurrences of events - the more frequently occurring events, and also 
the more recently occurring events, were remembered better. 
For example, if the event X followed the event Y on every occasion, then 
the Prob{ X : Y ) = 1, which meant that, based on the past information, X 
will always follow Y. Furthermore, Uttly weighed such probabilities in terms 
of their recency, so that events happening in the distant past did not have 
too much bearing on the behaviour. The 'patterns' of the occurrences of lhe 
inputs of Uttly's machine could be regarded either in parallel (spatially), or in 
series (temporally), and the machine can be thought of as simply carrying out 
some computations on these patterns. 
Another example of an actual hardware conditional probability computer 
has been described by Andrew (1959); it was a machine consisting of five 
inputs, but machines with arbitrarily large number of inputs could also be 
constructed on the same principles. This machine had 31 similar counting 
units which could count the number of incidental occurrences of 2, 3, 4, or 5 
inputs. If the value of a conditional probability exceeded a predetermined 
threshold, then an 'inference' was made about the activity related to that 
particular conditional probability. The counts were indicated by the amount 
of charge on leaking capacitors, hence, their value was gradually decreased. 
This type of conditional probability models bear a close kinship to the 
notion of 'expectancy' in psychology, and we can also intuitively see similar 
processes at work in humans and animals. But, as admitted by Uttly. his 
machines were a simulation of 'idealised' human behaviour; and it has been 
realised that to accurately model a pattern of human behaviour in terms of 
conditional probabilities a great deal of elaborations, constraints, and other 
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new concepts (e.g., hierarchical ordering) should be introduced to the basic 
conditional probability model. Consequently, it becomes very difficult to 
devise complex models of behaviour on such basis, and also the original 
principlefl are all but lost in the featured complexities. 
George (1977) sees the principal shortcoming of UUly's conditional 
probability computers in their inability to distinguish between the 'linguistic' 
considerations of stimuli and the, so called, 'factual' considerations. In other 
words, the inherent differences which exist between physical symbols and 
what they represent. 
(v) - anmR HAJUWm CYBERNETIC KDElS INVOLVING LBARNING m ADAPl'ATI~ 
Pask (1969) constructed a cybernetic hardware model which, to some 
extent, depicted the process of growth of nervous tissues. An electrochemical 
system, consisting of wire electrodes suspended in an acid solution, could 
simulate a chain of increasing and diminishing growth patterns, in the form of 
electro-deposition. Some non-reversible permanent changes could also occur. 
This type of model is, however, only an 'analogy', and not a hardware 
realization of Borne mathematical postulate. 
Young (1973) adopts a 'cybernetic engineering' approach in the 
construction of 'learning' models. He constructs electrical analogue circuits 
to simulate various properties of nerve cells and their assemblies in a simple 
form. These circuits were able to, in a very trivial sense, by using the 
transmission of electrical pulses, depict neuronal propagation of information, 
generate rhythmic activities, and simulate closed-loop recirculating type 
memory storage systems (which could also be effected by various noise 
considerations). Therefore, simulate a simple neurological basis of learning 
and memory. 
Mathematical formulations of these rigid engineering models were also 
undertaken, based on some transfer functions. The "Astra" 'learning' 
machines were an extension of this line of research. Many other researchers 
have also attempted to simulate the neuronal activities in this 
electrical-mathematical form. 
We must not forget to mention that the hardware neural-net models 
outlined, and discussed previously, form an important class of cybernetic 
machines. Neural-net and logical-net blue prints could be realised in 
hardware (e.g., George, 1961; Stewart, 1959), directly from their logical 
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descriptions; and some characteristics of simple 'learning', 'memory', 
'classification', 'motivation', 'reinforcement', and 'conditioning' could be 
displayed; in such endeavours, the hardware systems were found to be much 
easier to construct than to describe the complete behaviour of its equivalent 
in logical form. 
4.5.5 CYBERNETIC 'LEARNING' MODELS AND COMPUTERS 
Digital and analogue computing machines with some sort of memory storage 
are very important tools for the cybernetic model-builders. A digital 
computer can easily be programmed to display a typical process of learning or 
response conditioning. Similarly, various learning theories can be simulated 
and tested by means of computer programming. The major difficulty in 
programming computers to actually 'learn' from their experience is the 
problem of the 'generalization' of data. 
The cybernetic designers of 'learning' machines are not, generally, 
interested in the step-by-step imitations of the natural learning process, 
specially, in view of the impracticality of storing the large number of possible 
variations of behaviour - again, emphasising the importance of the concept of 
'generalization' to the learning process. Now, there are four basic ways that 
'intelligent' patterns of behaviour (e.g., learning) could be implemented on 
computers:-
(a) - They can be 'programmed to follow a set of instructions steE-by-step, 
and display tile appropriate behaviour, in an open-loop faSnlOn. 
(b) - Some form of working (previously conceived) 'intelligence', relating to 
the task in hand, can be incorporated within their programs. 
(c) - Their programs could be governed by some tentative 'heuristic' 
instructions which do not guarantee a solution. 
(d) - They could be programmed on the basis of some general and elementary 
principles, not, primarily, devised for a particular class of problems, and 
whose final outcomes are not normally predictable. 
'Feedback' could be an important but not an essential feature of the last 
three catagories. These four basic methods, illustrated schematically in 
FIG.4.14, could also be associated with 'simulated', 'algorithmically 
determined', 'heuristically determined', and 'minimally determined' behaviours, 
respectively. 
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FIGURE 4.14. A schematic diagram of the four princi{>al methods of 
programming a CC?mputer to display interestmg "intelligent" 
patterns ofbehavlOur. 
Computer programs, in general, can be described as a special class of 
cybernetic models. However, because of our particular taxonomy, tlearning' or 
tadaptive' computer programs will be discussed in later A.I. sections. 
In this section we will attempt to outline some analytical software 
cybernetic models which have tried to embody the notions of learning and 
adaptation. It is clear that simply collecting empirical data and restating 
them in a different form, by itself, is not a very fruitful scientific pursuit, 
and some general interpretations and integrations of results are necessary. 
Descriptive or mathematical models provide a vehicle using which various 
deductions can be made and theories can be constructed. A principal 
advantage of the mathematical representations is that a much higher level of 
objectivity of terminology can be attained, and logical imprecisions can be 
detected much more easily. 
The mathematical formalisations used for the modelling of learning have 
been quite diverse. The actual choice of the methodology depending on the 
specific application, and the individual worker's background. The trend in 
using mathematical techniques for devising learning or adaptive systems has 
spanned from the classical modes of mathematics, such as linear algebraic 
equations, to the more symbolic mathematics of modern (abstract) algebra, 
such as logic or set-theory. 
An often neglected issue in this area has been the translation and the 
interpretation of results in one formal descriptive languages in terms of other 
terminologies. Similarly, the relative merits of different techniques in 
tackling a particular problem is another important consideration in comparing 
mathematical models of the learning process. 
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Within the past few decades, the behavioural sciences have become 
increasingly more reliant on the use of mathematics for understanding various 
phenomena. The two most important conceptual tools, by far, nrc the 
statistical probability theory and the digital computers. 
Uttly (1956) translated some characteristics of animal behaviour, such m; 
the evoking of the same response by different stimuli, into the mathematical 
domains of set-theory and probability-theory. From such formal basis he 
described a machine whose behaviour was similar to those of animals' in a 
number of ways; also, the structure of the machine could be identified with 
some elements of the nervous systems. Again, the simple all-or-none 
representation of inputs were adopted, in addition, various other restrictions 
were imposed on this abstract model. 
The analytical machines he described could simulate a hypothetical 
experiment in conditioning a reflex. The basic underlying assumption was 
that the incoming data are classified according to resemblances between sets 
of input data, rather than the concepts or the phenomena which give rise to 
such data. In support of this premiss, Uttly states "the nervous system is 
limited similarly to assessing resemblances between signals in scls of fibers, 
not between sets of physical quantities external to this system, and from 
which those fibre signals were derived - between internal representations, not 
between external 'configurations'." 
Uttly's models also typify the trend in the early cybernetic models which, 
based on some simple mathematical criterion, promised and predicted a great 
deal, but in reality their rigid levels of abstraction did not allow any 
significant developments in devising practical models of interesting qualities. 
Mackay (1956) discusses the issues involved in designing intelligent 
automata, especially, the representation and the limitations of the "universe of 
discourse" of an automaton (the field of its activities) is scrutinised. He 
distinguishes two different approaches to constructing such automata, vaguely 
reflecting the dichotomy which has developed between the cybernetic and the 
A.I. approach in designing 'learning' machines - 'trial and error' versus 'fully 
informed'. Be also proposes a statistical mechanism which could display 
'mind-like' behaviours such as learning. Furthermore, he contends that using 
such principles any level of abstraction, including 'meta-linguistic' concepts, 
could be developed - by simply adaptively considering the regularities of 
sensory inputs. Be concludes that some similarities between his abstract 
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formalisations and the actual brain processes could be seen, but they are 
inadmissible as evidence for the workings of the brain. 
Uttly's 'conditional probability' model and l-1ackay's model were examples 
of stochastic models of behaviour, and could be regarded in the same category 
as the mathematical descriptions of behaviour and learning in psychology. 
Indeed, in a sense, all mathematical learning theories could be regarded as 
cybernetic. 
The essence of mathematical analysis of the learning proceSB in psychology 
is the probability theory; in addition, many related mathematical techniques, 
such as Markov chain theory, have also been applied to such investigations. 
It is generally thought that Hull's (1943) learning theories signified the 
introduction of precise mathematical descriptions of the learning behaviour, on 
par with other formalisations used in different physical sciences. The 
principal trend has been, mainly, away from finding a universal mathematical 
theory of learning, applicable to all learning situations, and more towards 
devising specific theories and techniques for individual learning situations and 
paradigms. 
But, on the whole, it must be emphasised that most mathematical learning 
theories are only the mathematical expression of a verbalised descriptive 
theory of learning formulated prior to the construction of the mathematical 
abstraction. However, in some cases, a mathematical model is devised to 
explain or fit to data obtained from a set of experiments. 1m example of 
this second type of model was Bush and Mosteller's (1951) 'learning' models, 
they used probability of outcomes as a measure of behaviour. and attempted 
to relate their analytical results to experimental observations on learning, in 
particular, to reinforcement (acquisition and extinction) aspects involved in 
simple learning experiments. 
Another cybernetic theory of behaviour is also proposed by Deutsch (1960). 
Deutsch's models are an attempt to put to order the immense amount of 
accumulated psychological and neuro-physiological evidence on the subject of 
learning. His theories are 'structural' explanations of behaviour in terms of 
possible, previously postulated, neural mechanisms. He postulates a process by 
which learning might occur in organisms, and defines five separate units, as 
the principal components of any 'learning system': (a) - an analyzer (input 
subsystems), (b) - a link (channel), (c) - a motor system, (d) -an internal 
medium, (e) - an environment. The elements of the system could have three 
types of relationships: 'activation', 'inhibition', and 'causing change'. The 
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basic elements of such models are shown in FIG.4.15 which illustrates the 
components of a postulated mechanism of 'need'. 
The basic process of 'learning' is defined as the sequential firing of two 
analyzers, leading to the formation of links between each other - which 
signify the establishment of associations between analyzers. The 
manifestation of learning also results in the detachment of some system 
elements from analyzers. Similarly, 'extinction' and 'forgetting' are defined in 
equivalent terms. 
"'III,""""'""UlII"'IIIIII"lllllm,p· 
*******,,~, 
EXCITES 
INHIBITS 
CAUSES TO 
* * * * * * ~,,* * * * * ( r e c e ~t 0 r a 1 "'''"''''''''''''''''"''~'''''''''''''.''''''~~'''''''''' 
V ARY ~lIulllunIANAi:yjlzIERmnmll""Ulllli 
I ,,,.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,:.::,~,,,,.,,~.~,,~,,,,,,,,,,,.,,,,,,,,,,' J "',m,,~,~~~~::~w"""I!: __ .• _I-:~·i;;:-l __ '--~~i';i::'.'- "0='1-=' .-:~~:~:::::.---
, .. """~~~.~~~"w''''.~, i l."" .. :"~":::"~:.::,,~ ... =,,,, "",~".:"~"~":: •• ~":":,,:,,,~,,,, ",'",.,''''''''''''w""."''',,.,'''',.''' •• ,''',.,,''''''',.,'''''""'w 
FIGURE 4.15. A simple model for 'need' mechanism, based on Deutsch's 
elementary definitions of components and processes involved. 
A mechanical device was also constructed to demonstrate a simplified 
version of Deutsch's theories. The machine consisted of a turtle-type trolley 
running in a maze, having touch sensors, and was capable of being remotely 
controlled from a central part made up of relays and uni-selectors. Besides 
the instructions received from the control centre, the machine had a set of in 
built fixed stimulus-response actions. The main distinction from the earlier 
similar devices, described previously, was that the photo-sensitive sensors 
placed around the maze, which told the central part the position of the 
machine in the maze, were in fact regarded as part of the system, rather 
than elements of the environment. The machine could learn simple mazes, by 
running through the correct path in a 'training' stage. Some properties such 
as 'generalization', 'reasoning', 'insight' were also shown in a very limited 
sense. The mechanical trolley was able to demonstrate an interesting variety 
and generality of learning behaviour within the context of its simple domain. 
Although, Deutsch emphasised that the properties observed are only a 
consequence of arrangement of relays, and not those of relays themselves; and 
envisaged that such systems could be expanded, without a loss of efficiency, 
to demonstrate more complex psychological properties. 
Ashby (1967) also develops his ideas on homeostasis within the more 
rigorous but abstract framework of set-theory. Be postulates a basis for 
representing all types of adaptive mechanisms, natural or otherwise, by using 
a formal "simplification" which is homoeomorphic with our observations - not 
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based on intuitive rules of thumbs. The theories and hypothetical mechanisms 
proposed, according to Ashby, could embody and demonstrate various notions, 
such as Shannon's concept of information or Sommerhoff's 'directive 
correlation'. However, because of their high degree of abstraction (in search 
of a high degree of precision), they have not been used for many practical 
modelling purposes. 
As outlined in chapter three, many other mathematical developments have 
also been used as such cybernetic tools. In the following, some other 
important (historically or otherwise) examples of cybernetic 'learning systems' 
which utilise a specific analytical methodology will be discussed. 
(i) - GENERAL SYSTEM ~ APPROACH TO CYBERNETIC 'LEARNING' l'DDELS 
Systems that can autonomously modify and adapt to their environments 
(changing or stationary) have been described in a variety of forms, 
'mathematical', 'logical', 'descriptive', etc. Cybernetics, in general, is 
interested in the behavioural and structural studies of such 'self-adapting' 
systems, particularly, in those systems related to some aspects of living 
organisms. 
The general system theory promotes the idea that a body of tools, 
predominantly mathematical, can be applied to a variety of apparently 
dissimilar fields. Thus, it is an appropriate methodology for studying the 
learning process which has applications in diverse SUbjects. However, the 
alternative view of studying the 'differences' between various systems is an 
equally valid undertaking. 
In general system terms, 'adaptation' and 'learning' represent the processes 
of changing control policies through interaction with the environment. Other, 
properties such as 'goal-directedness' and 'purposiveness' have also been 
attributed to these processes of systems. 
'Feed back control systems' or 'servo-systems' are a special class of the 
general adaptive systems, involving the notion of closed-loop control. 
'Governors', 'thermostats', and other stability-seeking systems which use 
feedback have always been considered as important cybernetic models. Some 
physiological and behavioural sub-systems of living organisms which show 
simple goal-seeking or homeostatic characteristics can be included within this 
category. Bence, control theory formalisations have been applied to these 
biological and even to some sociological systems. 
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For example, cardio-vascular regulations or particular aspects of economic 
systems could be modelled quite adequately using servo-system type 
descriptions, and mathematical techniques such as differential equations. But, 
the methodology of control system theory, which involves the finding of a 
mathematical definition of a system, or a search for an appropriate ttransfer 
function', is not very useful for applying to the more complex biological, 
human-based or organizational systems; neither it can faithfully represent 
elementary cybernetic principles. 
Similarly, the tlearning and adaptive control systems', discussed at the 
start of this chapter, are the more complex (and recent) manifestations of the 
processes of learning and adaptation in general systems. 
Many 'natural' scientists have applied the mathematical concepts of general 
systems theory to the domain of their investigations, and, using a cybernetie 
outlook, have noticed that many seemingly different systems have various 
features in common. The central problem for the cybernetician, in such 
enquiries, is the finding of well-defined behavioural variables and well-defined 
relations between them. 
Ashby, by introducing the concept of 'ultra-stabilitY't described adaptive 
analogue systems which could change and modify according to different 
environmental circumstances. Adaptation (deterministically or by trial and 
error), in organisms and machines, was defined as the controlling of tessential 
variables' by forcing them to remain within specified limits - through the 
manipulation of the environment by outputs. Ultra-stable systems were, 
thereby, defined as systems that were able to reorganise (adapt) themselves to 
abrupt changes in their variables and parameters. The abstract models "'hich 
he devised, and also the hardware model the 'nomeostat', could depict the 
equilibrium-seeking (also called 'purposive' or 'goal-seeking') behaviour of 
animals - once the stable-slate was achieved, the searching behaviour would 
stop, the particular path to stability being a function of the state of the 
system and also the degree of the initial displacements. An organism's 
nervous system was also looked at as a 'multi-stable' system (a system made 
up of many ultra-stable systems) which interacted with a complicated 
multi-variable environment. 
The underlying criterion used by Ashby, in general system terms, was that 
behaviour was considered 'state-determined', or in other words, at any instant 
of time, the present state of a system could exactly determine the next step. 
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However, clearly many of our observations in nature are based on 
probabilistic rather than deterministic criteria. In any case, within the 
abstract formal framework of systems, Ashby managed to postulate simple 
axiomatic principles that could lead to more complex and interesting 
subsequent developments. 
Gause (1971,1983) proposes a taxonomy of general systems which considers 
'adaptation' and 'intelligence' as two separate independent system attributes. 
Briefly, a system is said to be adaptive if it is capable of improving with 
experience; and is considered intelligent if it is capable of performing a given 
task in human-like manner. The performance of a system is taken to be 
describable in terms of a real, single-valued function of system states, time, 
and the task in hand. The attributes of adaptability and intelligence are only 
considered within the context of specific tasks, and in non-human terms - in 
an effort to reduce the ambiguity of the definition of such terms. Using 
these two attributes, a classification of different types of systems is made as 
follows:-
(a) - lInnane-Systems': non-adaptive, unintelli~ent. 
performance characteristics (e.g., a slmple 
programming system). 
Having a non varying 
machine or computer 
(b) - 'Meretricious-Systems': non-adaptive, intelligent. With a constant level 
of performance for a given task (e.g., most chess playing programs). 
(c) - 'Homeostatic-Systems': adaptive, intelligent. Performance oscillating 
within certain bounds (e.g., adaptive process control systems). 
(d) - 'Learning-Systems': adaptive, intelligent. Long range improvement in 
performance as the system interacts with its environment. 
Gause further proposes a general blueprint for a cybernetic 'learning 
system' with the following two principal components: (1) - 'evaluation 
mechanisms' which perceive the system's performance through 
goal-directed ness or reinforcement; and (2) - 'control mechanisms' which 
should be able to reduce entropy, maintain variety, and display selective 
forgetting. 
Pask (1967) discusses a cybernetic model of human cognition by viewing 
man as a special kind of control system. Be postulates a set of criteria 
which characterise such a control system; in particular, the human learning 
process is analyzed, and the notions developed in terms of general systems 
theory are applied to experimental learning and problem solving situations. 
Reuver (1978,1980) introduces a conceptual tool-kit for the realization of 
the process of learning in the context of general system theory. The 
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formalisations described is seen appropriate for use in the modelling of real 
learning situations in psychology, engineering and sociology. 
description of a 'learning system', according to Reuver is:-
A general 
"A learning system is a system purposefully adjusting its behaviour to 
constant or changing environmental conditions, availing itself of past 
experiences. Past nistory of the behaviour in the environmental 
situation is processed in order to find an optimal adaptation. 
Information processing is an essential characteristlc of the learning 
process." 
The notation used is a more elaborate version of the representations of 
'learning systems' outlined in the previous sections dealing with 'learning' 
control theory and automata theory. The basic elements are:-
T 
X 
Y 
S 
U 
Z 
P 
V 
{ •• , "L 1 , to , tl , • '1 
Xl ,X2 ,X3 , ••• ,Xa 
tYl ,Y2 ,Y3 , ••• ,YD 
{Sl ,S2 ,S3 , ••• ,SJ } 
{Ul ,1l~ ,\13, ••• ,Uld 
{l;~1 , Z2 , Z3 , ••• , Zl } 
{Pi ,1>2 ,1>3 , ••• ,pg} 
{VI ,V2 ,V3, ••• ,Vh} 
- linearly ordered discrc~ter set (time) 
- input space (set of inputs 
- output space (set of out ) 
- state space 
- decision space 
- information space 
- parameter spwe 
- linearly ordered set of variables, mostly real 
numbers 
Furthermore, a 'learning system' is described in terms of four simpler 
components of: 'real system' (an unknown or partially known black box); 
'system cell' (a mathematical model of the 'real system'); 'decision cell' (a 
mathematical model of a decision maker); and 'learning cell' (a mathematical 
model of the learning process) - any 'learning system' should have at least 
two of the above four distinct components. The goal functions and learning 
algorithms are also defined in terms of such formalisms. 
Finally, various catagories of 'learning systems' are defined according to 
the different configurations of the four above basic SUb-systems; and some 
specific examples, namely those for 'goal learning', 'learning inventory 
systems' and 'social learning', are investigated using this conceptual 
framework. 
Reuver (1980) also extends the notions of his formalization to the studies 
of psychological learning theories of Gal'perin - a Soviet psychologist who 
had based his theories of behaviour on three distinct level of human action: 
(1) - material, (2) - verbal, (3) - mental. On such foundations, 'action' is 
characterised by parameters which specify the 'extent', the 'detail', and the 
'efficiency' of behaviour; and any learning is proposed to be directed on a so 
called 'orientation basis' (the motivation behind the process). 
On the whole, this type of 'learning' models, by virtue of their 
universality, have to contend with an extremely high level of abstraction 
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which ilself alienates them from the scopes of the actual applications they 
are ultimately intended for - by making them incomprehensible or irrelevanl. 
(ii) - INREMATIOO '1'HIDRETICAL APPROACH 'ID CYBERNETIC 'LEARNING' H:>DELS 
Information Theory, which can be considered as a 6ubHection of 
Cybernetics, has been developing parallel to the latter. These two disciplines 
are sometimes grouped together, however, information theory is nol, 
generally, involved with control. This discipline, mostly developed in lhe past 
three decades, is mainly concerned with various aspects of coding, decoding, 
and transmission of signals (and information) within communication channels. 
The basic ideas behind the quantification of the amount of information were 
founded by Shannon in the late 1940's. But, Shannon's pure quantitative 
approach to 'information' did not take into account the concept of 'meaning' 
of acquired information. Today, information theory has more and more come 
to be concerned with the wider qualitative aspects of data as well us the 
measurement of various signal capacities. 
When the concept of information is used, as a generalised explanutory 
language, to describe the dynamic behavioural observations of the world, then 
the distinction between the quantity and the meaning of a message (a}so the 
ambiguities of such terminologies) is noted much more clearly. Elstob (1980). 
in an analysis of concepts of 'information', 'meaning', and 'knowledge', 
stresses the underlying paradoxes and confusions which exist in the usage and 
comprehension of such cybernetic ideas. He proposes a distinction between 
'physical-information' and 'semantic-information' based on the differences of 
types of behaviour they are associated with - involving some energy transfer 
considerations and specific consequential properties of input-outputs. Using 
this distinction, he also discusses the concept of meaning within the contexts 
of 'goal-directed' behaviour and 'purposeful systems'. It is argued that to 
convey the meaning of a message we need to involve the semantic component 
of information, and also take the behavioural intentionality considerations of 
a system into account. 
Some simple regulatory processes which use error-control or anticipatory 
cause control are intimately related to the quantitative aspects of information. 
Ashby (1956) by introducing his law of 'requisite variety' established an 
explicit basis for these relationships. 
Many of the 'information' related findings of the learning process have 
been accomplished by the engineering oriented cyberneticians who considered 
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the disparities between the capabilities of man and machine. Information 
entering (or leaving) an adaptive or 'learning system' (natural or artificial) if:; 
primarily of the physical type, and hence the quantitative aspects of 
information theory could be applied at this rudimentary ]cycl. At the next 
level, the manipulations of this raw data in the form of experimentation, 
constructing of various hypothesis, and a constant feedback from the 
previously accumulated knowledge and information takes place. Hence, it 
becomes extremely difficult to apply the quantitative formnlisations of 
information with any degree of cohesion. 
Information theoretical concepts developed by Shannon, such 1:16 
'information content', 'channel capacity', 'redundancy', and 'entropy' have all 
been applied to some specific aspects of neuronal functioning and brain 
mechanisms. For example, in the language of information theory, 'messages' 
in the nervous-system are thought to be 'encoded' and 'transmitted' between 
its different elements. Similarly, if a nerve-cell is considered as a source 
emitting information, then its output is the 'action potential' moving along its 
axon and regenerated by the subsequent firing of other neurons - hence, 
information is carried from one cell to other. Although, the use of 
information theory is sometimes criticised on the grounds that the actual 
neuro-physiological mechanisms are not themselves clearly understood yet, 
nevertheless, this methodology has been one of the fundamental approaches in 
the investigation of memory related aspects of learning. 
The usual holistic cybernetic view of the brain is that of the brain as an 
information processing system, having large memory storage, and operating on 
coded information derived from its environment and from within itself. This, 
of course, implies a level of 'analysis' of the brain's physiology which falls 
well short of detailed neurological scrutinies, but, is more specific than the 
investigations of electrical wave patterns of the brain (EEGs). 
Similarly, in cognitive psychology, a human could be regarded as a channel 
of communication, if viewed from the information theoretical angle 
perceiving and reacting to stimuli. The novelty of this outlook is that it 
considers all of the set of relevant stimuli at any time, rather than 
considering individual stimuli for every occasion. 
Various aspects of human perceptual capabilities could be studied by using 
notions of information theory. Broadbent (1965) discusses some areas of such 
applications. For example, the critical level of distinguishing simple 
perceptual stimuli is found to be approximately 2.5 bits of information, or 7+2 
Approacbes \0 ModelllD' of LearDID& - l'illl-l 231 
different signals. Similarly, the understanding of perceptual stimuli, as well 
as being dependent on the physical noise faclors present, are very much 
context dependent; and probabilities could be attached to the order of 
occurrence of events, such as the probability of consequential ordering of 
different physical events and sounds, or the chance of certain words following 
other words. Estimates of an average human's memory capacity have also 
been calculated using these notions, but its value ranges diversely between 
108-101% bits of information. 
Other quantitative characteristics and capacities of human pattern 
perception, signal perception, and attention systems have also been 
investigated. These findings suggest that, in fact, there arc some limitations 
to the human brain's perceptual mechanisms governed by external 
informational aspects of inputs, and not internal sensory factors. 
As far as the output (or the response) side of such a communications 
system is concerned, similar 'information' based analyses of the hrain have 
been carried out. Some temporal aspects of information processing, such as 
the rate and the capacity of the brain in reacting to various stimuli, have 
been experimentally measured. These quantitative results, being more exact 
and consistent than the ones obtained in the case of perceptual inputs, point 
to the fact that human beings are also limited, in some fashion, as far as 
their reactions to stimuli is concerned - this limitation being independent of 
the information they convey. 
The implication of such work on the studies of the learning proeCE,:;; is 
that the various information related quantitative changes which occur in the 
mappings of stimuli onto responses could be determined as learning progresses. 
Yet, the causes or the nature of these changes cannot be explained by 
observations based solely on this paradigm. 
(iii) - DYNAMIC ~ APPROACH 'ID CYBERNETIC 'I...F.ARNING SYS'lEiS' 
The classical mathematical techniques used in describing the behaviour of 
systems, deterministically or stochastically, most involved the use of 
differential equations; and optimising problems, generally, involved the 
minimising of specific functions. The basic assumptions were that the number 
and the value of variables, the cause-effect relationships, or their probability 
distributions were known a-priori. However, as the complexity of problems 
increased, and not all information about a system and its behaviour was 
known in advance, then the use of adaptive and learning criteria in the 
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solving of problems, such as those encountered in engineering and control, 
saw the introduction of various mathematical abstractions. Dynamic 
programming techniques are one of the principal methodologies in such 
analyses, they are used as an alternate approach to the classical methods in 
dealing with the modelling of adaptive and learning processes. This subject is 
closely related to the fields of adaptive and 'learning' control, but has also 
found applications in psychology, economics, and biology where similar 
processes are seen to be at work. Dynamic programming, basically, involves 
the finding of the optimal procedures in a series of observations, working 
backwards from a prescribed final stage to the first stage. 
From a cybernetic engineering point of view, if the various features of a 
system's characteristics are unknown, then estimations of some parameters 
could gradually lead to the compilation of a complete knowledge base about 
the system - by hierarchically improving the precision of system's description. 
Dynamic programming techniques can be used to formulate an optimal policy 
for a series of decision choice-stages; the decision could be based on choice 
of numbers, expected values, or probability distributions. 
A highly abstract mathematical formalization of 'learning systems' is 
proposed by Doberkat (1978) who utilises the view of dynamic programming. 
He uses a formal framework to show the existence of an optimal strategy in 
achieving goals. The notions of group and set theory are used to describe a 
'learning system' and its processes; and, based on such abstractions, 
mathematical models of specific examples of learning, such as classical 
conditioning are simulated. 
4.5.7 CYBERNETIC IBARN1l«1 PD>ElB BASED 00 '11IE MlDIANllIf3 OF '11IE BRAIN 
The notion of direct use of the brain's mechanisms as the basis for 
constructing artificial 'learning systems' was adopted by many researchers 
prior to the introduction of the science of Cybernetics. However, it was the 
founding of this formal discipline which allowed the widespread hypothesising 
of such endeavours, and opened up opportunities for future developments. 
The language a cyberentician uses to construct his abstract or physical 
nervous system only differs in degree from the so called actual observations 
of a neuro-biologist - since, they both are different types of conceptual 
descriptions. However, it is hoped that cybernetic models of the functioning 
of the brain will, also, eventually lead to a better understanding of the 
neuro-biology and neuro-psychology of the brain. 
. I 
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The neuro-physiological evidence for cybernetic model-builders are very 
extensive. Animals' purposive activities have been related to various neuronal 
su bstrate. Many fixed neuronal mechanisms are thought to govern the 
biological functions or the reflexive innate modes of behaviour (some 
purposive behaviours are also controlled by the electrochemical mechanisms of 
the body such as the hormones). 
The brain, seemingly, in a constant state of activity, has constituent 
neurons which rhythmically discharge, and induce patterns of impulse 
propagation. The summation of excitatory and inhibitory impulses of neurons 
when exceed a certain threshold value evoke further patterns within cell 
assemblies. The progress of the excitation not being limited from the 
'sensory' to the 'central' onto the 'motor' outputs, but in a kind of 
bi-directional reverberations. The generally, accepted postulate for the 
neuronal basis of learning experience states that the flow of messages along 
particular pathways of neurons leaves some kind of facilitation for the future 
passage of similar activity along the same neurons. But, as a whole, the 
knowledge is fragmented, imprecise, and mostly speculative. 
In addition, while our knowledge of the cognitive processes of the brain 
has been constantly improving, the sheer size of the nervous system has 
meant that the conceptual models (e.g., finite-automata, neural-nets, 
control-systems, etc.) cannot, in practice or theory, represent the brain's 
higher functions accurately. 
Bence, the current 'learning' models based on some aspects of the brain 
should all be looked at with a certain degree of skepticism. This point is 
strongly emphasised by Aleksander (1983) in discussing the difficulties of 
devising artificial analogues of the brain:-
"Knowledge of the human brain is currently confined to two fraJile 
bridgeheads bordering on a central .,gulf of ignorance. On the one SIde, 
neuro-physiology can give a superfIcial picture of the structure of the 
brain and offer some educated guesses about its operations; on the 
other, psychology provides a variety of hypothesis about its output. 
Bow, exactly, the one give rise to the other remains mysterious." 
Griffith (1971) gives an elaborate mathematical account of the functioning 
of the elements of the brain, and analyses various propagatory aspects of 
signal transmission within networks of neurons. Furthermore, various 
randomly connected neuronal models are investigated and mathematical 
deductions made. Similar type of research, defining a mathematical form of 
neuronal activity, has been carried out by Caianiello (1967); this work being 
mainly directed towards devising pattern-recognition 'learning' devices. The 
. i 
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implication of such work to the modelling of cybernetic 'learning systems' is 
that it can give some clues as to the possible ways artificial associative 
memory systems involving the contiguity of neuronal activity could be devised. 
Other hardware (electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, chemical) simulations of 
the actions of neurons and neuronal systems have been carried out by many 
researchers. Similarly, computer programs and other software mathematical 
models have demonstrated some properties of nervous systems. Some 
servo-system type engineering based models of the brain mechanisms (e.g., 
Deutsch's, 1967) have also been designed, involving the use of differential 
equations and transfer functions. The neural and logical nets discussed 
previously were also examples of cybernetic models of the brain mechanisms. 
A simple method of representing nervous systems in an abstract form is 
the use of matrix notation. Inputs could be depicted by the rows of a matrix 
and outputs by its columns, as in FIG.4.16(a). An inborn reflex action could 
be represented by a permanent connection at the junction of the relevant 
input and output. Other properties such as 'learning', 'conditioning', 
'inhibition' J 'forgetting', etc. can all be represented by the formation or the 
modification of the strengths of connections between inputs and outputs. A 
great advantage of this type of model is that it can be easily realised by 
various hardware devices (e.g., electronic, magnetic). 
A well known early example was Steinbach's (1963) "Lernmatrix" which was 
based on arrays of magnetic memory cores (similar to those found in early 
computer memories). Other abstract models (e.g., Griffith's, 1971) have used 
structural matrices to represent the input-output transformations of the 
nervous-system. 
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FIGURE 4.16. (a) 
(b) 
A matrix representation of associations between m-inputs 
and n-outputs; au (fixed or changeable) is the associative 
factor between input I, and output OJ 
- A Jraphic representatIon of single associations between 
pa1rs of independent inputs. 
• I 
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The associations between any two independent (orthogonal) inputs can alBo 
be represented by a matrix notation. Alternately, as shown in FIG.4.16(b), 
inputs can be graphically represented by points (A,B, ••• ) in a 2-dimensional 
space with interconnecting lines which depict associations bctween inputs; 
furthermore, the strength of association can be shown by the thick ness of the 
lines or their number. Graph-theory has also made somc UBcful eontributions 
to this type of analysis. 
An example of cybernetic learning model based on graphs is dcseribcd by 
Palvolgyi (1982). He outlines a later version of neural-nct type systems 
which can simulate the processes of adaptation and learning. Such networks 
are made up of elements that are either in 'active' or 'passive' state, and 
'activity' can be transferred to some neigh bouring points of the graph 
according to certain algorithmic rule. The designer contends that this kind 
of abstract cybernetic approach is a useful tool for stud ying various basic 
perceptual processes, memory, learning, and thinking. 
Although, there have been many objections and criticisms of these 
simplistic views of the brain, yet, by in large, most cybernetic brain models 
are based on simple binary-state elements, as depictions of neurons. The 
ultimate exactness of these type of information processing (digital or 
analogue) cellular models of the nervous-system will depend on the 
clarifications provided by discoveries in the neuro-physiological sciences. 
Another cybernetic approach to the modelling of the brain mechanisms of 
learning, along the same lines as neural-net models of the learning process, is 
described by Harth (1966). An attempt is made to devise a formalism to 
depict 'thought processes'. First, the epistemological problems are 
highlighted, and then a tentative model, heavily reliant on the available 
neuro-physiological evidence, is proposed. The basis of the model is an 
artificial abstract neuron, similar to McCulloch and Pitts type element, but, 
with an additional randomness incorporated. It also differs from Rosenblatt's 
'perceptron' (will be discussed later), especially since it is not designed for 
particular cognitive purposes, but, for the simulation of more general aspects 
of brain functions. Matrices similar to that of FIG.4.16(a) are used to depict 
the neuronal connections between the elements of the system; and learning is 
defined in terms of the changes in the coupling coefficients of such matrices. 
Finally, a computer simulation of this mathematical model of the brain 
mechanism is carried out for systems comprising of few elements. Various 
comparisons and parallels of the results obtained is made with the established 
physiological data. 
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The nature of memory is one of the most intriguing aspects of brain 
studies, and relattvely little is known about its actual mechanisms. The 
establishment of associations between memory traces is one of the brain 
processes which has attracted the attention of many cyberm~tic 
model-builders. Some examples of the modelling of the memory mechanisms 
were discussed in the previous sections dealing with neural and logical 
networks - simple models could depict the short and long term characteristics 
of the memory. 
Computer based models of memory mechanisms have been devised which 
simulate some basic types of associative learning. Generally, inputs are first 
stored in a short-term memory, and, later, either lost or transferred to u 
long-term storage; some cognitive aspects of 'retrieval' or 'forgetting' is also, 
normally, characterised in most of these models. 
Drozen (1970) proposes a layered mathematical model of associative 
memory. 
in the 
He sees the principle contribution of the neuronal network models 
possibilities they provide for filling the gap between 
neuro-physiological and psychological studies of various aspects of living 
organisms. Yet, he envisages possible applications to the problems in A.I. 
His model, in its simplest form, consists of three layers of input, associative, 
and output elements. These elements can change autonomously, and can 
produce a 'diffused' (distributed) memory. Again the matrix notation is 
utilised to characterise this model. The algorithm used for the formation of 
memory relies on the synaptic weighs of the inputs and outputs - which are 
considered at discrete time intervals. If some inputs are stimulated 
simultaneously, a kind of correlation is established between the associated 
inputs; by adding a kind of short-term (dynamic) memory, a process analogous 
to the conditioning of reflexes can be simulated, in the form of a simple 
mathematical realization of associative relations. 
Booth (1970) describes a simple model for the organization of memory 
which is based on the optimal stacking problem of a collection of items (e.g., 
words). This cybernetic model, also realised in hardware, is an attempt to 
suggest a possible way of optimising the access time in memory retrieval 
process, but the existence of equiValent psychological or neuro-pbysiological 
correlates have not been conclusively established. 
The main developments in the area of associative memory modelling have 
been directed towards the formation, association, and recognition of 'patterns' 
ApprOilchea Lo Modelllil' 01 I.earlli DC - l'ilrL-1 237 
in cellular models of neuronal networks. This type of work will be discussed 
more fully in future sections dealing with self-organization and pattern 
recognition. 
On the whole, cybernetic models of the brain have managed to demonstrate 
that the so called 'mentallistic' activities can be displayed by machines and 
other artificial systems. The goal-directed, purposeful, or tele()lo~ical 
behaviours which the early behavioural scientists believed to be too 
subjective, and hence not precisely definable, have, in fact, been simulated 
artificially. Although, these demonstrations have not actually disproved the 
mentallistic theories of teleological behaviour, nevertheless, they have 
managed to broaden the definitions of such properties from the exclusive 
realms of 'living'. 
4.5.8 AN OVERVIEW OF CYBERNETIC APPROACH TO 'LEARNING SYSTEMS' 
The science of Cybernetics has had an undeniable impact on the learning 
process in most areas of research. The immense accumulation of empirical 
knowledge in many learning related disciplines has necessitated the 
introduction of cybernetic models, in particular computer based models, for 
the mathematical analysis and ordering of such knowledge. Cybernetics hus 
drawn special attention to the concepts of 'organization', 'information', 
'control', 'feedback', 'stability', 'goal-directed ness' within natural systems, and 
emphasised that no system can be solely specified by its physical descriptions 
alone. 
The interdisciplinary nature of cybernetics has also brought a new vitality 
into the studies of the learning process; and enabled the scientists from 
various disciplines to communicate with each other. Hence, increasing the 
possibility of establishing a unified view of this phenomenon. 
During the past 40 years, cyberneticians have been constantly probing the 
foundations of scientific enquiries and methodologies, and trying to expand 
the scope of various disciplines by introducing concepts not intrinsical1y 
obvious from the empiric of observations. However, cybernetics has evolved 
into a subject that primarily gives a particular perspective to problems rather 
than providing specific class of solutions. 
Wiener's original goals of devising human-like machines, based on the 
concepts of information theory and control-theory, and also his suggestion of 
building analogous mechanisms to the brain which can self-adapt or learn 
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have been, largely, superseded by the exploits of digital computers. On the 
whole, presently, none of these objectives seem to be apt to the problem of 
devising intelligent-machinery, or to the furthering of the understanding of 
human-intelligence. IIowever, with a better insight into the workings of the 
nervous system, these outlooks might again be favoured at some point in 
future. 
Today, the science of Cybernetics is regarded with different degrees of 
appreciation and extent of usefulness around the world. In the Eastern Block 
countries, cybernetics is featured much more extensively in research subjects 
(mainly computer related and control engineering applications); but cybernetics 
is, probably, defined in a wider sense than the Western understanding of the 
science. In the Western European countries, various aspects of this science 
(philosophical, practical, theoretical, etc.) are still seriously investigated; 
normally, referring to abstract generalised systems approach to a subject. On 
the other hand, in the United States, the rise of subjects such as A.I., 
pattern-recognition, robotics, system-theory, and other more specialised 
subjects have all but replaced the generalist view of cybernetics in scientific 
research the primary feature of these new subjects being their 
functionalism. 
Before moving on to the more recent trends and approaches in the design 
of artificial 'learning systems', the tself-organizing systems' (SOS) approach 
",rill be discussed next. The term self-organization systems is orten used in 
conjunction with cybernetics or neural-nets, and sometimes these terms are 
used interchangeably. The SOS approach, however, has managed to arouse 
enough interest which justifies its appreciation as a distinct discipline, it has 
also lead to the establishment of a specific viewpoint and terminology. nut 
gradually, as in the case of cybernetics, the enthusiasm towards this subject 
has also declined. Particularly, in view of the apparent deadlocks reached 
following some concentrated research in this field, and lack of spectacular 
results. 
4.6 tSELF-QRGANIZING SYSTEMS' APPROACH TO 'LEARNING SYSTEMS' 
The notion of self-organization was discussed previously; firstly, as a . ! 
concept closely related to adaptation and learning; and secondly, in relation 
to specific views of 'learning systems' and machines, such as the control 
engineering view. 
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According to Feigenbaum and Feldman (1963) the 'self-organizing systems' 
(SOS) approach has an intrinsic fascination, and the basic objective of its 
workers is the design of intelligent machines which have simple information 
processing elements, arranged in a random or organised network, and certain 
processes for facilitating or inhibiting their activity. 
Andrew (1972), in a survey of the field of SOS, points to the initial 
enthusiasm during the 1950's about this subject, and the possibility of it 
throwing a good deal of light on the workings of the nervous system. 
The peak of popularity of the discipline of SOS was perhaps during the 
early 1960's, when many symposia and conferences were held on this topic, 
and various researchers presented their work in the context of this newly 
formed and promising approach. 
The main impetus behind this subject has been the desire of learning more 
about the nature of the nervous system, which clearly has some 
self-organizing properties; and hence, by direct implication, the possibility of 
constructing similar artificial SOS. 
On the one hand, psychologists, embryologists, neuro-physiologists, 
sociologists, and workers of other natural sciences such as evolutionary 
sciences have been trying to understand the self-organizing principles of 
living and human based systems. On the other hand, mathematicians, 
engineers, cyberneticians, computer-scientists, and physical scientists have 
attempted to design systems which show some self-organizing properties. 
4.6.1 DEFINITIONS OF SELF-oRGANIZING SYSTEMS 
The very definition of a self-organizing system has been met with some 
controversies. Von-Forester (1959) and also Ashby (1962) have argued that a 
system, in a strict logical sense, cannot really be self-organizing by itself. 
The basis of their argument, outlined more formally by Ashby's 'law of 
requisite variety'. is that only order in the environment could result in order 
or organization in a system. Bence, a system can only become self-organized 
if it is defined with respect to some external source of order; and therefore 
the use of this term is only seen to be justified if the interactive component 
of the accepted system-environment distinction is regarded as an implicit part 
of the system. 
, • I 
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The term "Self-Organizing Systems" was, according to Yovits (1962), first 
used by Farley and Clark in 1954, and it was defined as: "a system which 
changes its basic structure as a function of its experience and environment." 
But, even in the early 1960's the rise of the more modern trends in 
'machine learning' had already raised some questions regarding the feasibility 
or benefits of using the self-organizing approach in the design of efficient 
interesting (intelligent) systems. The principal issues involved are argued by 
Selfridge (1962), and it is contended that a great deal of initial organization 
(in the form of automated routines or in-built knowledge) is needed to 
achieve a truly intelligent machine. 
Andrew (1972) proposes an additional proviso to the definition of SOS by 
Yovits, which is to incorporate the property of purposiveness within such a 
definition. The main difficulties he envisages in devising a rigorous definition 
include temporal considerations, storage considerations, and the amount of 
initial organization inherent in the system. 
Ashby (1962), also, in a fundamental discussion of the principles of SOS, 
scrutinises the basic issues in machines and systems, such as: 'organization', 
'whole and parts', 'conditionality', 'reducibility', 'communication', and 'good' 
or 'bad' organization. He gives a definition for two catagories of SOS. First 
referring to systems which change from 'parts separated' to 'parts joined', 
with no considerations of system utility. Second definition refers to the 
change from 'bad' organization to a 'good' one. However, he goes on to 
qualify this second definition by saying that a system (or machine) can only 
be self-organizing if it can be considered as coupled to another system (or 
machine), and in view of this contradiction, he suggests that: "the phrase 
(self-organization) better allowed to die out." 
Another distinction which can be made within the class of SOS is whether 
the goals of a system are determined externally, such as in self-organizing 
process-controllers, or if they are evolved from within a system following 
behavioural interactions with its environment, as in the case of biological 
evolution. 
Andrew (1978) describes SOS in more general, and presently accepted, 
terms: "If the changes which occur in a system, constituting its adaptation, 
are sufficiently fundamental, the system is classed as self-organizing." 
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4.6.2 LEARNING AND SELF-ORGANIZING SYSTEMS 
The concept of self-organization, although not treated in isolation, was 
implicitly advocated and had been present in the adaptive and learning models 
of many early cyberneticians. 
Andrew (1967) discusses two possible general ways by which the property 
of self-organization could be manifested in a 'learning system'. First method 
involves the adjusting or adding of parameters to some polynomial control 
functions. The second method involves placing certain constraints on control 
actions, by seeking a set of key-points in phase-space and relating the 
incoming information to these key-points, and trying to maintain the 
performance within specific bounds. 
The learning capabilities displayed by SOS are primarily the result of their 
interactions with their environments; and the intention of their designers is 
to emulate, in a sense, the self-organizing features of the nervous system, 
while choosing alternate simplified abstract or physical means. Hence, the 
studies of neural plasticity become highly relevant to this approach. In 
addition, other psychological theories of learning and cognition can also be 
looked at from the SOS point of view (e.g., Estes, 1959; Rosenblatt, 1959; 
Farley, 1959). 
4.6.3 PRINCIPLES OF SELF-ORGANIZATION 
The concept of 'organization' itself is also subject to some ambiguity. 
But, within the context of self-organization it, generally, refers to the 
structural organization in relation with the potentialities for action, and not 
the orderly positioning of the physical constituents of a system, such as in 
growing crystals. In other words, it is functional considerations that tell us 
if a system is self-organizing, and not physical considerations - this issue can 
be traced to the classical distinction between 'form' and 'function'. 
Organization of a system, in general, can be separated into the formal 
organization that is given a-priori to the system, and the organization that is 
acquired adaptively or otherwise following some changes to its initial form. 
Andrew (1970) makes a tentative distinction between 'self-organizing' and 
'self-optimising' systems. The former referring to the systems that can 
change their own internal connections, and the latter being only able to 
change the value of some system parameters. However, such a distinction is 
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not, according to Andrew, a firm and conclusive one. Hence, a more precise 
definition for this intuitive principle is deemed to be essential. 
The primary assumption about a SOS is that it should start from a fairly 
low level of organization - but some information about the 'motivational' or 
'goal-achievement' aspects could be included in this organization a-priori. A 
further consideration is whether the system utilises its past inputs in the 
evaluation of its outputs at any instant of time - and if so, to what extent. 
If the complete history of inputs is taken into account, then the problem 
becomes one of classification and discrimination of similar situations. Now, 
the exhaustive classification of most non-trivial system becomes an 
enormously difficult task. Hence, as seen in the other previously covered 
approaches, the focus of problem is switched to designing an efficient 
'generalization' technique for the system, so that it is able to make an 
'inductive inference'. 
Andrew sees a possible way of achieving such generalization is to 
incorporate the inherent 'continuity' aspects of inputs (for systems that have 
some or all input-outputs continuous) in their discriminative processes; in 
other words, to classify and compare patterns of inputs as continuous 
functions, rather than as points in Cartesian space. lIence, he proposes a 
procedure for computing output signals in terms of a polynomial function of 
inputs; and the self-organization of such a system should involve the 
adjustments of the coefficients of this polynomial by the system itself. Bis 
approach to this problem is based on the techniques developed by some 
workers in self-optimising control systems, who had devised 'learning filters' 
that operated on a similar basis. The scheme works by evaluating coefficients 
using a hedony measure, normally in the form of 'error-information'. 
The specific algorithm used by Andrew for the adjustment of parameters 
utilises the well established statistical techniques of 'regression analysis' -
which can determine the correlation measures of a set of data points. 
However, in this case, the estimates are evaluated continuously rather than in 
discrete steps. Computer simulations of this system are devised and results 
compared with other similar techniques. Further discussions are also 
undertaken into the extension of such ideas into the topic of 
pattern-recognition; and possible methods of analyzing 50S which have no 
error-information feedback, or are of a more complex multi-layered nature. 
Dalenoort (1982) attempts to outline few principles which are seen 
essential to processes of self-organization. Such definitions are devised to 
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distinguish SOS from systems based on the current computer paradigm (i.e., 
A.I., cognitive-psychology). Firstly, tself-organization' is distinguished from 
'construction' on the basis of their design particulars - a constructing system, 
normally, needing a higher degree of incorporated intelligence. 
Self-organization is said to come about in one of two ways: (a) - by adaptive 
evolutionary method, (b) - by training a system to internally change it.s 
structure or knowledge for future better performance. Other essential 
considerations are: the trainer should not know the exact nature of the 
results of his actions; the system should have an internal capability to change 
its structure - the existence of Ashby's requisite variety is implicitly assumed. 
Secondly, to efficiently extract information from an environment it is seen 
necessary to establish correlations between different variables of the 
environment (and system). This principle forms one of the basis of the 
subject of pattern-recognition. 
Thirdly, the distinction between 'data' and 'procedure', which currently 
applies to most computer based systems, should not apply to SOS. The 
particular development of digital computers has necessitated such a 
differentiation. However, the rich complexity and the high efficiency of 
storage and recall of information in the brain can provide many possibilities 
to manifest 'structural information storage' in SOS. Whereby, incoming 
information is organised according to the structure of present pathways, and 
is, in turn, able to interact with and change these structures. 
4.6.4 SELF-ORGANIZATION IN CELLULAR NE'I"hUms OF IDENTICAL EIB1ENTS 
One of the principal frameworks for the investigation of the property of 
self-organization has been networks of identical elements based on neural-nel 
type models, similar to those discussed in the earlier parts of this chapter. 
In the following some distinct aspects of self-organizing networks will be 
discussed in more detail. 
(i) - SELF-ORGANIZATION IN RANDOMLY CONNECTED NETWORKS 
As mentioned previously, some workers such as Beurle (1962) and Kauffman 
(1969) had investigated the formation and the propagation of some kind of 
organization within randomly connected networks. One of the first attempts 
in designing self-organizing learning networks was made by Farley and Clark 
(1954). Of course, numerous McCulloch and Pitt's type mathematical neural 
W15 
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models were devised prior to them, but mainly involved the modelling of 
perceptual mechanisms, and were of a fairly organised pre-fixed structure. 
Farley and Clark's (1954) model consisted of a network of non-linear 
elements, a segment of which is shown in FIG.4.17(a). The elements were 
connected in a random fashion and each had a threshold value of Ti. When 
an element 'fired' its threshold rose to infinity and. after a refractory period, 
exponentially fell back to its normal value. Furthermore, a 'firing' element 
could transmit excitation to all connected elements for a short period after 
its excitation. The model, therefore, could show both 'spatial' and 'temporal' 
summation. The pathways themselves had variable attached 'weight' measures 
which could determine the efficiency of transmission of excitations between 
two elements. These networks, unlike logical or neural nets, operated on 
analogue basis. Another point to note is the lack of inhibitory inputs, which 
is probably a reflection of the state of neurological knowledge at the time. 
(a) 
FIGURE 4.17. (a) -
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(b) 
A segment of Farley and Clark's self-organizing network 
shown in more detail. An element fires when the 
summation of the weighs of its excited inputs exceeds its 
threshold value. 
A simple two-input two-output learning self-organizing 
network, showing the arbitrary differentiation of systems 
elements, denoted by *'s. 
A simple process of 'learning' could be displayed by the following exercise 
- which was also simulated on a digital computer. Arbitrary sets of elements 
were defined as the two inputs and the two outputs of the model, as 
illustrated in FIG.4.17(b). The state of the, so called "push-pull", output was 
determined by the relative number of firing elements in the two output sets. 
Now, if it was desired for the inputs to drive the outputs in a specific 
predetermined manner, then an algorithm for the modification of weighting 
parameters could gradually result in the self-organization of the system into a 
state which would show the appropriate input-output sequences. The 
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procedure involved increasing the preceding weights (of active pathways) if 
the change was a favourable one, and decreasing them otherwise. 
Beurle (1962) also examines some properties of functional organization in 
random networks - in an attempt to model some neuro-physiological processes. 
Ris devised hypothetical randomly distributed elements are able to make 
random connections with other cells, propagate excitations and inhibitions, 
and change their sensitivity during a refractory period. He goes on to 
discuss the results obtained (various graphic patterns) from simulations of 
such networks, in relation to some basic neural observations, in particular, 
the notions of long-term and short-term memory. 
(il) - SOME MATHEMATICAL ASPECTS OF SELF-ORGANIZING NETWORKS 
Andrew (1972) describes two general principles which could guide the 
process of self-organization in multi-layer parameter adjustment-type networks 
- being distinct and more universal than other earlier self-organizing 
networks, such as Rosenblatt's (1962) single-layer simple "perceptrons", or 
Selfridge's (1959) "pandemonium" which could operate in two different layers. 
The first principle involves the breaking down of the overall goals into 
'locally-evaluated' sub-goals, this should be done with particular attention 
given to the reduction of signal redundancy in the system. 
The second suggestion is the incorporation of special pathways in the 
network which can facilitate a, so called, 'significance feedback' to the 
elements. This is because, in the more complex networks, the effect of 
weight adjustments of particular pathways on the output are not known 
exactly. Hence, a measure of the sensitivity of the output to activity at each 
point is required to determine parameter adjustments at that point. A simple 
mathematical algorithm is suggested, and based on such, computer simulations 
of nets of both neuron-like and continuous elements are devised and their 
results discussed. Finally, the significance of such notions are considered in 
relation to the actual neuronal observations, or within the context of 
socia-economic systems. 
Uttly's (1956) work on systems based on 'classification' and 'conditional 
probability' concepts (discussed previously) has a great deal of relevance to 
50S, and has influenced many later developments in this field. Chapman's 
(1959) self-organizing classification system was an early example of this type 
of models. It had both of Uttly's classification and conditional probability 
properties incorporated within its design. However, there were two basic 
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differences. Firstly, the counting of significant inputs was done before 
classification was achieved, hence the frequency of occurrence determined if 
an input was classified. Secondly, an arbitrary number was imposed on the 
sets of combinations of inputs that could be classified. Abstract 
cell-networks were also devised on such criteria, arranged in configurations 
which displayed the property of self-organization in an adaptive manner; and 
were said to 'learn' to recognise patterns in a very trivial sense, using a 
simple set of rules - the oper?tions of cells involved analogue processes. 
These models had obvious connotations to the plasticity and growth aspects of 
the nervous system. 
An electronic hardware device was also constructed whose storage 
pathways consisted of moist cotton fibers, that reduced in conductivity as the 
moisture evaporated. This simple hardware was found to exactly duplicate the 
predicted logical workings of the abstract system. However Chapman saw the 
real potential of these artifacts in the much larger complex models whose 
behaviour exceeds the range of accurate predictions. 
Mathematically these models could be represented by matrices of the form 
described in the previous section. Links between outputs and inputs could be 
denoted by the elements of a matrix, and after each input-output sequence 
the whole of the matrix structure can be modified to take the new 
reinforcements into account. 
MacKay (1962) discusses the problems involved in designing 50S in terms 
of adjustments of effective topologies for neural-net type systems. He 
outlines some ways which pathways and connections between elements be 
modified, on the basis of reinforcement of the 'weight' of causal links, or a 
change in their 'conditional probabilities'. These processes could be 
continuous or discrete, and could involve parallel ,as well as serial, 
operations. He goes on to argue that a much greater efficiency could be 
achieved if topological organizations of 50S in the time domain could take up 
important functional roles - unlike the structure of most computing machinery 
where no particular functional significance is attached to the topological 
relationships of, for example, its memory cells. The various aspects of 
storage of information in temporal structures of SOS are also discussed, in 
terms of hypothetical elements called "coincidence detectors", and compared to 
some analogous aspects of neural organization. 
Justice and Gervinski (1968), in an investigation of possible functional 
equivalence of the process of biological evolution and self-organization, 
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describe a so called 'SOBLN' (Self-Organizing Binary Logic Network) device, 
whose functional diagram is shown in FIG.4.18. A network of elements, called 
'statistical switches', organises itself on the basis of probability modifications 
occurring as a result of interaction with environmental variables and a 'goal 
circuit'. 
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FIGURE 4.18. A schematic diagram of a tSOBLN' machine. 
Th design of this type of self-organizing networks, based on elements and 
procedures defined in some mathematical or logical terms, has been one of 
the principal trends in SOS. However, the consistency and the strength of 
these formalisms, and their theoretical analyses, have not managed to 
overshadow the weaknesses of their basic criteria and the deficiencies of 
their underlying premises. 
(iii) - SELF-ooGANIZING NJrnOlKS BASED 00 fDm ASPBCI'S OF THE NERVOOS SYS'1'Ei 
A belief in the parsimony of nature will imply that the problem of the 
organization of stimuli (and information) in the nervous system has been 
solved in the most efficient way, minimising all forms of redundancy. 
Information in the nervous system is compressed, generalised, classified 
and organised according to processes which are very much in the dark. 
Uttly's classification system was a simple hypothesis about such processes, 
and he suggested the possibility of finding similar mechanisms in the brain. 
Some principal developments of the topic of pattern recognition, to be 
discussed in the next chapter, are a direct consequence of the work carried 
out on neuron-like self-organizing networks. 
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The major thought provoking landmarks in this area were the work of 
Hebb and, later on, of Milner on the organization of neural assemblies. Their 
neurologically oriented theories were also complemented by the work of 
cognitive psychologists, mainly from the gestalt school, on the various aspects 
of perception. 
Later manifestation of the property of self-organization within networks of 
neuron-like units have been undertaken by some engineering oriented workers. 
The type of cells suggested are, normally, the threshold digital elements; and 
the tasks involve some form of learning of external patterns or sequences of 
external patterns. This class of investigations are closely related to 
'associative memory', 'recall', and 'concept formation' studies. 
Threshold elements, as non-linear models of nerve-cells, have been the 
subject of many modelling endeavours which deploy their 
information-processing capabilities. But, their non-linear feature has meant 
that they are difficult to analyze in very general terms. Amari (1972) 
discusses self-organizing networks of threshold elements in relation to 
learning and recalling of patterns, and sequences of patterns - again, based 
on Bebb's hypothesis on the neural organization during a learning process. 
Amari uses the criterion of stability to define equilibrium states or 
state-transitions for the network, and the system is said to learn from its 
repeated encounters ",.jth stimuli, hence self-organize itself into stable states. 
Once a pattern is remembered as an equilibrium state, then it can be recalled 
and reproduced by an associated stimulus. Similarly, if a sequence of patterns 
is remembered, a segment of this pattern can act as a 'cue' stimulus and 
recall the rest of the sequence. Furthermore, it is shown that a kind of 
generalization of patterns can be achieved, by forming a representative 
pattern for a given set (class) of stimuli. 
The analysis are all carried out theoretically. The formalisms devised 
involve defining a mathematical network of elements (having weighting and 
threshold values), and also investigating the stability of various stales, 
state-transitions, and state-transition sequences. The effect of 'noisy' 
disturbances on the learning of patterns is also analyzed. Briefly, the basic 
algorithms used for modification entail the increasing of weighting value of 
connections of inputs and outputs (or other inputs) that coincide, and the 
decreasing of weights if they differ. 
Fukushima and Miyake (1978) also describe a self-organizing neural 
network model of the functioning of human associative memory which, 
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according to its designers, show some of the self-organizing properties of 
neural plasticity. It is, principally, based on the hypothesis that 
reinforcements of the pathways between two cells occur when the high states 
of their activities coincide. Their previously conceived model, the 
"Cognitron" , was a multi-layered network, it was also simulated on a 
computer. The cognitrons were able to selectively respond to frequently 
occurring patterns, after a number of stimulus presentations. This laler 
development of the cognitron model, the 'feedback-type cognitron', included 
the additional feedback feature - by making connections between the 
last-layer cells and some of the front-layer cells. A mathematical formal 
model was described for this new network, and its computer simulation 
undertaken. Because of the feedback loop the stimulus, after their 
presentation to the system, continued to recirculate within the network (even 
though the inputs were removed). Hence, after a period of training with 
different patterns, the connections are 5elf-organized into desired states, 
depending on the characteristics of the externally presented stimulus patterns. 
The results of simulations showed that these self-organized associations could 
be recalled even if fragmented, noisy, random, or difficult stimulus patterns 
were presented to the system - on the basis of best correspondence with 
memorised patterns. 
4.6.5 J:NFOmoIATION-~CAL APPROACH TO SELF-rn.GANIZING SYSTEMS 
The concepts of information theory have been used to describe the basic 
criteria involved in SOS. For example, it has been established (by Ashby and 
Von-Forester) that the information theoretic concept of 'uncertainty' (or 
entropy) of information-content, or the variety, of a self-organizing system 
should be greater or equal to the uncertainty of the environment it is trying 
to control (or the uncertainty of disturbances to its goals) - as a necessary 
condition of achieving organization. 
Similarly, the 'certainty' of a seli-organizing system should increase as the 
system becomes more organised and the probability of response to a particular 
input increase. However, as certainty increases the system becomes more 
redundant, and, hence, the 'redundancy' of the seli-organizing system should 
increase with time. Therefore, a specific condition can be imposed on the 
rate of change of the 'entropy' functions of SOS. 
Von-Forester (1959) proposed, in a strict logical sense, the thesis that: 
"There are no such things as self-organizing systems;" and went on to justify 
this postulate on the basis of thermodynamic considerations of entropy within 
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finite universes that contained the SOS. Other philosophical issues in 
relation to this subject were also scrutinised, in particular, the conceptions of 
order and reality. 
Be, further, proposed a particular measure for torder' involving Shannon's 
tredundancy' notions of information. Redundancy is defined by:-
R = 1 - II/H. 
where H/H. is the ratio (or the relative entropy) of the entropy (in 
information theoretic sense) to the maximum entropy (or the maximum 
disorder) of a system. 
Bence, if H = H., or in other words the system is in its highest disorder 
then R = O. But, if the elements of the system are arranged such that given 
one element the position of the rest are precisely determined, in other words, 
there is no uncertainty, then n becomes zero, and R = 1, implying perfect 
order. 
Now, the criterion for self-organization becomes:-
dR > 0 , 
~ 
meaning that the rate of change of' redundancy should be positive; and, it 
can be deduced that:-
H( dR. ) > n.( dH ) 
dt --or-
(1) 
The two special cases of equation (1) are:-
Firstly, when the maximum entropy (Ha) is constant, then:-
dH < 0 , 
at 
meaning that the value of entropy should be reducing with time. 
Secondly, if the entropy (H) is constant, then:-
dR. > 0 ,meaning that the maximum entropy should increase with time; 
at 
hence, implying that additional elements should be added to the system to 
achieve self-organization. 
Von-Forester also suggests two general mechanisms which lie at the core 
of understanding of 50S; namely, the principles of "order from order" and 
"order from noise". 
The general information theoretic aspects of self-organization can be 
applied to fairly simple combinatorial type systems. An example is the models 
Approaclle. 1.0 Nodelll D' 01 LearDi D' - Par '-1 251 
described by Rapoport (1962). He discusses two sets of experiments in 
three-person learning groups, on the basis of their self-organizing properties. 
The, so called, "parameters of self-organization" are singled out as a melumre 
of the performance of the system - indicating the degree to which the system 
had managed to organise itself. The learning tasks are comprised of finding u 
sequence of associations, or optimising a reward. The empirical observations 
are supplemented by some information theoretic analysis of a mathemutical 
model, and the analytical predictions are compared with the actual results. 
Some indices and parameters are extrapolated which can quantitatively 
determine the learning efficiency of the group. Once such parameters are 
established, then their relation with respect to the composition of various 
groups, environmental conditions, experimental parameters, collusion or 
communication between the members of groups, and other controllable or 
observable variables could be studied. 
Pask (1967) applies Von-Forester's formalised information-theoretic notions 
on self-organization to his elaborate cognitive model of human learning, and 
discusses the consequences of such analysis with the help of computer 
simulations. His ideas are ext.ended to the domain of teaching and education. 
Man, in a general systems context, is also regarded as a self-organizing 
system, interacting and learning from its environment. Even a more int.ricate 
and general model of linter-nation' politics and relations has been studied and 
simulated by Guetzkow (1962), using the context of SOS. 
4.6.6 GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY AND SELF-ORGANIZING SYSTEMS 
There are many different, and sometimes conflicting, conceptions of SOS 
which mainly refer to a specific class of system. Mesarovic (1962) analyses 
the SOS from a broad outlook of general systems theory. The process of 
self-organization is seen as an orderly change in a system's structure. In 
addition, some high level examples of SOS in nature (e.g., the human brain) 
are only considered as a special type of the general class of all SOS. The 
interdisciplinary feature is seen as a very important aspect of such analysis, 
but it is emphasised that widespread careless generalizations should be 
avoided, and: "sos defined in terms of the activities or behaviour of the 
general system and not in terms of the specifics of the system under 
consideration. " 
Mathematical optimization techniques, on the whole, cannot be used on the 
general class of system structures that have no orderly relationships, and 
mainly apply to functional problems. Hence, Mesarovic outlines an abstract 
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basis for the description of systems that can accommodate the global view of 
the property of self-organization - enabling the identification of a behaviour 
of a system as self-organizing, distinct from other properties such as 
adaptation and learning. 
He also distinguishes two general methods of describing the behaviour of 
SOS: (1) - tcausal descriptions', and (2) - 'teleological descriptions'. The 
causal SOS change their structure according to a preprogrammed sct of 
input-output relationships, but the teleological SOS change their structure in 
an attempt to achieve (or pursue) certain goals. The latter systems are the 
more flexible, and hence can function in a wider range of situations. The 
essential question is, therefore, seen as the design of elaborale and complex 
decision-making procedures and strategies to attain a goal more effectively, 
which might involve the changing of the teleological structure itsel!. 
Mathematical description of such systems are abstracted, and their behaviour 
further investigated by studying the computer simulation of analytic models. 
4.6.7 AN OVERVIEW OF SELF-ORGANIZING SYSTEMS 
Andrew (1967) sees the way forward for the future generations of much 
more complex computers lying in the incorporation of self-organizing 
properties within the fabric of computers; and he anticipates that basic units 
of these computers to be of a more complex nature than f'1cCulloch and Pilt's 
models of neurons or the threshold logic elements. Furthermore, in this vain, 
he discusses a set of features that all SOS are likely to have, and proposes 
some hypothetical elements, namely "wondering correlators", which either 
dynamically or statically search for various significant levels of correlation in 
the system and then perform particular functions. The shortcomings of 
available experimental models are also discussed, in particular, the lack of a 
hardware device for adequate representation of analogue storage. 
However, these cybernetically biased views, although intuitive, have not 
produced any concrete results in practice, thus far. Similarly, abstractions 
emerging from the topic of 80S have not lead to any fruitful discoveries 
about the nervous system. Probably t because of the complex way the 
inherited (genetic) and the environmental sources of order interact and 
influence the organization of the nervous system. Nevertheless, some workers 
feel that this approach is still potentially fruitful. 
Furthermore, no precise global theories have been devised for the accurate 
functional analysis of this criterion. The formalisms proposed either deal 
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with this phenomenon in a very abstract and general sense, or are only 
applicable to a specific type or a limited class of systems. 
More recently, Andrew (1980) (also Dalenoort, 1982) reviews the 
development of the subject of SOS, and its current status, indicating the 
recent apparent abandoning of such an approach is, mainly, due to lack of 
disappointing resu1ts (unlike the spectacular achievements of A.I.). The SOS 
are also discussed in the context of 'autopoiesis' (referred to in the previous 
chapter), and the autopoietic view is regarded as a possible means of reviving 
the interest in SOS studies. 
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CHAPTER 5 
---------
PART-II 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is in fact a continuation of the preceding chapter; a fairly 
arbitrary division is made here to distinguish the more recent trends in the 
modelling of the learning process from the earlier trends labelled by a variety 
of terms such as 'cybernetic', 'self-organising systems', 'neural-net', 
'automata-theory', 'control systems', etc. (those outlined in chapter four). 
However, the taxonomy pursued in these two chapters does not follow a 
precise historical ordering, neither does it have clear cut boundaries. 
Therefore, many of the subjects discussed in this classification span the 
entire course of the evolution of the field of artificial 'learning' systems, in 
one form or other. The overlap of domains of research for many of these 
approaches has also lead to a complex inter-linking of interests of workers 
from different fields. 
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that, generally, most of the topics covered 
in Chapter 4 reached the peak of their popularity at some point during the 
past four decades, and, on the whole, have had a historical precedence over 
those that will be covered in this chapter (which are still extensively' and 
progressively researched). Two major approaches to the modelling of learning 
will be discussed here: 'Pattern-Recognition' and 'Artificial-Intelligence' 
( specifically some of its important subsections: 'problem-solving' , 
'concept-learning', 'game-playing' and 'robotics'). In addition, some other 
specialised approaches to learning such as the 'evolutionary-programming', and 
the 'educational' approaches will also be brieny considered. 
5.1 PATTERN-RECOGNITION APPROACH TO 'EARNING' SYSTEMS 
The subject of "Pattern-Recognition" or PR has been referred to previously 
in numerous occasions. But, here, we will attempt to outline a more detailed 
and broad account of this topic, and issues involved in relevance to the 
learning process. Many of the topics discussed in the previous sections on 
SOS and neural/logical nets have had a great deal of bearing on PR models; 
and some of the models described could indeed be categorised as PR models. 
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Firstly, it must be emphasised that PR does not solely refer to visual 
aspects, and more fundamental explicit qualities of percepts and their 
relationships are involved. The process of PR is also so intrinsically involved 
with the process of learning that it is hard to imagine any learning situation 
where the detection, recognition, or classification of input variances are not 
prime concerns. 
The discipline of PR came to life as a result of the scientific desire to 
find physical counterparts of physiological and mental events. Yet, the 
diversification of its enquiries has even extended to philosophical domains, 
such as discussions about the nature and validity of various epistemological 
assumptions on perception - usually involving aspects of mind-body problem. 
The science of PR has two principal facets; on the one hand, models are 
devised for the 'simulation' of relevant psychological properties; on the other 
hand, models are devised as 'artificial' counterparts for such properties. Such 
a dichotomy was also implicit in our previous approaches, however, it is only 
in the case of these more recent trends that the division has become explicit. 
The above, apparently arbitrary distinction is hinged on the underlying 
intentions and backgrounds of scientific workers interested in the subject. If 
their objective is the understanding of the 'natural' aspects of cognition by a 
step-by-step imitation of perceptual observations, then they are said to be 
engaged in simulation. But, if they are _occupied with the design of models or 
machines that try to achieve the task of PR by, principally, non-biological 
means (although some 'natural' considerations may be incorporated), or with 
the intention of out-performing humans in particular task-domains, then they 
are said to be involved in the artificial aspects of PR. However, so far, the 
majority of PR models designed have involved practical tasks of discriminating 
patterns by "artificial" means, and not simulating the wayan animal or human 
performs the same task. 
A survey of literature on PR reveals the variety of abstract and practical 
techniques that have been adopted in solving these problems. The 
engineering-oriented system theorists have been engaged in the design of 
efficient input-filters for improving a specific performance criterion of a 
system. The -workers interested in machine and computer 'intelligence' have 
been trying to· devise models that can display some human perceptual 
capabilities, but not necessarily following the same processes. While, 
scientists that have an interest in either simulation or synthesis of animal 
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and human PR mechanisms have endeavoured to construct a variety of models 
which emulate some such properties. 
The science of PR has, also, been distinguished from the more recent topic 
of artificial vision (or scene-analysis) by some workers. Artificial vision is 
said to be concerned with structural properties and relationships of idealised 
object patterns, while, PR is concerned with identification from raw data. 
Yet, ultimately, we could argue that both processes should be incorporated 
hand in hand in the true intelligent machines of future. 
Similarly, various researchers have distinguished PR problems from 
'pattern-classification' and 'pattern-formation' problems. It is contended that 
in PR a set of known classes of patterns normally leads to a classification 
rule. While, pattern-classification is only concerned with applying a 
previously established classifying rule to some unknown inputs; and 
pattern-formation refers to problems dealing with the identification and 
definition of appropriate class sets. 
However, here, neither of the above two distinctions will be pursued, and 
pattern-recognition and its related processes will be discussed in a broader 
context. Although it must be remembered that problems posed in PR are 
quite different from the engineering type problems involved in the design of 
automatic character or symbol 'reading' machines, where the principal issues 
of concern are the coding of a set of standardised patterns. 
The development of the science of PR has been land marked by specific 
solutions that, although spectacular in well defined small domains, are mostly 
dependant on ad-hoc practical methods. On the other hand, the more global 
solutions to the problem are characterised by mathematical formalisms which, 
seemingly, preoccupy their designers with the intricacies of their abstractions 
without paying too much attention to practical aspects. Furthermore, 
experience has shown that when the first type, the ad-hoc, techniques are 
extended to the more generalised situations, they are disappointingly 
inadequate. 
A classification for the different types of intelligent activities modeled by 
PR researchers was, proposed by Dreyfus (1972), which, in his view, 
distinguished, although not sharply, the four general areas most PR workers 
direct their efforts towards. These fields are: (1) - 'pattern matching' rigid 
responses to fixed templates; (2) - 'algorithmic rule based recognition' of 
simple rigid patterns, involving search of feature classes; (3) - 'heuristic 
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recognition' of more complex, or noisy, patterns which involve search for 
regularities; (4) - 'recognition' of varied and distorted patterns, based on 
generalising stimuli, and by having some insight into the meaning or the 
relevance of patterns - which usually involves learning from experience or 
examples. 
Within the previous three decades, numerous PR sYRtems have been 
developed, tackling varied tasks such as:-
(a) - Reading of codes, symbols or characters 
(b) - Recognition of various objects 
(c) - Speech-typewriting 
(d) - Voice-recognition, speaker-identification 
(e) - Identification of radar, sonar, or EEG signals 
(f) - Weather-map analysis 
(g) - Finger-print identification 
(h) - Chemical analysis of stained tissue slides, blood-cell classification 
(i) - Medical diagnosis 
(j) - Game-Playing 
(k) - Automatic translation and programming 
(1) - Industrial process and quality control 
The degree of proficiency of a system depending on the number and the 
complexity of patterns in its recognition range, and also on the ease of 
detecting and defining features of such patterns. 
Although, most research in PR has been directed towards the recognition 
of visual patterns, a significant amount of work has also been progressing in 
the area of 'speech-recognition'. Early works on speech recognition 
approached the problem by trying to first recognise words on the basis of 
their phonetic patterns, and then, by using some rules of grammar, recognise 
whole sentences, and finally the embedded meanings. However, it has become 
clear that much more complex interactive processes are involved, whereby, 
recognition is influenced by a variety of semantic and syntactic factors, and 
also environmental cues and clues in a holistic manner. Currently it is 
regarded that the progression of methods developed for simpler type lower 
level sub-problems (phonetic recognition techniques) is not a viable route for 
finding a solution to the problem of artificial speech recognition. 
There are also certain types of PR processes which do not depend on a 
specific sensory modality (vision, speech, etc.), such as the recognition of 
symptom patterns in a medical diagnosis system, or some geophysical patterns 
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in a weather forecasting system. However, the fundamental problems of 
speech recognition (or other types of recognition), which are of interest to 
this thesis, will be covered within the general discussions of the topic of PR 
in this section. 
5.1.1 SIGNIFICANCE OF PATTERN 
Some early workers in cybernetics had reached the conclusion that 
recognition of patterns was the critical operation in any process of learning. 
For example, Walter (1953) embarks on an interesting discussion of 'pattern', 
and the important part it plays in every facet of life and development of 
scientific enquiry. Pattern, as the 'raw material of order', is defined as: "any 
sequence of events in time, or any set of objects in space, distinguishable 
from or comparable with another sequence or set. " Its significance as an 
intrinsic quality of living is highlighted; and all sciences, in a broad sense, 
are said to stem from 'pattern-seeking'. The developed capabilities of the 
nervous system are also seen as the solution provided by evolution in dealing 
with the problem of perceiving complex patterns. 
A more engineering-oriented definition for 'pattern', given by Glorioso 
(1975) as distinct from 'signal', is: "If one has no convenient mathematical 
description of the information structures of signals, then they are generally 
referred to as patterns. Also, patterns often take on a multidimensional 
nature and are expressed as n-dimensional vectors." 
The significance of 'pattern' has also been evident in investigations of the 
workings of the brain at the neural level - it is the pattern of inputs to a 
neuron which determines its 'firing', and not the excitation/inhibition of 
individual inputs. 
Hence, the questions of how pattern is formed, classified, preserved, 
retrieved, changed, and what it signifies, become central to the investigations 
and modelling of the learning process. In Walter's case, he approached these 
questions by trying to analyze and model the patterns of holistic activities of 
the brain - in the form of EEG recordings of the brain wave patterns. 
5.1.2 PATTERN-RECOGNITION AND PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
Evidence from psycho-physiological observations show that animals and 
humans can recognise shapes independent of their size, angle, mirror-image, 
distance, movement, brightness, colour, incompleteness, and their relative 
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retinal location. The less developed organisms possess inferior perceptual 
capabilities, due to the more primitive central processing features of their 
nervous systems, and nol the deficiencies of their visual systems. In humans, 
visual pattern-recognition and image-processing is carried out by very fast 
parallel sensors (estimated at 1()6) that transmit information from the eye to 
the brain - this process is in contrast to the slower and more limited 
sequential auditory signal processing achieved by the ear. The visual signals 
are further manipulated in the brain by utilising its huge data base of 
information. 
Some workers have attempted to devise artificial PR models which manifest 
a variety of psycho-physiological observations. As in the case of earlier 
neural-net and SOS trends, the theories of learning introduced by Hebb (1949) 
have featured prominently in many such endeavours. 
Psychologists have, in general, divided the process of recognition into: 
'primary-recognition', referring to the process of recording physical attributes 
of an object; and 'secondary-recognition', referring to the interpretation rules 
imposed or the classifications of sensory data. Furthermore, other higher 
aspects of perception such as 'expectations' and 'beliefs' are assumed to arise 
from these two lower levels. It is also recognised that various motivational 
factors influence the process of PR, and that motivational centres are 
intricately connected with PR mechanisms - although, most artificial PR 
models do not encompass motivational aspects. 
The difficulties encountered in devising artificial PR systems are better 
understood when we carefully consider the natural PR systems. Clearly, the 
biological mechanisms present in the nervous system cater for this facility of 
animals, and in most cases no conscious or direct effort is made to classify 
or recognise an object as a member of a class of similar objects. However, 
the complex interplay between experience, learning and PR (and many other 
contextual and linguistic factors) has hampered the discovery of exact 
postulates about the nature of this process, or the mechanisms involved. 
Furthermore, due to the particular nature of most psychological experiments 
carried out on PR, which are generally based on logico-linguistic criteria, no 
real insight can be obtained into the actual way physical inputs are processed 
or utilised within the brain. 
As far as a direct connection between the processes of PR and learning in 
the psycho-physiological sense is concerned, perhaps only 'habituation' can be 
described in terms of a crude process of PRe Whereby, an internal 
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representation or a model of a stimulus pattern (or its general class) is 
formed and stored within the memory, and subsequent input patterns compared 
with it. Hence, in this sense, we can say that PR is only akin to the 
primitive levels of the evolutionary hierarchy of the learning process. 
However, PR is today being used as basis for a wide range of 'learning' 
models, many of which involve the more complex and higher strata of this 
hierarchy - 'learning' of meanings or concepts. 
5.1.3 BRAIN. NEURO-PHYSIOLOGY. AND PATTERN-RECOGNITION 
The lack of precise knowledge about the workings of the brain, and the 
complex nature of problems associated with its analysis, has prompted many 
scientists from various disciplines to apply the conjectures of their own 
paradigms to the modelling and explaining of the functions of the brain. 
Pattern-Recognition is one such discipline; an initial biological bias 
culminating in models which are more or less non-physiologically oriented has 
been the feature of most endeavours of PR workers. There has been a 
striving to find engineering or mathematical analogues of natural PR 
processes, and also a desire to explain these natural processes in terms of 
some engineering or abstract criteria. 
Some engineering-oriented workers, having this latter objective. consider 
the whole brain as a kind of modular pattern recognizer. The brain in their 
view functions by extracting meaningful patterns of information from the 
mass of incoming data, compares these patterns with previously stored 
patterns, and based on the past and present patterns makes intricate 
judgments on which internal or external outputs to activate. Consequently, 
this simple explanation of biological reaction mechanism is extended to the 
entire hierarchy of intellectual capabilities. Such scientists see PR to be of 
prime importance to all biological organisms, and contend that it is only the 
size or the complexity of the memory-storage, comparing, or decision 
mechanisms of the PR systems in species which determine the phylogenetic 
ordering of intelligence. 
At the neuro-physiological level, also, many workers such as McCulloch 
and Pitts (1959) have tried to uncover the mechanisms of PR and perception. 
They have directed most of their research towards the analysis of neural 
information processing, in particular, in the visual systems of humans and 
animals (e.g., frogs, cats, monkeys). These studies have been a valuable 
source of information for PR model-builders. For example, it has been 
discovered that certain retinal detectors of these animals are dedicated to 
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preprocessing and responding to special types of visual features (e.g., edges, 
contrasts, convexities), more or less functioning on a sort of 'template 
matching' criteria. 
Rosenblatt's (1959) 'Perception' machine, constructed with photocells and 
lights (inputs and outputs), was also able to display some basic qualities of 
human vision, and was even able to make simple classifications of inputs. 
Many other anatomical studies of simpler visual systems have managed to 
reveal some of the mechanisms that extract more basic features involved in 
transforming visual information from the eye to the higher processing levels 
(as well as showing some general principles of neuronal plasticity and 
specificity). Subsequently, most of these concepts, in a more simplistic form, 
have been appearing in various PR schemes. 
In addition, numerous engineering oriented scientists have attempted to 
apply various hypothetical neuronal models to the problems associated with 
PRo Using analytical neuronal models they have designed systems to emulate 
the 'feature extraction' or the 'stimulus discrimination' mechanisms of the 
brain of some animals. 
Examples are Deutsch's (1967) models of the visual and auditory PR 
mechanisms of animals, which use established engineering techniques such as 
transformation matrices or functions, information theory, Laplace Transform, 
frequency analysis, etc. Deutsch's line of investigation firstly involved the 
understanding of biological processes at work, followed by the application of 
known engineering methods in analyzing these processes, and finally the 
introduction of a simple hypothetical model, based on arrays of elements 
represented by matrices. These models were capable of recognising simple 
patterns, such as the decimal numbers - the recognition was done by 
comparing and correlating features of inputs with sets of test patterns. 
Arbib (1972) also approaches the problem of PR from the brain sciences 
point of view. He embarks on his line of argument by first considering the 
various hypothesis and discoveries made in the physiological investigations of 
visual perception and· visual recognition in animals, in particular that of cats 
and frogs. His principal contention is that perception is 'action oriented', 
and goes on to develop analogous artificial models for some perceptual 
mechanisms. 
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5.1.4 COGNITION, PERCEPTION AND PATTERN-RECOGNITION 
The vast amount of research and experiments carried out by cognitive 
psychologists in the field of 'perception' has provided an important source of 
knowledge for PR workers engaged with such problems. Discoveries, mainly, 
based on human perception have suggested ways which information could be 
classified, compared, generalised, organised, stored, retrieved, and in general 
perceived. Much of the general principles used in the construction of PR 
computer models have been adopted from these studies, especially from 
research on visual-perception - of course, other principles adopted from 
various empirical studies have also been incorporated in such models. Ideas 
on 'perceptual cues' and 'clues', and formation of 'belief-structures', are some 
of the principal notions incorporated in the work of PR model-builders. 
Simply stated, to 'perceive', according to George (1973), is something more 
than 'to sense' and less than 'to know'; and while, the defined boundaries of 
terms 'perception', 'cognition', and 'learning' are to some degree arbitrary, 
such a segmentation has helped the investigation and analysis of behaviour. 
George (1986) emphasises that these terms should not be viewed as pieces of 
a "jigsaw puzzle" that fit together, but as concepts which overlap in a 
somewhat "fuzzy" way. 
The distinction between psychological concepts of 'cognition' and 
'perception' is vaguely reflected in another dichotomy, "parallel/sequential", in 
PRo If the trivial classification of patterns by, primarily, using information 
from the sensory level, the ·cognition", is the objective, then the 'parallel' 
methods of PR could provide the appropriate examples. By contrast, if the 
more complex logical and deductive (knowledge level) aspect, the "perception", 
is to be emphasised, then the 'sequential' procedures of PR, mainly developed 
in the field of A.I., could be cited. However, it is hard to imagine the 
complete PR systems of future solely relying on only one of the above 
paradigms. 
The close analysis of even ~he simplest recognition tasks carried out by 
man, and the identification of parameters and components of perceptual 
processes involved, reveals the daunting difficulty of trying to implement PR 
in machines, computers or robots. 
Some perceptual laws of organization were outlined and discussed in 
chapter two. Human and animal perceptual systems show many peculiarities 
which have been extensively demonstrated by, the so called, perceptual 
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illusions. Examples, such as those illustrated by Gregory (1966) or Lindsay 
and Norman (1972), clearly show that sensory information could be interpreted 
in erroneous ways. 'Degradation of images', 'competing organizations', 
'organizations without meaning', 'motion paradoxes', 'sensory aftereffects', 
'spatial and temporal illusions', 'impossible organizations', and 'context 
dependant illusions', are some of the labels used for particular idiosyncrasies 
of human visual systcm - which arc, in fact, manifestations of implicit rules 
of perception embedded within the neural structures. The main question for a 
PR worker is that to what extent these issues are significant to the core of 
the PR problem. This is important since direct physical observations of the 
mechanisms involved will not, in general, account for or predict the oddities 
observed in perceptual systems. 
In spite of a lack of precise explanatory hypothesis, there are strong 
evidence which point to the existence of some 'feature extracting' mechanisms 
in the brain; and, also, there are indications pointing towards the importance 
of issues such as 'visual cues', 'context', 'expectations', 'meaning', and 
'attention' in perceptual recognition processes. 
Recently, some solid theories have been developed in the field of 
perception, be it in a narrow sense, in an attempt to explain a number of 
above peculiarities and distortions of the human visual and perceptual system. 
For example, rules have been proposed which based on simple notions of 
convexity, concavity, or relation of faces, edges, and corners of a picture 
could decide whether the object is physically "possible" in configuration or 
not. Consequently, these theories are finding their way to the design of 
various computer programs dedicated to scene-analysis or PRo 
Cognitive studies of the process of PR have, therefore, shown that some 
interpretations must be made on the sensory data reaching the brain. The 
rules of these interpretations have been modelled by some computer and A.I. 
workers. One class of models analyze scenes of group of objects or shapes. 
For example, Guzman's (1968) model or Winston's (1977) 'block-world' model. 
Another class of models try to simulate human cognitive processes, and 
provide a medium for testing perceptual observations, an example being Simon 
and Feigenbaum's 'Elementary Perceiver and Memorizer' (EPAM). Generally, 
such models are characterised by their dual processing levels; first, an 
elementary specific feature extraction level; followed by a more global 
concept forming level, in a vaguely analogous manner to the natural PR 
processes. 
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5.1.5 INTELLIGENT MACHINES AND PATTERN-RECOGNITION 
PR has long been considered as one of the central problems in the design 
of intelligent machines and programs. A prime objective of designers of 
intelligent machines has been to give machines the capability to communicate 
with the outside world, more or less as humans do. Hence, implying the need 
to design vision systems that can 'see' and 'comprehend' the environment 
without the use of specialised intermediating switches, keyboards, or 
transducers. 
As explained, PR encompasses a multitude of issues such as perception, 
cognition, and abstraction. This important consideration was acknowledged 
right from the outset of development of this subject, as stated by Selfridge 
and Neisser (1960): ..... until programs to perceive patterns can be developed, 
achievements in mechanical problem-solving will remain isolated technical 
triumphs. " 
Perhaps, the impressive array of competent yet very specialised models 
developed in the computer related and A.I. subjects thus far reflects the 
above early skepticism and concern. Many indications point to an imbalance 
between the developments of 'acquisitional' and 'processing' aspects of 
intelligent machinery. The net result being that most developed systems only 
function proficiently in specialised domains with carefully prepared inputs. 
Aleksander (1984) outlines three broad classes for recognition systems 
developed for use in intelligent systems or machines. Briefly, they are:-
(a) -
(b) -
(c) -
tpreprogrammed systems': that detect geometric properties (e.g., area, 
perimeter, etc.) of objects, and, hence, calculate their iCientity. 
Standardization and simplification of images is of prime impqrtance, 
therefore!. Jreat attention is given to smoothing and enhancing the 
quality 01 unages (from TV-cameras). High speeds of processing are 
required for this class of systems. 
'Adaptive systems': which incor~rate more versatility (but Jess 
expertise) into their designs. Tliese systems can, either under the 
external supervision of an operator or acting autonomously, interact 
with their environments; and, by 'seeing' samples of objects to be 
recognised, are able to make a recognition choice when confronted with 
an unknown object. 
'IntelliJrent systems': which can be attributed with some hil(her 
intellectual capabilities of humans.. such as language and reasonmg. 
The emphases in this class of moaels have been on the formation of 
knowledge structures (logical! linguistic), and on the representational 
aspects of 'concepts', rather han physical 'images'. 
Aleksander also discusses how these three classes of models, having found 
their specialised applications in different areas of PR, A.I., expert-system, 
etc., could be combined and utilised in the development of tintelligent 
automation'. 
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5.1.6 ARTIFICIAL-INTELLIGENCE AND PATTERN-RECOGNITION 
PH is one of the principal pillars of the science of 'artificial intelligence', 
and its overlaps with logic and language, specially in the realm of perceptual 
models, have been some of the central issues in A.I. research. 
PH is generally regarded as one of the four principal subdivisions of the 
field of A.I. - the other three being 'game-playing', 'language understanding', 
and 'problem-solving'. The importance of PR within the science of A.I. is due 
to the fact that most developments in the latter subject (e.g., 
problem-solving, concept-learning, theorem-proving, language-understanding, 
etc.) have to deal with some aspects of recognition of patterns; and it is 
implicitly assumed that any truly "intelligent" system should have the 
important capability of PH as a prerequisite of its operation. 
Some examples of conceptual PR models developed by computer-oriented 
A.I. workers are those which are able to detect vertices, lines, and surfaces 
of input patterns, and identify the structural features of different geometric 
forms. In other cases the programs are based on detecting 'resemblances', 
and not absolute 'matching' of patterns to the originals. In addition, A.I., 
computer vision and PR models which concentrate on the higher level analysis 
of feature spaces have also served as frameworks for testing various 
conceptual hypothesis and issues on problem-solving or learning. 
At the core of the field of PR is the process of 'recognition'. 
Recognition, according to Raphael (1976), is one of the two principle 
approaches involved in 'problem-solving' - the second being 'derivation'. This 
distinction (arbitrary and non-fundamental in some sense), in general, hinges 
on the relative emphasis given to 'search' and 'logical deduction' aspects 
involved. Examples of each type of process are: the 'recognition' of 
characters from a pool of predetermined catagories; and the 'derivation' of 
formal proofs for some specialised class of mathematical problems. 
A typical scheme for PR ira the science of A.I involves one or more of the 
following three stages:-
(1) - Sensory image processing: sharpening, noise-reduction, or normalising 
input patterns. 
(2) - Pattern classification: naming objects, and formulating equivalence 
classes. 
(3) - Scene-analysis: identifying comwnents of objects, and describing how 
these components interrelate and form larger structures. 
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A problem which has increasingly come to the forefront of the area of 
scene-analysis research is the question of three-dimensional (3-D) vision. 
While, in the earlier models, it was thought that a simple two-dimensional 
representation of objects could be extended to solve this issue, today, the 
complexities of 3-D vision are better understood and appreciated, and such a 
simplistic progression of ideas is not considered viable. 
In the PH techniques of A.I., classes are normally defined by structural 
relationships of a set of features. For example, the connectivity, proximity, 
and orientation of various segments of alphabetical characters are used to 
form structural classes in character recognition programs. 
Some early scene-analysis programs (e.g., Roberts, 1960) could recognise 
simple shapes made up of straight lines, such as boxes, wedges, pyramids, or 
any combination of them. These programs used simple engineering methods, 
based on geometric properties of such shapes, to predict the identity of a 
new pattern presented to the model, even though in some cases parts of their 
outlines were obstructed. Allowances were also made for camera perspectives, 
and in some programs the background of the room containing the objects 
could be 'recognised' and segregated from the main patterns. 
Guzman (1968) (and other workers) employed a more general approach, 
sometimes referred to as the 'heuristic approach', in analyzing scenes of 
straight-edge objects. His program would take simple rules based on some 
trivial properties of objects such as vertices, edges, or faces; and by testing, 
experimenting, and modifying these rules produce a criterion which worked 
for some specific class of problems, and, hence, was able to recognise 
particular class of objects. Problems of much higher magnitude are, however, 
introduced when pictures to be analyzed include curved objects, or have light 
and shades, or when the issue of three-dimensional vision is to be considered. 
Slagle (1971) had devised an algorithm for finding 8 so called 'linear 
evaluation functions', which by acting on feature vectors was able to evaluate 
or recognise patterns. He anticipated that these type of functions would have 
applications in game-playing, learning, utility-theory, automatic feature 
extraction, programming, and other socio-economic systems. The evaluation 
of these functions for any given task was said to simulate learning, in so far 
as that it could approximate the process used by an individual, or a consensus 
of experts, in carrying out the same task. Various analytical procedures were 
proposed for finding a 'good' set of values for the coefficients of these 
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function - such techniques were an extension of already well established 
methodologies of statistical decision theory for patterns with known 
distributions. 
Bere, it was implicitly assumed that features are readily detected by an 
expert pattern-recognizer or problem-solver, and that their expertise could be 
realised in terms of a function of these features. However, for most practical 
tasks, this assumption is grossly inadequate, and the traits are either not 
identifiable, or the procedures for decision-making involve many other 
unknown factors. Furthermore, these techniques do not incorporate facilities 
for generating and testing novel features, or evaluating new hypothesis. 
Bence, the relative lack of progress in these lines of research could be 
contributed to the narrowness of its methods, and to some of their underlying 
phenomenological assumptions. 
Learning a language without perceiving the objects or subjects it is about 
would be a meaningless task. The complex interdependence of human 
faculties of vision and language has, hence, been depicted in other PR 
programs of A.I. Probably the best example is Winograd's work on 'block 
worlds', in the early 1970's. 
Later on, the more conceptual, the 'semantic net' type, recognition models 
were developed by other workers such as Winston (1977). These semantic 
networks could augment the previous class of models, by interpreting the 
results of a scene-analysis program. 
The above class of models, which heavily rely on the semantic 
representations or descriptions of perceived data, have sometimes been 
labelled as the 'top-down' solutions to the problem of PRo However, 
according to some critics, the top-down preprogrammed rule-based (rules 
arrived at heuristically or otherwise) PR approach, despite having some 
similarities to the mechanisms of human perception, has many shortcomings. 
Their contention is witnessed by the fact that, so far, such models have been 
unable to deal adequately with real environments (outside laboratory), and 
have usually been confined to recognition tasks involving specific classes of 
relatively simple objects with uncluttered backgrounds. Their proposed 
alternative approach to PR, the 'bottom-up', is dependant on the more 
fundamental properties of human and animal perceptual systems, and 
therefore, in principle, should be able to tackle patterns of much higher 
complexity. An underlying feature of systems in this, sometimes called 
'adaptive PR', approach is their widespread use of the learning process as a 
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means of achieving the objective. Techniques employed are, normally, 
different from the 'serial' algorithmic met.hods of conventional comput.er 
oriented researchers, and involve 'parallel' processes - more or less emulating 
the sudden simultaneous changes of neuronal stat.es of the brain. 
In our continuum of investigations of the area of artificial 'learning' 
systems, the higher conceptual PR models will be discussed more fully in the 
later section dealing with Artificial-Intelligence. 
5.1.7 DESIGNING PATTERN-RECOGNITION SYSTEMS 
A simple line of argument will be followed here, whereby, the basic issues 
involved in designing PR 'learning' systems, in particular the parane] syst.ems, 
will be elaborated step by step. FIG.5.1. shows schematically t.he principal 
components involved in a typical PR system; however, in practice, some stages 
may be eliminated. 
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FIGURE 5.1. A general blue-print for a pattern-recognition system. 
(i) - REPRESENTING and ENCODING INPUTS 
The question of 'representation' of inputs, for models which do not 
exclusively rely on their raw sensory data, is of prime importance for PR 
model-builders. This issue, sometimes referred to as 'pre-processing', has 
been tackled by various mathematical techniques (e.g., probabilit.y 
distributions, fuzzy-set.s, etc.), as well as some purely descriptive methods. 
The elaboration of a particular model and its range of inputs dictate the level 
of complexity and the type of representational characteristics that. need to 
be considered. For example, whether it is necessary to consider the higher 
semantic or cont.extual issues or not. 
In designing a simple PR system the first step is to present the input to 
the system in its most trivial components. This is normally done by breaking 
up the incoming data into an ordered array of segments. The digital nature 
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of computers, and most neural network models, has meant that information in 
the majority of such models is presented in a binary form - giving a sequence 
of binary bits as the state of the matrix of input cells. 
Moreover, it is normally desireable to reformat or change the initial basic 
binary input pattern in the latter stages of preprocessing (for the ease of 
subsequent analysis). Some of the methods used for preprocessing (or 
'conditioning') the primary input patterns into a more convenient form are:-
(1) - 'Enhancing' or 'emphasising' certain characteristics of input data which 
are deemed important. 
(2) - 'Providing invariances' in spite of minor changes, obstructions, 
perspectives, environmental changes, or spatial positions. 
(3) - Reducing the amount of incomin)t information by 'noise suppression', 
'normalization' of inputs, 'focussmg', or 'segmentation'. 
(4) - 'Reformatting' the inputs, for ease of processing by next stage of the 
system. 
(ii) - TEMPLATE-MATCHING 
Now, the most obvious and intuitive approach for pattern-recognition 
would be to compare the incoming information with a specific set of 
previously stored examples (or more commonly called 'templates'), and 
calculate their similarity to these examples on the basis of their optimal 
matching of bits. Bence, the simplest of all possible schemes for 
classification and PR is 'template matching'. Machines whose designs are 
based on this criterion are easiest to build, yet are most susceptible to error. 
An arbitrary threshold N can be chosen, above which the correlations 
signify a recognised pattern, otherwise, the pattern is either stored as a 
'new' template or discarded as 'insignificant' - here, 'significance' could 
either be defined on the basis of frequency of occurrence of inputs, or on 
the basis of distinctiveness from previously stored patterns. A simple 
illustration of this scheme is shown in FIG.5.2 (next page). 
The process of template-matching can be seen to be present in most PR 
models. Since, even those systems which are based on the more complex 
processes of feature-extraction and feature-recognition use template-matching 
on portions of their total input patterns at some stage - to locally. identify 
the nature of a feature (e.g., edge, point, angle, etc.). 
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FIGURE 5.2. A simple scheme for recognition of patterns presented and 
stored as arrays of binary bits. 
(iii) - PRESERVING INV ARIANCES 
In the basic form the above procedure is clearly not going to be very 
efficient, since patterns that are similar to the stored templates yet are 
rotated or shifted to a slightly different orientation, or enlarged/reduced in 
size, will not be recognised as same, because of their poor matching. 
Ideally, PR systems should be able to identify objects in spite of their 
spatial transformation, partial inputs, or slightly distorted inputs. As stated 
by George (1973), the long term goal of a PR designer is: "the search for a 
system that preserves, certain invariances under transformations." (Be also 
points out the clear interdependence of the processes of PR and learning, and 
contends that only the utilization of previously acquired information by way 
of learning could result in an efficient manifestation of the natural 
recognition process). 
One way of preserving invariances is to carry out various spatial 
transformations on the input pattern, and try to c;onvert it to a more 
standard form; alternately, all orientations and sizes of an input could be 
matched with the templates. In either case, we can see that an extra level 
of processing becomes necessary to reduce the otherwise enormous number of 
exhaustive classifications - that would have resulted from individual storin. of 
all possible variations. A commonly used technique for standardization is to 
find maximum density areas of a set of patterns, or, alternately, find the 
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average values of groups of data points. Similarly, various mathematical 
techniques such as transformations of coordinate systems or 
matrix-transformations could be used as a possible means of realising spatial 
variations of a standard pattern. 
Standardization of input patterns is particularly useful for technological or 
commercial applications involving PR (e.g., character recognition, automated 
sorting machines, etc.). 
'Smoothing' and 'sharpening' operations, which remove some of the noise 
and irregularities from inputs, are very common in most computer vision 
systems based on digitization of picture patterns. Mathematical processes 
which entail transformation of zeros and ones of picture arrays have been 
scrutinised extensively by numerous workers. In particular, studies involving 
"Life" transformations have yielded some interesting results about the 
behaviour of networks of interacting elements. The possibilities of using 
"Life" transformations as means of achieving standardization have also been 
investigated. 
In one of the earliest PH models, Selfridge's (1956) computer based model, 
the input patterns were formed by an array of sensory elements, arranged in 
an NxM matrix. These primary inputs went through a series of 
transformations, in some cases through the same transformation more than 
once, to form 'secondary images'. Three basic transformation operations 
resulted in: (a) - an increased uniformity of patterns; (b) - the emphasis of 
differences (or contrasts); and (c) - the replacing of relatively isolated sets 
of elements by a single element. The secondary images were, then, compared 
and matched with some stored set of templates, and when a specific 
predetermined level of correlation was achieved, a pattern was said to be 
recognised. The most important aspect of this model was the finding of the 
correct sequence of the above three basic operations for reaching the 
recognizable patterns. The sequences were initially chosen at random, but 
after 'detecting' successful sequences, a 'matrix of transition frequencies' was 
biased accordingly. 
Culbertson's (1963) PR model, based on a neural-net type representation, 
had the capability to 'translate' (shift), 'rotate', 'dilate', 'expand', and 'centre' 
the shape of an input image into alternate forms, and then compare these 
translated images with previously stored templates. 
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(iv) - CLASSIFICATION 
'Classification' is one of the fundamental issues of PR, as well as being 
one of the most basic and common operations in science. The ability to make 
appropriate classifications is basic to all intelligent behaviour. Classification, 
in a trivial sense, involves taking a 'sample' and naming the 'category' or 
'catagories' it belongs. The most simple case for classification is when 
classes are to be assigned on the basis of the values of some quantitative 
variables of a particular description space. For example, in the classification 
of height or weight measurements of a group of people. But, when the 
variables are of a subjective, incomplete, or unknown nature, then the task of 
classification becomes a much more difficult endeavour. 
The way classes are described (or selected) is principally dependant on the 
use which will be made of them. Classification in its simplest form is only a 
basic task of recognition. But, generally, three basic methods are used for 
process of classification:-
(a) - Selection by a simple direct matching process (e.g., identifying a letter 
of alphabet by individually matching with a set of possible examples). 
(b) - Utilising some logical information about patterns (e.g., a shape is a 
"SQUARE" if it has four equal sides and four right angles). 
(c) - Choosing outcomes on the basis of statistical causalities of events (e.I(., 
if event A is followed by B with high degree of probability then A IS 
classed causally with B). 
In type (a) and (b) classification we can see that samples have to be 
defined either by identifying all members or categories, or by defining their 
characteristics. In addition, similarities of an input pattern with the members 
of these sample spaces have to be evaluated. Once a novel input has been 
confronted, a decision must be made to either include it within a previously 
defined category, or to introduce a new category. But, care should be taken 
to not increase the number of classes unnecessarily, or have too few classes, 
or disturb the entire classification when adding new catagories. 
In a broader sense, the process of PR has also been divided into a process 
of 'feature-extraction' and a process of 'classification'. Most methods of 
non-trivial feature-extraction are quite ad-hoc, while, for classification a 
variety of independent and well developed techniques are available for any 
particular type of problem - generally assuming a statistical independence 
between features selected. However, this simple division of the process of PR 
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becomes quite inadequate for the more complex or contextually dependent 
recognition tasks, and a variety of other issues must be considered. 
In the exhaustive extreme of classification, as depicted in the simple 
example of FIG.5.3(a), all possible inputs are taken into consideration. Hence, 
whenever a particular input symbol (e.g., bd, eh, eghi) is activated, we could 
recognise it from our complete classification system. The obvious futility of 
this approach for any non-trivial system suggests that only a selection of 
stimuli should be classified and stored, such as in FIG.5.3(b); these inputs 
could either represent the inputs that occur more frequently, or the 
properties/features that occur regularly in the inputs. Now, supposing the 
more feasible case of the latter, the real task is how to select these 
properties so that neither we are, again, confronted with a high number of 
trivial classes, nor general features that cannot adequately distinguish 
between inputs. In other words, to efficiently recognise an object we need 
to recognise its list of properties/features, but the shortest possible list. 
FIGURE 5.3. 
COMPLETE CLASSIFICATION OF ALL INPUTS 
===================================== 
a J b, c, d, 
aD, cd, • . 
__ UlOflllmlmIlJUnnlllrT:W':lIIu;m;, a be, bed, . 
(a) 
NON-EXHAUSTIVE CLASSIFICATION OF 
REGULARLY OCCURRING INPUTS 
or PROPERTIES (FEATURES) 
==================================== a, c 
ab , ef, gi 
efh, defghi, abefhi 
(b) 
(a) - The exhaustive classification of all possible combinations 
of firing on input elements. (b) - An example of selective classification of sets of firing 
elements. 
In our example, tab', 'ef', tgi', etc. could represent properties (e.g., size, 
colour) of inputs; and for an input such as "ahcef" we could make a 
recognition based on which features (tab' and tef') are detected. However, 
the list of features may be extended or reduced based on other frequency 
considerations. For example, if new and consistent features are detected, or 
if too few features are defined, or if two features are coincidental on 
numerous occasions. 
If we, now, look at some possible ways which decisions about the identity 
of the class of an object may be reached from the detected features, then we 
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could see that, probably, the most promising methods are those which involve 
statistical probability considerations based on previous experiences. These 
methods could entail attaching probabilities (or conditional probabilities) to 
various features being associated with a particular object. 
If a 'learning' is also to be incorporated, then the probability values could 
gradually be modified using some 'counting' mechanism which determines the 
frequency of successful associations; hence, after sufficient experience, we 
could decisively associate the occurrence of a particular feature, or a set of 
features, with an object. In other words, given such features, the probability 
of recognition should approach 'one'j but, normally, in practice, lower 
probability levels than 'one' are considered quite adequate. 
Now, if the machine itself is to determine and generate its own pattern 
classes (or feature classes) autonomously, then it is imperative that some 
measure of utility (or hedony) should be also incorporated within its design -
so that the system can judge the usefulness of its selected classes. Where, 
again, the statistical and other techniques such as 'cluster analyses' could be 
employed to achieve a simple realization of a hedonic measure - spatial or 
temporal clustering of sample patterns could indicate possible boundaries for 
classification, and groupings defined accordingly. 
A problem common to most PR models which use classification of traits or 
features, and statistical decision procedures based on this classification, is 
that the inherent connectivity of a pattern is not preserved. Whereby, data 
is collected at distinct instances of time, and stored in locations having no 
direct spatial relationship or dependence on each other. While, it would be 
more logical not to disturb the information contained in the topological 
continuities of input patterns - specially, since evidence from some neural 
observations point to this type of preservation of topology of input (although 
the input patterns are also diffused non-locally to some extent). 
It should be mentioned here that time related elaboration of above ideas 
on "classification" and simple "recognition" (i.e., sequences rather than 
individual inputs) yet adds further complications to the probability calculation. 
The connection of temporal ordering of events on the basis of a measure of 
texpectancy' will be one issue infiuencing the probability modifications of such 
PR scheme. In addition, when the patterns to be recognised are of a more 
complex form, then problems of tsegmentation of patterns' or 'feature 
distinction' pose more difficulties. 
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The issues of "feature-detection". "feature-generation". and 
"feature-extraction" will be further considered here. Patterns presented to a 
system are not simply shapes made up of homogeneous points or segments, 
but, as in most natural stimuli, normally consist of parts which have varying 
amounts of significance. For example, in the recognition of song patterns in 
birds, or in the recognition of symbolic patterns (e.g., numbers or letters) in 
humans; specific 'features' I'traits' I'attributes' I'properties' give the majority of 
information about a pattern. These features can characterise a pattern 
without actually relying upon the precise point-by-point (which is in fact the 
trivial listing of pattern 'features') configuration of the pattern. 
The process of defining 'feature classes' for a set of observed patterns is 
an arbitrary one, since a variety of different features might be used to 
construct pattern sets - ranging from individual points to topological 
regularities or various semantic and syntactic characteristics of inputs. But, 
generally, it is the shortest and the most efficient list of features which is of 
interest. 
Additionally, a PR machine (or program) has a 'most primitive' set of 
measurements which it responds to (e.g., binary bits or voltage levels). Such 
measurements do not, normally, have a direct bearing on its feature sets. 
Here, if we consider Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety, it can be said that for 
implementing an adequate recognition process the variety in the 'most 
primitive measurement set' should be greater or equal to the variety of the 
feature set involved in the task. 
Therefore, now, helped by clues from natural observations, and other 
parsimony considerations, we can improve our previous PR model to one that 
recognises 'features' of patterns rather than their exact shapes. 
There are two principal ways these features could be detected, generated. 
or extracted and subsequently utilised in the system. Firstly, the system can, 
in a sort. of self-organising manner, generate its own features and decision 
procedures. For example, a random network (such as those discussed in the 
previous chapter) by reinforcing its pathways on the basis of some 
performance criterion could determine its significant features. This method is 
probably the most ideal way of selecting features; yet. so far. models devised 
on such basis have not shown a significant degree of complexity or expertise. 
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Secondly, the designer or the programmer could using introspection define 
all the adequate features of the model, a priori. In this method very little or 
no real 'learning' takes place and the performance of the systcm will remain 
rigid, yet the system will invariably perform much better and faster, and will 
start with a high degree of proficiency from the outset. 
In practice, however, the systems designed are a compromise betwecn the 
above two extremes - mixing versatility with efficiency. Typically, features 
are defined from the analysis of some sample patterns, using part 
introspection and part investigation of sample properties. 
Here, we will attempt to elaborate on three principal schemes that have 
been developed for the analyses of features in various PR systems:-
(a) - At the most primitive level of input measurement (i.e •• the binary coding 
of patterns) features are assumed to be subsets of the basic binary patterns. 
The primary objective, here, is to define a useful set of such subsets. 
In FIG.5.4(a), a 9x9 binary array of cells (sensors) is illustrated, each 
element either being in '0' or '1' state. If alphabetic characters are to be 
classified. then, typical 3x3 sets of points (features), such as those shown in 
FIG.5.4(b), can be used as possible elements for building each character - any 
character could be defined as a union of some feature subsets. 
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(b) 
An example of a 9x9 matrix of binary elements used for 
representation of characters in a PR machine. 
Tiiree typical examples of features observed in various 
characters - many other anEled or straight line segments 
could also be used as possible features of the pattern. 
Methods used for extracting this type of features depend on determining 
local regularities of patterns. Mathematically, the problem can be represented 
by binary matrices and analyzed by Boolean Algebra techniques. However. 
because of the difficulties involved in solving Boolean equations. the more 
successful developments in this area have. mainly. utilised alternate heuristic 
feature detection methods. 
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A type of heuristic feature detection was used in Uhr and Vossler's (1963) 
PR model, which was concerned with the problem of recognition of 25x25 
binary patterns involving simple 2-dimensional pictures. Arrays of 5x5 bit 
configurations were selected as features, on the basis of their frequency of 
occurrence. Thus, a vector of such arrays could describe a particular pattern; 
and simple clustering algorithms could determine the category (class) of an 
unknown pattern (if any). In addition, these feature sets could be modified, 
and a sort of 'learning' (or "generation") of new features, and 'forgetting' (or 
"elimination") of little used features was said to be manifested - based on the 
extent of utilizations of features. The system, indeed, outperformed 
human-subjects in discriminating tasks where patterns were of unfamiliar, 
abstract, random, or non-meaningful nature. Yet, it was not as competent in 
recognising other range of patterns, for example, different faces, letters or 
numbers. 
Other techniques have also been developed in this area. A more 
formalised approach to the above problem was proposed by Nilsson (1965) and 
co-workers which involved the use of set theory concepts and operations. 
The similarity of patterns were decided on the basis of their set theoretic 
commonality of features (or "masks"). 
(b) - A second distinct approach to the problem of feature extraction is that 
taken by engineering-oriented workers who, sometimes, regard their field to 
be a branch of applied mathematics. Here, patterns or objects are 
represented in terms of a set of basic (or primitive) measurements, which is 
normally denoted by a weighted combination of some basic features. The 
problem, now, becomes one of analyzing and determining various parameters 
and variables of feature (or 'factor') spaces. Methods used in this approach, 
usually, referred to as the 'multi-variable factor analysis' approach involve 
topics such as 'parameter-estimation', 'matrix-algebra', and 'statistical 
correlation analysis'. 
Therefore, if we consider patterns as vectors in an n-dimensional space, 
then the recognition problem is the finding of regions of this vector space 
identified with particular class of patterns. Alternately, a process of PR can 
be described by a mapping from 'pattern-space' to 'decision-space', as:-
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The optimum mapping being one which has the minimum probability of 
error. However, treating such problems as a simple mapping by statistical 
decision methods is extremely cumbersome. Hence, in practice, this type of 
mapping is divided, quite arbitrarily, into sub-mappings, resulting in a loss of 
some sort of information at each stage of division. This is shown in the 
following diagram. The observation made is that these distinctions are not 
universally applicable to all PR models. 
Representational Feature-extracting Classifying 
sub-mapping sub-mapping sub-mapping 
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. ~ ~ 
Loss of resolution, or Loss of Loss of 
structural, physical, non-contributing non-frequently 
semantic information features occurring classes 
Most formal analysis of PR systems assume that a large class of features, 
which contain the necessary data for classification, are known a priori. The 
number of features could be reduced to a manageable size by: discarding the 
'poor' features; selecting the 'good' features; or combining (generally linearly) 
a number of features into a single new feature. Techniques such as 'contour 
tracing' could be deployed to detect and extract features from input images 
or patterns. The algodlhms used can detect lines, edges, etc. on the basis of 
the contrast of input picture pigments. 
Similarly, the mathematical techniques of 'fourier analysis' have been used 
to define intensity functions of patterns, and have been used in some 
recognition problems of 2-dimensional images (Glorioso, 1975). The result of 
such transformations, and other similar techniques, is to redescribe patterns 
into a much more simplified form, while retaining some essential 
characteristics, and hence facilitate the use of well established formulas. 
Particular difficulties have been confronted in devising genera) 
mathematical feature evaluation methods which can yield optimal 
feature-spaces for various PR systems. Some restrictions on the 
'independence' or 'normality' of features have helped to simplify the problem 
in certain cases, and have resulted in fairly generalised solutions. But, on 
the whole, feature extraction methods are only defined for a particular class 
of problem in hand. 
(c) - Thirdly, pattern-features could be detected and defined on the basis of 
criteria outside the immediate specifics of their physical forms. On the one 
hand, the designer of a PR system, using his expertise and intuition could 
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devise a powerful, yet very specialised, method for dealing with a particular 
class of problem (e.g., in classifying a . group of patterns such as those 
obtained on a chemical spectrograph). Here, no general techniques could be 
specified, and it is up to the individual designer to use his knowledge, and 
information about the characteristics of patterns under scrutiny, and propose 
an ad-hoc solution - the mathematical or other properties of patterns are 
used to simplify the task of feature detection or extraction. Many examples 
of these techniques can be found in the A.I. related work on PRo On the 
other hand, in the classification problems which involve semantic or syntactic 
elements different, and usually non-mathematical, feature-extraction methods 
are used. Here, feature-extraction is concerned with 'structural (grammatical) 
descriptions' of patterns, 'meanings', and 'relationships' between patterns. 
Such methods will be elaborated more in the A.I. section. 
(vi) - PARALLEL vS. SERIAL OPERATIONS and PROCESSES 
Assuming the essential features of a set of patterns are known, then there 
are two fundamental ways of comparing and matching incoming patterns with 
these stored features: (a) - 'sequential processing', (b) - 'parallel processing'. 
These two methods are outlined in the schematic examples of FIG.5.5. 
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FIGURE 5.5. 
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(a) - An example of a sequential recognizer of patterns PI .... P •• (b) - An example of an equivalent pariillel PR system. 
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The sequential PR system tests each feature in turn, and the results 
determine the next steps. This is more or less the basis for the operation of 
most computers and machines in general. Parallel PR systems, on the other 
hand, function seemingly the way animals and humans handle information. 
The historical course of development of PR models began with the design 
of simple parallel systems, involving statistical analysis of Boolean or 
Euclidean classifications of patterns, fonowed by serial systems which used 
sequential sampling methods. Later, these models lead to the introduction of 
computer-recognition (and vision) systems, based on structural descriptions 
and sequential classification/recognition techniques. 
The particular advantages of parallel processes to sequential processes are 
their higher immunity to noise, distortion and error. Another advantage is 
the possibility of attaching adjustable weighting factors to parallel 
connections, whereby, slight adjustments could be made to the functioning of 
a system without disturbing the totality of its behaviour too much. While, in 
serial systems such small adjustments could lead to drastic variations in 
system behaviour. The implications of this final point is that gradual 
modifications and 'learning' could be incorporated much more easily in parallel 
systems - either by the system itself, or by changes brought about by an 
external operator (designer, programmer). 
In addition, for any given parallel decision process, an equivalent 
sequential system could be designed with fewer steps; but, the speed of 
computation will, normally, be much higher in the parallel system. However, 
it has been found that the reverse is not true, and there are sequential 
procedures which do not have parallel equivalents. 
Parallel classification systems could be, normally, represented by 
mathematical equations; but the serial decision procedures suffer from a 
greater complexity and, unlike their parallel counterparts, are much more 
cumbersome to analyze mathematically, and describe their formalised 
quantified representation. The serial classification rules are, often, in the 
form of sequences of conditional functions or probabilities, and, thus, can 
normally be only illustrated by a graphic 'decision tree' - as in the example 
of FIG.5.6. The criterion used for selecting the best rule could depend on 
notions such as the shortest path through the graph, or the least features 
used. 
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FIGURE 5.6. An example of a simple classifying rule (shown by the graph) 
for implementing the following problem:-
class X = 'ABC' 'ABF', 'BRM', 'LGM' , 'AFT' } 
class Y = 'APM' 'RBK', 'MTO', 'MPK' , 'MTA' } 
In a limited sense, notions analogous to those used in formalisms of 
parallel systems have been defined for sequential systems to simplify their 
mathematical analysis. Concepts such as 'description spaces', 'samples', 
'classes', 'classification rules', and 'classification probabilities' are some 
examples. Similarly, statistical techniques, such as 'Bayesian decision 
procedures', originally developed for parallel systems, have also been applied 
to sequential systems. Another important and widely used analytical tool for 
use in sequential type systems is 'dynamic programming'. 
The various mathematical procedures that have been developed in the 
sequential PR approach are far less dependant on successive adaptive 
modifications of their classification rule, hence show far less 'learning'. This 
is, mainly, due to a lack of concrete general 'convergence' theorems, similar 
to those devised for parallel systems. Thus, unless a serial system is 
convertible to an equivalent parallel system, or has a small finite sample size, 
no general conclusions about a 'learning procedure' can be made. In other 
words, we could not find out whether a serial 'learning' algorithm converges 
to an optimal limit or not, therefore only specific ad-hoc solutions could be 
found. 
Aleksander (1983) discusses the advantages of parallel hardware PR models 
on the basis of two principal arguments. Firstly, due to speed and capacity 
limitations it would be impractical to implement serial algorithms on present 
day computers (other than for very basic systems). Secondly, on the strength 
of similarities of parallel approach to some biological mechanisms of the 
brain. As an exponent of the, so called, 'bottom-up' view of PR he also 
attributes the relative lack of success of this, historically precedent, paradigm 
to the inappropriateness of supporting technological hardware devices. 
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5.1.8 MATHEMATICAL TECHNIQUES IN PATTERN-RECOGNITION 
The interest of mathematicians and engineers towards PR was aroused in 
the late 1950's, particularly, in the area of automatic character recognition. 
The early endeavours were, mainly, occupied with ways of classifying input 
patterns of systems, and their devised early models (some hardware) basically 
tried to mimic natural vision mechanisms using clues from neuro-physiological 
studies. 
Gradually a divergence from the main course of PR was established. An 
abstract mathematical PR related topic was developed which, generally, dealt 
with the property of automatic classification within the framework of formal 
(mainly statistical) systems. This field is sometimes considered as a 
su bsection of computer sciences, however, its workers pursue research lines 
different (much more abstract) from those followed by computer scientists. 
For the mathematically-oriented researcher in PR the problem is normally 
reduced to one of classifying vectors or points in multi-dimensional spaces -
not the analysis of actual forms of patterns or images. Many aspects of such 
work are related to the classical techniques of control and systems theory 
involving multi-variable analysis. 
Another diversification of statistical methods has been to devise systems 
whose classification rules are not determined from fixed samples of patterns. 
This class of problems are sometimes referred to as 'machine learning' or 
'adaptive PR', and are closely related to the adaptive control systems 
(discussed in chapter 4). Here, the sample size is taken to be infinity, and 
the classification rule is continuously updated using successive approximations. 
The algorithms used are normally called the 'learning rules', and their 
'stability', 'convergence', and 'goodness' characteristics are of prime 
consideration. These 'learning' algorithms have been used in the 
implementation of some neural-net type systems - the best known example 
being the 'perceptron' (outlined elsewhere in detail). Various mathematical 
treatments and developments of such algorithms have been undertaken by 
numerous workers, for example, Nilsson (1965) or Minsky and Papart (1969). 
Typically, first, formalisms are developed for simple linear systems, and later 
generalised to higher order classifications, non-linear, or non-Euclidean 
systems. 
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Again, whether the psychological notions of 'learning' are emulated by 
such models or not is debatable. Yet, it is a truism that most of their 
designers strive for such an objective. 
(i) - PROBABILITY THEORY AND PR 
In current A.I.-oriented models of PR the use of probability theory is, 
mainly, limited to the manipulating and representing of uncertain information 
in game-playing or problem-solving situations. However, in the neural-net or 
the engineering approach the mathematical concepts and theories of 
probability play a much more central role, and, often, probabilistic criteria 
constitute the essence of techniques used. In particular, when the outcome 
of uncertain events is to be defined or approximated, or when it is desired to 
establish correlations of various hypotheses and events for a given set of 
evidence. 
One of the theories that has been extensively employed for finding such 
correlations is 'Bayes' theorem'. Bayes' theorem provides a methodology for 
calculating the validity of hypotheses (events) for a given set of observed 
events. Bayes' theorem is based on the concepts of conditional probability, 
and it has also found applications in some A.I. programs for recognifdng 
patterns in terms of previously observed characteristics. But, the more 
~idespread applications of this theorem are found in the lower-level 
classification (PR) models which use the trivial significances of input patterns. 
The basic form of Bayes' theorem has also been elaborated and modified for 
various complex or specialised problems, and in some cases other techniques 
of probability theory have been used in conjunction. 
In addition, mathematical concepts such as "conditional probability" are 
used in 'Bayesian inference methods' to devise 'decision procedures'. In the 
more classical statistical approaches if the appropriate probabilities are not 
available, using information from samples of data and some tentative 
probability distribution functions, some parameter-estimation techniques can 
avail the value of probabilities of encountering a particular pattern (or class) 
from a class of patterns with specific features. 
(ii) - STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES IN PR 
As in the case of most other approaches to learning covered in chapter 
four, statistical methods form an important and integral part of pattern 
recognition techniques. Indeed, in some cases, the work of analytical PH 
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researchers have been categorised within the body of mathematical discipline 
of statistics and measurement theory. The basic criteria of the statistical 
approach to PR are that an object can be wholly represented and defined by 
a set of features, and that such features should be known before the process 
of classification could take place. 
The formalisms devised for these type of models are based on describing 
patterns (or objects) as points in a multidimensional Euclidian Space, whose 
axis constitute scalars for particular features. Ideas of proximity, 
categorization, or reorientation of patterns are treated in terms of distances, 
regions, or transformations of such description spaces. 
The principal objective of a mathematical feature-extracting system is to 
generate an n-dimensional vector from the input patterns it encounters. This 
vector should be able to adequately 'characterise' the patterns that are to be 
recognised. However, the intuitive and vague manner by which this 
characterization has so far been manifested leads us to believe that 
feature-extraction should be regarded as one of the most complex aspects of 
the process of PRo 
In general, the process of feature-extraction could be manifested in two 
basically distinct ways:-
(a) - 'Logically' extracted features: the designer includes features he deems 
to oe important. 
(b) - 'Statistically' extracted features: a sample of pre-classified patterns, or 
continuous input data, are used to change or supplement the existing 
feature list. 
A mathematical elaboration of classification of inputs can be made in 
terms of features. Each class could be represented by a function Cit a 
weighted sum of a set of features {fl,fz,fa ••• }. Such functions could be of 
form:-
Where, Wi,j represent the weights attributed to each feature f~. The value of 
weights could be positive, zero, or negative, identifying the degree of 
significance or hinderance of that particular trait to the class Cl. 
Once a feature-set is selected, then the problem of classification can be 
mathematically tackled by a variety of formal statistical or decision theoretic 
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means. These methods, normally, involve either the minimising of an 'error 
function' or the maximising of a 'discrimination function'. But, a prior 
knowledge of the probabilities of occurrence of classes, and also the 
conditional probabilities of features (or feature vectors) is required. However, 
in most PR problems such data are not known in advance, or are incompletely 
known. Therefore, various techniques have been developed to estimate the 
values of these probabilities and their distributions, and hence enable the 
application of well established formal classification met.hods to a particular 
problem. 
Techniques covered in t.he 'adaptive control systems' section of Chapter 4 
are very similar to these estimation methods of PRo Samples of data can be 
used to gradually 'learn' the values of certain parameters of a probability or 
density function Bayes theorems providing the principal theoretical 
groundwork for such techniques. 
Alternately, when no clear functional form can be assumed about a 
probability density, then other general statistical procedures, such as 
'least-square' or 'nearest-neighbour' techniques could be employed to estimate 
the density. However, here, a much larger set of samples and data points are 
necessary. 
The need for this large number of samples can be reduced by introducing 
the, so called, 'adaptive classification procedures'. These techniques could be 
applied to various forms of distributions of pattern occurrences; and can, 
normally, yield an optimal classification rule after a series of weighting factor 
modifications (which use specific reinforcing or error-correcting criteria). A 
disadvantage of these techniques is that after the optimal classifier is derived 
from the analysis of a particular set of samples, then there is no guarantee 
that in the real mode of operation its performance will be optimal. The 
formalisms involved have been investigated by workers such as Rosenblatt 
(1962) and Nilsson (1965). 
Irrespective of the method used for classification, it ,,'ould be very 
desireable to construct machines (or programs) that could define their own 
classes. Classes could be defined by self-adjusting the parameters of simple 
features (i.e., fi'S). This feature is commonly referred to as 
'unsupervised-learning' or 'learning without a teacher'; and is. normally, 
incorporated in designs where many analyses of samples are necessary to 
discover the underlying consistent traits. However, it is found that a good 
deal of prior information should still be incorporated in such systems. 
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Similarly, the issue of 'overlap' of classes has been a point of particular 
interest when designing algorithms for classification. 
There are many ways of designing the • classifier , of a statistical PR 
system. Such 'decision mechanisms' are discussed by Vigilone (1970) in a 
survey of applicstions of PR technology. A typical configuration of a PR 
system is considered, as illustrated in FIG.5.7. Bere, the case for a two-class 
problem is shown - additional response units could be incorporated for 
multiple class problems. 
After a pattern is pre-processed and represented to the feature detectors, 
then their outputs (bi'S) are denoted by:-
b (j) = 
1 if the j-th pattern contains the i-th feature 
o otherwise 
. . ......... -f, bl (j )~_ 
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FIGURE 5.7. A schematic illustration of a typical PR decision structure from the engineering point of view. 
Now, the response of a linear response unit for an input j could be 
defined by:-
1 , if 
D( j) = 
o if 
~'''lIn 
./ Wi hi (j) - T > 0 
L....Ii=l 
~ n WI hi (j) _ T < 0 L. i =l 
Where Wi'S are the adjustable weighting factors, and T is a decision 
threshold value. 
Approaches '0 HodelliD' 01 Lear.iDe - Parl-II 2H7 
There are also many techniques for the modification and updating of 
weighting factors (wi's). Viglione embarks on a comparative sludy of some 
such methods, namely: 'Forced Learning', 'Error Correction', 'Bayes Weighl6', 
'Iterative Design', and 'HADALINE'. Furthermore, the application or these 
different ways of achieving the decision function are discussed in various 
practical problems, such as the analysis of EEG wave forms or fmtellile 
photographs, and their relative merits investigated. 
Another formal approach, distincl from lhose menlioned so far, has been 
proposed which uses lhe concepts of 'sequential decision lheory' to find lhe 
classification rule or feature-space. Here, the principal difference is lhat 
decisions are taken on the basis of continuous evaluations of confronted data, 
and not a sample set. Both 'forward' and 'backward' sequential tcchniqueR, 
such as dynamic programming, have been utilised for featur(~ selection and 
classification purposes. 
The above techniques are predominantly designed for 'linear' problems, 
hence, the idea of 'linear-separability' of classes is of importance; however, 
various other techniques have been developed to transform a non-linear type 
problem into problems containing linear classes. 
other analytic tools such as 'decision theory' and 'filler lheory' have also 
been ulilised in dealing with the probabilities of occurrence of eventR, and in 
minimising errors between the actual responses and lhe desired responses of 
PR systems. 
Finally, some theoretical solutions based on a compound decision theory 
have been put forward, to deal with the contextual aspects of recognition -
omitted in the simpler isolated PR problems. 
On the whole, although the above formal techniques have added a valuable 
general theoretical dimension to the science of PR, nevertheless, in reality 
most research in this field is directed towards practical ad-hoc (and 
non-global) solutions. 
(iii) - INFORMATION THEORY AND PR 
"Information" received from the primary levels of a PR process can also 
form the basis for PR models. Whereby, quantitative aspects of information 
contained within patterns is investigated using formalisms and techniques of 
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information theory. Some methods deal with the raw data, others deal with 
feature spaces. 
Rapoport (1955) analyses a neural-net type PR system in terms of some 
information-theoretic concepts. Various hypothesis are proposed regarding the 
way information is transmitted and transferred from retinal receptors to the 
brain. Similarly, the plausibility of different criteria for the transmission of 
messages during the process of recognition is investigated. 
5.1.9 EXAMPLES OF PATI'ERN-RE(X)GNlSING K>DmB INVOLVING 'LEARNING' 
The three main components of any PR process are: (a) - the 'description' 
or 'representation' of objects (or their classes) to be recognised; (b) - the 
'classification-rule'; and (c) - the nature of 'prior information' supplied to the 
model (e.g., sample patterns, priming of parameters). 
An important observation made about the majority of PR models devised so 
far is that they are more concerned about the process of 'recognition' than 
'learning to recognise'. Now, if a process of 'learning' was to be manifested 
in any such system, then all or some of the above three components could be 
involved. But, more often than not it is only the modifications of the 
'classifying-rule' which is the target of the designers interested in 
implementing some 'learning' or 'adaptability' aspects. General1y, a 
performance or error evaluation function determines how successful the 
'learning' is. The classification-rule changes are governed by the previous 
results of system/environment interaction. Either a 'specific memory' of 
occurrences is kept, or 'statistical recordings' of occurrences (the average or 
typical cases) are used to update each tentative classification-rule. 
An interesting case is when no direct error feedback from the environment 
is used for the modification, in such a case, it is assumed that the in built 
classification-rule of the system is correct, and only minor adjustments are 
made on the basis of some averaging of inputs; this type of 'learning' is 
commonly referred to as 'unsupervised learning process'. Other notions 
introduced in the area of rule modification are: 'convergence', 'optimality', 
'computational complexity', etc. These terms, evolved from within the more 
analytical studies of the subject of PR, and refer to the attributes of the 
various algorithms involved. 
In the following sections some particular examples of PR models where 
'learning' is a prominent feature will be discussed in more detail. 
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(i) - PANDEMONIUM 
One of the earliest 'learning' PR models, using the parallel principle, was 
Selfridge's (1960) "Pandemonium" system. Pandemonium was a computer based 
system which specified a sequence of events needed for a feature analysis of 
different pattern. For example, in recognising ten different hand-written 
characters. It could apparently 'learn' how to associate various features and 
patterns. Yet, it could not deal with the problem of spatial transformations 
of a pattern. 
Pandemonium was made up of a hierarchy of relatively autonomous units, 
the so called "demons". At the lowest level, 'data demons' would encode the 
input information and pass them on to the 'computational demons', these, in 
turn, detected and combined features in patterns (for some simple systems it 
would be possible to exclude the computational demons). At a higher level, 
'cognitive demons', one for each class of pattern, would indicate the relative 
likeness of an incoming pattern to different stored classes. Finally, at the 
topmost level, a 'decision demon' would give the final choice of the system 
for a given input pattern. A ch matic representation of this hierarchy is 
shown in FIG.5.S. 
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FIGURE 5.8. A schematic representation of different levels involved in a 
typical 'Pandemonium' system. 
The Pandemonium, as a 'learning' machine, using a feedback from its 
environment makes adjustments to the connections between its 'demons', so 
that a better performance could be obtained from the machine. The 
evaluation of performance could either be done by the degree of some goal 
achievement, or judged by an external 'teacher' or • supervisor' • 
Techniques used by Selfridge to realise these adjustments entailed definina 
functions of the form:-
~ • Wl J dJ ~J 
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where Di is the output of i-th cognitive demon and is determined by the 
weighted sum of outputs of all computational demons, the d/s. Similarly, the 
'worth " the Wj, of the j-th computational demon to the whole system is 
determined by:-
Once the weights were adjusted to a relatively successful Bet of values 
(using various algorithms, some described in chapter 4), it was possible to 
eliminate the 'low-worth' demons, or genera.te other new demons. The two 
following possible schemes were suggested by Selfridge for generating new 
computational demons, both involving some modifications of some existing 
demons:-
(a) - 'Conjugation method': combining two 'high-worth' demons. 
(b) - 'Mutated fission method': forming new demons which are similar but not 
identical to the 'high-worth' demons. 
At the first stage of a ten character recognition pandemonium program, 
inputs were presented on a 32x32-cell matrix; in the second stage, the 
patterns were smoothed-out, and then presented to the feature recognising 
sub-system. Some features, deemed to be significant by the designers, such 
as the number of intersections or the length of different edges, were initially 
stored in the program. 
The initial 'learning' phase of the Pandemonium involved presenting various 
known inputs to the system and evaluating the relative frequency of 
occurrence of different features. A look-up table was formed which could 
give the probability distribution of outputs in terms of the defined features. 
Later, if an unknown input was fed into the computer, the system could test 
for each of the features, and depending on features detected it could guess 
the character with the highest probability of matching. 
For this simple task domain the program was able to perform the task of 
recognising ten characters with a respectable efficiency (10% worst than a 
human reader). Bowever, as conceded by Selfridge himself, the design of a 
comprehensive pattern recognition system would pose problems of many higher 
orders of magnitude. In particular, the problems of: separating or segmenting 
inputs into individual identifiable parts; devising systems that generate their 
own test features; and also introducing different levels of 'learning' to such 
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systems, so that, as information is transferred from sensory to higher 
semantic and syntactic centres various refinements and improvementfi could be 
manifested. 
(ii) - PERCEPTRONS 
Probably the best known class of models within the PR approach m'o the 
so called 'perceptrons', initially introduced by Rosenblatt (1958). T'erceptrons 
could be regarded as descendants of early neural-nets, since u continuum of 
ideas is apparent, and also their representational notions are doseh" related. 
Perceptrons were, like Pandemoniums, parallel feature detection sy stems with 
some 'learning' capabilities. Rosenblatt's contention was to introduce a 
general purpose functional model of behaviour which did not dellend heavily 
on structural topologies, or specific logical realization of a system's function; 
instead, he was, mainly, concerned with lhe organizational properties of 
systems. 
A simple perceptron refers to a class of network type models that could 
be characterised by: a 'stimulus-unit', an 'association-unit', a 'response-unit', 
and a 'variable interaction matrix' which depended on the past activity of the 
network. This matrix is sometimes called the 'st.ructure matrix', and gives 
the stales of coupling coefficients belween pairs of units. Also, both stimulus 
and response units can generate 'internal' as wen as 'external' signals. 
Furthermore, various specific conditions could be imposed on the type, the 
strength, and the signal transmission characteristics of connections between 
different units. Transmission of signals along a path of a network can be 
affected by the 'value' of the connection and its 'transmission time'. 
Other more elaborate forms of perceptrons have also been devised. 
Examples are 'experimental perceptron systems' (which are perceptrons 
connected to a reinforcement control system); and the more generalised 
perceptrons, the so caned 'universal perceplrons'. 
In addition, developments based on perceptrons have resulted in the 
introduction of various solid formal concepts such as 'linear PR systems' or 
'threshold-logic systems' - constructed, respectively, on the primary units of 
'teature-recognisers' and 'threshold-logic elements'. These mathematical 
concepts and their applications have been extensively investigated, both in 
abstract form, and also in specially designed hardware (analogue computer) 
devices. 
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(iii) - WISARD 
Aleksander (1983) and other engineering-oricnted co-workers have 
elaborated a PR systcm over the years. The basis of their parallcl model, 
which has also been realiscd in hardware, is the RAH (Random ACCCf>H 
Mcmory) unit of computer storagc systems. The RAHs are considered us 
simple analogues of neurons, and various aspects of their operation is 
compared with a rudimentary view of neuronal firings or non-firings, and 
synaptic changes. 
The simplest realization of this type of model is in its, so called, 'single 
layer net' configuration of RAMs - no interconnections bctwecn the RAH 
elemcnts. Automatic visual PR is one area which could, according 10 
Alcksandcr, cxploit this type of system to its fun potential. The basis of 
funclioning of lhese single layer nets is to change the con1ents of a memory 
address, and later when that particular address is read, the existence of a 'I' 
on the output would be equated with 'seeing' ('recognising') the pattern 
corresponding to the digital code of that address. Elaborations of this basic 
design idea, involving larger number of elements, could be carried out -
whereby, more varied and complex responses could be elicited. 
A more detailed analysis of the ways 'recognition' could be carried out by 
RAMs shows that combinatorial explosion will inhibit the design of systems 
that are solely based on single RAMs identifying each distinct pattern (of 
acceptable resolution). Hence, ways should be found to limit the storage 
requirements, yet enabling the system to deal with small variations and 
distortions of a basic pattern adequately. 
Aleksander describes the, so called, tn-tuple' method of segmenting the 
array of patterns into distinct areas, each segment being associated with a 
single RAf.I. The system is 'trained' to recognise different variations of 
individual segments, as a particular pattern is moved/distorted from its 'ideal' 
orientation. Furthermore, a generalization is introduced by defining the final 
recognition decision choicc on the basis of a statistical consensus of segments 
recognised. A surprising versatility is manifested in the system by thc adding 
of the above properties, and many 'novel' and 'untaught' patterns can be 
recognised with a high degree of success - a kind of 'universal' of a pattern 
is said to have been created. However, it was found that this segmentation 
of patterns could not be carried out to extremes, since gradually ambiguities 
would creep into the system, and although in the 'saturation' state of one 
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RAM per element of the pattern the capacity of storage will be at minimal, 
the discrimination will be very poor. Bence, a compromise should be made 
between the number of RAMs, the size of storage capacity, and the degree of 
recognition accuracy. 
An interesting feature of this model is the way it has managed to emulate 
Bome biological properties of visual mechanisms. For example, in experiments 
on cats, it was established (by Bubel and Wiesel, and others) that some areas 
in the visual cortex are dedicated to detecting horizontal or vertical patterns, 
and they are only partially active in the intermediate angles. 
An 8x8 artificial system made up of sixteen 2x2 segments is trained to 
recognise vertical or horizontal patterns of the form illustrated in FIG.5.9(a). 
Upon confronting a pattern similar to FIG.5.9(b) it will show the uncertainty 
of its equivalent natural system - 11 of 16 segments are detected for the 
'horizontal', and 11 of 16 segments detected for 'vertical' (each segment is a 
2x2 array). 
FIGURE 5.9. 
(a) 
One of 16 
""_on 2x2 
discriminating 
segments (RAMS) 
(b) 
(a) - Two examples of 16 different perfect horizontal (8) and 
vertical (8) patterns used to train the system. (b) - An example of intermediate pattern. 
A problem is also envisaged if the segmentation of picture results in a set 
of discriminating arrays which all become active for two (or more) different 
training patterns (i.e., patterns having the same building blocks). Here, again, 
by observing the way connections between the receptors in the eye and the 
visual cortex seem to be randomly established a similar principle is deployed 
to randomly separate the array into groups of elements, rather than organised 
divisions. The result is, opposite to expectations, to enable the system 
operate in a more organised and superior fashion. 
This 'bottom-up' parallel approach to PR resulted in models which were 
very impractical to simulate on computers for any reasonably large number of 
elements. Hence, in the early 1980's, Aleksander and colleagues built (at 
Brunei University) a hardware model based on the above general blueprint. 
The model is a 512x512 resolution machine called WISARD, the earlier 
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versions of which, the MINERVA machine and the JANSYS program, were 
built during the early 1970's. Wisard is capable of discriminating between 
different patterns (e.g., faces) after an initial training phase which involves 
feeding various configurations of a pattern to the machine. 
Aleksandcr (1983) also discusses the possibility of devising more intelligent 
type machines. He predicts that such machines could be created by combining 
the above single-layer type PR systems, that are powerful in discriminating or 
generalising patterns, with 'learning' automata, that are capable of inductively 
'learning' state transition rules - using some form of feedback. It is also 
envisaged that autonomous machines could be designed that are not 'laught', 
but directly interact with their environments. Introducing 'feedback' to such 
systems could result in the strengthening of distinctions made between various 
patterns (subjects of discrimination); and, also, it can be said that a sort of 
'short-term memory' has been manifested - by signals persisting within the 
system, even in the absence of their source. 
Furthermore, by defining the response of a system in terms of a mixture 
of its present and previously occurred inputs it can be said that now the 
model has a non-trivial 'state-structure', and, hence, it can be thought of as 
a rather more complex type of 'automaton'. 
By implementing (hypothetically or practically) these new ideas in the 
basic WISARD machine, its designers have been able to bring more complex 
dimensions into its behaviour. Images could be memorised and recalled, simple 
associations between patterns could be established, and new schemes could be 
devised for storing these images and associations. A single large 
discriminator is deemed to be able to carry out the job of 'learning', for 
example, the associations of names and objects; and can even carry out 
generalizations, such as relating a variety of different expressions to a 
particular face. Moreover, by adding feedback, sequence of patterns could be 
'learned, whereby, giving one segment of a sequence to the machine as a cue, 
the whole of the pattern could ~e recalled. In its most advanced form, 
WISARD is given some capabilities for control of its environment, in 
particular, the control of its 'eye' (camera) movement. 
However, it must be pointed out that this model and its particular design 
features (feedback, etc.) have basically been developed to tackle a class of 
practical PR problems in a more proficient manner, and, therefore, references 
to incidental similarities with the natural recognition systems, or other higher 
level explanations, should be appraised cautiously. 
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(iv) - OTHER NETWORK-BASED MODELS 
The work of neural-net and logical-net modelers was a prime impetus 
behind the design of many PR systems; and the mathematica] analysiR and 
synthesis of logical threshold elements and functions lead to the introduction 
of analytic celJuJar systems, parts of which were modifiable for recognition 
purposes. 
Various network-based models have been developed, either in abstract or 
in hardware (mainly electronic), to emulate some PR capabilities. For 
example, George (1973) discusses a hypothetical general model for perception 
(visual) which could be based on neural networks. Various schemes are 
proposed as to how the specific characteristics of human visua] system 
(colour-vision, etc.) could be manifested in such models. 
Rosenblatt in the early 1960's developed his hardware 'Perception' machine, 
modelling the basic workings of the human visual system. A simple 
conglomeration of input, output and associative cells together with adjustable 
weighting elements was able to 'learn' to recognise very basic patterns, by 
following three general rules of:-
(a) - increasing weights of non-active cells for incorrect recognitions 
(b) - decreasing weights of active elements for incorrect recognitions 
(c) - making no changes for correct recognitions 
Culbertson's (1963) simple image processing model was also based on 
neural-nets. His model could recognise trivial shapes (e.g., squares, triangles) 
by a process of matching with a standard template of these patterns. The 
input pattern received by the 'retina' of the system underwent 
transformations (i.e., 'linear', 'dilation', 'expansion', and 'rotation'), this 
enabled the comparison of the unknown input pattern with different 
configurations of standardized templates. 
In pandemonium and perceptron the emphasis was on adjusting the weights 
of a predetermined set of feature detectors. An alternate method, originally 
proposed by Uhr and Vossler (1963), was to look for 'good' features which 
could give rise to a suitable weighting rule. They devised a PR system that 
could develop its own features, by generating and testing the validity of new 
features on the basis of its discriminating value. It was, thus, possible to 
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generate some useful and novel features which even the designers of the 
system had not anticipated. 
The feature-extraction process of Uhr and Vossler's model (briefly 
discussed in section 5.1.7.(e)-i) entailed scanning along and across the 
unknown pattern with a 'feature-detecting operator', and determining 
'rnatchings' with this operator at each region of pattern. The operat.ors 
themselves were selected/generated by experiments. A 'learning sc.heme' waR 
devised at the classification stage of the process. Whereby, a 'heuristic' 
method modified (on hedonic basis) weights of feature vectors for each 
'pattern-class', using a 'difference-score' (i.e., similarity to a range of 
previously stored patterns) for an unknown input. This well elaborated 
functioning PH system established a very high standard for the category of 
models it represented, yet in spite of its 'learning' capabilities was only able 
to operate on a limited and simple range of isolated patternR. 
Other classes of models, based on the neural-net and logical-net models of 
chapter four, have also been developed to depict various information 
processing aspects of the process of PR in the brain. Their designers, 
normally, characterise neurons as on/off devices connected by 'weighted 
synapsis', and arranged in certain conglomerations (networks). An interesting 
and powerful feature of these networks is that, by changing their synaptic 
'weights, the behaviour of the system could be modified in a useful way, and, 
in some cases, 'learning' is said to be manifested. 
In the 1960's, numerous researchers were involved in the elaboration of' 
such logical PR network systems. For example, Singer (1961) proposes an 
electronic model for a 'learning' character recognition system, based on the 
human visual processes. The emphasis is on implementing a size invariance 
for the patterns of an object, as the angle of view or distance from an 
object changes. The technique used involves introducing a mathematical 
lattice in the form of a matrix of polar coordinates, upon which the 
transformations of input patterns take place. Various forms of alpha-numeric 
characters are tested in typical recognition tasks - whereby, the number of 
coincidences of outward transformations of an initially 'centred' patterns with 
previously established templates determine the class of a pattern. 
A wide class of abstract PR models are also labelled as 'adjustable-weight 
majority logic' systems. These systems (perceptrons being some special 
examples) are designed on the basic premise that their inputs should be 
connected to the system through adjustable weighting factors. The 
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recognition of patterns is achieved by running the system (or machine) 
through a distinct 'training' phase, where adjustments and reinforcements of 
weights are carried out, generally by human operators. The procedures 
involved should ensure a convergence to a final trained state in a finite 
number of steps; however, the existence of such procedures is a prerequisite 
to its convergence analysis. The separation of 'training' and 'operating' 
modes of such PR models 1. as limited their potential; and, unlike the natural 
recognition systems where the inter-linked processes of training and operation 
are continuously active, their adaptability is rigid, and only ensures adequate 
performance for fixed environments. 
An early version of such systems was the 'Adaline' (ADAptive LINear 
Element) based networks, introduced by Wid row (1962, 1973). Adalines were 
fundamentally different from the basic neural elements proposed previously. 
Each unit in a single layer Adaline network, as depicted in FIG.5.10., had 
independent weight adjustment provisions for its inputs to the threshold 
section. Basic Adalines were constructed in hardware and also implemented 
on digital computers. The weights were modified, either continuously or in 
discrete steps, according to some performance criterion. In the hardware 
models these adjustments were done by electro-chemical means, however, later 
other models used alternate electrical means for modification. 
(in~:t:,~ ___ ¢ (output) 
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FIGURE 5.10. Diagram for an tAd aline' element having the threshold value T. 
For a more functionally complete configuration a two level unit, the so 
called 'Madaline' (Multiple ADAptive LINear Element), was developed; yet, the 
adjustments were only directed towards the first level - here, the close 
similarity of these systems and some SOS or logical-net systems (discussed 
earlier) should be recognised. 
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In these more complex systems the problems of simulatin~ parallel 
networks using inherently serial or sequential machines and computers were 
magnified many folds, and posed much complications. In particular, mnny 
limitations of perceptron type devices were exposed by an exhaustive and 
thorough analytical investigation of the paradigm by Minsky and Papert (1969) 
in the late 1960's, which resulted in a significant recession of interest along 
these particular lines. 
Studies of the behaviour of 'cellular-automata', as a sub-section of 
automata-theory, have been a useful source of theoretical ideas for the 
designers of network type PH systems. This discipline has provided some 
important insights into the computational powers and limitations of networks 
in general; and has also greatly helped the designers of parallel comput.ers 
and machines. A cellular-automata can be defined as any collection of cells 
(or elements) arranged and interconnected in some regular organization (in 
two or more dimension). A simple example of a cellular-automaton (also 
mentioned previously) is the realization of "LIFE" transformations which has 
been investigated by various workers. Von-Neumann's 'self-reproducing' 
automaton was another example of these machines, and many of its concepts 
have been used in various modelling exercises (both mathematically and in 
hardware). Arbib's cellular abstract machines could also display many 
interesting computational capabilities. 
(v) - STATISTICAL/MATHEMATICAL 'LEARNING' PR MODELS 
Mendel and McLaren (1970) discuss various aspects of the application of 
the learning process in PR systems. 'Learning' is said to take place when the 
system's past experience can effect an improvement in performance. This 
implies that for a given decision a feedback of information about the 
'performance' of the system should have taken place. 'Learning' PH systems 
are classified as 'parametric' or 'non-parametric', 'supervised' OJ' 
'non-supervised', 'on-line' or toff-line'. Various 'learning algorithms' are 
considered, especially those related to some mathematical learning theories 
developed in psychology. The principle of reinforcement is incorporated in 
the design of a class of algorithms, the so called 'reinforcement-learning 
algorithms', and applied to different PR problems. It is found that the 
probability of occurrence of outcomes could be updated favourably by 
changing the values of decision parameters (or certain other parameters) of 
the 'classifier' on basis of a reinforcement criterion. Similarly, reinforcement 
algorithms could be applied to feature-selection. 
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Furthermore, 'learning' PR systems are considered as 'goal-seeking' 
systems, and various system-environment-interaction assumptions or other 
issues (e.g., 'linearity', 'memory', etc.) are discussed. Comparisons are made 
between such systems and 'learning control systems' (discussed in Chapter 4); 
and also many equivalences are established between the elements of a 
proposed 'reinforcement-learning' PR system (using a stochastic automaton 
model) and the elements of psychological stochastic learning theory. 
5.1.10 AN OVERVIEW OF PATTERN-RECOGNITION APPROACH 
On the whole, the discipline of PR has been characterised by three 
distinct approaches. The distinctions approximately reflect the three major 
developmental periods of this subject, as signified by the relative popularity 
of each viewpoint within the past three decades. These approaches are:-
(1) - 'The neural ap.proach': characterised by pattern-matching models which 
are effective 10 rigid and exact dom81ns, yet, are very inflexible and 
impervious to small variations of inputs. 
(2) -
(3) -
'The engineering approach': an elaboration of neural approach which 
involves defining rurther characteristics of input patterns. Various 
mathematical methods and combinatorial techniques are developed and 
utilised. 
'The A.I. approach': models in this more recent and flexible approach 
are, mainly, concerned with definition of featurestaand description of 
remtionshlps of features. TheT are, generally, re ted to some human 
cognitive processes, and thell' desi,ners try to incorporate some 
perceptual notions such as 'knowledge , 'meaning', 'understimding', etc. 
mto their desifns. However, learning from experience is not featured 
to the extent i was considered in the earlier paradigms. 
Many scientists have voiced their criticism over the engineering only or 
abstract only view of this subject. The stalemate confronted, when pursuing 
a too narrow an approach, is the main witness for their argument. It is also 
felt that possibly more fruitful, and universally applicable, results would be 
obtained if first the nature of the process of PR could be better understood 
in humans and animals. 
As far as the human PR is involved, in spite of a great deal of work on 
the subject, it is still not clear yet how this process is exactly manifested, or 
what its underlying mechanisms are, and many of the principal/questions 
raised in the early days of this science have still not been answered 
adequately. 
In a critique of the current trends of A.I., Dreyfus (1972) rejects any 
similarity between the way, presently, humans and machines recognise 
patterns, and attributes the slowness of progress in this field to ignoring such 
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similarities. In his view, PR models which perform their tasks on the basis 
of: normalization of inputs, by means of transformations; detection of 
discriminatative features, by means of a decision tree-search or a statistical 
choice procedure; or recognition of resemblances; cannot be equated with 
human perceptual mechanisms. He also speculates on the nature of some 
properties which characterise human PR, and proposes that:-
"Any [artificial] system which can equal human performance, must 
therefore, be able to 
(1) - Distinguish the essential from the inessential features of a particular 
instance of a pattern; 
(2) - Use cues which remain on the fringes of consciousness; 
(3) - Take account of the context; 
(4) - Perceive the individual as typical, i.e., situate the individual with 
respect to a paradigm case. II 
Efficient technological tools for PR which do the actual sensing of the 
outline of an object have been available for some three decades - mainly in 
the form of hardware devices which translate an image (obtained by 
TV-cameras or otherwise) into an array of firing or non-firing elements. 
Many computer or robot-vision systems have also been developed within 
the past two decades, and the prospect of extensive industrial application has 
put a great deal of emphasis on research in this subject. In recent years, 
researchers on PR in partnership with workers in Robotics have introduced a 
new specialised dimension to machine recognition. However, models devised in 
this principally industry-oriented area are quite distinct from the earlier 
endeavours of PR workers. 
Hence, while the progress of the technological side of the research, that 
of designing sensory mechanisms or faster and more powerful computers, has 
been very spectacular, research on the inference making aspects, which 
involves the information processing level, has not shown the same degree of 
achievement. The main endeavour is, therefore , to devise an appropriate 
general classification system· to operate on available data obtained by 
hardware peripherals. 
Today, the initial optimism of computer scientists have been substituted by 
an appreciation of the complexities of the problem. Some of the principal 
difficulties and stumbling blocks encountered are: (a) - devising appropriate 
algorithms for three-dimensional vision; (b) - separating and classifying 
different objects in a scene; (c) - preserving the constancy of size of an 
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object within different percepts. In addition, some proposed sophisticated 
algorithms for real-time scene-analysis require computing speeds and data 
handling capabilities far in excess of present computers to function in 
non-trivial environments. The use of inherent 'continuities' of patterns is 
one possible way of limiting the need for such extensive computing power. 
When assessing the performance of a PR model, the consideration of 
'meaning' and 'intentionality' aspects incorporated within the design of the 
system is extremely important. We should determine how much the system is 
capable of 'understanding' - whether it operates blindly according to a 
preprogrammed set of rules, or works towards a "pecific 'objective'. 
Similarly, we should enquire if it makes 'generalizations' or 'inferences' (if 
any) on its experiences. 
Many important issues have also been raised by considering distinctions 
between 'serial' and 'paranel' processes. Although parallel processes could be 
simulated (but more slowly) by sequential machines, such as digital computers, 
recently, a great deal of attention has been focused on the design of parallel 
computers and machines. Typical reasons cited by designers of such machines 
are: the limitations of serial machines; and also the desire to incorporate and 
simulate some aspects of parallel biological neural systems (such as 
redundancy), which are deemed to possess the optimal forms of information 
processing capabilities. 
The various parallel PR models elaborated so far have shown that, indeed, 
machines could be built to display some facets of intelligence as a 
consequence of their particular structure. In particular, they could have the 
added capability of learning from experience. Unlike most preprogrammed 
machines of A.I. where systems involving 'learning' either rely on the 
'learning' of sequences of patterns or the rules which bring about such 
patterns. In this light, such PR machines (and systems) should be regarded as 
challenging alternatives to the algorithmically based models that presently 
dominate the field of machine intelligence. 
However, the paranel PR models (based on networks) which function quite 
proficiently in single-layer configurations, dedicated to simple recognition 
tasks, have not been very successful when extended to higher order layering 
- where there is feedback and interconnection between elements. The main 
reason is that the complexity of tasks, and the processes, which these higher 
order systems are trying to convey are of a different degree of sophistication. 
Most proposed higher-layer solutions have, hence, involved limiting or 
App .. O.c: .... ,. Node"'.,., Le ...... , - , ... '-11 302 
defining new constraints on the range of acceptable patterns, or adding extra 
structural features to conform to a particular design specification. Thus, 
suggesting that, perhaps, models which are originally designed for achieving 
simple engineering objectives, or are solely based on particular simplistic 
hardware configuration, will not provide an adequate vehicle for representing 
complex 'learning' PH processes - their potential will be too limited. 
5.2 'I1IE ARTIFICIAL-IN1'ELLlGENCB or "'!UP-DOWN" APID:lAaI ro 'J...BARNING' SYS"I'EHS 
In this section we will attempt to survey the approaches to the modelling 
of learning from the, so called, "top down" view of the subject. This trend 
of enquiry, which is generally accepted as the most recent, is normally 
labelled as the 'Artificial-Intelligence' (A.I.) approach; but, in some instances, 
also referred to as the 'Information-Processing' or the 'Machine-Intelligence', 
approach. A dominant (and distinguishing) feature of all models devised in 
this area has been the importance of role of computers in their manifestation 
and representation. In fact, if disciplines such as A.I. were devoid of their 
'computer angle', then, it would be difficult to differentiate between many of 
its research fields and some areas of disciplines such as cognitive-psychology. 
Although, in some of the following specialised subjects, such as the 
'evolutionary programming' approach, the 'connectionist' approach, or some 
cited examples of generalised models of learning, a kind of "bottom up" 
tendency is prevalent. Nevertheless, because of their predominant reliance on 
the use of computers in design, and the relative recency of their appearance, 
these topics are all included within this final categorization of 'learning' 
systems. But, they should really be regarded in more independent terms; 
even, in some instances a closer kinship with our other previously covered 
paradigms could be established. 
Additionally, because of the diametric distinctions in emphasis and 
approach from the rudimentary cybernetic undertones of our thesis, here, the 
A.I. 'learning' models, will be discussed and analyzed fleetingly - without 
scrutinising their various underlying concerns, or typical examples, to a great 
extent. However, the large collection of literatures and papers cited in the 
reference section of our thesis can provide details of many research 
endeavours on this type of 'learning' models. 
5.2.1 THE SCIENCE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
In some of our previous chapters, we discussed different aspects of the 
discipline of A.I.; indicated its characteristics; and considered some typical 
examples of its work. 
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The discipline of A.I. ,is usually derined as t.he science of 'int.elligent.' 
behaviour by automata and comput.ers for the purposes of study and simulation 
of human intelligence, or construction of bigger and betler automata. The 
principal techniques used in A.I. are 'introspection' and 'intuition'. The 
various mathematical and computing techniques used are, generally, considered 
as secondary in importance, and non-fundamental t.o t.he met.hodolog). 
Philosophy, Linguistics, and Cognitive Psychology have been some of t.he 
major contribut.ors to A.I. 
Ever since its introduct.ion, the subject of A.I. has ent.ertained a great. deal 
of self-analyses and self-criticisms regarding its 'validity', 'just.ification', and 
'practicality'. The principal phenomenological difficulty of A.I. is that there 
is no clear cut definition of intelligence (human or otherwise). The normal 
resolution of this difficult 'analysis' task has been to breakdown t.he notion 
of intelligence to some more manageable component.s; and redefine the 
problem in t.erms of concepts such as 'problem-solving', 'theorem-proving', or 
some other currently pursued subtopic of A.I. Yet, paradoxically, it is also 
possible to envisage all these secondary notions in t.erms of 'non-intelligent.' 
behaviour, as attested by a variet.y of 'clever' programs of today. 1t is also 
true to say that although great many questions are asked about. t.he nature of 
intelligence, nevertheless, not many researchers dwell upon the viability of 
equivalence of an 'intelligent' and 'non-intelligent' behaviours. 
Computers are made to exhibit more and more complex tasks, yet, once the 
exact means of achieving t.hese tasks are known they are no longer given 
attributes such as 'creative', 'thinking', 'free-will', etc. However, unless all 
t.hese attributes are defined precisely, or machines could be construct.ed which 
can exactly imitate all human mental processes, this dilemma will continue. 
Today's endeavours in A.I. are mostly directed towards particular task 
domains. Models devised, normally, have some aspect of human cognition 
incorporated within them; and the realization and manipulation of such models 
occupy A.I. scientists to a much greater degree than 'pure' analytical studies. 
However, the actual synthesis of 'intelligence' was not the primary impetus of 
this paradigm; but, it was a desire for a better understanding of the human 
mental functions which initially instigated the scientific quest in the field of 
A.I. - hence, its kinship with cognitive-psychology. 
5.2.2 COGNITIVE-PSYCHOLOGY and ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
Cognitive psychology is a very broad subject, covering disparate areas, 
which at times make it very. difficult to represent its views uniquely. 
"Intelligence" and "cognition" are also considered as closely related notions; 
and, hence, by and large, the task of simulation of cognitive processes is 
taken up by A.I. researchers involved in such aspects. 
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In cognitive psychology the human brain is vaguely regarded as a kind of 
"information-processing machine" (more or less like a computer); with 
elements such as 'sensory receptors', 'effectors', 'memory store', and a 
'central processing' unit. As we have seen previously, "perception" and 
"memory" are two of the central pillars of. cognitive studies. Hence, the 
majority of the cognitive models of human learning have revolved around 
these two issues. Particularly, the concepts of 'Long Term Memory', 'Short 
Term Memory', or 'Working Memory' have been utilised in many such models. 
Prineipal concerns of cognitive psychologists have been the ways which 
memory is organised during the learning process, and the strategies used for 
storing data - not the actual recording of data. For example, the information 
accumulated in LTM (regarded as main source of learning) is categorised into: 
(a) - 'Sensory-Perceptual' knowledge, which contains information extracted 
from sensory inputs; (b) - 'Procedural' knowledge, which contains sets of 
rules, or stimulus-response rules of association; and (c) - 'Propositional' 
beliefs, which contain value judgements or beliefs about subjective truths. 
In cognitive psychology the general view is that relationships are more 
important than individual elements; and that cognitive mechanisms are a kind 
of filters on percepts. The notion of "perception" is referred to as the 
process of interpreting the stimuli encountered by sensory systems from the 
environment. Additionally, cognitive psychologists define the process of 
"learning" in terms of changes brought about in the cognitive systems; and 
consider the system's structure (not its elements) to be the critical agent in 
bringing about such changes. 
Simulation models of human learning which involve 'memory formation' 
have been devised both for the developmental stages of the growth of a child, 
and a]so for the adult state of humans. The investigations of these models 
have, normally, featured aspects of memory such as 'forgetting', 'recall', 
'rehearsal', 'information coding', etc. 
The nature of architectural principles of human mind, and the investigation 
of similarities (and differences) of such structural organizations with their 
artificial counterparts in abstractions, programs or machines are other major 
issues in cognitive psychology. Some workers have attempted to explain the 
various cognitive processes in a unifying fashion, contending that there are 
equivalent principles at work. However, others have proposed the so called 
"modularity hypothesis" in explaining various facets of cognition; whereby, 
each cognitive function is contended to be governed by distinct principles. 
For example, workers such as Chomsky or Marr have tried to theorize about 
the faculties of 'language', 'reasoning', 'problem-solving', or 'vision' in an 
independent and externalised manner. 
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5.2.3 'NATURAL' vs. 'ARTIFICIAL' ASPECTS OF INTELLIGENCE 
Two basic fundamental assumptions are made in A.I. Firstly, the faculty 
of human "intelligence" is regarded as an 'universal' phenomenon, independent 
of culture or individual variations. Secondly, it is assumed that we know 
enough about this natural process to consider its simulation. However, both 
assumptions can be said to be over-optimistic simplifications. 
At the beginning, a proficient chess-playing program was considered as 
'intelligent'. But, today, the common view is that once a program manages to 
achieve its goal then it no longer is seen as 'intelligent'. If "intelligence" 
was simply defined on the basis of apparent similarities with human 
intelligence (as is the case in 'Turing test for intelligence'), then, it could be 
argued that each instance of such exhibited trait in a machine is only a case 
of mimicry. Yet, diametrically, it could be argued that any dissimilarity with 
human inte1ligence could be detected, measured, and hence incorporated in 
such machines; leading to the narrowing of the gap between the 'natural' and 
the 'artificial' manifestations of intelligence. 
An important theoretical discovery 
deterministic automatic formal system 
by Turing was that: "For any 
whatever, there exist a formally 
equivalent Turing machine". The implications of this theory was that no 
automatic system can do anything that Turing machines can not do, and also 
that the Turing machine is the only automatic system we would ever need. 
In the same abstract sense, COdel's theorem, which states that: "In any 
sufficiently powerful logical system statements can be formulated which can 
neither be proved nor disproved within the system, unless the system is 
inconsistent", has been cited as an argument against the possibility of 
constructing truly 'intelligent' learning systems or artifacts, without 
encountering inherent inconsistencies. Yet, many workers in the field of 
"machine intelligence" have rejected this type of reasoning on bases of two 
arguments; firstly, human intellectual powers themselves are not free from 
fundamental errors or inconsistencies; and secondly, it would be possible to 
eonstruct 'open' artificial systems to which such objections would not apply. 
The above arguments and counter-arguments are typical of the disciplines 
which involve the modelling of 'natural' aspects of human mental faculties, 
such as learning or intelligence - course of their developments characterised 
by numerous mind/body or man/machine controversies and debates. Here, we 
will not attempt to linger upon the controversies and arguments which the 
meaning and the definitions of "intelligence" has brought about. Since, this 
kind of philosophical altercations about human mental attributes sometimes 
regresses towards highly ambiguous debates, and will not be scrutinised 
deeply. The notion of intelligence and its facets (e.g., learning) will be 
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considered as natural properties of living animals, whose descriptions (at some 
level) are the bases for their implementations in artificial systems. 
5.2.4 COMPUTERS and ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
Computer is the principal tool used in A.I., because it is currently the only 
usable logical manipulative system. Ever since its introduction, the computer 
has been attributed with 'living' characteristics, and often the scope of its 
potential misjudged. As an 'infant progeny' of technology, questions are 
asked about the possibilities of its future developments. What will happen 
when this 'infant' grows up? Will future computers be our masters or slaves? 
At what stage in its development can we regard them as 'intelligent'? 
History has shown that every 20 years the computing power has increased 
by a factor of 1000; and while their future technical enhancements have been 
consistently underrated, their scope of capabilities have been overrated. It is 
generally envisaged that within the next 40-50 years truly 'intelligent' 
('thinking') computers can be built which are able to compete with humans, 
and solve many of their intellectual problems. These 'intelligent' or 
'super-intelligent' computers will, probably, not be thinking as the humans do, 
and might have very little in common with us; but, indeed, it is possible to 
imagine a coexistence with such machines. Although, the actual pathways of 
these developments are not clear, and most research is currently focussed on 
digital computers; nevertheless, some alternate possibilities are also 
scrutinised. For example, self-reproducing computer architectures have been 
investigated; or parallel processing structures, that do not rely on absolute 
computing powers but on the intricacy of their connections developed. 
computers are presently in their fifth-generation, with blue prints of their 
next two generations already sketched. The essence of today's 'intelligent' 
computers is in the way they are able to use a data-base of information (or 
rules) in conjunction with an inference program, and interact with a human 
operator. Some are able to 'talk', 'voice-operate', 'read', 'diagnose', 
'translate', etc. Others employ alternate computing architectures (e.g., 
parallel) or languages (e.g., LISP, PROLOG, STRIPS, PLANNER) as a more 
efficient way of dealing with particular problem domains. In any case, 
normally, the questions posed about the level of 'intelligence' of a computer 
program, such as a chess playing program, should be redirected towards its 
level of 'performance'. Since, it is the evaluation of the performance of the 
program which signifies whether it is behaving intelligently or not. 
Additionally, many attempts have been made to 'simulate' the various 
aspects of intelligence and learning on computers. For example, Friedman 
(1967) describes an elaborate computer simulation of instinctive behaviour, 
based on traditional psychological theories; Findler and McKinzie (1969) apply 
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a general computer simulation technique to a wide range of goal-secking 
biological phenomena, such as learning and self-preservation; Kent's (1978) 
work concentrates on the computer modelling of the brain's neural 
mechanisms; and Albus's (1979) .computer models try to depict the cognitive 
functions of the brain. 
5.2.5 KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION and ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
Considerable work has been done in the fields of A.I. and cognitive 
psychology on the problem of representing knowledge. One of the most 
common methods is to represent knowledge in terms of 'propositional' 
relationships. However, work has also been progressing on other modes of 
knowledge representation, such as 'linear ordedng' or 'categorization'. 
Some knowledge representation tasks rely on computing or A.I. high level 
languages (e.g., PASCAL, LISP, PROLOG). However, many of the cognitive 
structural models use "production systems" for organising their knowledge 
bases. Production systems have also long been advocated as a suitable 
medium for modelling learning. For example, in acquisition of skills, 
language, or in development of reasoning. Additionally, many algorithms have 
been devised for extracting rules from data, some by organizing information 
to recognize patterns; others by more formal means of reasoning or induction. 
One of the knowledge intensive fields of A.I. which has attracted some 
learning related research, and is deemed to benefit. enormously il 'learning' 
was to be incorporat.ed within its programs, is the area of 'Expert Systems'. 
Expert systems are currently limited because the process of extracting 
appropriate knowledge is the arduous task of their programmersi and also 
because their knowledge bases, normally, do not change (and improve) with 
experience, unless, their human operators add new information to them. A 
recent trend in expert systems has been to develope 'learning' programs that 
are able to opel'ate on a data-base and "grow" richer in context. Typical 
elements of such programs are: a 'descriptive language'; an 'interpreter'; an 
'associative memory'; a 'generalization procedure'; and a 'learning strategy'. 
5.2.6 SCENE-ANALYSIS (PATTERN-RECOGNITION) 
Various 'scene-analysis' models have been devised in A.I. to deal with 
quite complex real situations, specially, in limited problem domains. 
Objectives ot such endeavours have been to find the 'existence', the 
'description', the 'orientation', or the 'position' of an object of interest in a 
natural background. The more global objective of defining 'real-world scene 
analysis strategies' has, also, been pursued. Yet, in reality, many 'general' 
aspects are sacrificed so that working models could be devised; and applied to 
practical problems of 'detection', 'location', or 'navigation'. 
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An example of this type of model is described by Bullock (1976). Whereby, 
a generalized theoretical scene-analysis strategy is applied to the more 
specific problem of finding an object in an outdoor scene, by identifying its 
position and orientation. The necessary trade off and simplifications required 
for such a task is discussed, and various experimental results scrutinised. In 
this model the features are analyzed in three levels: 'point' (pixel intensity), 
'local features' (lines, edges), and 'global' (shape descriptions). Additionally, 
some well established 'feature-extraction' techniques are utilised in the model. 
The two principal approaches to the problem of 'feature-extraction' are: 
the 'statistical/mathematical' approach, and the 'structural' approach. In 
statistical feature-extraction, normally, a mathematical performance measure 
evaluates whether a particular feature should be selected or not. These type 
of features may not have a real physical meaning, yet, they represent an 
efficient and computable set of attributes of patterns. Such techniques are 
particularly suited for 'noisy' patterns, or when no obvious organisation is 
present in the pattern. However, there are, also, many difficulties associated 
with such techniques. For example, the 'availability', the 'number', or the 
'quality' of samples used during a 'learning' phase severely effect the choice 
of features selected. Similarly, there are various problems involved in 
segmenting images into parts; or devising nonoverlap ping independent features. 
On the other hand, the 'structural' feature-extraction preserves all the 
richness of contextual information, and uses the close topological relationships 
of parts of a pattern, or various prior knowledge, in the task of selecting 
features. The weakness of this approach lies in the absence of generalised 
mathematical techniques for abstracting structural features. Therefore, it is, 
by and large, the intuition of the designers of such systems which governs 
the choice of features, from the endless list of possible contextual features of 
a set of patterns. Chen (1976) discusses the relative merits of the above two 
techniques, and argues the case for a mixed (structural plus statistical) 
feature-extraction system, which is contrary to most current efforts. 
5.2.7 LEARNING and ARTIFICIAL-INTELLIGENCB 
A typical view of learning from the A.I. perspective is expressed by Arbib 
(1970) in his analogy of computers and brains:-
"We can gain much insight into the process of learning if we think of past 
experience as providing a re,Pertoire of programs of activity, which become 
umts out of which new routmes are to be fashioned by further learning -
even higher order routines may then become the units of later learning." 
In behavioural sciences, such as psychology, learning or adaptation are 
regarded as a kind of fundamental perpetuating force which give rise to all 
behaviour, more or less, as the sub-atomic forces are regarded in physics. 
However, when we look at the direction which current computer l"elated 
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research, such as A.I., has taken we see that the prominence of this central 
phenomenon has been lost. No longer it is deemed necessary to look at 
behaviour the way it manifests itself in nature, starting from a raw state and 
gradually developing to its fully fledged form - using experience, education, 
instruction and introspection on its course of development. 
In these new paradigms 'knowledge' itself, and not the way it is 
'acquired', has become the domain which has attracted the majority of 
research. This tendency is in support of the belief that the scrutiny of 
knowledge structure is a less cumbersome endeavour than finding out how it 
was formed. The metaphor we can compare to here is to look at the 
structural organization of leaves and branches of a fully grown tree and try 
to predict its future changes on such basis, without considering its botanical 
mechanisms and developmental processes. In any case, the complexities 
encountered in trying to tackle the structural knowledge on its own, even at 
a simple logical common-sense level, impels us to believe that the isolation of 
'knowledge' and 'learning', and their separate analysis, is not a viable premise 
for the task of understanding and investigation of human and animal learning 
processes. Although, the main reason for the apparent slowness of progress 
in designing machines that can act 'intelligently' is the complexity of the 
task. Nevertheless, recently, even some of the proponents of A.I. have come 
to appreciate the need for reactivation of 'learning' as a central research 
topic - Schank (1983). 
The process of learning has been categorized in numerous ways by workers 
in the subject of A.I. These classifications, in some sense arbitrary, have 
involved distinguishing between 'rote learning' (e.g., learning by memorization, 
or mimicking), 'learning by example' (e.g., a scene-analysis program learning 
from samples), 'learning by being told' (e.g., a natural language program 
making inferences on a knowledge base, or extracting 'meanings'), 'learning 
by doing' (e.g., a game playing program learning from its previous mistakes), 
'learning by analogy' etc. 
A.I. or information-processing models of simple learning behaviours (mainly 
in animals), such as 'conditioning' or 'trial-and-error' learning can easily be 
implemented. The precision or these type of 'simulations' can, indeed, be 
increased, by elaborating the model into one which depicts the empirical 
observations more faithfully. Yet, workers in A.I. are seldom interested in 
the simple modalities of the learning process outside the human domain. 
Cognitive psychologists were occupied with devising models of human 
learning processes long before the advent of computers brought the A.I. and 
information-processing models to the forefront of this paradigm. Later, a 
variety of A.r. computer based models were devised to exhibit BOme higher 
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'learning' capabilities within particular domains (e.g., language, expert-systems, 
problem-solving, etc.). Similarly, various hardware models were elaborated to 
display some 'learning'. But, always a crucial question has been asked: 
whether such systems are 'inteIUgent' or just 'clever'. 
Some of the early hardware systems· bordered closely with 'adaptive 
control' concepts, and the 'learning' interpretation, mainly, depended on the 
descriptive level the model was looked at. However, the later hardware 
models (e.g., robots, turtles) were designed in conjunction with the knowledge 
base of a computer, and could show much more advance 'learning' capabilities. 
Although, 'learning' models in A.I. display a wide range of interesting 
behaviours, nevertheless, they almost universally are dependant on a "teacher" 
or "guiding" external element. Firstly, to evaluate their actions; and 
secondly, to provide procedures for development or initiation of 'learning'. 
Very few are in the natural sense oriented by basic 'drives' or 'needs'; even 
the 'goals' defined are, generally, non-elementary, and closely relate to the 
task in hand in an ad-hoc fashion. In a sense, their artificial portrayal of 
'intelligence' or 'learning' will be only significant to a subjective human 
observer, having no connotations for the machine domain. In the following 
the various sub-divisions of A.I. will be outlined in a summary form. The 
emphasis will be governed by the relevance to our underlying fundamental 
cybernetic bias of the thesis. 
5.2.8 GENERALISED 'LEARNING' MODELS IN A.I. 
Here, we will briefly describe some A.I. work which do not concentrate on 
particular facets of intelligence or learning, but, provide a framework for 
analysis and simulation; or a methodology for synthesis, of much broader 
range of processes and behaviours. 
Friedberg (1958, 1959) describes a learning procedure used in a computer 
program, and attempts various experimental implementations. However, 
this program was more akin to the previously discussed cybernetic learning 
systems; and its approach was general and non-task dependant. 
Hormann (1962, 1964) also describes an abstract scheme for machine 
learning; '~sks', 'proble~s' and ot,her' aspects of the ~l~arning' sys~em are 
discussed Ul a generalized fashton. But, a specifiC problem IS also 
addressed as an illustrative case. 
Andreae (1964 ... ) (and co-workers) is one of the principal researchers in 
the field of 'machine learning', but his approach has not followed the 
mainstream of A.I., and has been, generally, treading an interdisciplinary 
line. Ris comprehensive coverage of the subject has traversed an 
evolutionary developmental path. Ranging from very abstract attempts at 
the unification of concepts at learning machines, to elaborate discussions 
ot underlying philosophical issues, to p,ractical implementation problems. 
The initial endeavour in design of a learning' automaton involved the 
construction of a simple mechanical tortoise. His general purpose learning 
scheme STELLA, was based on 'pain-pleasure' reinforcements; and was 
realized by a hard-wire machine. Later, a symbolic manipulative dimension 
(a monologue) was added; and various conceptualizations, abstractions, 
theoretical-analysis, and computer simulations were undertaken. Further' 
developments Ot thIS model was the PURR-PUSS learning machine, which 
could ~earn' by a teacher specifying patterns and act~ons, yet, it was still 
based on rudimentary learnIng criteria. The software deVIsed were tested 
for various task classes, including robot problem solving. 
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5.2.9 GAME-PLAYING 
Turing (1953) had suggested that games were prime domains for 
experimentation on design principles in the quest for intelligent machinery. 
Some of the consequent models 'devised have, in fact, demonstrated (with or 
without 'learning') how close they come to our definition of intelligent 
activity - chess or checkers playing programs. 
Cybernetic machines and artifacts which display interesting 'game-playing' 
characteristics have been constructed for many centuries. Yet, it was the 
advent of computers which changed the emphasis from pure 'mimicking' of 
game playing behaviour to the mechanization of underlying thought processes. 
In some instances, the mental skills required for the playing of simple 
games, such as noughts and crosses, can optimally be programmed into a 
computer. But, for less trivial games, like chess or checkers, a higher degree 
of elaboration is necessary, to depict the 'planning' and 'reflective' aspects of 
the human thinking. The game-playing programs and machines developed 
within the past few decades have managed to accomplish a high degree of 
proficiency in their particular task domains, some achieving competence 
standards comparable to an expert player. 
One of the most prominent, and best thought out, early game-playing 
programs was Samuel's (1959, 1960) 'checker-playing' program. This program 
was able to display an intriguing 'learning' behaviour, and develope an expert 
performance level. Yet, its 'learning' was confined to parameter adjustments 
of some mathematical functions - following the trend of other contemporary 
work on adaptive control techniques. Also, a great deal of expertise and 
knowledge was primed within the 'non-learned' initial state of the program. 
Samuel (1959) used an ingenious method for optimising the performance of 
his checker-playing program. Whereby, two similar programs were able to 
play each other, and upon three successive defeats a program would undergo 
a set of (fairly arbitrary) changes; hence, gradually converging towards its 
optimal performance. However, some later work has shown that for more 
complex systems neither the existence of such a convergence can be 
guaranteed, nor, the utility or efficiency of such techniques can be justified. 
Samuel's checker-playing program involved many executive or 
house-keeping routines, but, its 'learning' features were incorporated within 
two 'rote-learning' and 'generalization-learning' routines. Rote-learning 
routines were used to store, organize, and evaluate past incidences; and 
generalization routines were used for choosing heuristics, and making weight 
adjustments. The 'utility' or the 'worth' of actions were chosen on basis of 
an "evaluation-function" (a multi variable polynomial with adjustable 
coefficients) which indicated the 'value' of a specific move in terms of a 
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single real number. This type of function, expressing the 'value' in a single 
or multi-dimensional manner, has been a feature of many later game-playing, 
problem-solving, or heuristic-search programs. A comparative study of various 
'evaluation' and 'learning' proc~dures is undertaken by Griffith (1974). 
Another aspect of game-playing programs, such as Samuel's, is the 'search 
techniques' used for 'forward' or 'backward' analysis of possible alternate 
moves. The usual means of representation is in a "tree" format, each 'branch' 
indicating the choice of action, leading to 'nodes' where the evaluations of 
utility of actions is made. The task is to find the 'best' sequence of moves. 
For this purpose, a wide range of mathematical procedures, such as "pruning" 
or "minimax" have been developed. A broad analysis of the techniques used 
in game-playing programs is carried out by Marsland and Rushton (1974). 
Yet, from our point of view the principal interest is the examination of 
the 'learning' aspects of this type of programs. The limited 'universe' of a 
game provides many advantages for a worker interested in tackling the 
problem of learning in machines. Firstly, games such as checkers, GO, or 
chess involve astronomically high possibility of movements (estimated at 1040 
for checkers), which implies that deterministic techniques cannot be 
practically employed for their analysis. Secondly, they have a set of definite 
'goals' and 'rules' which determines their behaviour. Thirdly, they can easily 
be programmed within a computer. Finally, they are widely familiar, and a 
good background of knowledge exists to verify the usefulness of their models. 
But, at the same time, the limitations of the game domains can lead to 
restrictions on the type of learning which can be investigated. 
A survey of the work done in this area shows that, in fact, only few 
game-playing programs involve modifiable 'learning' or 'adaptive' components. 
Some 'rote-learning' or 'generalization' procedures developed in game-playing 
programs have also been applied to other real or abstract problem domains; 
for example, in solving control problems. Such tasks are sometimes described 
as "games against nature". Games are also excellent domains for utilising one 
of the principal tools of A.I., namely 'heuristics'. 
5.2.10 PROBLEM-SOLVING 
Many 'Problem-Solving' programs have been devised in other fields of A.I. 
(e.g., robotics); but, here, we will discuss some of the more prominent 
'generalised' problem-solving techniques developed in this paradigm. 
Newell and Simon (1959, 1972) describe their 'General-Problem-Solver' (GPS) program which uses 'means-ends analysis' and various 'heuristic' 
techniques; in essence, based on human problem solving faculty. However, 
their system is general enough to be applied to other task domains. 
Doran (1968 .. 1969,1970) develops a simulation proJ(ram for a simple 
automaton-environment system; and also devises varIOUS algorithms and 
procedures which would enable the automaton, called the Graph Traverser 
to display 'problem solving', 'planning' and 'generalization' features. ' 
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Winograd's (1973) work on understanding natural language included a 
problem solving sub-system that was able to proficiently carry out many 
tasks within its limited domain. Yet, its techniques were general enough 
to be applied more widely. 
Fikef!.! Hart and Nilsson (1972) devillo:ped a well thought out methodology, 
STRIpS, for solving problems.. partIcularly for use in robot ~roblem 
domains such as fin<ling boxes In a room environment. Later, the learning 
and problem-solving schemes used were elaborated..l and ap.Elied in broader 
contexts. Examples of such work are: Siklossf. &. ureussi (1973); Sacerdoti (1973); Stepankova &. Havel (1976); and Baner Ji &. Ernst (1977). 
5.2.11 KNOWLEDGE-DIRECTED CONCEPT/PATTERN/LANGUAGE LEARNING 
A large proportion of contemporary A.I. research covers the problems 
associated with searching, analyzing, structuring and organizing of 'formal' or 
'linguistic' knowledge bases; also, the majority of recent 'machine learning' 
work is, seemingly, directed towards these cognitive levels. However, since 
the class of learning processes targeted are at the top of the hierarchy of 
learning, unlike the domain of interest of our cybernetic approach, we will 
only engage in a brief discussion here. 
Broadly speaking, symbolic description or representation can be viewed at 
five levels: 'message' (strings of words with no structure); 'syntax' (grammar 
or structure); 'memory' (formal notions of accessibility and organization); 
'belief' (conclusions and inferences); and 'external' (SUbjectivity) level. 
Various knowledge structures place different emphasis on 'language', 
'uniformity', 'consistency', 'labelling', 'accessibility', 'partitioning', 'growth', or 
'change'. Some of the principal methods of such representations are: 'Plans'; 
'Scripts'; 'Frames', 'Logical Nets', 'Semantic Nets'; 'Production Systems'; 
'Predicate Calculus'; or other specialized representational languages. 
Numerous Programs have been devised to work on a special class of 
data-basis and problem domain; and to 'extract', 'form' or 'learn' concepts. 
Similarly, 'language learning' programs have been designed to operate on 
semantic type knowledge basis. There are three principal methods by which 
concepts could be formulated. Firstly, by 'analysis', which involves applying 
existing concepts to events and processes in a new situation (customizing). 
Secondly, by tinduction', which means hypothesising about new concepts on 
basis of older concepts which are inadequate. Thirdly, by 'generation', which 
involves creating new concepts from more fundamental notions. 
Some examples of research in this field are: Buchanan's (1978, 1985) 
DENDRAL, META-DENDRAL and MYCIN systems for, explaining empirical data 
and medical consultation; Soloway &. Riseman (1977), Winston et al (1983), 
Torrance (1984), Connell &. Brady (1985), and Phelps &. Musgrove's (1986) 
knowledge-based 'pattern recognition' or 'description learning' syslems; 
Winograd (1973), Brown (1975), Akama &. Ichikawa (1979), and Gause &. 
Rogers' (1983) [Kellerman,1972), knowledge-based 'language-understanding', 
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'language-learning', or 'question-answer' systems; and Hayes (1970), and 
Kochen's (1974) abstract 'learning' and 'problem solving' systems. 
Finally, even a higher level of analysis of information contained within a 
data-base is undertaken in the' 'Theorem Proving' or 'Automatic Deduction' 
research areas of A.I.; which involve drawing conclusions from a body of 
knowledge represented by logical statements, using deductive inference 
methods. This line of enquiry which was initiated from the original work of 
Newell and Simon (1959) into "Logic Theorist" has developed into many 
different application domains, such as 'logic programming'. 
5.2.12 ROBOTICS 
The introduction of term "robotics" is generally attributed to Czech play 
writer Karl Capek (term "robot" is a derivation of Czech word for 'workers'). 
During the past few decades, many unconstrained speCUlations of robots and 
their capabilities have been put forward by science-fiction writers and 
cinematographers. But, only when the advent of digital computers helped to 
realise these artifacts for scientific or industrial purposes was their 
limitations fully appreciated. Nevertheless, the science of robotics has 
suffered, perhaps irreparably, from the wild flights of imaginations which 
render most scientific achievements in this field as' mundane or predictable, 
when compared to those seen or read in science-fiction films or books. 
Various early cybernetic machines and robots have already been discussed 
in our thesis. But, during the past few years, many impressive achievements 
have also been attained in the science of 'robotics'. Intelligent robots, now, 
use powerful 'processing', 'manipulative', and 'vision' systems for perceiving 
and acting upon their environments; and, hence, have been utilized for solving 
many real-time practical problems. Some robots also use speech 'synthesis' or 
'recognition' systems for ease of communication with their human operators. 
Similarly, many educational or experimental robots have been designed in 
various research establishments. A state-of-art snooker playing robot has 
been developed in Bristol University, which incorporates many of the 
ingredients of industrial robotics research. Other 'walking' or 'hoping' 
robots, or 'mobile robot vehicles' have also been devised, and many aspects of 
control or dynamic characteristics of locomotion investigated theoretically. 
Another area of robotics research is 'transportation robots' and their 
networking control systems, for use in industrial manufacturing/warehousing. 
Some of the principal application areas of robot research are those which 
involve hazardous and inaccessible environments, or monotonous and laborious 
tasks. For example, robots are widely used in industrial assembly plants, 
space research, oceanic research, nuclear-plants, or security applications. 
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A trend in robotics which is of most interest to us, and which has also 
been gradually becoming more utilised in industry, is the fusion of A.I. 
schemes with hardware robot realizations. The prevailing approach of the 
researchers involved with this ~roblem (inherited from early cyberneticians) 
has been to construct 'mobile robots' for experimentation, verification, or 
demonstration of some hypothesis. Although, some 'hand-eye' configuration of 
manipulative vision systems have also been used. 
Some research in robotics has clear biological undertones; and not only it 
is obvious that their protagonist's ideas originate from some natural sciences, 
but, in fact, one of their stated aims is the better understanding of the 
human and animal processes. Examples of this type of work are Friedman's 
(1969), Koplowitz and Noton's (1972), Kent's (1978), Filo's (1979), and Albus's 
(1979) models; in each case, robot 'learning' or 'intelligence' is discussed in 
terms of its equivalent biological underlying considerations. Yet, various 
engineering and A.I. techniques are also utilised in the work. A related area 
which explicitly declares this interlinking of natural and engineering concepts 
is the science of "bionics" - briefiy discussed in an earlier chapter. 
(i) - EXAMPLES OF EXPERIMENTAL MOBILE ROBOTS 
In next chapter we will discuss our mobile experimental robot which was 
built as an exercise in designing a cybernetic 'learning' model. However, 
here, we will attempt to enumerate some similar hardware design endeavours, 
in each case describing briefiy the main facets of exercise:-
Rosen and Nilsson (1967) describe a mobile robot equipped with a TV 
camera and a simple retractable arm. The software Implementations 
involve a hierarchy of computer programs which can solve. simple problems, 
and devise 'plans'. Also, some scene analysis capabilities, and simulations 
of its environment are incorporated. 
Raphael (1968) describes one of the earliest, and best known experimental 
robot exercises, the Stanford Research Institute mobile robot vehicle (also 
referred to as SHAKEY). This model had an on-board TV camera and was 
connected by cable to a computer. Various software developments 
involving different high level lanlf':1ages and A.I. techniQ.ues, were devise(l 
to demonstrate some obstacle aVOidance or problem solVing behaviours. 
Lewis and Bejczy (1973) discuss the planning considerations in the design 
of an elaborate autonomous roving [y~e robot with a manipulator arm -
such as those used in space missions. Principal software concerns are the 
control of the arm, and the navigation of the robot. 
Smith (1973) describes a basic implementation of a three-wheeled robot 
model, equipped with a sonar sensor and in radio-contact with a computer. 
He also outlines some executive control problems of the design. 
Heiserman (1976); Loofbourrow (1978); Gupton (1979\ [separate works] 
describe detailed accounts for construction of 'turtle type robots, with 
various electronic features (e.g., sonar, lil{ht-sensing, computer-control), 
that could be used for simple experimentation (e.g., tracking). 
Hollis (1977) describes a mobile robot equipped with a clasping mani'pulator 
and a simple image sensor. He, alsol discusses some underlying deSign and 
control aspects of such models; ana outlines a 'charger-seeking' program. 
Allen and Rossetti (1978) describe a fairly sophisticated mobile light 
seeking robot connected with a PDP-ll computer, which is able to track a 
light source while avoiding obstacles by use of a sonar detector. 
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Marc, Julliere and Place (1980, 1981) describe a computer controlled mobile 
robot with a simple manipulator, a tactile sensory system" and an intra red 
position measurement mechanIsm. They also descrlDe the software 
Implementations, and schemes used for navigating and guiding the robot. 
Moravec (1982) describes a three-wheeled mobile robot equipped with a TV 
camera, and later to deploy some A.I. scheme (e.g., 'productIOn systems'). 
In addition to the above hardware designs many researchers have been 
involved with developments based on mobile experimental robots with emphasis 
on the software aspects, examples are:-
Nilsson (1969) describes some A.I. procedures devised for implementation of 
'problem-solvin$' tasks in mobile robots, using "Q-A tecliniques"· also 
outlines and dIscusses some other higher issues in designin~ inte\ligenl 
mobile automata, such as 'theorem-proving', 'perception' and modelling'. 
Lasker (1974) engaies in a theoretical discussion of the 'theory of mobile 
automata'; formulatmg an algebraic notation for the representation of 
robot movements and trajectories in its environment. 
Chan and Phillips (1975)· Miller (1977); Thompson (977); Giralt et ale ~1979); Moravec (l979,198~); Shih (l982); Witkowski (1983); Thorpe (1984) in separate work\ describe research on various theoretical and software acets ot the vrob em of navi~ation of mobile robots. The principal topics 
involved are: robot control', robot stability '\ 'obstacle avoidance', 'range 
detection', 'sonar signal analy'"sis', 'visua mapving', 'simulation of 
environment', 'search techniques', 'path planning', decision procedures', 
and 'parallel route-planning algoritllms'. 
Coles et ale (1975) devise a problem-solvin~ pro~ram (in FORTRAN) for a 
computer controlled mobile r060t, which uses deciSIon-analysis' procedures. 
Rushby et al (1975) describe a simple computer controlled mobile robot 
equipped with a plotting pen and confined to a limited environment; and 
was devised to manifest the PURR-PUSS generalized 'learning scneme' 
introduced by Andreae 0972,1976). This worlt pursues a "non-engineering" 
approach, in essence different from most other A.I.{robotics exercises; and 
is concerned with the more fundamental aspects 0 machine intelligence. 
Bond c\ Mott (1978,1981) describe research based on a computer controlled 
mobile robot, involving experimentation and development of a software 
language that can be used to implement a 'learning system' - established 
A.I. techniques and languages are utilized (e.g., SCHEMAs; PLANNER). 
Iijima et a1. (1981); Elfes and Talukdar (1983); Prender,ast et ale (1984~ 
[separate works] aescribe and discuss various 'locomotIon' and 'control 
routines, 'control systems' I and 'specialised robot-control programming 
languages' which are used in conjunction with mobile robot research. 
Kanayama (1983) describes a mobile robot control technique ('concurrent 
programming') which enables various tasks to be performed simultaneously, 
for use in perceptual recognition problems in such machines. 
Laumond (1983) describes a methodology for providing a mobile robot with 
'learning' capabilities. Two aspects of 'concept learning' and 'procedure 
learning by generalization' are tackled. Most of the matllematics used are 
adopted trom graph-theory. The 'learning' mobile robot is able to improve 
its navigation8.l capabilities by modelling and analysis ot its environment. 
( ii) - anmR HXAHPLES OF RBJrIai RBSEAIDI RELBVANl' ro 'LBARNING' 
Many other research fields of the science of robotics have also been 
pursuing the objective ot designing 'intelligent robots'. In the following some 
of the areas which have some relevance to the problem of modelling of 
learning will be outlined, and brieny described:-
(a) - COMPUTER SIMULATIONS OF ROBOTS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENTS: Some workers such as Nilsson and Rap'hael (1967): Uhr and Kochen (1969): Jacoba and Kiefer (1973); Uragami et ale (19'('6); Webster (1978); 
Heiserman (1981); and Rosenberg and Rowat (1981) have been involvea 
in designing simple robot-environment (or organism-world) abstractions. 
Sevel"a1 mathema~ical techniques are used for depicting physical laws, 
and representing interactions. These models are either used lor 
(b) -
(e) -
(d) -
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experimentation or validation of various hypothesis; or, simply, they are 
exercises in 'simulation' of a physical robot. Normally, the robot and 
its environment are represented on the computer screen by very 
simJ,.>listic images, and various 'obstacles' or 'boxes' placed within the 
envIronment; also, 'tasks' are defined in terms of movements or 
rearrangements of these boxes. Examples of issues tackled, using some 
A.I. techniques (e.g. LISP, Fuzzy-LOgic), are 'navigation', 'obstacle 
avoidance', 'random-walk', 'spatlal perception', 'aaaptation', 'habit 
formation', 'pattern recognItion, 'purposive action', or SImple 'learning'. 
MAZE SOLVING ROBOTS: The early 'maze-running' cybernetic machines (e.g., Shannon's mechanical mouse) were intriguing artifacts. Even, 
today this class of problem-solving robots attract much attention, 
although, not always from established scientific circles -{early contests 
are hela amongst the designers of micro-controlle maze-solving 
machines. ExamThesl of the more serious analysis of such problems are Stanfield's (197 SImulations of maze-solving on computers" or Allen 
and Allen's (1 79) discussions of maze traversIng algorithms. 
Maze-solving is also one of the main problems tackled by LOGO 
programs and their 'turtle' robots. 
"PLANNER" ROOCtr LANGUAGE am. PLANNING AND GBNERALIZATIOO IN HOBJrICS: 
"PLANNER" -'programming language was developed by Hewitt (1969) as a 
'deductive rogical system' which could best 6e used for manipulating, 
problem-solving or theorem-proving in robots. Various goals are 
established or dismissed, USIng a hierarchical control structure in 
conjunction with a set or assertions (statements). Many researchers 
have, hence, developed 'planning systems' or 'generalization systems' 
based on PLANNER, or other variations (e.g., STRIPS PROLOG) for 
different classes of robots. For example, Nagata et ale (1973); Siklossy 
and Dreussi (1973); Kuzin et ale (1975); Hayes (l975}, and Ferguson (1981) discuss such techniques in the context of specifIC task domains. 
ROBOTS IN UNKNOWN OR PARTIALLY KNOWN ENVIRONMENTS: The 
control and manoeuvering of robots in unknown or partially known 
environments are problem areas of robotics which have attracted a lot 
of 'learning-related' issues. One solution is to use established 
mathematical procedures, such as 'dynamic-programming', for solving 
these control problems. Yet ... some workers, for exampfe Keckler and 
Larson (1970) or Friedman (19"17), have propqsed and discussed alternate 
'heuristIc' methods in formulating 'learning' or 'inference' systems. 
5.2.13 TEACIDNG MACmNES 
Although "teaching machines" are included within our A.I. (information 
processing) categorization of the 'learning' systems, nevertheless, they are a 
fairly independent area of research, normally associated with education. 
Principally, these teaching machines and systems are used in conjunction with 
some sort of "programmed learning", as tools for assisting learning, or 
evaluating progress. Yet, in spite of their early promise, these machines have 
not had a major impact on the educational system. The most elaborate, only, 
having few controllable parameters, and involving simple hardware/software. 
An early example of teaching machines is described by Hoffman (1962), 
which was a simple device to be used as a supplementary tool in training 
behavioural scientists. Similarly, Pask (1970) discusses the mechanization of 
teaching from a broad cybernetic systems point of view, and in an elaborate 
survey of the field outlines some computer assisted instruction schemes. 
The programming language LOGO was specifically designed, by S. Papert, 
for educational purposes; and has round popularity amongst the teaching 
establishments from a varied range of cultural backgrounds. LOGO is 
intended to be a compact experimental framework for teaching the concepts 
and skills or analytical and heuristic thinking. One aspect of the 
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developments of this programming language has been the introduction ot a 
complementary hardware realization, namely, the simple 'turtle' robot. These 
robots are only regarded as an extension of the notions used in LOGO; and 
they are considered as valuable .tools for developing problem-solving or other 
perceptual skills of children. Feurzeig .and Lukas (1974) discuss various 
aspects of use of LOGO and 'turtles' as programmable teaching machines. 
5.2.14 EVOLUTIONARY-PROGRAMMING 
We have previously discussed the kinship of the processes of evolutionary 
adaptation and learning. Various early cybernetic models (e.g. Pask,1962) had 
tried to depict the process of evolution through certain developmental stages. 
More recently, some A.I. researchers, in attempting to synthesis intelligence, 
have chosen the 'evolutionary programming' approach. This distinct avenue is 
away from the mainstream research of A.I., and aims to achieve artiticial 
intelligence through the computer simulation of the process of evolution. 
Their protagonists cite various inadequacies of traditional A.I. methods in 
dealing with certain classification tasks, or in tackling a range of problems 
'globally'. The basic technique is to abstract processes which can 'reproduce' 
with 'mutations' amongst the new 'population'; and, also, by using a process 
similar to 'natural selection', can evolve many generations of such 'organisms'. 
Fogel et a1. (1966) describe some attempts in the simulation of the process 
of evolution. Holland (1970) develops a mathematical basis for the analysis of 
such adaptive systems, which uses 'adaptive algorithm' in searching for 'good' 
solutions. Hand (1979) describes a simple computer simulation of organismic 
evolution. Schaffer &: Grefenstette (1985); Davis (1985); Frey (1986); and 
Schrodt (1986) describe various research work based on Holland's 'adaptive 
algorithm' I'classifier', and 'genetic algorithms'; also discuss the concepts of 
'learning', 'problem solving' and other related issues in such implementations. 
5.2.15 CONNECTIONISM 
In the p1.St few years, once more the notions of neural networks have 
come to the forefront of the science of machine-intelligence. 'Ibis type of 
research initiated from the 'neural-net' models of l't:lCul.loch and Pitts; and 
later 'logical-nets', 'Self-Qrganizing Systems', and 'pattern recognition' 
models tackled the notion of constructing , intelligent' automata from 
conglaoeration of identical interconnected elements. Meanwhile, other 
lnter-disciplinary researchers had been occupied with developing various 
COIIIPlter models ba.sed. on 'associative memory' (Kohonen, 1977; Hinton, 1981; 
Palm, 1982; Barto, 1981; Drozen, 1970). However, the Plpularity of all 
these subjects had been wan..ing for a.l.most two decades; and it was only the 
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advent of some relatively recent developments in 'parallel computers' (and 
other technological progress) which signified a revival of this approach. 
The new, 'connectionist', discipline is fundamentally same as those 
discussed earlier. Yet, the influence of various A.!. related developnents 
are evident in this area. The principal. contention is still to depict the 
brain's mechanisms in some way, simulating the massive pu-allelism of 
neuronal networks. Learning has featured greatly in connectionism, and. 
'recognition' or other tasks have been tackled by various researchers. 
Examples of work in this area can be found in: Hinton, 1981; Palm, 1982; 
KOhonen, 1984; Feldman, 1985; Flynn, 1985; Shaw, 1985; Kibler, 1985. 
5.2.16 AN OVERVIEW OF 'llIE A. I. APmOACH ro 'mE KDELLING OF LEARNING 
The various 'Learning' programs developed in this paradigm, and their 
associated robot realizations, display some interesting (and clever) behavioural 
learning patterns. Yet, there are some ideas expressed, or concepts and 
procedures defined, in their simple system/environment configurations that 
could have no real physical significance or sense for the model itself. 
Additionally, since there are no natural correlates of the learning behaviours 
observed, exact inferences cannot be made about any aspect of the natural 
learning process from this type of synthesis of learning. The only definitive 
conclusions made about the efficiency, accuracy, or complexity of the model 
will be confined to the particular physical or abstract implementation. 
Additionally, most work in A.I. take certain primitive underlying logical 
organizations for granted. For example, the structured logical basis of digital 
computers or algorithms. Yet, when we look at the gradual developmental 
stages that the neural mechanisms of natural intelligence and learning have 
passes through, then, a phenomenological question becomes pertinent: could 
we truly expect to realize 'machine intelligence' if we bypass this apparently 
fundamental property of life, namely 'self-organization' trom randomness, and 
attempt to 'synthesise' intelligence from well-structured beginnings. 
When we look at the resulting entanglements of various robot or 
computer-based machines (e.g., vision-systems) in confronting the natural 
environment, or when the deep mathematical obscurities of some abstractions 
of a so called 'natural' process is observed, then a need for a rethink 
(refocus/reappraisal) of the problem becomes more evident. Today's robots 
and 'intelligent' programs seem to be on a path of ever increasing complexity; 
taster and technologically more advanced devices are utilised, and seemingly 
clever (yet ad-hoc) methods used in conjunction with large data bases to 
manifest proficient programs. A machine which has the capability to start 
learning from 'zero' or 'little' knowledge is the logical answer. 
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CHAPTER 6 
---------
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter once again we turn our attention to cybernetic models as 
tools for synthesis and simulation of learning. In particular, we focus on the 
problem which, as explained initially, was the root motive for our broad 
investigation of the field of learning; namely the design of a general purpose 
cybernetic model for manifestation of simple 'learning', which could also be 
used as an experimentation tool on various learning schemes. 
We have, in fact, traversed a full circle. Starting from a practical specific 
problem, it was found that, to truly appreciate the underlying fundamental 
considerations and issues involved, a much broader perspective was necessary. 
Specially, in view of the rigid and unitary approach of ahaoat all research 
into deslgn of 'learning systems', it was deemed iJIlportant to look ,t every 
poaaible aspect of learning. Bence, we embarked on an extensive scrutiny and 
discusaion of the many facets of the ubiquitous phenomenon of learning. 
Now, we return, ~, to our or~ problem equipped with a clearer 
understanding and a more qualified evaluation of its various aspects. 
In the first part of this chapter We' will attempt to briefly outline' our 
hardware modeL The principal intention wU1 be to point out the general 
considerations involved in the design of the particular Imdel, and also the 
whole class of this type of models. Specific technical features of the model 
will not be emuained deeply, neither wiD the subsequent software 
developments be described beyond their generalised flow-charta. 
In the second part of this chapter a more subjective rmalysis of the topic 
of our interest will be undertaken. Discussions wU1 revolve around the 
general problem of devising simple 'learning systems' and various important 
related issues involved, keeping in mind many of the diverse subjects covered 
previously. Additionally, the blue-print and elements of some hypothetical 
'learning schemes' will be proposed and scrutinised, particularly in the context 
of our hardware model. 
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The principal aim is to systematically approach the problem of design of 
simple cybernetic type 'learning' ~els, which have been appearing in various 
research fields as aids for demonstration or explanation within the past 3-4 
decades. 
The case for designing "hardware" models as an aid for experimentation, 
demonstration and better understanding of abstract theories or ideas was 
argued in the first chapter. SubsequenUy, various other aspects of such 
physical realizations were discussed, and many examples of hardware 
cybernetic or robotic 'learning' models were cited and examined in Chapters 4 
and 5. In some instances it was also seen that a particular hardware 
configuration or device was, in fact, either the starting point for the desian 
of a 'learning' system, or dominated over the software aspects; in a sense, 
the 'physical' features of these models overwhelmed all its later developments. 
I 
The degree to which the two aspects of 'simulation' and 'synthesis' have 
featured in the hardware models discussed so far have been quite varied. 
But, generally, the historically precedent physical models have been more 
involved" in simulation of a particular learning trait; and the mor, recent 
models, with their enhanced processing capabilities, have inclined towards 
designs which. try to synthesise a 'learning' behaviour using some 
non-physiologically based criterion. 
Although, it must be emphasised that the distinction of these two features 
in modem is 'not very clear cut, and an -intricate 1Dixing of simulation' and 
synthesis is often seen in 'learning' models. Whether, a hardware model is 
trying to solve a 'maze finding' problem in the human fashion (simulation), or 
it is involved in an 'artificial' portrayal of problem solving behaviour 
(synthesis) are kinds of questions which can only be answered by considering 
the details of the design, the level of description, and the aims or 
intentionalities of the model's designer. Hence, such characterizations are 
often subject to interpretations, and are to some extent arbitrary. 
Moreover, to make good use of 'simulation', it is necessary to have a 
certain degree of knowledge of the organizational aspects of the structure of 
a system and details of its mechanisms. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
in view of the complexity of underlying neural functions involved in learning, 
and a lack of precise neurophysiological postulates about learning, all 
attempts at its simulation should involve tentative synthetic criteria. 
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6.1.1 CXHlIDERATI<HJ IN DBSlmf (Ii' A ammw:. Rmam KJlRIJ·DIl IIARDWARB 'nXL 
The first consideration of the design was how to manifest the 
model/environment configuration, as represented schematically by FIG.S.1 in 
its most general form. Once the boundaries of a model are fixed within an 
environment, then the outputs can be defined in terms of changes that are 
brought about to the environment, or movements which are made by the 
model; and, conversely, inputs can be defined in accordance to the percepts 
that the model makes of its environment, or the physical influences that are 
impinged upon it. Of course, the subjectivity of such definitions must be 
appreciated; since, at any instant of time, the machine may be affecting its 
environment in a variety of ways; and also is being influenced by numerous 
inputs. 
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FIGURE S.l. A general configuration of Model/Environment. 
Now, the objective was to devise a hardware device capable of modelling 
the simple modalities of the learning process, as that which might be 
displayed by a hypothetical organism with basic sensors and effectors 
interacting with its environment. Additionally, the design of the machine was 
not to include any task-oriented consideration; in other words, it was not to 
be designed for displaying or achieving a preconceived pattern of behaviour -
which might have limited the r.hoice of approach to its later programming. 
Various alternatives were investigated. The "environment" could be either 
fixed or changeable. A fixed environment can be used for simplicity and 
convenience to match some particularities of the machine, or limit the amount 
of inputs to the device. For example, a confined box with simple contours, 
or a meshed surface which could indicate the coordinates of the moving 
device, could be considered as a possible simple non-varying environment for 
the model. 
However, in view of the general interactive way which the model was to 
realize the process of learning, it was decided that the richness and 
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changeability inherent in a normal physical environment (the laboratory) 
would indeed be a desirable attribute. Any limitation on the amount of 
perceived information by the machine would be imposed by the choice of its 
inputs. 
other desired features of the "model" were considered. If a 'learning' was 
to be observed, and evaluated, then it was necessary that some controllable 
dynamism should be built into the model - a static model, or a model which 
modifies itself by virtue of simple thermodynamic exchanges could not convey 
any learning. Again, since the machine was to be used for the synthesis of 
basic learning criteria, then 'movements' rather than 'manipulative actions' 
were deemed to be more appropriate as outputs for the model. The system 
was to have the potential to even determine its own primitive goals, and any 
a-priori inclusion of specific patterns of action (innate behaviours), or use of 
manipulators which would require previously defined routines for operation, 
would hinder a true manifestation of rudimentary goal-determination. 
Hence, it was decided that a free roving mobile robot be constructed as 
the 'body' of the model. A specific environment for its operation, as 
previously mentioned, could be devised. For instance, grid type surfaces 
similar to the examples illustrated in FIG.6.2 could convey the x-y position of 
the robot. 
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FIGURE 6.2. Three examples of intersecting the floor surface for monitoring 
the position of the robot. 
Yet, these methods of determining the position of the robot in relation to 
its surroundings had the disadvantage of needing a lot of mathematical 
preprocessing, and subsequently lost all (or most) information contained in the 
connectivities of their physical world. 
Other methods of 'perceiving' the environment were investigated, such as 
using TV-cameras, intra-red detectors, C.C.D.'s (Charge Coupled Devices), 
Photo-diodes, Sonar, etc. Eventually, it was decided that it would not be 
necessary for the model to realize its spatial coordinate within an 
environment, since this itself is a higher order learning stage. 
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Hence, a simple ultrasonic method for obstacle sensing was adopted, for 
reasons of simplicity and economy. The sonar devise could either be located 
in the environment, tracking the position of the robot from the emissions of 
a beacon signal. Or, it could be incorporated within the machine, showing its 
distance from various obstacles in its periphery in one or several directions 
(as depicted in FIG.6.3). 
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FIGURE 6.3. Two possible methods for ultrasonic detection of the 
environment: (a) - Multidirectional; (b) - Unidirectional. 
It was contended that for the level of analysis of the process of learning 
we were interested in, and for the realization of primitive criteria of 
learning, a single narrow beam sonar located at the front of the robot would 
be more appropriate (and sufficient). Any fundamental issue explainable by 
the omni-directional sensing of the environment could also be explained, 
although in simpler terms, by the unidirectional sensing. After all, an 
identical compound map of the environment could be obtained by the simpler 
sensing device if only the robot made a 36()0 rotational scan of its 
environment around its central axis (which was possible); only the process 
would be a lot slower. 
Of cou 'se, it must be appreciated that this type of one-dimensional 
perception of the environment will give a far less precise indication of the 
relative position of the robot than a two or three dimensional sensing 
process. The environment will be seen in a much more immediate and 
changeable fashion, and, hence, decisions for actions have to be taken on 
such bases. Examples of this type of environment sensing is abundant in 
nature, and many simple animals manage to deal with various significant 
changes in their surroundings adequately using a single monocular input 
(chemical, electrical, tactile, olfactory, sonar, visual). The differences from 
the higher order sensing methods are only highlighted when a comparison is 
made by an external observer. 
It can be said that a kind of hierarchy of 'environment perception' exists 
as far as the actual physical inputs to a robot within an environment (as 
below) is concerned - this is indicated in the ordering of FIG.6.4. 
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FIGURE 6.4. A representation of the hierarchy of p?ssible methods for the 
phYSIcal sensing of the environment and its changes. 
An important premise of this unidirectional design feature was the need to 
define a 'front' for the robot. This non-homogeneity implies that higher 
significances should be attributed to the inputs/outputs at a specific 
orientation of the robot's body. In other words, if the machine only 'sees' 
its forward direction then environmental changes occurring at its front should 
be much more 'significant' than one at its rear; similarly, 'forward' 
movements should be more 'consequential' than movements in other directions. 
This issue may be considered as trivial, nevertheless, in our desire to 
incorporate minimal machine-specific features in the design it has to be 
further pondered upon. A solution would have been to build the robot 
completely symmetrically, using a single wide-angle sonar detector (or several 
detectors around the periphery) which could give a nondirectional sense of 
the nearest object to the robot; and also incorporating the capability to move 
in all directions from any point without the rotation of the 'body'. Yet, the 
ambiguity involved in such a diffused evenness of percept (and action) 
impelled designing the model in a 'forward-biased' fashion. The observation 
of an almost universal asymmetry in the organization of sense organs in all 
species, even in the very basic unicellular organisms, was a strong 
corroborating evidence towards the inclusion of such a non-uniformity in the 
design. 
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The sonar range sensor designed could indicate linearly the distance of the 
nearest object to the front of the robot at approximately its own floor height 
up to 5-meters quite accurately (±I-cm error) with a 7-digit binary code. 
Additionally, eight touch sensors uniformly located around the perimeter of 
the chassis, and also a single centrally positioned shock-sensor, represented 
further 9-digits of binary input to the system. 
Outputs were, in turn, defined by the direction and speed instructions to 
the single steering/drive wheel of the robot. Eight possible speeds (3-binary 
digits), sixteen possible angles for steering (4-binary digits), and one spare 
binary digit comprised the 8-bit output of the model. The robot could now 
be regarded as a system with following input/output configuration: 
8-bit touch sensors 
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The information perceived by the mobile robot should now be sent to and 
instructions received from a computer. The choice was between a cable link 
or some form of wireless transmission of data (radio waves, ultrasonic, 
infrared, etc.). The cable connection could involve using special multi-way 
swivel connectors; or multiplexing the signal, and hence using a pair of wires 
for transmission. Yet, since an on-board power source was used the 
entanglements of the cable could pose problems in a long term free operation 
of the model. Therefore, a two-way radio link with appropriate error 
checking circuitry was designed for computer control and communication. 
Nevertheless, a multiplexed cable link option and use of remote a power 
source was also incorporated. 
A question which is frequently asked by outside observers of such 
developments is that why not simulate the same robot on the computer screen 
rather than constructing it in hardware, specially in view of many advanced 
graphic capabilities of modern computers. Although, such simulations have 
indeed been undertaken by various workers (Webster, 1978), there are 
numerous shortcomings - of course, unless the objective is to devise a simple 
idealised robot/environment visual simulation. 
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Firstly, no present day computer, or for that matter in a foreseeable 
future, can faithfully simulate the rich complexity and unpredictability of the 
"natural" environment. Whereby, the senses are in a constant bombardment 
by a variety of parallel stimulations and natural forces; the depth, colour, 
contrasts, texture and all other physical influences of the real world have to 
be calculated. Even then many novel or unexpected events happen in the 
physical surroundings which cannot be predetermined in the simulation. 
Secondly, the interaction of the robot itself with the environment seldom 
follows an exact predetermined path, and hence not only it would be difficult 
to simulate all dynamic trajectories or movements of the robot but almost 
impossible to predict all unexpected eventualities of its interactions. 
6.1.2 SPECIFIC DESIGN FEATURES OF THE MOBILE ROBOT 
In the following we will briefly outline the specific mechanical, electrical, 
electronic, and computer-interface features of our hardware model. Pointing 
out any particulars of design which might be of interest to the wider aspects 
of our discussions. 
(i) - MECHANICAL FEATURES OF THE MOBILE ROBOT 
The steering and drive mechanisms of the mobile robot were assembled on 
a circular chassis, as illustrated in FIG.6.5. The front wheel was used for 
both steering and drive, and appropriate step-down gearing mechanisms 
incorporated. The two rear wheels were free running castors allowing a high 
degree of manoeuvreability. 
drive motor 
FIGURE 6.5. 
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Three perspectives of drive and steering mechanisms of the 
robot. 
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Additionally, eight mechanical touch switches were designed to detect any 
physical contact made by the robot with its surrounding objects. These were 
spring loaded metal contacts spaced equally around the periphery of the main 
chassis. Also, a pendulum type shock switch (sensitivity adjustable) was 
constructed and placed in the centre of the robot's body, whose activation 
would signify a vigorous collision or tilting. These inputs are illustrated in 
FIG.6.6. 
switch 
FIGURE 6.6. The position of eight touch switches and the shock switch. 
(ii) - BLBCTRICAL FEATURES OF THE MOBILB ROBOT 
The normal power source for the robot was two 12-volts rechargeable 
lead-acid batteries connected in parallel, supplying power for approximately 
four hours of continuous operation when fully charged. Appropriate charging, 
regulating, protection and monitoring circuitry were devised and built. In 
addition, an on-board power regulator could supply the necessary +5 and +12 
smooth voltage levels. This regulator circuitry was also able to use an 
external power source (rather than the batteries) as input - connected to the 
robot via an umbilical cable. The general electrical features of the robot are 
outlined in FIG.6.7. 
operation mode selector switch (CHARGE/BATTERY OP./MAINS OP.) 
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FIGURE 6.7. Schematic diagram of main electrical design features. 
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(iii) - ELECTRONIC FEATURES OF THE MOBILE ROBOT 
There were three main areas of design involving electronic control of the 
hardware of the mobile robot, and electronic communication of information: 
(a) - Motor Control; (b) - Ultrasonic Range Detection; and (c) - Data 
Organization, Checking, and Transmission. The principal components of the 
mobile robot and its control system are illustrated in FIG.6.8. 
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FIGURE 6.8. The basic components of the mobile robot system. 
(a) - Motor Control 
Two identical precision stepper motors were used for both steering and 
driving the robot. The use of stepper motors would obviate the need for 
devising feed back mechanisms to monitor speed or direction. Each stepper 
motor would be driven by a power circuitry which received a 'clocking' and 
also a 'direction' signal from its appropriate logic circuit. For each clock 
pulse the shaft of the motor rotates by 7.5 degrees in the direction specified 
by the polarity of tdirection' input. 
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Once the 3-bits of speed and 4-bits of direction instructions are received 
and verified by the robot, then the logic control circuits translate these data 
to appropriate number of clock pulses and direction of shaft rotation for the 
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stepper motors. The rules for translations of the 7-bit output command, 
indicated below, are outlined in FIG.6.9. 
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FIGURE 6.9. {a} - The format of an output instruction to the mobile robot. 
b - The translation codes for various direction commands. 
c - The translation code for seven different speed commands, 
and one zero direction (forward) calibration command. 
The direction instructions received (from the computer or control box) 
could be interpreted by the robot in two different modes, which were 
selectable by a switch. Either, the steering wheel would rotate in relative 
terms to its present setting. For example, rotating 9()0 to the right when a 
steering signal 0100 (4) was received, and taking no action when 0000 signal 
received. Alternately, the change of direction could be based on absolute 
terms in relation to the robot's body. Bere, it was necessary to calibrate the 
steering mechanism for forward (zero) direction. Bence, using a small magnet 
and a reed-relay a feedback system was devised which upon the receipt of 
speed-signal 7 (SISaSa = 111) would halt the robot and =:t{U"t a routine of 
zero-direction-calibration. This procedure could be repeated during the robot 
operation every 10-15 minutes to ensure that the selected directions remain 
accurate, and errors would not be accumulated. Another hardware design 
feature was the ability to change the steering wheel to a new direction using 
the shortest arc of rotation. 
The drive circuitry could enable the selection of six different speeds 
(including zero-speed) in a single direction, although, a variable speed facility 
was not deemed to be as crucial as a high directional variability feature. 
Additionally, the speed control clock pulse frequency was also adjustable. 
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(b) - Ultrasonic Range Detector 
The ultrasonic range detector is outlined in FIG.6.10. It could measure the 
distance of nearest object from the front of the robot at approximately floor 
level by detecting the shift between a transmitted pulse of ultrasonic wave 
and its returned refiection. Various pulse widths, cycle widths, frequencies, 
and controls were hardware adjustable to suit specific operational conditions. 
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FIGURE 6.10. A diagram of the Range Detector system and its main controls, 
showing a representation of transmitted/received waveforms. 
Each detection cycle, typically of order of 150 milli-seconds, could be 
either initiated independently by a clock, or governed by the main 
communications cycle of robot's data transmission system (details in following 
section). 
(c) - Data Organization. Checking and '!'rJUlsmission 
Information collected by the mobile robot about its environment (also the 
movement instructions received) had to be serially transmitted (and received) 
before interfacing to the computer. For this purpose a control box was 
constructed which as well as relaying and processing the data housed the 
power supply, the manual control panel, and also the monitoring displays. 
The 8-bit output and the 16-bit input data were transferred between the 
control box and the mobile robot using a pair of identical 27-MHz radio 
transceivers (same data could also be transferred by cable). 
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THE PAGE 
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After an output instruction was received by the robot, first the number of 
~ary" bits and their parity would be checked, and if verified the data 
accepted as correct. Then, the robot input data would be transmitted to the 
control box, going through similar verification or rejection processes. An 
example of a typical transmission cycle approximately lasting 350-ms is 
depicted in FIG.6.ll. 
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Control-Box to Robot 
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FIGURE 6.11. An illustration of phases of a typical data transmission cycle. 
Output 10110010 is transmitted from the control box)... and input 
10010011 ... received, using Pulse-Width Modulation wWM). 
(iv) - THE COMPUTER INTERFACE 
A high density 64-bit interface expansion card was used to connect the 
PDP-11 digital computer to the control box. This interface allowed 64 lines 
of input (or output data) be read (or written) in parallel into the computer. 
It also had the interrupt facility, whereby information could be read only 
when required, hence saving on computer processing times. 
The 16-bit robot-input and 8-bit robot-output lines of the control box 
were connected to the above interface ports. Additionally, a hardware 16-bit 
binary clock was designed and connected to one of the ports. This clock 
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could be reset and initialized at the start of an experiment, hence keeping 
track of the lapsed time, up to approximately six hours - a software designed 
clock could, more or less, perform the same task, but less economically. 
6.1.3 SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE MOBILE ROBOT 
The initial software programs developed after the completion and testing 
of the hardware design were mainly for the purposes of demonstration and 
investigation of the potentialities of the model. 
At the lowest level, various utility routines were devised for: processing 
the output/input signals and checking their validity; setting operating 
conditions and initializing the system; or visually monitoring the states of 
the mobile robot on the computer screen. 
At the next higher level, which can be thought of as the reflexive-action 
domain of the robot, certain deterministic procedures were formulated to 
enable the machine display specific behavioural patterns. These procedures 
could either be used as components of a more elaborate 'learning' program, 
or, alternately, used as an integral part of a learning scheme itself (e.g., in 
simulating refiex conditioning). 
The inclusion of such "innate" behavioural repertoire not only posed 
challenging questions in trying to enable our perceptually simple model to 
display some fairly complex actions; but, also, provided interesting insights 
into the specific input/output characteristics of the model, and the limitations 
which the scope of percepts or actions (universe of discourse) can impose on 
a design. In addition, these refiexive processes could ensure the smooth 
operation of the robot ever long durations, in particular, if trapped or 
entangled in its surroundL'"lg irregularitie~. 
Although, as mentioned previously, we are principally interested in 
fundamental 'learning' issues in machines which incorporate minimal 
directiveness of behaviour at the outset. Nevertheless, the analysis of these 
algorithmic emissions of the machine should greatly assist us in devising 
'learning' schemes, later. Whereby, behavioural patterns similar in nature to 
these algorithmic behaviours could be "acquired" - using the model's own 
experiences and inference systems, rather than,he intelligence of its 
designer. Hence, these rule based sub- programs, which will be briefly 
outlined in the following, should provide good yardsticks for the level of 
complexity ot 'learned' behaviours we may expect from our model. 
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(a) - Sub-Program to "TRAVERSE PARTICULAR TRAJECTORIES" 
This was a simple program written to demonstrate intricate and interesting 
behavioural emissions from the robot, as its speed and direction output 
settings were changed according to certain rules. In one example, the value 
of various parameters of two time dependant polynomials would determine the 
type of function/trajectory the output variations would follow. The general 
form of these polynomials were: 
SPEED(t) = A + Bxt + Cxt2 + DxV 
DIRECTION(t) = K + Lxt + Mxtz + Nxt3 • 
(A, B, C, ••• are constants) 
(K, L, M, ••• are constants) 
Because of the limited speed/direction values possible (speed = {O, ••• ,6}, 
direction = {O, ••• ,15}), a modular measure of the SPEED/DIRECTION (in their 
appropriate ranges) values were used for steering and driving the robot (i.e., 
SPEED(16) =-SPEED(O), SPEED(17) =-SPEED(1), ••• ). 
(b) - Sub-Program to "RETREAT AFTER COLLISION" 
If one or more of the touch switches around the periphery of the mobile 
robot were activated, then the 'retreat' procedures of this program would 
steer the machine in a direction away from the activated contact switches. 
When only one switch is closed, a simple mathematical relation could give the 
retreat direction. But, for two or more switch contacts the extremes of the 
contacted points on the circumference had to be identified, then the retreat 
angle calculated accordingly. A general flow-chart of the processes involved 
is ou tlined in the following: 
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CONTINUE 
(c) - Sub-Program to "MANOEUVER AFTER SHOCK-SWITCH ACTIVATION" 
A similar sub-routine to the 'touch reaction' was devised to deal with the 
activation of the 'shock' switch, which indicated that either the robot was on 
an uneven/slanted surface or it was being agitated vigorously. In either case 
a set of evasive actions were formulated, illustrated by the flow-chart below, 
to deal with such eventualities. 
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(d) - Sub-Program to "SCAN SURROUNDINGS AND FIND LONGEST RANGE" 
This program allowed the robot upon nearing an obstacle (distance less 
than a critical preset range, Rc:) go into a routine of 3600 scanning of its 
surroundings, and once the direction of maximum distance was established 
would steer in that particular direction. In operation, this sub-program alone 
was capable of navigating the mobile robot around the room without collisions 
indefinitely. A radar-type display of the scanning process was also 
incorporated within the program, showing a simplified map of the room on the 
computer terminal. The scheme is illustrated in the following flow-chart. 
(e) - Integrated Programs for Robot Operation 
The above four Bub-programs were combined with other subroutines and 
operational procedures in various integrated complex programs. Two examples 
are outlined in the flow-chart illustrations below. The program-(i) would 
steer the machine around the room in straight direction as long as the sonar 
DesigDiDg a C,.ber.elic 'Lear.i.g' Model 336 
distance (R) was larger than a critical value (Rc). Once within critical range, 
the direction and speed (Se is the speed at Rc) would gradually start to 
ehange according to the criteria specified in the flow-chart boxes, steering 
the robot away from obstacles and avoiding collisions. Similarly, the 
program-(ii) would steer the robot in the same manner outside the critical 
zone, however, once inside the critical range it would go into a scanning 
mode and find the longest sonar direction. The normal operation could be 
interrupted by shock or touch activation, the zero-direction calibration, or 
keyboard override • 
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6.2 DESIGNING A 'LEARNING' PROGRAM FOR THE MOBILE ROBOT 
Having investigated in the previous section some possible schemes which 
enabled our model to display interesting behavioural characteristics, now, we 
can attempt to devise 'learning' programs which will try to aim for a similar 
level of operational complexity. 
The essence of our algorithmic programs could be summed up by few lines 
of mathematical expressions which determined speed/direction (outputs) as 
functions of range/touch/shock (inputs) and time. Hence, a learning program 
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aiming towards same ends should somehow manage to extract similar 
relationships on its own accord after a period of experimentation. For 
example, elementary objectives of the 'learning' model could be to " AVOID 
COLLISIONS" or to "ROVE IN A ROOM KEEPING CERTAIN DISTANCE FROM 
OBSTACLES". 
In the following first we will try to highlight and discuss some of the 
principal issues involved in designing such 'learning' programs, then we will 
attempt to outline the details of one scheme for our specific hardware model. 
6.2.1 "TIME" AS AN INPUT TO THE MODEL 
An important question should be addressed here, and that is the function 
of "TIME" variable in the schemes we have devised so far, and by inference, 
its significance to our later discussions - although, a deep analysis of the 
role of "time" in such modelling problems is outside the scope of our enquiry. 
In our specific model a measure of time is not expressly perceived by the 
robot, but time is regarded as an input which affects the environment and the 
model in a parallel fashion. The independent clocking mechanism manages the 
coordination of the whole system, facilitating ease of analysis and control of 
various aspects of the operation. 
It is contended that the inclusion of 'time' as a primary input is not an 
essentiality for such basic 'learning' systems. Firstly, 'learning' can be based 
on a simple spatial (rather than temporal) contiguity of events. 
Secondly, it can be envisaged that some sort of temporal consequentiality 
of events may be used for 'learning' without explicitly referring to the 
element of external time as a clocking. mechanism. Here, 'changes' or 
'differences' of percepts may be used to represent an ordering of significant 
stimuli during the process of learning. However, in this case, it is assumed 
that stimuli perceived follow each other within reasonable periods of time. In 
other words, the detected environmental changes should be meaningful for the 
system, and time scales of external changes should relate to internal time 
scale of changes. 
Thirdly, a different physical parameter of the model itself could represent 
an independent sequential scaling of events, either in step with external time 
(although out of phase), or with its own gradation. 
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6.2.2 TELEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Another important aspect of our design is the teleological (directiveness) 
considerations. In Chapter-2 the psychological and physiological contexts of 
related concepts were examined, and also in Chapter-3 we discussed such 
topics in their general systems context. But, here, we will focus on the 
teleological issues involved in designing the more specific class of cybernetic 
simple 'learning' models. 
(i) - GOALS and GOAL-DIRECTED BEBA VIOUR 
Many of human and animal activities, and almost all their learned or 
adaptive behaviours, are unquestionably goal-directed in nature; and 
descriptions of learning processes in their biological domains invariably 
contain some directive concepts such as goals, intentions, motives or purpose. 
Yet, the successful translation of these concepts to the artificial domain of 
machines or systems, where no real sense of 'purposiveness' or 'intentionality' 
can be expressed, requires some careful consideration. 
In biological systems it has been shown that specific neural mechanisms 
govern the motivational and drive aspects of basic patterns of behaviour, and 
also indications point to the involvement of physiological factors (hormones, 
chemicals, etc.) in the determination of higher purposive behaviours. On the 
other hand, in artificially constructed systems all such teleological notions are 
defined on subjective basis by external designers, and are generally seen as 
properties of the 'behaviour' of the system (not its construct). However, in 
spite of this fundamental difference, many workers have attempted to devise 
global definitions for goal-directed behaviour, applicable to both natural and 
artificial systems. 
In the following diagram (FIG.6.12) the various levels of teleological 
activity as a general system property, related examples, and also schematic 
representations of their processes indicating types of goals and behavioural 
pathways are outlined in a tentative classification. Although, it must be 
mentioned that there is no consensus about the categorization or definitions 
of teleological behaviours amongst scientific workers from different disciplines 
(e.g., cybernetics, philosophy, A.I., psychology, etc.). For example, the first 
category of our classification in FIG.6.12 (the equilibrium-seeking/reflexive 
behaviour) is sometimes not considered as a goal-directed type activity. 
However, they are included in our taxonomy in an attempt to construct a 
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broad framework, and also to demonstrate a developmental or evolutionary 
continuum from the simplest to the most complex modes of behaviour • 
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FIGURE 6.12. A possible taxonomy for the various levels of teleological 
betiaviours and systems, together with appropriate exam pres. 
The examples of the first three levels of goal-directed ness as defined in 
the hierarchy of FIG.6.12 are quite abundant in nature, their teleology being 
implicit in the simple consequence of their physical actions, but the higher 
types of goal-directed ness are only seen in the more advanced animals capable 
of some mental processing or abstraction. In humans it has become clear 
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that the lower levels of hierarchy of goals serve the higher levels in 
determining goal-directed ness. 
Aside from the first category of our teleological taxonomy the process of 
learning could be involved in the formation of all other types of goal-directed 
behaviour. In addition, the more complex modes of teleology, in particular 
those involving heuristic concepts, could entail some anticipatory aspects, 
such as 'expectations' and 'predictions'. These notions inevitably require a 
higher processing and conceptual level which can somehow internally model 
the consequence of actions, overseeing the development of goal-directed 
behaviour. 
An example of different characterizations of teleological processes is 
proposed by Ackoff and Emery (1972) in defining 'Purposeful Systems'; which 
are defined as systems that are able to change or select their goals under 
constant environmental conditions, and are also able to adopt different 
functional means to achieve the same goal. Their 'ends', 'goals', 'objectives', 
and 'ideals' being equivalent to the 'specific-goals', 'well-defined-goals', 
'ill-defined-goals', and 'target-goals' of our categorization of FIG.6.12. 
(ii) - DEFINING GOALS 
The task of defining and setting goals in cybernetic systems that are 
characterised by an input/output/internal-processing configuration, such as our 
model, could be carried out in four principal ways: 
(a) - At the most basic level, the 'goals' of the machine are unknown at the 
outset, and the model itself gradually starts to develope its own goals 
following a process of interaction with its environment. Either, procedures 
designed into the system will enable the machine to extract goals from of its 
interactions. Or, the system can start with near random or very primitive 
behavioural characteristics and approach a more complex form of behaviour. 
However, in both cases some initial organization is deemed to be necessary, 
since it is inconceivable that without any a priori physical biases or imposed 
general operational constraints, such as aiming towards the attainment of 
instability /stability /change/equilibrium, the model would be able to randomly 
extract useful goals from its interactions with environment. The various 
entropic analysis of systems (e.g., the law of requisite variety) attest to this 
need for Home initial organizational order. 
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(b) - More specific, yet all encompassing, goals could be incorporated within 
the model at the outset. These goals have to be maintained, achieved, aimed, 
or kept within certain limits during the operation of the system. 'Hedonic' 
principals (pain-pleasure, reward-punishment, etc.) can be considered as simple 
expressions of this type of goals. In our particular model an example of this 
method of goal setting is: 
"WHEN TOL'CH SWITCHES ARE ACTIVE" ""''''''''''''''''i;' PAIN and 
"WHEN TOUCH SWITCHES ARE NON-ACTIVE" "'''''''''''''''''h' PLEASURE 
"WHEN RANGE LARGER THAN CRITICAL RANGE" '''''''''''''''''''''il' FAVOURABLE 
The above simple goal criteria alone have the potential to direct the 
development of the activities of the model, following some 'learning' phase, 
towards 'obstacle-avoidance' type behaviour. 
(c) - A compound pronouncement of the desirable target events, as 
extrapolated by the designer, could be used as goals. Such goals could either 
be a sequence of the more fundamental type-(b) goals; or, a 
logical/mathematical combination of type-(b) goals - whose pursuit should 
"algorithmically" result in the desired end pattern of behaviour. For example, 
in the case of our mobile robot we may have goal events defined as: 
"WIlEN ACTIVATIOO OF mE SIKa{ sms<E IS FOLl..QflID BY rom SENSCES"; or 
"WHEN SCJ<lAR RANGE IS ZImO AND FOONT 'n«> 'lUJCH SBNSCm ARE ACTIVE". 
(d) - The designer of the system, using introspection, could determine that a 
certain sequential/mathematical/logical relationships between inputs an i 
outputs would be conducive to bringing about the desired behavioural pattern, 
without actually knowing the exact steps for attaining the objective. In our 
particular model examples of this "heuristic" type goal events could be: 
''WIlEN mE HDl1.m OF RANGE AND SPEIID IS LESS 'IHAN A CDBl'ANT 1["; or 
"WIlEN ALL TaXll SWITCHES ARE INACTnh F<E TIMB T AND SPEED ~ 0". 
(iii) - DRIVE AND MOTIVATION 
Most of animals' simple drive mechanisms have action which typically can 
be represented by the following generalised response curve: 
t DRIVE Variable (e.g., thirst, hunger) 
dr i v: ~ ~ ~ _1_ ------- :'-:;-';-;';---~-~-:-=iiiiill"-"IIaI"'''''''-
J 
~ 
delay in "need" system 
feedback mechanism 
NEED Variable (e.g., water,food) 
__ ........ ___ +""'~lm::;;;lIfII"lf:t .. 'amIIU'l1tnlllIUl'".II.u'"IIIIUIIII"'IHIIIII"1II/UIIIUIIIIIU,i/UIIfIllI,MII;IIIIUIIII'I'"'",UmIfIlUI.iUUllmllllllftlolllltU""lIrllmIU:fUlltlu:'m"'UII:I:nlZ:I.I.:u;.l~I' 
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Additionally, various factors such as fatigue, sensitization, boredom, 
attention, distraction, time, etc. cOuld affect an animal's motivational aspects, 
and reduce or increase the drive accordingly (this is equivalent to changing 
the skewness of the curve in the previous diagram). 
There is, also, a complex interaction between the various drive and need 
mechanisms of an animal and some higher hedonic centers, which indicate the 
severity of other more global variables. These hedonic mechanisms could be 
considered as 'reward-punishment' centers, or alternately, more fundamentally, 
as 'pain-pleasure' centers. 
In the context of elementary 'survival', the 'pain' mechanisms are those 
which signal undesirable inputs or outputs, and stop the organism from 
exceeding various critical limits of its physical capabilities. Conversely, 
'pleasure' mechanisms consolidate and enfo~ the IDOBt utilitarian, efficient, 
or desirable modes of action; or try to sustain pleasurable experiences. For 
simple physically quantifiable stimuli (also for some complex or abstract 
stimUli) the function of a pain-pleasure mechanism can be typic8ny depicted 
by following illustration: 
PLEASURE 
PAIN 
I 
Pleasurable 
Region 
Physical Variable (e.'.J temp., pressure, 
br1gntness, loudness) 
--~--~~----------.. 
optimal comfort 
stimulus value-
Bere, 'motivaUon' can be loosely defined as an aversion from painful or 
attracUon towards pleasurable stimuli; and 'drive' can be considered to be 
proportional to the degree of such aversive or attracting forces. 
Of course, as before, different interference factors could change the shape 
of a pain-pleasure curve, or cause a shift in its x-y axis. Similarly, 
compound, conflicting, or competing pain-pleasure mechanisms can result in a 
much more intricate curve shapes, which have various nodes and troughs, or 
have sharp transitions from pain to pleasure areas. 
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In some observations of animal behaviour in nature (e.g., sea-gulls) it has 
been established that coincident a~tivation of various conflictin.r innate drive 
mechanisms (maternal vs. escape) results in an intermittent non-stable 
response from the animal. The normal solution to this problem provided by 
evolution is to develope a hierarchical. order for various motivational 
variables. 
Now, we shall discuss how to go about choosing hedonic principals for 
simple 'learning' models such as our experimental mobile robot. 
In our argument we shall consider a simple hypothetical organism in an 
environment which exerts ph7sical or information-baaed inputs upon it, as 
indicated below: 
inputs 
l/P( 1) . O/P( 1) ------~:~I ORGANISM ~I--------~: outputs 
I/P(2) ... -----...... O/P(2) 
BNVIRONMBNT 
Now, • 'lets suppoee that the organism starts from a non-goal-directed 
random behaviour. Then, we (as external observers) notice that one of the 
inputs, say 1/P(1), which can represent "hunger" should be f0110wed b7 a 
specific output, say 0/P(2), which could represent "intake of food". In our 
judgement this sequence of events should increase the chances of survival for 
the organism. In other words, it is desirable that an association should be 
estabHahed between I/P(l) and 0/P(2). ~. 
Of course, not every pairing of aaaociations will make sense, and both 
external causalities of events and, also, internal connectivities of the 
structure of the or.ranism have to be taken into account. For instance, if 
0/P(1) represented "sleep" then the association of 1/P(1) and 0/P(1) (hunger 
and sleep) would not be a very positive one (normally). 
Bence, it is clear that unless the organism goes through the whole lfBIDut 
of evolutionary development, involving genetic mutations and natural selection, 
then such useful associations cannot come about from within a random system 
that has no way of assessing the relevance of inputs to outputs or vice versa. 
Therefore, for any autonomously 'learning' system some internal measure of 
utility of actions is considered as necessary, even in systems that need to 
'learn' simple associations. 
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The designer of a machine equivalent to the above hypothetical organism, 
which is required to 'learn' a simple rule of association, can either explicitly 
include the desired connections between inputs and outputs (e.g., I/P(1) and 
O/P(2» within the design; or, alternately, can incorporate means by which the 
machine could discover such associations by chance, by search, or by 
following specific procedures. However, since we are interested in "acquiring" 
these associations, then we would like to include the capability of evaluating 
useful input-output sequences within the model. For example, the activation 
of some 'favourable internal states' could indicate that the machine should try 
to reinforce/repeat/reexperience the immediately preceding events. 
Dedicated 'pain-pleasure' centers are probably the simplest hedonic 
mechanisms for directing learning. Yet, the dilemma exists that the very 
notions of "pain" or "pleasure" themselves have to ~ learned by a particular 
artificial system, on the basis of the contributions they make to its 'survival' 
(in a simi1ar fashion to the natural organisms), and therefore an even more 
fundamental measure of hedony should be chosen. However, this relCression in 
manifesting ever more simple hedonic principals cannot be reaolved, unless we 
revert back to phylogenetica1ly determined pain-pleasure centers. 
A search for the most trivial hedonic system possible for machines could, 
therefore, on the one hand, result in a pair of very trivial internal indicators; 
and, on the other hand, at even a more fundamental level, yield hedonic 
indicators that are simply expressed in terms of the system's inputs and 
outputs. In our particular model the simplest pain-pleasure mechanism 
envisaged is to define a specific digit of the input code as the indicator of 
pain/pleasure (I.e, PAIN=O, PLBASURE=l)~' 
The above discussions point to the fact that hedonic principles themselves 
can be developed during the process of learning and interactive experience. 
Bence, in design they should be modifiable in nature, and possibly involve 
some aort of hierarchy. 
Now, having decided to incorporate a simple hedonic system into the 
model, then the various 'goals' of a self-goal-determining 'learning' system 
can be defined on the basis of the activations of its 'pleasure' centers and 
suppressions of its 'pain' centers. In a sense, the teleological behaviour 
'learned' by the use of pain-pleasure mechanisms will not be so much 
"directed" by 'goals', as in the case of externally set goals, but will involve 
"searching" for goal events which the model can subsequently aim for. In 
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FIG.6.l3 these two opposing methods of setting goals and the role of 
'pain-pleasure' centers is illustrated. 
{1"III11U"IIIIOIIUf1IIIIM_~~ I-·"'· ACTIVITY """"'-'} 1IIIIUIHfW,IIIIIIUllftlhl .. llllnlHhlt ...... II1CH 
[""'i'XTERNALLY-'] 1''''''''''''''''''''''''''''·'aOAL''''':'"]' r""' ........ ' ... ··"' .... ·' .. ""I· . SET GOALS _."t-- ACHIEVEMENT ''' ... '· ..... 1 MODEL··,ojI-· 
." ...... ,*.""-"' ..... _-'" . EV ALUATOR 
LUlutn", ... hIUItt ... "n"W""U~UWlllUlHttl 1IIIIIIIIIIt!l!"""",,lIIllmn_nUIllUI 
(a) 
r-.... "·-, ....... 
----l . ,. 
INTERNALLY GOAL r-{ Mo~iI DISCOVERED ACHIEVEMENT GOALS EVALUATOR .. ......-au,... 
(b) 
. 
FIGURE 6.13. (a) - bterna1ly set goals, (b) - Internall7 set goals. 
For our particular mobile robot it was decided that rather than designinar 
specific goal/drive centers, whose inputs were to be maintained within 
appropriate limits, the aoaI events would simply be defined in terms of 
conditions set upon one or a combination of inputs and/or outputs. 
In some simiJar experimental exercises, to convey an artificial sense of a 
'need' mechanism in the robot, special inputs such as battery level indicators 
are incorporated which is deemed to 'motivate' the machine towards searchinar 
for a battery~harger outlet. Although, drive and need mechanisms are· well 
investigated attributes of animal behaviour, seeminar17 involved in every aspect 
of their learning, nevertheless, this superficial inclusion of an artificial 
'sense' of a 'need' in the design, by express reference to motivational inputs, 
was not found to be conducive to our elementary approach to the modelling 
of the learning process. 
Bence, no attempt is made to explicitly manifest 'survival' or other 
animal-specific aspects into the model. However, concepts such as drive and 
motivation can be later defined as composite higher order functions of the 
more basic hedonic parameters. For example, if "utility" (pleasure) in the 
model was defined as:-
"KEEPING RANGE AT MAXIMUM AND SPEED AT I", 
then, starting from a random pattern of behaviour, the robot's behaviour 
should converge towards movements in the centre of the room after a period 
• ••••• 1 ••• Cl'b.~ •• li c • .... ~.I •• ' lI.d.. 346 
of appropriate 'learning' - this being equivalent to explicitly stating a 'need' 
for the robot to stay in the middle of the room. Although, the exact 
consequence of such goal-seeking operations will not be obvious for many 
combinations of inputs and outputs at the outset; neither a 'convergence' 
towards a final 'learned' pattern of behaviour can be guaranteed. 
6.2.3 EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Previously, we have referred to epistemological or knowledge related 
aspects of the learning process as one of its most important integral 
considerations, specially, when investigating the acquisitional aspects of 
learning. Knowledge and learning are implicitly connected, since when an 
organism improves/changes some facet of its behaviour through learning, it 
clearly has gained additional knowledge about itself or its environment. 
Firstly, it must be emphasised that the acope of learning and knowledge 
. 
acquisition even for an entity as simple as our model is almost limitless. To 
illustrate this point, the eight touch-switches, the shock-switch, and the 
seven-bit range input can provide ~=2Ja different patterns of input; 
and the three-bit speed and four-bit direction outputs provide 2ax2.=2' 
different- output combinations. It we were simply to consider direct 
associations between single inputs and outputs, then there are 2'z2u=21a 
possibilities. Added to this are the temporal or combinatorial possibilities of 
associations between sets of inputs and outputs. Bence, it is conceivable that 
a great deal of knowledge, only bounded by the size of storage, can be 
represented and accumulated by our simple modeL 
The scanning program devised earlier was an example of the high level 
knowledge representation possible by the mobUe robot, whereby a 
2-dimenaional map of the room was composed by appropriate programming of 
the robot. Many other conceptUalizations are indeed possible; of course, the 
level of such conceptualizations, which should also be compatible with the 
sensory complexity of the model, need to be described at the beginning of a 
modelling exercise, and objectives pinpointed. 
The analysis of the nature and organization of knowledge is one of the 
important aspects of epistemology of learning, which in humans concerns 
issues such as the content of thoughts, concepts, mental-images, 
discriminatory factors, imaginations, etc. These analyses also involve the 
investigation of rules, operations and laws which underline such phenomena. 
The above issues form the core of many philosophical deliberations, and have 
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instigated various diametric standpoints amongst workers of learning related 
fields (e.g., empiricism vs. rationalism). In earlier chapters of this thesis such 
issues were discussed to some extent, particularly in sections dealing with 
cognitive studies of learning. 
If we suppose that an organism after undergoing a specific experience 
endures a change in its knowledge state - as a result of some external 
input/information, or as a consequence of observations made on the results of 
its responses, or following some internal processes, or some other method. 
Then, there are various important considerations that have to be taken into 
account. 
Firstly, what was the level of the knowledge at the outset of learning. 
The organism can start from zero or very Httle knowledge and gradually build 
up (learn) a composite picture of its operational domain. It can alao start 
with a priming of certain parameters, and upon confronting a particular 
. 
experience develope specific patterns of knowledge rules. Alternately, at the 
most knowledge-intensive stratum, all appHcable knowledge can be 
incorporated within the system at the start, and only refinements and 
omissions made to its organization after a period of operation. 
Secondly, how can we know that knowledge has been acquired or changed 
within the organism. Here, the answer Has in evaluating a certain facet of 
the organism's behaviour or its "performance", before and after a specific 
experience. By judging certain responses, an "inference" can be made that 
learning caused a certain change in knowledge. In a way, knowledge could be 
thought of as an entity lying dormant within an animal, and is only. activated 
when the attainment of some goal is desired. The organism may 'know' how 
to do many tasks, but, unless it is properly motivated it may not perform the 
task. Bence, the clear distinction between "learning" and "performance" 
should be appreciated. 
Thirdly, what is the nature of the knowledge that an orpnism has, and 
how can it be represented. This could involve a variety of different forms. 
In its simplest manifestation, the implicit physical interconnection between 
inputs and outputs could represent knowledge. Yet, from our previous 
discussions we may speculate that to convey any interesting learning features 
a second representational meta-level is desirable. In this higher level, 
probably, the simplest form of knowledge representation is the mere recording 
of events, which can be a representation of combinations of input and output 
sequences, or a sort of 'copy' of the 'image' of temporal connectivities of 
·e •• , ••• , • c~.or •• tl c 'Lo.r ••• " "0.0' 348 
inputs and/or outputs. Many other more complex conceptualizations are also 
possible for representing knowledge and its rules. Examples are: 'parameters 
in algebraic expressions', 'decision trees', 'graphs and networks', 'formal 
grammars', tproduction rules', 'frames and schemas' , 
linguistic/mathematica1/10gica1/conceptual expressions. 
or other 
The work in the discipline of A.I., specially in some of its branches such 
as 'expert-systems', is highly pivotal on the issue of representing knowledge; 
and there have been impressive developments in these areas within the past 
few years, particularly in commercial knowledge-based systems. Most of the 
effort has been directed towards the efficient collecting, storing, and utilizing 
of information by computers. For example, decision trees, classifiers or 
various rule-based systems can manifest the knowled.re involved in a task 
domain; and programming languages (e.g., LISP, PROLOG) have been developed 
to manipulate these knowled.re bases. However, learning or acquisition of 
knowledge is not, generally, emphasised in these fields. In general, in these 
. 
"top-down" approaches to knowled.re formation, only 'inferences' are made 
upon the knowledge-structure - although in some instances new rules may be 
'extracted' • 
On the other hand, in the "bottom-up" disciplines, such as connectivism or 
; 
pattern-recognition, the interest is focussed on the more trivial 
representations of knowledge. Rather than describe objects and relations in 
terms of their underlying rules or hi.rher level linguistic characteristics, their 
elements or basic features are identified. Therefore, more fundamental 
criteria are used to accumulate knowledge about the experiences of an 
organism - by compiling descriptions of objects and events in. terms of 
subsets of more simpler entities. 
Bere, in our model, due to our particular cybernetic incHnation to the 
JDOCIeDing of ledrning, we will not include the higher strata of 
conceptualigtion and representation of knowledge. The level of the 
complexity of the model, its perceptive powers, and its behavioural 'learning' 
potentialities indicates that we should try to devise knowledge representation 
schemes which rely on simple consequences of inputs and outputs. Bence, the 
major concern should be the organization and restructuring of this knowledge 
base stored in the 'memory' of the system. We should also try to incorporate 
almost no, or minimal, prior knowledge into the system, enabling the model to 
build up a perception of the world around it in a progressive manner - even 
managing to develope its own goals. 
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6.2.4 MEMORY and GENERALIZATION 
The faculty of 'memory', which can be defined as the capability to retain 
and recall past experiences, has been discussed in previous chapters of this 
thesis. In Chapter 2 the cognitive aspect~ of memory were scrutinized by 
outlining its characteristics and hypothesising about its various facets of 
formation, retention, recall, consolidation, decline, and utilization. 
Additionally, in the various 'learning' models discussed a memory-element of 
some sort was either implicitly or explicitly present. Here, we shall attempt 
to discuss such features in relation to our simple cybernetic model. 
The most trivial form of recording a 'memory' of an external event is to 
make a permanent or temporary physical impression of that event. For 
example, a finger-print mark or the oscillations of a tunina-fork both indicate 
that a certain event occurred in the past. Althouah. certain animal coanitive 
systems (e.g., imprintina, iconic-memory) apparenUy exhibit this type of 
memory formation/retention characteristics. The real interest tor the 
modelers of the learnina process. actually. lies in the more complex forms of 
memory. which convey information in a more accessible and modifiable form. 
Yet, it must be pointed out that if the non-trivial view ot memory is 
adopted, then the presence of a memory element is not a necessity tor all 
'learning' models. For example, simple 'learning' systems can be enviaaaed 
which forae connections or associations between inputs and outputs, by 
modifying connection weights or creating new c;onnections on basis of current 
percepts. Criteria used can be the instantaneous conu.uity of events, or 
modifications ·of some mathematical funcj.ipn (e ••• , conditional pro~bi1ities) 
for each recurrence of inputs. 
For an inquisitive cybernetic modeler of tlearnina' SyatelDS, clearly, lookina 
simply at the external behaviour of the system or the procellBing of internal 
signals alone will not yield any results of much interest. Rence, some level 
of interaction of a model and its environment in the form ot internal 
abstraction of external world is desirable; using which the model can make 
inferences, solve problems. and even hypothesise about its interactions with 
the environment. The knowledae-base which will provide the necessary 
framework for this abstraction can be contained within the memory of the 
system; and the simplest method envisaged tor representing this type ot 
knowledge in memory is to merely record that output 0 occurred tollowina 
the occurrence of input I. 
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Now, to investigate a simple memory function further, lets consider a 
hypothetical system that has input 1={Il,I., ••• } and output O={OI,Oa, ••• }, and 
starts from a completely random 1-->0 transformations. The system has a 
simple goal mechanism in the form of pain-pleasure centers, and also has 
unlimited storage capacity. 
The system, illustrated in FIG.6.14, commences operation by first reading 
an input II and choosing randomly an output 01 from the table of 1->0 
transformations (initially equally distributed). The transformation tables 
indicate the probability distributions for various outputs for any given input. 
Next, the goal evaluator will indicate whether the 'pain' or 'pleasure' centre 
has been activated, and a value <*={ I=pleasure , O=pain } will be attributed 
to that particular Ia-->Ol pairing. If this pairing is already recorded in the 
infinite memory of the system (in one or several instances), then its previous 
~ values are looked up and modifications made to the selection probabilities 
(Le., their distribution) of the 1-)0 traftsformation table - accordiDa to 
. 
some criteria based on current and past If08l values. However, if the 
sequence of the 1-)0 is novel, then the pairing together with its If08l 
value is simply stored in the aeJDOrY. 
READ I I INPUT II I 
l 
I .0 
TRANSFORMATION I INFINITE I TABLE random) MEMORY (initially 
-l Il--+01.......al Il--+O • .......a' 
~ . I.--+O • .......al. 
SELECT I.--+Ol.......al 
OUTPUT 0, 
· 
• • • • 
-l • • • • • MODIFY • • • • • I .0 
· 
• • • 
· READ GOAL TRANSFORMATION • 
· 
• • • VALUE Gk TABLE 
for II .OJ ACCORDING TO SOME CRITERIA 
. 
~ 
IS N LOOK UP Gil 
II -+0, IN MEMORY 
NEW 
? 
i" 
Y 
STORE AS NEW 
1--+0--+0 
SEQUENCE 
FIGURE 6.14. A simple idealised hypothetical 'learning' system with unlimited 
memory. 
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This simple scheme will in theory enable the model to 'learn' any existing 
desirable associations between inputs and outputs after an arbitrary period of 
operation. Similarly, using equivalent procedures, desirable reJationships of 
output-->input pairings or sequences of inputs and/or outputs could also be 
discovered. Of course, all such learning is conditional upon the very 
existence of favourable underlying causality of inputs and outputs, and in 
many instances no convergence (or useful outcomes) may result - even after 
very long periods of operation. 
The principal limitations and disadvantages of such idealised learning 
models are: firstly, the immense amount of storage capacity which might be 
required; and secondly, the time consuming nature of the processes involved 
in recaJUng, scanning and comparing events with stored past experiences; 
particuJarly, for compound sequences of inputs and outputs. Today's 
computers (digital, analogue, or parallel) are not really equipped to deal with 
such complexities for any non trivial 'learning' system of interest which 
, 
operates on these basis. It is also not envisaged that future technoJodcal 
progress in computing IDIICbinery will promote this type of ezbauative 
approach to the modellina of learmn.. 
Therefore, measures have to be taken to limit the IDKJUnt of stored 
~ 
information in the ..,..,ry. Various criteria can be used to do this. For 
eDmlple, we can record only 1->0 relations which bring about a positive 
~ event (pleasure). But, perhaps, the beat indications can be found in the 
discoveries made _ to how the brain's equivalent limiting functions are 
performed in nature. 
Seemingly, me..,ry mechanisms in animals and humans retain the trace of 
a particuJar event for varying periods of time, depending on variou. 
underlying significance factors (e.g., motivation, attention). Two principal 
components, the 'short-term' and the 'long-term', are identified in natural 
memory mechanisms; enabling unused or irrelevant information to be discarded 
or replaced. In artificial models of 'memory' systems, aIao, ai.flar principle. 
can be employed. Normally, three principal criteria are used to lDBDiteat 
'forgetting' in artificial systems, which are 'utility', 'qa' and 'relevance'. 
Extreme care should, however, be taken so that earlier information is not 
overwritten by new information which somehow might be dependant on the 
earlier information. 
Additionally, groupings of information are apparently made in the brain, by 
forming 'generalizations' of primary percepts; and, at a higher level, inputs 
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are classified and heuristics formed to obviate the need for looking at every 
permutation of events and their significances. 
The generalization of stimuli (inputs) is a characteristic of all learning 
processes in animals, and also a prominent feature of many of their 
perceptual mechanisms. The generalization process ensures that a response 
can be evoked by a broad range of stimuli which are appropriately similar to 
the stimulus already encountered by the organism. Yet, the critical levels of 
similarity at which two stimuli evoke' the same response may vary for 
different animals, and also are dependant on the specific type of learning; in 
many cases, this range of similarity itself is refined by the animal during its 
learning process. In behavioural psychology the two types of generalization 
(non-learned and learned) are distinguished as 'primary' and 'secondary' 
generalization. 
In our hypothetical learning model of FIG~6.14 a generalization could mean 
. 
redefining .roups of inputs as a new 'generalized' input. For example, the 
three sequences Il->Ol->Gl, Ia-->Ol->Gl, I.-->Ol->Gt could be 
represented by a new sequence IUD)-)Ol-)Gl. Alternately, some sort ot 
Jogical or mathematical reJationship could be discovered or hypothesised, 
which would enable a more parsimonious expression ot events which elicit the 
positive goals. 
8.2.5 'LBARNING' SCIIBMBS FOR SIMPLB CYBBRNBTIC MODBLS 
Bavin. looked at some periphery issues and considerations deemed 
bDportant to· our level ot investigation. ot the learning procesa and. its 
modellin.. We can now elaborate more on the way a working 'learnin.' 
system can be devised. 
But, perhaps it is worth reiterating that our intentions in the scrutiny ot 
learning are all directed towards its global and fundamental features. Bence, 
no particuJar pattern of behaviour (skill) is of special interest. Neither, shall 
we attempt to engaae in discussions of higher 'mental' aspects of learning, 
such as consciousness, self-awareness, meaning, understanding, etc. 
The idea is to try to define a limited but concise model, with limited 
scope of activities and task potentials, engaged within an environment that 
can exert a set of defined inputs upon it. The model should start with 
almost no external knowledge, aside trom general directiveness information, 
and gradually 'learn' some interesting (non-trivial) behavioural patterns from 
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its interactions with the environment. The question is posed, whether a 
consistent closed system could be built which exhibits the fundamental 
characteristics of the learning process, such 88 'unpredictability' , 
'repeatability', 'self-improvement', 'permanence', 'generalization', 'recognition', 
'recall', 'forgetting', 'relearning', etc.; a~d also whether a hierarchy of 
learning could be developed. Although, not necessarily copying the empirics 
of equivalent natural processes. 
A look at other generalized attempts at the field of the modelling of the 
learning process reveals that, in the main, either their designers quickly 
abandon the global aspects of their supposedly all-encompassing endeavour, 
and focus on a particular task oriented domain; or, the vagueness of their 
abstractions, and the intricacies of mathematics involved, makes no 
accommodation for any coherent practical realization - of course, there are 
some exceptions (e.g., Andreae's 'learning' systems). 
We have already discussed SODle of the' fundamental features common to 
moat learning which we would Uke to incorporate in our model, such 88 
'elementary goals', 'pain-pleasure reinforcement', 'short-term' and Ilona-term' 
memory, 'generalization', and a 'knowledge-structure'. Nen, we have to 
decide whether our JDOdel will be a kind: of 'child-model' with no (or very 
Httle) prior knowledae; whether, it should start from a riaid knowledae 
structure and become more general purpose, or vice-versa; and whether, 
associations should be 'created' during learnina, or simply 'refined'. Also, the 
extent of randomness incorporated into the system at the outset, to enable 
the JDOdel discover novel or unpredictable patterns of behaviour should be 
contemplated •. 
Some other important considerations are whether the environment or the 
domain of learning should be 'fixed' or 'chanaeable', in the chanaeable case a 
more critical evaluaUon mechanism should be designed. SimUarly, the extent 
of external contributions made by a 'supervisor' or 'teacher' durina the 
process of learning should be considered 
Before we describe the details of one such 'learning' program, in the 
following, a simple ascending order of various types of simple learning will be 
proposed and discussed. The hypothetical "system" illustrated is considered to 
be a conglomeration of an array of input and an array of output cells, 
whereupon, associations could be established following a 'learning' phase. 
Bere, the object of exercise is to identify and highlight the principal 
pathways of information exchange in a progressive manner:-
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(a) - In the most trivial case, the connections are prewired, and there is no 
change in the associative connections between Inputs and outputs during 
the operations of the system. As in the case of innate mechanisms or 
refleXIve behaviours of animals. 
(b) -
ENVIRONMENT 
rn
"'· ...  ..... __ · .... · ... ···· ...  .. ·......· .............. ·] 
~~=>+~ ~=>+ 
_~ .. ""'&hII 
lnitia1ly_ there are no connections (or there are onI;!" pm:tial 
connections)" but after a period of time and going through a 'learning' 
phase some aeterministic or stochastic associations are established by a 
simple process of perceiving certain cue inputs. An example oJ this 
type of learning in nature is "imprinting" in birds. 
Input * 
* 
..  
* 
* 
ENVIRONMENT 
· . 
t 
*  Output 
* ------... 
* 
* 
I LEARNING J I ELEMENT 
(c) - Initially there are no connections between the inputs and outputs, but 
now the system has a feedback loop from its outpu~.1 and can evaluate 
its actions. Bence, after a 'learnirur' pbasi, tile sr.stelll' learns 
associations based on some measure of U\ilify (or hedony • 
ENVIRONMENT 
* • • • • * Input 
* * 
Output 
... 
* • • • • * 
.. 
* * 
* • • · ~ * ~ . t 
LEARNING L I BLBMBNT I 
(d) - Internal mechanisms euable the s7stem to store a memor.7 of previous 
input-9U~~t sequ.ences, and initiate actions on basis of present and past SlID ezpenences. 
Input 
.... 
ENVIRONMENT 
* · · · · 
* 
* · · · · 
* 
* · · · · 
t 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Output 
=--==--... 
LEARNING ELEMENT 
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c 
. 
(e) -
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Certain internal faculties allows the system to make abstractions about 
its external world, and hence make predictions or establish expectations 
about events and their conaequences at some time in future. This is 
essentially the capability of conceptualizing a model of the external 
world. 
* * 
* 
. . . . 
* 
'--r=- .. 1""'----~ LEARNING ELEMENT 
I[ MEMOR!j 
! IMODELLING OF;I ENVIRONMENT 
6.2.6 NI ~ c:. A 'urA&NDIl' PIIXIWI g 1111 !lJtDlIlDIJI" 
, 
In Chapter-3 (section 3.4) we outlined and discussed the elements of a 
generalised 'learning' system. A representation of the principal components 
of such a system is illustrated in FIG.6.15. 
DISCOVERY 
ELEMBNT 
t 
I PLANNING ..... I MEMORY GENERALIZATION ELEMENT I ELEMBNT ELEMBNT 
t l 
~ 
boice of LBARNING 
"-
BLEMENT Inputs I 
..... 
FILTBRING 
BLEMBNT I 
lIP (input) 
.. t 
I EVALUATION ELEMENT I 
EXBCUTIVB I ELEMBNT (0 
OIP 
utput) 
FIGURE 6.15. The eight major components of a generalized 'learning'system. 
In the remainder of this chapter we will outline a specific example of a 
'learning' program which can be used in conjunction with our hardware modeL 
Although, the majority of the elements of the generalised 'learning' system of 
FIG.6.15 will be implemented in our proposed system, nevertheless, due to our 
level of approach some higher order features, such as 'planning', are omitted. 
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When we come to decide what to include in a 'learning' program choices 
are, indeed, enormous. We can in~rporate a variety of concepts developed in 
behavioural and cognitive studies of learning; and also we can employ 
numerous techniques put forward by worker in learning related areas of 
disciplines such as A.I., P.R., Control Syst~ms, Cybernetics, etc. 
If the objective is to devise a program to simulate the simpler forms of 
adaptive behaviour in animals, for example, "habituation" or "conditioning", 
then the task is fairly straight forward. Firstly, a list of refiexive 
behaviours can be defined, specifying how a particular stimulus elicits a 
response. Secondly, criteria can be formulated for modifying these refiexive 
associations, or forging new associations, according to specific 
mathematical/loJrical rules. For instance, temporal contiguity of events could 
form the basis for such modifications in an exercise to simulate tirst order 
conditioning. Additionally, a simple evaluation unit may be desirable for 
keeping track of previous successful incidence of events. other refinements 
. 
can also lead to the reaUution of more elaborate models, which simulate 
actual laboratory observations of lower forms of learning behaviour much 
more realistically, and in more detail. 
In our foUowing proposed 'learning' program we will attempt to devise a 
scheme that will try to synthesise higher modalities of learning ~haviour. 
The target of exercise is not the instinctive or basic refiexive type adaptive 
modifications of behaviour, but those categories of learning as defined in 
psychology by 'Trial A. Error Learning' or 'Associative Learning'. 
OUr starting point in design will ,be . to externally as .... n gOQla pt, the 
system. Previously, we have discussed various aspects of teleological 
behaviour and goal-selection in this chapter, however, in the absence of 
underlying instigating forces, simi1ar to those found in nature (e.g., evolution, 
bioloJrical need mechanisms), we will not argue the case for 'utility' of actions 
from the point of view of the model itself. In other words, we will not 
reason why a certain goal seeking behaviour is "good" or "necessary" for the 
machine, or why the system "needs" to take a certain course of action. The 
goals will be set by an external observer, they are of the primary type of the 
hierarchy of goals discussed earlier (section 6.2.2(ii», and do not immediately 
convey the type of behaviour (if any) they hope to induce. 
Some general conditions set by the experimenter will be the goals which 
the model will try to maintain (or avoid). Although, even this type of goals 
can be randomly selected by the machine itself. But, again another externally 
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set higher order evaluation system is necessary to judge the relative merits of 
the internally set goals - and rec~.lrssion of argument will continue. 
Thus, for a simple manifestation of teleology, the goals of the model can 
be defined by setting conditions upon one or any combination of inputs 
and/or outputs. Even for our simple mobile robot the permutation of the 
choices based on the 16-bit input and the 8-bit output is enormous. Bence, 
for further simplification we can make the goal states independent of outputs 
of the robot - action (output) dependant goals are in principal similar to our 
simpler input only dependant goals, and can be incorporated within a later 
elaboration of the 'learning' program. 
For example, if a 16-bit input was represented as:-
8-bit touch sensors 7-bit range shock-switch 
" ("" " '"'-1 ......... / 
liP = Iw[!!][!!][!!][!!]wW[!!j[wW~~~~~~ 
Then, a goal G for the system can be defined as: "the sustainin .. of an 
input with active bits (i.e., "l's") at specified digits" - in the case of 
"pleasurable" or "attractive" goals. In other words:-
go itt ,. ,. g. Is I. 17 g, I. Ih 0 111 1 112 '1 31h. '1 s 
o = ImmmmmmmmqJmcpm~Eoml 
~the Significantl goal bits ("l's") 
In the case of "painful" or "aversive" goals having "O's" at specified digits 
of input -will be the desirable objective of· the system. Yet, the &'OBI will be 
said to be activated only when the undesirable (painful) events occur - when 
"1 's" occur at specified digits of input. 
Every time all of the significant bits of the goal are at state "1", we can 
say that the goal is totally satisfied. Accordingly, partial activation of such 
bits can signify a lower degree of goal attainment. 
Bence, a measure of 'goal attainment' can be defined by: 
\,15 
Delree of Goal Attainment = A = l ..... IJ IJ 
J = 0 
where o < A i 15. 
Next, we have to consider how experiences (inputs) of the model are 
registered and stored in its memory. Initially, the mobile robot is assumed to 
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be randomly roving in its environment, receiving inputs from its surroundings 
at a regular clock interval T. Similarly, outputs of the machine are also 
updated at the same clocking intervals. 
The interdependence of outputs and inputs is the issue of prime concern 
here, since, if a causality of response and stimulus is established, then we 
could simply arrange to select appropriate actions for attaining maximum 
goels. Such a dependance could take one of three forms. Either inputs and 
outputs are found to be wholly dependant deterministically; or 
partially Istochastically dependanti or completely independent upon each other. 
The discovery of any deterministic or stochastic associations between 
inputs and outputs will, indeed, mean that the control which is incidental 
with the process of learning has been established. However, in real 
situations, the problem is much more 'Complex, and such direct dependencies 
are very rare or difficult to pinpoint or define. Normally, it is the temporal 
, 
or spatial sequencing or contiguity of a series of inputs and outputs which is 
the crucial factor in signifying causality. 
The robot starting from a totally random behaviour should, upon the 
incidence of goal events, be able to extract from interactions with the 
environment whether there is any dependance between its actions and 
percepts; hence, modify its behaviour towards sustainin« the ~ events; and 
also specify and record such dependencies tor future utilization. The 
'learning' scheme described here will try to achieve these objectives. 
At the beginning ot the exercise, each' input state Ia can lead to _y' one 
ot 2" = 128 outputs (21 = 8 speed choices and 24 = 16 direction choices) with 
equal probability:-
II = 
(initially all Probabilities = 1/128) 
1.0 
I. 1 
.... 
. . . . 
II 111 
Prob {( o/p=O) II. } 
• 
Prob {(a/p=1)/I.} 
• 
. . . . . 
. . . . . 
. . . 
1010101 01010101 
101010101010111 
· . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . 
Output=o 
Output=1 
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The initial random distribution can be interpreted in two ways. We can 
• 
either say that for a given input the 128 outputs have an equal probability 
distribution:-
I. ::~:~::::=:::~::::::~::::::::~.:::..;. 
of 
Byte 
Or, we can say that for input Ii each of the seven bits of output has 
probability 1/2 of being "1":-
Ii ====,.,. 
Prob(O/P) 
1/'1- I -1- I -1- I -1- I 
o 1 I 3 • S • 
Value of 
Output Bit 
• 
Now, either method of depicting the pro~bility distributions of outputs for 
a given input can be used, depending on various design considerations, and 
also on the computer storage limitations. But, the important issue here is the 
criterion which should be used for updating and modifying probabilities as the 
experiment progresses. 
After each attainment of the desired level of goal event, the probability 
distribution of the immediately preceding occurrences is adjusted. Increasinc 
the probability of the most recent output and decreasing the probability of all 
other outputs. This process of successive modification of probabilities should 
increase the expectation of goal events, provided there is an underlying 
causality' between outputs and inputs.· 
However, if no improvement is observed in the model's performance, and a 
converafence cannot be detected in the output probability distribution curves, 
then, we can conclude that a single layer analysis of input-output 
relationships is not adequate for our problem. Rence, a deeper level of 
scrutiny is necessary. In other words, longer sequences of inputs-outputs 
(three or higher) should be looked at, and same probability adjustment 
procedures repeated for the more elaborate combined inputs. 
Additionally, the critical values of goal attainment could also be adjusted 
to improve the performance of the system - a lower level of goal (pleasurable 
or painful) attainment (A) can signify the activation of probability 
modification phase of the program. 
Both the variation of depth of look-back and the change of critical goal 
attainment level will be dynamically adjustable. Whereby, if after a number 
of input cycles no pronounced improvement is seen in performance, or no goal 
states are confronted, then appropriate modifications is made to the depth of 
analysis or the degree of goal attainment. Conversely, if very fast 
fiuctuations of performance are observed, or goal states are constantly 
activated, then the inverse changes to above can be made. 
Various practical considerations impels us to set certain constraints on the 
amount of information stored for analysis in the memory of the system. 
Firstly, not every single occurrence of input-output sequence will be stored, 
but only those which precede the instances of goal (painfuVpleasurable) 
activation. Nevertheless, a 'Short-Term-Memory' (S.T.M) will hold a record of 
a prescribed number (k) of input~tput sequences. 
Secondly, once sianificant events are stpred in the 'Lonat-Term-Memor7' 
(L.T.M.) of the system, then the L.T.M. memory structure can go throu"h 
various processes of reor.ranization:-
(a) - If an inp'ut (or a sequence of input-outp.ut) is not re~ted over a 
number (1) ot clock intervals, then it is 'deleted' from the L.T.M. as 
being an isolated case, or for being irrelevanL 
(b) - If'· groups of different inputs converge towards the BBJDe output 
distribution pI1.ttern, then more 'generalIzed' new groupinats of inputs 
can be defjned. 
(c) - Inverse of the above process, whereby, a compound input (or "roup of 
inputs) is 'divided' into indiVidual in~uts (or inDaller sub-"roups) - as 
the need arises to focus on a particuuar input. 
The process of searching through the contents of the L.T.M., and 
comparing th~ incoming information with previously stored data, is another 
... . . .' 
potentially time consumin" phase of the 'learnin,,' program - which could 
create a processing bottleneck. A solution considered is to translate the 
binary data of the L. T .M. into 'analogue' form, and hence use the much faster 
analogue-comparator hardware available to search through the contents of the 
memory. This solution is particularl7 useful when looking up 'sequences' of 
input-outputs rather than sin"le inputs. 
Once a previously stored output probabilit7 distribution is discovered in 
the L.T.M., then the modification of such probabilities can be carried out in a 
number of ways. The specific procedure used is, normally, considered as the 
core feature of a 'learning' program. An eDllDple of these modification rules 
wiD be outlined here. 
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Suppose input II is initially assigned a random output probability 
distribution function Pu(O/P). Ea~h output will have an equal probability of 
1/128 to be selected:-
P{ (o/p=O)/li) = 1/128, P{ (o/p=1 )/II} = 1/128 , ••• , P{ (o/p=127)/II} = 1/128 
r~w.~127 
' .. 
and also, . /" P{(o/p=j)/II} = 1 • 
nU"lllnln 
j = 0 
Now, using a random generator, suppose 0/p=74 was selected, and at next 
incidence of clock pulse it is noticed that a goal state with attainment value 
a (0 5. a 5. 15) is perceived. We look back at preceding input, which was II, 
and reinforce the probability of occurrence of 0/p=74; at the same time 
reducing the probabilities of all other outputs occurrin., given input Ia. 
If the probability of occurrence of each output for a given input is 
represented by a 7-bit binary number (rep~Benting 128 different values), and 
the output itself identified by another 7-bit binary number. Then, one way of 
digitally storing the output diatribution functions P;a(O/P) in the L.T.M. ia to 
only asaiJrn probability values to those outputs which have been reinforced in 
the past; since all other outputs wm. have equal and complementary 
probabilities. Bence, the entry in L. T .M. could simply entail:-
II P{(0/p=74)/I.} = 1/128 + F(a) , 
where, F(a) is an incremental function depending on goal attainment value a. 
SiJDi]arly, all other output (0/~74) probabilities, given input I., will be:-
P{(o/p=.m)/I,I} = {1 - (1/128 + F(a»}/127 , 
where, m is any output other than 74. However, these probabilities need DOt 
be stored in the L. T .M. of the system, and can simply be worked out at the 
output selection staJre of the program when required. 
Compound output probabilities (Le., two or more outputs with reinforced 
probability values) can also be dealt with in a aiJDi1ar fashion. Obviously, in 
such cases the mathematics involved will be more compIeL Yet, to simpUty 
the probability adjustment procedures we can choose to only reduce the 
probabilities of outputs that have not contributed to .oa1 attainment up to 
that point, leaving other previously reinforced output probabilities unaffected. 
In the following diagram (FIG.6.16) the 'learning' program we have outHned 
here is illustrated in chart form, with brief expJanationa of its different 
functional elements. We have also indicated that the manifestation of BOme 
higher aspects of learning, such as 'expectancy', 'generalization', 'heuristic 
1 
~ 
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formation', 'theorem proving', or 'model building' can all be directed towards 
the data which will be gradually built up in the L.T.M. of the system. 
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FIGURE 6.16. 
detected, increase 
depth of look-back 
A block diagram of the tentative '1earnina' 2rop-amuJl;poaect. The prograaa can enable the mobile robot wtiich ini starts 
with -r8ndom-' - aetivitr,--' -discover ('tearil)input:-output 
aaaociations us~ extAf.rDall7 aet Jroa1 attaimilent and output 
modification criteria. Input" in tlie above d~ refers to 
both single ~uts or compound ~uences of inputs and 
outputs. P(O/PI's are output probability distributions. 
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6.3 SUllllARY OONCLUSIOIS or atAPTII AIm S<III POSSIBILITIII FOB JlUR1'IIIR PUBSUIT 
In this chapter we discussed the many issues and considerations that can 
arise in the design of simple 'learning' models, in particular those that we 
have categorized as 'cybernetic~. We also embarked on the analysis and 
description of one such exercise in more detail, starting from the design stage 
to full implementation, concluding with a proposal for the implementation of a 
'learning' program within the 'body' of the model. In following concluding 
notes of the chapter we will first enumerate the system elements which were 
highlighted as the principal components of all cybernetic 'learning' models. 
As a more speculative postscript, we will also briefiy consider the kind of 
hypothetical formalism which could provide a possible vehicle for the 
universal manifestation of learning in models. Indicating whether some of the 
well established mathematical methodologies such as the 'group theory' can be 
used to develope this elusive formalism. Finally, some areas of mathematics, 
will be advocated as promising avenues for further pursuit. 
(i) - One of the central goals of this thesis was the identification of the 
fundamentals of 'learning' models. In our coverage of the various approaches 
to the task of modelling of learning we were confronted by many 
classifications, terminologies, depths of analysis, and formalism. In many 
instances the same concept or process was referred to by different labels. At 
other times the levels of analysis were so disparate that no direct correlates 
or relevances could be established between their descriptive languages. 
Nevertheless, the recurrence of some principal elements has been evident 
within all 'learning' models discussed, in one form or other. So, in 
conclusion we can identify six central components as the very basic 
requirement of all (non-trivial) 'learning' systems. While reminding ourselves 
of the intricate and varied manner these components are manifested or are 
interrelated, the six elements are as follows:-
THE INPUT ELEMENT: Incorporates all sensory input ,rocesses, filtering, 
decoding of information, and generally making sense 0 the external world. 
THE ASSOCIATION ELEMENT: Incorporates processes which determine 
how connections are established between inputs and outputs, entropy (organization) increasing processes, or the processes which bring_about the 
changes or improvements in' the system. 'Learning' itself can be 
consfilered as an implicit facet of this element's function. 
THE EVALUATION ELEMENT: Incorporate all teleological processes, the 
setting of goals and assessment of their attainment. 
THE MEMORY ELEMENT: IncorP9rates processes related to the storing of 
external and internal events; and their subsequent recall, distortion, decay, 
or interfeltepce. Th\s ele.,ent has ~enerally been cnaracterised by a duality of short-term and long-term memory. 
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THE GENERALIZATION ELEMENT: Is closely related to the 'association' 
and the 'memory' elements; and incorporates processes which enhance the 
efficiency of the system"'1:?: extend the capabilities of the system into 
higher levels. Concej)tu . tion or theorizing can be considered as some 
of the advanced manifestations of this elemenl;. 
- THE OUTPUT ELEMENT: Incorporates the final decision J>rocesses 
involved in selecting appropriate responses for the 'learning system. 
Including all stochastic or deterministic executive processes. 
(ii) - One of the prevailing characteristics of cybernetic models has been 
their reliance on some form of abstract tool, normally borrowed from 
well-established branches of mathematics (e.g., control-theory, conditional-
probability, stability, etc.). It is also true to say that in some instances 
original mathematical elaborations have been made, or even completely new 
abstract language and framework devised. Hence, we can say that cybernetics 
does not have a distinct methodology as other traditional sciences; and the 
decline of cybernetics within the past decade could be partly attributed to 
the lack of a formal language for an adequate expression of intuitive ideas 
that so many workers from diverse fields of science were able to articulate 
within its boundaries. 
Some pioneers of cybernetics, such as Ashby, indeed tried to formulate 
abstract frameworks for the "cybernetic" analyses of problems. But, by 
tradition cybernetic is a subject involved directly with real world problems, 
and two main shortcomings became evident in such efforts. Either, the 
techniques were too rigid and hence narrow in application; or, they were 
extremely vague conceptualizations and inapplicable in reality. Paradoxically, 
the most successful techniques were branched away from the mainstream of 
cybernetics, and evolved into new disciplines which seldom acknowledge their 
cybernetic heritage. 
Here, we shall attempt to speculate on what kind of unifying cybernetic 
axiomatic system would be needed for the realiv,ation of a true cybernetic 
language. In particular, for our purpose ot designing cybernetic 'learning' 
models. 
At the core ot mathematics lies the concept of natural number system, and 
the linear progression of the magnitude of a number (real or integer) as we 
move along the single dimensional axis trom minus to plus infinity. Over the 
centuries many powerful classical theoretical frameworks, such as euclidian 
geometry or probability theory, have been developed which rely on this 
implicit relationship of magnitude of numbers (i.e., the number 6 baa an 
implicit magnitudal relationship to the number 2, represented by a number 3). 
.. 
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Some branches of mathematics such as 'set theory' or 'logic' also 
incorporate other fundamental measures within their building blocks, namely, 
the notions of 'set' and 'truth'. Although, the natural number systems still 
remains an inseparable component of their infrastructure. 
Similarly, in dealing with other more specific domains, higher mathematical 
abstractions have been devised which do not directly refer to the concept of 
natural numbers at their micro-level. The numerous mathematical 
methodologies used in A. I. and cognitive sciences are of this group. 
The question to be posed from the cybernetic perspective is whether 
another elemental basis can be abstracted on par with the 'natural number 
system' which could be more appropriate to the task of emulating mental 
processes. Now, instead of numbers relating implicitly to each other by 
"magnitude" they can have "associative connections". 
The comprehension and the realization of such a system at the higher 
semantic level is a fairly straightforward task. For example, in a semantic 
network, we can give labels to various items such as "chairs", "tables", 
"desks"; and simply from a definition "items of furniture" we can see an 
inherent relationship amongst these distinct labels which does not change 
according to which combination of labels are considered together. 
Furthermore, other inferences can be made about these labels, such as what 
material they are made from. Mathematically these conceptualizations can be 
represented by different means. For example, a multi-dimensional vector 
whose elements represent different 'features' could be defined. 
However, for the systems which are based on the more rudimentary 
criteria (i.e., pattern-recognition, neural-nets, connectionist, or other cellular 
systems) the normal method of abstracting associative connections is to either 
formulate complicated equations, or to devise ad hoc coding systems. 
Moreover, in many realizations of such models the associations of elements 
are expressed in terms of physical/structural properties and other hardware 
specifics of the system which are invariably very difficult to analyze 
mathematically. 
If an associative axiomatic basis was available, then indeed the problem 
which was addressed to in the P.R. section of the Chapter-5, the 
'preservation of invariances', would be a trivial one. Since now every 
element of the system would implicitly carry information about its neigbouring 
... 
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elements. But, as to what the specifics of this so called tassociative number 
system' should be, we can only speculate in a vague manner. 
An area of mathematics whose study could provide interesting insights into 
how a concise framework of theories can be developed using rudimentary 
non-numerical basis is the 'group-theory'. In group-theory operations and 
theories are defined in terms of elements of 'sets' (collections of items) 
rather than numbers. Although, in practice the majority of problems tackled 
by group-theory are those which use sets of numbers. In any case, it would 
be an interesting challenge to investigate the possibilities of utilization of 
'group theory' as a framework for manifesting simple cybernetic 'learning' 
. systems. 
As mentioned previously, the majority of formalisms developed in current 
areas of A.I. are ad hoc problem-oriented techniques. In other rudimentary 
'parallel 'approaches of today such as P.R., neural-nets or connectionist 
although the level of investigation is more generalized and fundamental, 
nevertheless, abstractions devised are fairly conventional and use techniques 
which are by and large domain-dependant. 
Recently a new and non-conventional approach to the problem of 
mathematical expression of thought processes has been proposed by SODle 
workers in Oxford University (Deutsch, 1985; Penrose, 1986,1987,1988). 
Principally, their ideas originate from the conceptualizations of 
'quantum-theory'; also, many of their arguments are developed on the basis of 
the findings of quantum-theory, by drawing parallels with quantum concepts. 
Their basic contention is that using such concepts alternate non-algorithmic 
computing procedures can be devised for the analysis of mental events. 
These procedures are neither stochastic nor heuristically based. Although 
most of the work in this field is highly theoretical and deals with aspects of 
computability of such procedures (as in the context of Turing machines), some 
of its adherents (e.g., Deutsch,l986) have proposed hypothetical designs for 
'quantum computers' and 'Universal quantum computers', which are deemed to 
be much more efficient computational devices than the conventional 
processors in tackling 'parallel' problems - such as the intellectual functions. 
This fresh outlook is also a promising avenue for further research into the 
problem of design of a possible mathematical abstraction to be globally 
utilised in 'learning' systems, and one which is more akin to the underlying 
mechanisms of the brain. 
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CHAPTER 7 
---------
CONCLUSIONS 
7.0 INTRODUCTION 
In this final concluding chapter of our thesis we will begin by a brief 
review of the areas covered in previous chapters, followed by a generalized 
discussion of some of the principal issues that have come to the forefront of 
our enquiry. We will also argue the case for the broad perspective of this 
work; and promote the rudimentary cybernetic approach to the problem of 
modelling of learning, while attempting to speculate on some fruitful course 
of future pursuits in this field. 
7.1 A BRIEF REVIEW OF THESIS 
Firstly, we set the historical and the philosophical background which led 
to today's diverse variety of learning-related subjects. Next, we outlined the 
dominant issues, disciplines, problems, dichotomies, definitions, and approaches 
involved in the investigations of the learning process; focussing on the main 
topic of our interest, namely, the modelling of learning and the design of 
simple cybernetic hardware 'learning' models. 
Later, a more detailed study of the 'pure' empirical aspects of learning 
was embarked. The three major approaches were 'behavioural', 'cognitive', 
and 'brain studies'. The principal methods of analyses and domains of 
research were discussed; and various definitions, discoveries, and theories 
formulated within each approach scrutinized. Additionally, some other 
periphery approaches to the study of learning, such as 'evolutionary', 'social', 
'educational', and 'developmental' were identified; and various categorizations 
and taxonomies of the learning process (and behaviour) were outlined. 
Next, the attention was turned on the modelling of learning. A 'natural' 
vs. 'artificial' distinction was pursued for the way that such problems are 
approached - which basically reflects the difference between 'simulation' and 
'synthesis'. The tools and techniques used for representation and analysis of 
learning models were surveyed; some of the abstractions (mathematical or 
other) used for realization of these models were also considered; and some 
notions propagated from explorations of such abstractions were discussed. 
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Workers in many secondary disciplines have, also, used the phenomenon of 
learning in devising working models, utilizing techniques and formalism 
particular to their discipline. A broad study of the distinct approaches to 
such synthesis problems was made, following loosely the historical precedence 
of subjects involved. Typical examples of work in each field were cited, the 
principal exponents identified, and central points of contention highlighted. 
Finally, the specific hardware/software project undertaken as an "exercise 
in construction of an autonomous cybernetic 'learning' model was described, 
and the main considerations involved in the design of the whole class of 
similar endeavours discussed. 
7.2 "LEARNING": A MULTI-FACETED PHENOMENON 
Learning is a very broad and multi-faceted concept, which if taken in its 
wide adaptive context embraces a diverse range of observations in the living 
world. To illustrate this point, some form of 'learning' or 'adaptive' process 
is thought to be involved in the following accounts:-
The young of an animal is unable to carry out a task. Yet, after a period 
of development it is able to. 
- A species of animals cannot, seemingly \ do a task. Yet, after few 
generations they attain the capability of aoing that task. 
An animal. is reacting in a certain way to a stimulus. Yet, later on it 
reacts differently. 
- An adult animal cannot perform a task. Yet, after a while it carries out 
the task quite proficiently. 
- A person does not recognize a pattern. Yet, at Dext confrontation it does. 
A mental connection does not exist between concepts. Yet, after some 
time it is created. 
An object cannot be labelled with a name. Yet, later a linguistic label is 
established. 
Further, To appreciate the role that "learning" plays in biological lite, in 
the following we will attempt to tentatively delineate its attribution to the 
development of an organism's neural structure, while considering some other 
influencing and governing factors. The hypothetical organism (illustrated in 
FIG. 7.1) begins life with part of its nervous system organised into specific 
structures which allows the organism to display its range of innate and 
refiexive behaviours. During its lifetime, the organism is affected by 
numerous 'external' influences, which, in turn, result in the reorganization of 
its neural structure. 'Internal' (temporal).proceSBeS, also, lead to other neural 
reorganizations. Moreover, interactions between externally and internally 
induced order brings about even more changes in neural structure. Now. the 
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learning process is seen to be acting at all three levels of reorganizations of 
nerve structure. Which further demonstrates the ubiquity of this phenomenon, 
and the reason behind the complexity and the diversity of its explanations. 
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7.2.1 LEVELS AND IIITIIODS OF IlIVISTlGATIOR or DIE LIABIIRG JIIII!fIIINQfI 
The question, foremost in our mind at the start of our enquiry, was 
whether we had good working knowledge ot natural learning processes, 
behaviours, and mechanisms. So that, equipped with such knowledge, we 
could pass judgement on the various modelling attempts from different 
scientific corners in trying to simu1ate or synthesise the learning process 
within the boundaries of their own paradigm., 
To acknowledge the multiplicity of layers of investigations ot learning, let 
us consider a simple learning situation. For example, a human subject 
engaged in a cognitive experimentation on learning, such as learning to 
associate pictures and names, can be looked at. Although, it is now the 
undisputed beliet that all changes occurring during a learning experience is 
registered and, hence, can only originate from the nervous systems. 
Nevertheless, the effects of such changes can be observed in a variety of 
manners:-
We can look at the molecular or sub-molecular changes occurring in the 
subject's nervous system. We can investigate the chemical, physiological, or 
electrical changes which result amongst the neurons. We can holistically 
study the chemical, physiological, or electrical changes coming about in 
groups of neurons, regions of the nervous system or its totality. We can 
theorize about the organizational cognitive aspects of the brain, and hence 
try to explain the changes in terms of our theories. We can construct 
various abstract or physical models to synthesise or simuJate the appropriate 
neural processes. We can examine the external behavioural changes of the 
subject. We can devise hypothesis based on these external behavioural 
observations. We can investigate that particular observation in the context of 
several other identical or similar observations. We can attempt to design 
hardware or software models which can simulate the behaviour of the subject. 
We can ask the subject to linguistically describe the changes he experiences. 
Finally, we can investigate the broader phylogenetic, onthogenetic, or 
philosophical aspects of our learning experiment. 
Therefore, the scope of investigations of the phenomenon of learning is 
astonishingly intricate and multi-layered. Furthermore, the domains of its 
application cover a very wide spectrum; encompassing humans, animals, 
machines, abstract systems, computer programs, etc. 
Similarly, the theories proposed in the various expJanatory planes have 
been different in character; and have involved assorted modes of 
manifestation, such as, mathematical, descriptive, physical, computer 
programming, etc. The degrees of 'applicability', 'generality', 'precision', 
'complexity', 'predictability', and 'objectivity' of these theories have, also, 
been diverse. Some compromising precision to enable a wider scope of 
application; yet, normally, a resulting vagueness makes the validation of the 
theory or its disproof very difficult. others by narrowing down the 
definitions, and increasing the objectivity, usually by use of abstract 
formalisms, are able to devise theories that are precise, but only applicable to 
certain problem domains. Here, the ever increasing elaborations of 
abstractions is such that after a while the initial objectives are, seemingly, 
lost by an engrossment in the theoretical details of analysis; and the whole 
field becomes very inaccessible from outside. 
It we regard the sciences of learning as a whole, then there are many 
areas of vagueness, contradiction, controversy, cross-definition, and 
inconsistency. However, this is hardly surprising due to the intricacy of the 
phenomenon under observation; and the diversity of backgrounds, 
methodologies, descriptive languages, prejudices, and preferences of the 
workers involved in its investigation. 
Previously, in Chapter-I, we had outlined the connectivity of the numerous 
disciplines directly or indirectly involved with the study of learning in a 
"tree" format. But, for a person entering into this subject, perhaps a better 
metaphor would be a "maze" of corridors, some interconnected; but, mostly 
having a singular pathway, with only occasional glimpses into other avenues -
through windows stained with a particular bias. The workers within each 
field not only pursue the objectives of their own paradigm, but spend effort 
on trying to trivialize or discredit alternate views. Once, a unilateral 
blinkered view of the subject is adopted, then progress within its course of 
development, normally, distances the subject away from other related topics; 
leading to either further specialization, or extreme complexity of abstraction. 
Indeed, for a prospective researcher on the topic ot learning and its 
modelling who intends to survey the subject there are no exact maps for the 
above described maze of corridors. Only indications of its nodes, and partial 
portrayal of interconnections or proximities. Hence, it was deemed vital, as 
one of the objectives of this thesis, to outline a broad perspective of the 
whole topic without a particular prejudice; so that, possibilities of 
collaborative research are not compromised. Next, we will summarize our 
conclusions about the principal modes of study of the learning phenomenon. 
(i) - BRAIN-SCIENCES &. NEUROLOGICAL STUDIES 
The Brain Sciences approach to the studies ot learning involves the 
investigation of the electrochemical activity and the physiology of the brain. 
Many important contributions have been made to the understanding of the 
nature of information transfer in nervous systems, the effects of localised 
brain damage on learning, and also the discovery of various functional 
contributiol&~ of brain regions to the process of learning. Yet, Brain Studies 
have, generally, steered away from holistic conceptualizations about the 
process of learning. An analogy which can be made, to stress the 
shortcomings of this approach to the problem, is to compare the task with an 
attempt to discovet.: the workings of a motor car engine by either listening to 
sounds emitted from it, or analyzing individual components or small areas of 
the engine in isolation. 
There are two principal under17inlt criteria in the studies of the nervous 
system. The 'reductionist' view which contends that isolated studies of 
components of the brain could help to build up a complete picture; hence, its 
proponents engage in the study of individual or groups of neurons, or try to 
characterize specific regions of the brain. While, the 'holistic' view refutes 
reductionism, and sees the brain as a kind of receptor (similar to a television 
set) of external information and knowledge; also, a great proportion of our 
percepts are considered to be dependant on external 'order' and 'causal 
relationships', hence, the 'knowledge' which is conveyed cannot be inferred by 
any sort of neurological investigations of the brain. 
However, it is a truism that workers in brain sciences unanimously accept 
that there is, so far, no clear understanding of neuronal. processes at work 
during the learning process. Hence, no solid global explanations have been 
put forward; but, only isolated analytical principals proposed, as glimpses into 
the complex overlapping systems at work •. 
(ii) - PSYCHOLOGICAL &; BEHAVIOURAL STUDIES 
The disciplines of behavioural and physiological psychology hold the 
heritage of the scientific scrutinies of learning; and have contributed a great 
deal to the main body of knowledge about the phenomenon of learning. The 
. 
data collected, based mainly on experiments on animals, where controllability 
and repeatability were the principal concerns, and theories formulated on such 
data, have been the primary source of reference for the modelers of the 
learning process. Yet, by its very nature, psychology has not managed to 
sever itself from empirical results. Generally, different types or aspects of 
learning are investigated independently, without adopting a holistic view of 
the subject and trying to interconnect or relate topics. 
Similarly, in devising learning theories only particular areas of learning are 
targeted, and no unifying proposals are made ·which can describe learning as a 
functional entity that can progressively manifest itself in different forms. 
The weaknesses of such discontinuities have been particularly highlighted 
when various fundamental notions are applied to thuman learning', which 
traditionally has not been the principal domain of investigation, due to 
practical or ethical reasons. 
The way that learning is, typically, investigated in these sciences is to 
define certain quantifiable aspects of a behavioural pattern and use it to 
monitor performance; and, hence, hypothesise or organise all observations 
around such definitions. This texternal' view of the learning process has 
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meant that there is very little hypothesising about the underlying mechanisms 
involved. 
Although, some learning-related psychological concepts, such as 'drive', 
'motivation', 'attention', 'memory', etc., show some direct correlations with 
certain neural substrate; nevertheless, most generalised theories proposed have 
many shortcomings and inconsistencies, and are constantly being refined on 
basis of new evidence - the principal obstacle being the task of integration 
of various concepts. 
(iii) - COGNITIVE STUDIES 
The workers in cognitive psychology have been concerned with the study 
of learning primarily in the domain of humans. The investigations of the 
cognitive scientists (and later on the A.I. scientists) have involved modelling 
and simulation of higher aspects of human learning, such as 'problem solving' 
or 'theorem proving'. This "top-down" paradigm approaches the problem by 
trying to breakdown the totality of the solution, which is normally taken to 
be known at the beginning (intuitively), into smaller components. A 
technique employed at many instances is to divide the goals into sub-goals. 
However, this methodology has been inadequate in dealing with simpler 
learning situations where elementary goals direct the learning process using 
'experiences', and where knowledge is progressively 'accumulated' from simple 
principles - here, the contrast between the direction of approach of two 
diametric ttop-down' and 'bottom-up' trends is again emphasised. 
The cognitive study of human learning, with the predominant involvement 
of 'language' and 'subjective thought', has reintroduced the philosophical 
dimension as a central facet of enquiry. While, the philosophical concerns, 
having instigated the whole chain of scientific scrutinies of the subject of 
learning, had been demoted to a much less significant position in the 
behavioural and neurological studies of learning. 
7.2.2 THE CONTINUITIBS AND THE IIIERARCJIIBS OF LBARHING 
The categorizations of the learning process bas assisted the scientific 
scrutiny of the subject. NevertheleBB, some workers have recognised various 
continuities amongst the different modes of the learning process, and have 
tried to define learning in terms of a hierarchy; while, others have attempted 
to explain its processes from a unitary point of view. Even, the commonality 
of the origin of 'instincts' and learning behaviour have been argued, despite 
having clear differences in underlying neural mechanisms (i.e., instincts 
imbedded in DNA genetic coding, learning contained in neural organization). 
.. 
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If a continuum was established across the diverse range of learning 
phenomena observed in nature, whereby, complex modalities of learning could 
be explained from the simpler ones; implying that the learning differences 
seen amongst animals are only "degrees" of their underlying neural 
endowments, and not fundamental "jumps". Then, it' is conceivable that rules 
or principals could be described, analogous to the evolutionary laws of 
'natural selection', for building up the hierarchy of learning processes. 
An important issue raised in the above scenario is whether neurons or 
their equivalent abstractions are the only medium for the manifestation of 
learning in the true sense. Since, given rules to elaborate the whole gamut 
of learning from basic elements, the task of 'externalization' of 'learning' 
from its natural domain would be much simpler. The next step would be to 
devise a global tlearning operator', which could also be effectively applied to 
the artificial domains of machines or computers - for realizing any of the 
layers of the learning hierarchy, ranging from simple learning seen in 
unicellular organisms to human learning, and perhaps beyond. 
The phylogenetic (or evolutionary) studies of the leaning process is one of 
the subjects which does try to establish a continuity between different strata 
of its hierarchy, and narrow down the distinctions. Certain laws of 
'perception' (e.g., significance of high pitched BOUnd as danger) can be 
observed amongst a diverse range of species, even those which are not 
phylogenetica1ly closely related. Although, these similarities can be explained 
in terms of evolutionary selection processes, nevertheless, it does not obscure 
the fact that there is an underlying external commonality involved, governed 
by the causalities of the physical surroundings. 
The commonality of the external world, genetic kinship of species, and 
various empirical observations have prompted workers in this field to 
speculate that the progression of learning from its simple modalities to its 
higher complex forms goes through specific stages in nature. Implying that 
the functional hierarchy of learning observed within an animal corresponds to 
the order of the evolutionary development of learning within species; the 
order of complexity of learning processes seen alDOl) gst different species; and 
the onthogenetic sequence of learning seen during the growth of an animal. 
In our earlier analysis of learning we also drew some generalized 
comparisons between the processes of "learning" and "evolution", in a very 
fundamental way - equating some of the underlying aspects 'of each process in 
a broad sense. It was, indeed, observations of this nature which instigated 
the wide perspective of this thesis. 
A tentative evolutionary ordering of adaptive behaviour is schematically 
outlined in FIG.7 .2. The final outcome of the development of different types 
of reaction mechanism is indicated by examples in the final column. Each 
hierarchical level has a particular characteristic, novel in essence, but, not 
reducible to or deducible from those preceding it. 
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7.3 THE MODELLING OF LEARNING 
As we have seen, although the volume of knowledge accumulated on the 
topic of learning is indeed massive, nevertheless, our real understanding of its 
underlying proce.Jses is fairly limited; and, hence, the theories and hypothesis 
proposed are speculative, fragmented, and at best isolated to a particular 
aspect or definition of the learning process. 
The path of modelling of learning was adopted by many researchers as an 
aid to its better understanding, a tool for experimentation, or a method for 
verification of theories. The initial. endeavours were mainly attempts at 
simulating some 'natural' aspect of the learning, phenomenon, but, the 
development of this methodology has seen a gradual permeation of its notions 
into 'artificial' domains, where synthesis of learning is the prime objective. 
Of course, an overriding and pivotal question has always been present, and 
that is whether the learning process is an implicit quality of "life", and, 
hence, should not really be applied to non-biological form. It is, indeed, 
sometimes implausible or impractical to translate certain features of learning 
which are clearly biologically oriented to the artificial domain. However, 
there are other characterizations of learning which could be manifested 
artificially in a different, or even a more efficient, form, only if the 
biological constraints were severed. 
An inherent problem of designing 'artificial learning systems' also lies in 
the tools which are used in such exercises. Computers, machines and 
mathematical abstractions are different from brains in fundamental ways, yet, 
we regularly attribute them with human and animal values and expect them to 
behave in 'natural' ways. If we compare a simple process of learning, say in 
a child, to that in a computer we can see that, first and foremost, there is 
structural 'growth' and 'development' in the organization of the brain of the 
child, while the only changes occurring in a computer are in its program. 
Although, it must be pointed out that this issue is subject to interpretation, 
and various researchers either see an isomorphic relationship between 
neuro-physiological changes and programming changes, or the learning in a 
child is analyzed at the more abstract 'knowledge' level where similarities can 
be drawn between 'mental states' and 'states of a computer program'. 
A characteristic observation on some learning models in fields such as 
brain-studies, psychology, cybernetics, A.I., P.R. is that their designers, 
although initially start off by a generalized study or theoretical analysis of a 
particular mode of learning, are too willing to hurriedly apply concepts 
defined for their machines, abstractions, or computer programs to human 
learning, without considering the underlying implications carefully. Another 
problem, also, arises when mathematical abstractions are exploded into areas 
of complexity and vagueness. Both these hasty elaborations are adverse 
distractions from the original objectives. 
The task of designing a 'learning' model is, generally, approached from a 
previously fixed view point. A worker, competent in the formalism of his 
particular field, attempts to incorporate some adaptive or learning criterion in 
the design of a modeL The elaborations of the model could involve 
mathematical (or other) techniques which are normally employed in that 
discipline (e.g., use of statistical techniques in psychology). Furthermore, it 
is intended that the immediate applications and usage of such 'learning' 
models should be found within the discipline itself. Hence, very few 
modelling exercises on learning approach the problem from a neutral 'pure' 
stand point, which would allow the study of the subject independently, 
without reliance on a specific domain of application or methodology. 
Examples of 'learning' models surveyed in this work have been very varied. 
They have ranged from 'black box' type system models; descriptive models; 
abstract or machine simulations of learning processes; to computer programs 
and mathematical formalisms for synthesising learning, using deterministic, 
stochastic, heuristic, or algorithmic techniques. 
In 'learning control systems' the 'behaviour' of a system was either totally 
or partially known, but the 'structure' was, normally, less known or unknown. 
After identifying significant inputs and outputs of the system, a 'learning' 
technique was used to discover a structure which would give rise to an 
appropriate system behaviour. Two principal criteria were used. Either, 
internal connections were deemed to be present, and simply their strength 
was 'adjusted' (increased/decreased); or, the connections were 'created' on 
basis of BOme associations. 
In state-space, automata theoretical, or BOme other mathematical 
realizations of 'learning' systems the behaviour was normally specified by 
functions or rules which were not inherently obvious from the particular 
structure of its representation or form - the behaviour was, normally, 
selected (intuitively/scientifically/arbitrarily) on basis of some utility 
consideration. This aspect sharply contrasts the natural learning mechanisms, 
which singularly determine behaviour. 
. I 
... 
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The neural-nets, the self-organizing systems, the pattern-recognition, and 
the connectionist approach to the modelling of learning were all closely 
related in terms of their underlying objectives, and also methodologies. The 
central point of contention in these reductionist views of the subject was 
that by designing networks of, mainly, identical elements, and using simple 
principles, it was possible to devise complete systems that behaved in a 
complex manner. More or less, imitating the way nature has, through the 
process on evolution, managed to manifest learning. An important question 
which was explicitly raised by these modes of investigations of learning was 
that if we have a particular system structure, displaying a pattern of external 
behaviour, and we intend to modify its behaviour, then, is it better to 
physically restructure the underlying organization of its elements, or try to 
modify the functional behaviour of each element - and what are the relative 
advantages. 
The A.I. approach to the modelling of learning did not involve designing 
systems with inherent learning capabilities; but, principally involved devising 
computer programs which could 'synthesise' learning in some form - and not 
necessarily including 'natural' correlates. The common methodology was to 
use a 'knowledge base' of well developed ideas, and try to 'learn' (or 
discover) some features or implicit rules of the knowledge base by certain 
reorganizations of its structure. Also, a prominent feature of such models 
was their reliance upon an external 'teacher' or 'guide' for evaluating and 
directing their actions for maximum utility. 
7.3.1 TBI RUDIIIDl'ARY CYBIBBITIC APPIOACII1'O 1'111 JlQl)ILLIIG or LlA8NIIG 
There have been many attempts in the past 3-4 decades to devise 
cybernetic experimental 'learning' models. However, with the exception of 
very few, mostly have either concentrated on a narrow path of application or 
have involved some non-qualified speculation. Hence, it was one of the 
principal aims of this thesis to provide a broad framework for a systematic 
analysis of the problem - pinpointing the controversial areas, and highlighting 
the main issues involved. 
A common feature of most cybernetic 'learning' models is their reliance on 
some form of mathematical formalism for representation and analysis of the 
behaviour of the model. Yet, to be able to display interesting learning 
capabilities, such as problem solving or concept learning, some designers have 
also incorporated the facility of abstracting the environment as welL 
Whereupon, the model is able to manipulate the 'knowledge' gained through 
its experiences, and make deductions by experimenting on the "model" of the 
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real world rather than going through the actual steps themselves. The need 
for such a higher 'mental modelling' level becomes evident when we consider 
various learning situations in humans (or higher primates). For example, in 
trying to learn to solve a problem, different possibilities are examined within 
the mental framework of the problem and appropriate inductions made. 
The approach adopted in the design of our own 'learning' 
hardware/software model, and by implication promoted as a fruitful course of 
investigation, was the rudimentary approach. The main advantages of such an 
approach to the modelling of learning are the simplicity and relative 
objectivity of definitions; limitations of output-input interactions; economy on 
the processing resources; and the possibility of implementing fundamental 
notions observed in the natural domain of learning. Conversely, the 
disadvantages are that their achievements are normally uninteresting, and such 
models are incapable of performing any complex tasks. 
The first step of the design was to define the particular type or the class 
of problems that the model was expected to solve. For example, was it 
suppose to learn to 'play games', 'solve equations', 'analyze graphs', 'perform 
tasks', 'refine skills', or in the extreme be a generalised 'learning machine'. 
Our learning model could be categorized in the final 'generalized' grouping. 
However, the model could also be used for various classes of problem-solving 
experiments, or for the verification of simple learning theories. 
The model designed was not intended for simulation of human learning. 
However, since it is the understanding and hopefully duplication of such 
higher forms of learning which is the final objective of all such research 
endeavours, some· accommodation was made for the incorporation of certain 
important higher cognitive notions, such as S.T.M., L.T.M., recall, forgetting, 
generalization, etc. into the primitive modeL Although, these elaborations 
were only made after considering the fundamental features of the basic model 
first. 
The main challenge was to design a closed analytical model that can 
exhibit some learning within a limited universe of percepts and actions. It 
should be able to fully exploit all possibilities of model-environment 
interaction. Also, without, actually, replicating in detail the characteristics 
and peculiarities of natural learning processes, it should be able to 
demonstrate simple rules of knowledge reorganization which resemble patterns 
of 'recall', 'recognition', 'forgetting', etc. Additionally, th~ model should have 
a potential for elaboration into higher levels, depicting the hierarchy observed 
amongst natural learning processes. 
The theoretical analyses of computing machinery have shown that, in 
principal, all Turing machines are capable of representing all patterns of 
behaviour expressible mathematically. Our proposed simple 'learning' model 
could, indeed, be also regarded as a Turing machine (with the addition of an 
unlimited memory); and, hence, theoretically could depict any pattern of 
behaviour. Yet, in practice, we must determine the appropriate level of 
complexity that the structure of a machine or system demands. In the same 
way that the human brain is not only utilised for dealing with trivial 
variations of percepts. 
Further tes~ents for the appropriateness of behaviour and structure 
come from the evolutionary studies of the brain and behaviour. Fossil (and 
other) evidence indicate that neural potentialities were actually present before 
a species began displaying a certain pattern of behaviour, or exhibit BOme 
skills. For example, the acquisition of flight by birds was preceded by the 
development of the required brain regions in their corteL Similarly, the 
manipulative and linguistic capabilities of man only followed the development 
of appropriate neural substrate. The apparent immense overcapacity and 
redundancy of the brain mechanisms is another clue into the way the process 
of evolution has been tackling this matter. 
Therefore, we concluded that a model designed to 'learn' a task should 
have the potentiality for learning that type of task in the first place. In the 
case of our simple mobile robot, these potentialities were initially 
investigated. The "behaviour", the "goals", and the "tasks" of the model were 
all simply defined in terms of its inputs and outputs; however, trom the 
sizable range of possibilities only those were chosen which signified an 
interesting feature, or conveyed a meaning, to us as human observers. 
Indeed, it would have been an interesting exercise to investigate the type of 
behaviour that such a simple model would itself develope, it it starts from 
completely random beginnings, and also chooses its teleological criterion 
randomly, without interference from external programmer/instructor.· 
Another choice had to be made as to what level of 'intelligence' should be 
implanted into the model at the beginning. Whether, the model was to start 
from a totally random behaviour and approach more directive behaviour; or, a 
lot of information was to be pre-programmed into the model, enabling a 
proficient behaviour from the start. In many similar exercises an intermix of 
these two extremes is evident. Yet, sometimes falsely the system is 
attributed as starting from random behaviour, whUe it is only 'programed' to 
behave as such. At other times, a model's directiveness is implicit from its 
physical construct, and care should be taken in attributing concepts such as 
memory, etc. to elements of these systems. In our particular 'learning' model 
the minimal initial level of knowledge was aimed for, and the directiveness of 
action was determined by simple hedonic criteria (set externally). 
Other important considerations were the level of external guidance 
provided by a 'teacher' (instructor); and the choice of search techniques used 
for finding solutions - whether 'exhaustive' "random' "parallel"'serial' or other 
techniques were to be employed for comparing information and discovering 
associations. 
7.4 AN OVERVIEW 
Today, we see that workers from numerous disciplines engage in research 
topics which involve "learning". The prevailing opinions dominant within a 
discipline are, in fact, the culmination of years of complex development and 
filtering of ideas within that discipline, and other branches of related 
scientific fields. Yet, the individual worker embarking on research, generally, 
does not consider the lineage of the subject, and simply occupies himself with 
specific problems posed from a particular perspective. Therefore, it is 
common that at some point of the development of his work due to the 
narrowness of approach, and a lack of appreciation of the width and the 
depth of the subject and its heritage, he is confronted with ambiguities, holes 
of knowledge, or inconsistencies. 
The special nature of the subject of our scrutiny has meant that, unlike 
other classical fields of science, the avenues chosen for its investigation are 
not fully exploited before a new, and fundamentally different, line of enquiry 
becomes dominant. Progress is being made in most areas involved with the 
simulation and synthesis of learning in a parallel fashion, the pace of 
development being governed by trends (and fashions) as much as by other 
underlying technological factors or empirical discoveries. Hence, it is 
important that an awareness of the 'genesis' of the subject of learning should 
be maintained; and from time to time the previously tried (and seemingly 
dismissed) avenu~s revisited in the light of newly acquired knowledge or 
technological tools. 
The cybernetic approach to the modelling of learning is an example of this 
type of partially traversed pathway of investigation, whereby, its high point 
of popularity was, perhaps, reached more than two decades ago. This 
approach, both, as an intuitive mode of enquiry, and also as a precise formal 
methodology providing an objective framework of analysis, promises future 
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prospects which should be rigorously pursued. Nevertheless, it is believed 
that until an accompanying mathematical formalism which can depict the 
concept of 'association' is not formulated (more or less the way real numbers 
express the notion of 'linear relation'), true cybernetic 'learning' model 
cannot be fully realized. 
In final analysis, although, our very broad approach to the problem of the 
modelling of learning, covering a multitude of subjects, has not furnished us 
with precise indications of the most fruitful lines of pursuit; or, yielded 
accurate 'global' judgements, without being too general; or, in fact, served to 
strengthen any convictions. Nevertheless, this wide perspective has immensely 
increased our knowledge, understanding, and the objectivity of the subject; 
and has been instrumental in loosening some preconceptions and prejudices 
about the potentialities of various approaches, by exposing their shortcomings 
and clarifying many underlying issues. Perhaps, the only definitive conclusion 
we can make is the reaffirmation of the complexity of the task, and the 
acknowledgment of the inadequacy of our understanding of the details of 
natural learning processes and their mechanisms. 
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